

Oaktree

The Youth Bulge in Papua New Guinea: Challenges and Opportunities

An Oaktree Research Report

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Oaktree is young people leading a movement to end poverty. For us, change starts with a simple belief - that extreme poverty is unacceptable. Beliefs turn into action, and enough informed action will create sustainable change. Oaktree is Australia's largest youth-run organisation with over 150,000 members. Join us.

Introduction & Acknowledgements

The youth bulge is a serious development challenge for Papua New Guinea. The demographic shift represented by a large and growing youth population will exacerbate many key challenges that the country faces, particularly in the economy, civil society and the political sphere. However, the youth bulge also represents a significant opportunity for the country. If the correct approach is taken, the unique skills, experiences and perspectives of young people can be leveraged to ameliorate challenges faced by the country, and accelerate inclusive, sustainable development. 53.8% of the population of PNG were 25 and under in 2011 (National Statistical Office figures) - 18% between the ages of 15-24. The next census is likely to show an even higher share of the population being between those ages.

Oaktree produced this report because we identified a need: decision-makers need a deeper understanding of the impact of the youth bulge on service delivery, human development, governance and security, the issues that matter to young people in PNG, and the unique skills and experience of young people which will inform the policy responses available to take advantage of these. The report makes the following key findings about the impact of the youth bulge.

1. The proportion of young people in the population of PNG is growing, not shrinking.
2. A large percentage of youth in the population profile of a country is a *necessary, but not sufficient* condition for civil unrest and other forms of political violence.
3. The literature on youth bulges indicates that a large percentage of youth in the population profile of a country is an indicator of the *likelihood* of civil unrest and other forms of political violence.
4. However, the exact interaction between the youth bulge and other factors that contribute to the likelihood of political violence requires further investigation, *particularly in PNG*.
5. The youth bulge has significantly increased pressure on service delivery - in education, health, and justice - and will continue to do so as the population ages.
6. In the short-term, without significant investment with a view to increasing the economic and political opportunities available to young people, the trend towards increasing disengagement, and discontent with, the current political arrangements in the country will increase.
7. It is essential to offer a stake in society to young people, who may otherwise receive more respect and recognition from engaging in armed violence than in lawful activities.
8. The literature on youth bulges indicates that the potential for political violence to escalate in severity and become more widespread is proportional to young people's share of the population profile of the country.

The report advocates a model of youth participation which is developed in the Oaktree-ACFID Practice Note *Youth Participation in Development*, and highlights the unique strengths and skills of young people.

1. Young people know best how to craft changes that are appropriate. Young people are best placed to identify their own needs and priorities, and make assessments about whether project or policy plans will successfully address these needs and priorities.
2. Young people experience connectivity like no other population group. This connectivity means that young people are well positioned to be responsive and adaptive to changes in their environments.
3. Young people readily adopt the new. Young people have an intuitive understanding of, and are readily able to, adopt new technologies that can be key to unlocking development gains.

This report also makes the following policy recommendations for the benefit, of policy-makers and practitioners within government generally, and the aid sector - with a view to increasing the engagement of young people in social, political and economic life in PNG.

1. PNG's national youth policy should provide clear guidance to actors within the aid sector emphasising the importance of youth participation in decision-making.
2. Organisations working within the aid sector should develop strategies for working more effectively with young people, particularly in contexts where project outcomes are designed to impact young people, either directly or indirectly.
3. Investment should focus on:
 1. The promotion of effective service delivery in health and education.
 2. Youth-led good-governance initiatives which take advantage of new technologies. Social accountability programs which lead to the development of coalitions which can make demands of the state are of central importance.
 3. Priority programs for job creation in the formal sector:
 1. Transitional employment measures
 2. Strengthened links between education institutions and employment
 3. Social and cultural activities which promote job creation
 4. Support for civil society organisations and coalitions of actors that:
 1. Foster youth leadership
 2. Facilitate interface between young people and decision-makers; and
 3. Promote linkages with youth-led movements in the wider Asia-Pacific region for skills-sharing and advocacy on issues of regional concern such as climate change.
 5. In all areas, an approach is required which takes lessons from the Doing Development Differently agenda, encouraging experimentation quick adaptation, and embracing positive deviance.


