



# **Aid in fragile and conflict-affected situations: New perspectives on stakeholders and state-building**

**presentation to the 2016 Australasian Aid Conference**

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# Outline




- **Background to the SLRC**
- **Stakeholders in statebuilding: the challenge of non-state actors**
  - **Do non-state service providers crowd out the state?**
  - **Do non-state service providers undermine state legitimacy?**
- **Beyond binaries: implications for programming in conflict-affected countries**

# Background to SLRC

## Who are we and what are we doing?



- Exploring livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict-affected situations
- 8 core countries - DRC, Uganda, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal
- 7 core partners – ODI, FIC, Wageningen University, SDPI, CEPA, NCCR, AREU
- £8 million from DFID, €1.1 million from Irish Aid and €1 million from EC
- 6 years – currently in year 6



# SLRC's three research questions



- Does support to services, social protection and livelihoods = state-building (state legitimacy)?
- How to build state capacities to deliver services and social protection and support livelihoods?
- How to effectively support people to build more resilient livelihoods as they recover from conflict?

# Stakeholders in statebuilding: the challenge of non-state actors



- Do donor agencies, NGOs and other non-state actors contribute to or undermine state legitimacy?
- Does delivery of services by non-state providers (NSPs) crowd out the government and slow progress in state capacity development?
- Can the compact between citizens and the state be cemented, if the state itself is not delivering services to its people?


**Statebuilding and stakeholders:  
The received wisdom**



***How, if it is NGOs and not the  
government delivering services, will  
we build the state?***

*Government official, Kabul, January 2015*

## Introducing SLRC's panel survey



- Why? Little quantitative evidence exploring statebuilding over time
- Where? 5 countries (plus South Sudan) in 2 – 3 districts
- How? Longitudinal panel
- What? Does change in perceptions of government results from a change in: service provider / access to services / satisfaction with services?


	DRC	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Uganda
N=	1259	3174	2114	1377	1887
% women	56%	56%	34%	61.7%	62.8%
Representative at	Groupement & Chefferie	Ward level	Union Council level	GN Division and district	Village and sub-region

# Do NSPs crowd out the state?



- A barely-present state for service delivery – and not because of crowding out post-conflict


(Perceived) water providers in South Kivu, DRC



# Lango and Acholi, Uganda



## Share of government provision by sector




# Do NSPs crowd out the state?



- Who delivers often matters for satisfaction with services

## Satisfaction with health clinic in Nepal by provider




# Do NSPs crowd out the state?



- Who delivers often matters for satisfaction with services

e.g. DRC health services

Satisfaction with health centre (combined scale)  
(1= very dissatisfied, 5 = very satisfied)




# Do NSPs crowd out the state?



- The state is barely present in some of our locations, particularly in the provision of water
- Not so much crowding out as plugging gaps?
- Provider appears to affect satisfaction with services

Implication:

- Twin policy objectives of statebuilding and delivering (high quality) services not easy to align – which is the priority?



# Do NSPs undermine state legitimacy?



# Local government decisions reflect respondent's priorities (Never or almost never)



Explanatory variable	DRC (Only in some areas)	Nepal (Never or almost never)	Pakistan (Only in some areas)	Sri Lanka	Uganda (Almost never)
Provider of health service	0.12 (Government)	-0.16 (Government)	n/a	0.82* (Government)	-0.08 (private) -0.72 (religious) -1.84 (NGO) -22.55 (other) (ref: government)
Provider of water	0.12 (Committee) 0.20 (NGO) -0.87 (Nobody) (Ref: government)	0.71 (Government) 0.37 (Private) -1.63 (NGO) (ref: other)	n/a	-0.36 (Government)	0.21 (government) 0.15 (private) 0.34 (community) 0.00 (NGO) 0.52 (other) (re: nobody)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.10	n/a	0.28	n/a
Number of observations	502	1417	2088	1303	1373

# Do NSPs undermine state legitimacy?



- Few statistically significant relationships between provider and perceptions of government actors
- No linear or consistent relationship between provider and perceptions of government actors
  
- Whether local or national government actors
- Whether health, education, water or social protection and livelihood services
- Whichever proxies for legitimacy ('government cares about my opinions', 'government reflects my priorities')

## Refuting the received wisdom



*How, if it is NGOs and not the government delivering services, will we build the state?*

*Government official, Kabul, January 2015*

- Limited evidence to support the assertion that NSPs undermine state legitimacy
- Explanations mirror qualitative research
  - limited expectations of government on basic services
  - prioritising getting security from government rather than basic services
  - recognising / valuing stewardship or regulatory role played by some governments

# Binaries and statebuilding



- Conflict / post-conflict binary rarely reflects reality in countries where we work (e.g. conflict in South Sudan before December 2013)
- View that services either delivered by government or non-state actors. (In practice partnerships and hybrid models are common).
- Either humanitarian assistance (avoid the state, neutral, impartial) or development assistance (state-building)

# Beyond binaries: new perspectives on statebuilding and stakeholders



## So, SLRC has found:

- Not clear that to achieve legitimacy, it must be state actors delivering services
- Transitions from conflict to post-conflict are not linear nor simple
- History matters: legacies of conflict are longstanding; former institutions don't dissipate but infiltrate the 'new' state

## And concludes that:

- Stark distinction between conflict and post-conflict undermines good programming, results in rapid exit of important actors (especially NGOs / relief organisations providing services)
- Technical, transactional approaches to statebuilding and services need a rethink, different timelines and more nuance between “conflict” and “post-conflict” modalities, between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’