The message of this report is that urgent action is required, as the youth bulge will continue to grow for a number of years. We call upon the government, civil society and the aid sector to engage in a concerted effort to give a seat at the table to young people. The greatest stake in the future of PNG lies with them, and they are the most invested in success.

In writing this report, we were supported by by many others, who contributed their words, ideas, and encouragement. We wish to especially acknowledge the hard work and dedication of Geordie Fung, Rachel Nunn, Sophie Purdue, Emma Clampett, Christine Deng, Emily Curran, Ashley Wild, Heidi Peterson, Aidan Craney, Chris Roche, Linda Kelly, Tait Brimacombe, Barbra Thomas, Linda Koerner, Arianne Kassman, Rohan Fox, Jan Cossar, Samanthi Gunawardana, Campbell McLachlan, and Darian Naidoo.

Literature Review

Young people & the youth bulge

Research on the youth bulge and its interactions with political, social and economic change, while voluminous, is underdeveloped. A comprehensive analysis of each strand of the research is not possible given constraints on form and the patience of the reader, however this literature review seeks to provide a general overview of the current state of the research, and a theoretical framework for the analysis that follows. First, we ought to define 'youth'. This is not as simple as it may initially seem. Understandings of youth are culturally constructed and vary across the world and throughout history (Hansen & Daalgaard, 2008). Broadly however, *youth* can be understood as the period of time in which a person makes various life transitions from dependence to independence. It is during this period where young people make important decisions about studying, finding employment, starting a family, taking responsibility for their health and lifestyle and exercising active citizenship (Furlong, 2012). In different cultures and social contexts, these stages might take place at different ages. They might occur simultaneously, or gradually over many years.



There are many different definitions of the youth age bracket. The United Nations defines youth as people between 15 and 24 years of age (United Nations, 2013). In contrast, the African Youth Charter defines youth as 'every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years' (African Union Commission, 2006). Ultimately, the age bracket should have regard to how young people define themselves, the unique development challenges for youth, and the unique skills, knowledge and insights that they possess. The National Youth Policy of Papua New Guinea 2007-2017 defines youth as between 12 and 25 years old, however also welcomes individuals over 25 to participate in youth programming. Culturally, the youth age bracket is defined by roles, health and involvement in the community.

The youth 'bulge' is a term used within sociology and political science. It describes a situation

where a spike in the fertility rate of a population (generally at the national or regional level) produces a large cohort of young people as a percentage of the population, compared to the historical average. The 'bulge' describes a type of population pyramid (Fuller, 1995) - a graphical illustration that shows the distribution of various age groups in the population of a country or region. In a population pyramid, continuous stacked histogram bars are used to visualise sex and age composition of the population. The population size is depicted on the x-axis (horizontal), and age-groups on the y-axis, from youngest on the bottom, to oldest on the top. The graph resembles a pyramid when the population is growing, and is inverted when the population is shrinking. The 'youth bulge' therefore describes a situation where the population pyramid has an extremely large base and narrow peak, such as that seen in the population pyramid of Papua New Guinea (fig. 1).

Due to the often extreme nature of the demographic shift caused by a spike in the fertility rate, youth bulges are associated with challenges to the capacity of the state and society to ensure security and provide essential services. When thinking about the youth bulge in the context of national and regional security, a key assumption is often made - that there is 'power in numbers' (Hendrixson, 2003 p. 2; Kaplan, 1994, p. 46). Jack A. Goldstone (1991, 2002) contends that youth have played a significant role in political upheaval and violence, highlighting political revolutions through the 18th and 19th centuries in Western Europe. Further, he argues that the existence of a 'youth bulge' has 'historically been associated with times of political crisis' (Goldstone, 2002, quoted in Urdal, 2006, p. 608). A large cohort of young people concentrated in certain locations can be perceived as a serious security threat. Hendrixson finds that 'the presence of more than twenty percent of young people in the population signals the possibility of political rebellion and unrest, particularly in the global South - where analysts argue that government may not have the capacity to support them' (2003a, p. 29). Significant multi-country studies have tracked the relationships between youth bulges and political conflict.

As the population of young adults enters working age, a country or region's dependency ratio - the ratio of the non-working age population to the working age population - will decline. If the increase in the labour supply can be absorbed by the economy, all else being equal, average income per capita should increase - a net positive for the economy and society. However, if the economy cannot absorb the increased labour supply, un- and under-employment will grow, and wage growth will slow, with negative consequences for the population. This is one way in which the demographic youth bulge can pay dividends or cause distress, depending on contextual factors. Yair & Miondownnik (2016) find that 'as a result of the negative effects of youth bulge on the economic conditions of the youth cohorts... [in a particular country] ...[the] youth bulge affects the onset of' some types of civil conflict (p. 25). Sommers (2011) examines these dynamics in the context of Africa, and finds that 'that the nature of relations between the state and massive populations of young, marginalized, and alienated citizens directly impacts the governance, security, and development prospects' of countries in the region (p. 293). The potential for large scale youth led social movements and protests should not be underestimated. The youth bulge in the Arab world in the late 2000s was a primary driver of events that later came to be called the Arab Spring, a large mobilization that, though not entirely successful, upended the political establishment (Rad, 2012). Kaiku, summarising these arguments, states that 'youth bulge theories argue that a country with weak governance and lack of social or economic opportunities for its youthful population will inevitably experience civil unrest and political strife, as young people increasingly become assertive' (Kaiku 2017, p. 2).

There are some significant gaps in the literature on the impact of youth bulges at the individual country level. Firstly, little of the existing literature accounts for and explores the political, economic, ethnic and social context of individual countries and how the demographic youth bulge will interact with this context (Hosgelen & Saikia, 2016, pp.244-262; Huveline & Poch, 2007, pp.405-424). We ask how the massive youth bulge evident in Papua New Guinea is impacting processes of social, political and economic change, assess the risks and opportunities which emerge out of the youth bulge, and make policy recommendations that are targeted to those specific mechanisms of change. Secondly, the bulk of the literature draws conclusions based on large-scale quantitative data-sets. This preponderance of quantitative evidence has tended to marginalise the perspectives and agency of young people (Kaiku, 2011, pp.1-137). The literature

fails to represent the nuanced and complex experiences of young people. This research has, in the past, been framed in a way that limits space to explore this nuance. While the present paper will focus in part on the significant risks and obstacles the youth bulge presents, it will reframe the conversation to look at the opportunities presented by a large population of young people to improve governance, service-delivery, and economic outcomes. Finally, the literature also lacks an analysis of appropriate policy responses.


Papua New Guinea

Humans first populated the island of New Guinea an estimated 45,000 years ago (O'Connell & Allen, 2004, pp. 835-849). Although the first arrivals were hunters and gatherers, early evidence shows that people managed the forest environment and farmed to provide food. Political and social life was organised around diverse and isolated tribal groupings well into the 20th century. The country is highly diverse, boasting over 800 language and cultural groupings. This diversity is largely due to topography. The majority of PNG's landmass is dense rainforest carpeting steep mountains, significantly restricting mobility, and hence the spread of people and ideas. This meant that individual social groups became isolated from each other quite easily, accelerating their evolution in diverse directions. Cultural identity is maintained primarily through strong informal associations known as *wantoks*. This system of informal association has survived over thousands of years, and interacts in many complex ways with hybrid political, economic and social structures that are extant in PNG today. An understanding of the *wantok* system is useful for our purposes in this report, and it will be treated in more detail below.

In the late 19th century, Germany began settling the north-east corner of the island, and the British government took over the southern portion, establishing a protectorate called British New Guinea. In German New Guinea, large plantations were established and by 1900, the German military was venturing further inland gathering workers under its forced labour policy (Johnson, 1993; Rannells, 1995; Waiko, 1993). At the outbreak of WWI, Australia took the opportunity to seize German New Guinea, establishing Commonwealth control over the entire eastern half of New Guinea. Today knowledge of that history remains limited (Dorney, 2016, p. 2). Australia administered the eastern half of the Island in two territories. After WWII, Australia talked of a process of modernisation but did not follow up with adequate investment in education or infrastructure (Dorney, 2016, pp. 11-26). By the 1970s, when the UN was calling for independence from Australia, PNG had few of the preconditions for a successful modern state. Independence gave PNG the opportunity to define itself as a nation and choose its own path. However, many in PNG and Australia have concluded that the country was unprepared for the challenges independence would bring (Denoon, 2012, p. xii). PNG has also been the scene of bitter conflict. The Bougainville war of independence fought between 1989 and 1998 claimed 20,000 lives and stemmed from mainland policies towards resource extraction. Contemporary PNG is still grappling with the legacy of Australian colonization. The narrative of a deeply problematic Melanesian region, of which PNG is a part, gained currency following the September 11 2001 terror attacks. Australian policymakers began to talk with more seriousness about an 'arc of instability' to the country's north, taking in almost all Melanesian countries. At around the same time, a number of commentators began to talk of Melanesian countries as failed states (Hughes, 2004; Wainwright, 2003). This is the framework within which current dialogues about PNG, and Australian aid policy in regards thereof, are conducted. The aforementioned gloomy outlook is a somewhat parochial view. Many Papua New Guineans see a contested yet vibrant democracy emerging, which, while facing challenges of governance, service delivery and economic development, has great latent human and natural resource potential and a growing population of young people which can be tapped for developmental progress. In 2011, 54% of the population was under the age of 24 - 18.4% between 15 and 24 (National Statistical Office, 2011). Many young Papua New Guineans are grappling with identity and the direction of their country. In considering the future of their country, many see the political settlement and social contract established at independence - which emphasised the importance of human centred development and the need for the state to support the community - under attack by pressures both political and economic.


Economic growth and opportunity

Papua New Guinea's economy is dominated by the agricultural, forestry, and fishing sector, where most of the labour force of the country is engaged, and the minerals and energy extraction sector from which most of the export earnings are made. Real GDP per capita has grown by an average 3% per annum since the mid-2000s, with the bulk of this growth driven by extractive industries. The economy exhibits a high level of informality which stems from a number of factors. Some 80% of the population of 7.6 million live in rural areas, making a living from subsistence agriculture and selling crops in domestic and international markets. Analyses of highly informal economies frequently cite education levels, the level of penetration of financial services, and the extent of corruption as determinants of the level of informality, which is a response to the unique influence that these factors have on the productivity gains that rational actors can expect from joining the formal economy (Oveido, Thomas, & Karakurum-Özdemir, 2009, p. 2).



The outsized and disruptive influence extractive industries have on PNG's politics and economy is symptomatic of a 'resource curse', a term that describes the economic and social volatility experienced by developing countries fruitfully endowed with resources (Ross, 1999). Since independence, economic growth has been supported by extractive industries. While recent data is hard to come by, in 2000 extractive industries represented value added of 41% of GDP (World Bank, 2000). The dominance of extractive industries presents three major problems for the PNG economy. First, this sector tends to be dominated by large multinational corporations with vast amounts of capital. This means that a company like Exxon-Mobil, who runs the PNG-LNG project — the region's largest — has a high level of influence over the political process, directly or indirectly creating incentives that political actors must respond to. Second, the price of commodities is volatile. If commodities constitute a major component of GDP and export earnings, like they do in PNG, then the fortunes of the economy are linked to the price of its key commodities. As world commodity prices have declined significantly from their 2011 peaks, the PNG economy faces cyclical and structural issues which have led to a weakened external and fiscal position (ADB, 2017). Third, the support of extractive industries has come at the cost of more balanced investment in increased productivity in the formal sector.

The primary impediment to sustainable development in PNG is poor governance. Corruption is



believed to be widespread, and has a flow-on effect to service delivery. PNG was ranked 136 out of 167 countries on the Transparency International (2016) Corruption Perceptions Index. Many political relations in PNG are characterised by patron-client relationships. A bias exists within such structures to defer to those higher up in hierarchies, who control distribution of resources and make demands for political support. Benefits a patron might confer include legal representation in court, loans of money, influencing business deals or marriages, and supporting a client's candidacy for political office. In return, the client might be expected to offer their services or support to their patron as needed. Patron-client relationships are necessarily closed to outsiders - those who do not act as clients may find themselves excluded from decision-making processes, or unable to access resources and services. This is the situation for many communities in PNG, but such political structures disproportionately disadvantage young people, who lack financial resources and social standing. Many young people, especially in urban areas, feel disempowered and frustrated. The fight against corruption in PNG seeks to frame the debate around a return to the Constitutional ideals of independence as the foundation for a review of the legal system and a call for government accountability. Disempowerment results in disillusion, and frustration with the current political system is growing. Research on the dynamics of the youth bulge shows that political repression often follows (Nordas & Davenport, 2013).

The Marginalisation of Youth

To what degree, and why?

The interaction of local and imported livelihoods and cultural forms has marginalised youth in PNG society. Social structures often exclude youth from decision making processes, as it is customary for older members of society to hold the decision-making power. Modern society has also increasingly created challenges for youth. This section will focus on Papua New Guinean and Melanesian understandings of the role of youth; how the disjuncture between modernity and tradition has marginalised youth; and the problems associated with this marginalisation. It discusses the the complex challenges for youth in PNG. The sections that follow are based on conversations with young people and review of the extant literature on issues important to young people. Papua New Guinean society is underwritten by kinship associations known as *wantoks*, informal associations which link people together through cultural and linguistic commonalities. Tok Pisin for 'one talk', *wantoks* can be characterised as a social safety-net which serves to ensure the welfare of members, incorporating strict customs underpinning expected ways of behaving and interacting with the members of one's *wantok* and those belonging to another, as well as assigning roles and obligations, rights and expectations. To be a youth in this context means not to be of a particular age, but rather to be experiencing a transitory phase between childhood and adulthood (Thomas, 2017). This phase involves the transfer of knowledge from older men to young men and women, and often concludes with an initiation ceremony which signifies the admission of the youth to adulthood. Until this time, however, youth are often unable to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes, and their thoughts, ideas and values are accorded a lower value. In Sepik culture, for example, young men and women are not regarded as being ready to assume a leadership role until they have successfully passed through the initiation ceremony (Prideaux, 2009). The hierarchy of authority in Melanesia's traditional social fabric marginalises young people with the understanding that as they get older and wiser, their authority will grow. Young people lack agency, but are provided with social support as they transition into adulthood, at which time they will be entitled to contribute meaningfully. Parenting styles are often authoritarian, focussing on discipline, which can undermine self-esteem and foster resentment, alienation, and passivity (McMurray, 2006 p.10).

As incomes have increased, young people's identities have shifted. Across PNG, attitudes have become more individualistic and less communally-oriented (Thomas, 2017). This has meant that young people face pressures that the structure of the *wantok* has not equipped them for. They are expected to go out and find work to support themselves, yet are not allowed to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes - the outcomes thereof directly impact on their ability to find work. Young people who drop out of school lack the skills for formal sector employment and are often characterised by those in their community as 'useless individuals without hope' (Hamea, 2008, p.41). Young people are often victims of competing and contradictory messaging and demands as to what kind of life they ought to live. The media promote Western materialist ideals and for young people, life in poverty is a life of failure and disappointment (Hamea 2008, pp.49-50). Young people are afforded few meaningful opportunities to participate in society, and often face stark choices. This marginalisation of young people has also created social problems in PNG. High-risk behaviour is a common response among young people faced with limited opportunities. Violence, crime, and substance abuse are rife in centers of urban settlement. Gangs, typified by the *raskols* of Port Moresby and Lae, among other urban centers, are comprised of loose gatherings of young people who commit crime opportunistically (Lakhani & Willman, 2014). Similar manifestations of young people's disengagement can be seen in other developing- and developed-country contexts (ARACY, 2008). Young people face pressure to move to urban areas to gain formal employment, but employment opportunities in PNG are scarce. In urban areas, young people often lack the social safety net the *wantok* provides and are driven to crime to sustain basic necessities. High levels of crime are symptomatic of the frustration and disillusionment many young people feel with regards to PNG society. They do not have a 'vision for their lives' and are 'surrounded by violence, poverty, alcohol and drug abuse, purposeless and idleness' (Sumanop, 2012).

Cultural Understandings of Leadership in PNG

Zimmer-Tamakoshi (1997, p. 107) observes that increasingly diverse conceptions of leadership roles are emerging in PNG, formed from a confusion of, and intrusion by, capitalism, western education, missionization, and new forms of national and local government, into traditional leadership ways. Customs, norms and traditions in PNG are complex, diverse, in many instances unique, and operate to significantly influence the practice of leadership at all levels. In many instances, these customs and understandings with regards to leadership serve to exclude young people from the political conversation.

Historically, Sepik traditions of leadership are based on respect, trust and integrity of the individual. The onus is on the elders to appoint community leaders. To be considered for community leadership, potential qualified leaders must be reputable and have community standing. Leadership appointments are reached through general consensus as opposed to inheritance. However, younger generations, and women in particular, are not considered as potential leaders. Women are seen as second class to men, and struggle for equal rights and opportunities. However, change is gradually occurring in the major centres where women are beginning to occupy important positions in government and the corporate sector. Traditionally, Papuans practice chiefly or 'big-man' leadership. Generally, sons inherit traditional leadership. Tribal and clan leadership tends to be fluid because of this. Big men must have acquired enough knowledge, wisdom, status, and capital to prove to the community that they are worthy. Big men have significant authority over the governance of a tribe, and are tasked with delivering wealth to the community. Women in some contexts hold an equal status with men, participate in the decision-making process, and generally take greater responsibilities in their communities and families than the men. Papuan young people are not generally considered suitable for any form of leadership, until they have achieved adulthood. Clan leadership in Melanesia is leadership over a segmentary society, societies described by Sahlins (1976) as being comprised of rich social relations among kinship groups. A tribe will have a 'big man', a position of leadership that is earned by providing benefits to the community, and sustained by keeping their respect. When the leader loses the respect of the community, he can no longer be a big man (Sahlins 1963, pp.288-290).

Some aspects of the colonial Australian administration have persisted after independence and find expression in cultural understandings of leadership. Australian administration of the territory of Papua, particularly in the remote Highlands and coastal districts, was centred on officials known as *kiaps*, who were the central administrative authority in their district. The *kiap* also controlled the police and magistrate. They ruled districts in an authoritarian manner. Dorney (2016, p.30) notes that because PNG was unprepared for independence, and because the transition to independence was so rapid, when provincial members of Parliament (MPs) were elected, they often assumed the same role and responsibility of the former *kiap* in the district. Consequently, the spirit of leadership skewed towards authoritarianism, rather than a representative expression - the interests of the leader considered equivalent that of the community, rather than the inverse (Dorney, 2016, p.30). This history continues to influence the forms of leadership which are most prominent in the administration of districts today. While the concept of leadership by the individual in the interest of the community is common throughout PNG and is normatively positive, it interacts with modern politico-bureaucratic state institutions in often perverse ways. We will take a closer look at the ways in which political institutions like political parties and the conduct of elected representatives

There are four poles of power and sources of leadership: community, district, provincial, and national institutions. Power has been concentrated in the hands of provincial MPs and traditional leadership is being steadily eroded (Ambang, 2007, p.95). MPs are, in the main, seen as leaders of their constituency and are not tied to furthering their interests (Dorney 2016, p.30). In 1995 PNG passed the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local Level Governments (OLPGLLP) with the purpose of 'bringing the government closer to the people' (Allen & Hasnain, 2010, pp. 13-14). The OLPGLLP was also intended to provide recognition and integration of traditional leaders into local level government. Instead, the concentration of power in the hands of provincial

MPs has meant that they resemble the tribal big man in both style and conduct of leadership. They exercise considerable control over the means of distribution of funds, District Development Authorities (DDAs) (Allen & Hasnain, 2010, p.14). This has facilitated patronage and corruption. The practice of vote buying, common in PNG elections, is one indication of the extent to which tribal loyalties influence the selection of political candidates. In many cases tribal leadership decides which political candidate the whole tribe will vote for; often in response to entreaties and financial incentives from prospective candidates. Candidates will spend large amounts of money, up to PGK1,000,000 in the Highlands (Standish, 2007, p.140). Because young people are not involved in these decision making processes, the candidate does not have to consider their needs as a primary concern.

The weakness of political parties

PNG is one of a few countries in the world where, despite its pluralist electoral system, parties have proliferated rather than consolidated (Okole, 2005, p.362). This proliferation presents two main problems for PNG's wider political system. Firstly, the lack of strong party brands and identity based on ideology or policy platforms engenders a politics of personality that is harmful for democracy. In the 2012 election, Peter O'Neill's People's National Congress party received the largest share of the votes. It only won 27 (24%) of the 109 contested seats. 21 parties, and 16 independent candidates also won seats. Parties are small, lack permanent members, do not have a strong traditional identity group or ideology, and attract voters by appealing not to issues but rather through the charisma of the party leader (Okole 2005). The party with the largest number of seats is given the privilege of being the first to attempt to form a government, so other members flock to join the government, casting aside ideological or policy differences (The Economist, 2012). This rather simple sketch requires further research, into questions around the motivations for switching, for example. Political parties lack the structural integrity they have in other country contexts, where party discipline is stronger, and where they can provide a plurality of competing ideological viewpoints against which voters may then align themselves. As Ratuva (2008, p.30) notes, 'political parties in Melanesia engage in a dynamic process of identity creation'. Politics of personality, seen as an extension of the big man tradition in Melanesia, create an environment where the issues that face the lives of young people are not discussed in great detail. This compounds a sense of disenchantment with the political system amongst young people; disenchantment that will present growing challenges for PNG. Secondly, proliferation of political parties in PNG has meant that parties have provided little space for youth participation. One of the strengths of established political parties generally is their cultivation of a 'youth wing', a sector of the party where young people participate at all levels. Political parties are highly atomized, fragmented, personalised, and for a long time were seen as 'irrelevant' (Reilly, 1999). Further research into the changing nature of the party political system in PNG is required. Recent developments following the 2011 leadership dispute have seen political parties gain somewhat in terms of 'brand recognition' and prominence - however, major ideological differences around which party 'brand' can be established are still lacking. Strong and resilient political parties can be a highly effective vehicle for youth participation in the political process. They create a civil space where young people can meaningfully participate in problem definition, campaigning and advocacy on the issues that matter to them. The fluidity of the party system in PNG prevents this from happening. It is a significant impediment to youth participation in the political process, aggravating the disenfranchisement of youth in PNG.

Despite having one of the longest records of democracy for a developing country, political instability combined with issues related to governance, particularly at the local level, is causing deteriorating service delivery. There may be a feedback loop between the youth bulge and the political system extant in PNG which reinforces the negative effects of both: political instability related to the weak party system and the current culture of leadership, lead to poor governance outcomes and service delivery, which foments growing frustration among young people who, in turn, protest and provoke a clamp down by the state upon their activities (Urdal, 2006.). Young people face barriers to equitable and meaningful access to leadership positions. For a young person in PNG, the political system is recognised as being both distant and dysfunctional (Rossi, 2009). The costs associated with running for office are simply too great for a young person to

bear. Fees for nomination in the 2017 election were raised to K10,000 in 2016, an amount out of reach of many, including most young people. In interviews, young Papua New Guineans repeatedly expressed the sentiment that elections were a 'joke'. The primary and most common concern raised was in regard to the quality of leaders which vote-buying produces. This lack of participation in tribal governance and leadership leaves young people with few avenues to advocate for changes that address important issues in their lives. The interests and voices of young people are also not given adequate expression in the national conversation. When young people see that they are not only unable to partake meaningfully in customary decision making processes over who to elect, but that whomever they choose to elect will not represent or even consider their interests with great concern, this causes a feeling of disillusion related to the loss of agency that their marginalisation represents. Life can seem hopeless and without direction, and prospects for the improvement of this situation seem desperately far from reach. Disenchantment with, and disengagement from, political life is the result (Ross, 2009). In circumstances such as this, some strands of the literature on the youth bulge posit that crime and organised violent behaviour will rise (Urdal, 2006). If such behaviour becomes more widespread, stability and the rule of law could come under threat. Finally, vote buying as an expression of corruption and nepotism is corrosive to the representative intent of PNG's democratic institutions, and leads to situations where political and economic capital is not being allocated in a fashion that maximises their impact upon key development priorities such as infrastructure, market development and the delivery of primary services like health and education.

The youth bulge in Bougainville

The Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB) is in the process of state-making in the lead up to holding a referendum on independence in 2019. After a brutal civil war that lasted from 1988-1998, which killed up to 20,000 Bougainvilleans, a peace agreement was signed in 2001, leading to the establishment of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) with an independence referendum to be held. The Bougainville Civil War had devastating effects on the lives of youth. The conflict was bloody, protracted, and placed immense stress on Bougainvillean society. Divisions over the issue of Bougainville's independence from PNG is exacerbated by numerous intra-Bougainville conflicts, and the linguistic and cultural fragmentation of the island (Wallis, 2013, p.310). In 1990, after being driven from the Island by the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), with the support of Australia, imposed a blockade on Bougainville, causing immense suffering and hardship, which some historians characterise as collective punishment - a war crime (Lasslett, 2015, p.36). The PNGDF re-invaded Bougainville in 1994. The brutal conflict entered into all areas of society, including into the homes of civilians (Lasslett, 2014, p.178). Up to 40% of the population were internally displaced (Regan, 2010). The war further undermined the integrity of infrastructure in the country, and many built up areas were completely levelled. The horror and devastation the civil war caused in Bougainville had particularly acute effects on youths. The aptly called 'crisis generation' is the generation of youth who have memory of the horror of the conflict. The conflict has exacerbated many challenges to economic advancement and political participation for young people: poor access to education and employment, insufficient access to health-care, particularly mental health support (Kent & Barnett, 2012). Many young people from the crisis generation report trauma related to their experiences. This has presented challenges for the process of peacemaking.

The process of peacemaking in Bougainville is described by Wallis (2012) as being a process of interaction and exchange between local, national and international institutions, where local institutions are used to maintain peace and engage in the state-building process. Local level institutions are prominent in the lives of Bougainvilleans and have been used to legitimise the more remote state institutions. Attempting to heal the wounds suffered by the 'crisis generation' and has been one of the most significant challenges to peacemaking in Bougainville.

Landownership is matrilineal in Bougainville. Women have high status in society because of this, and played a vital role in the peace process (Reddy, 2008, p.120). Matrilineal land ownership means that young males are under pressure to acquire adequate wealth to marry well. The

trauma of the war, lack of access to education and employment has created increasing hopelessness among young, Bougainvillean men. Abuse of home-brewed alcohol and marijuana, and domestic and criminal violence is rife among male youths (Kent & Barnett, 2012, p.37). Youth that are unable to elevate their social status through education and employment often turn to crime. This has undermined family and traditional structures, making peace more tenuous. The President of Bougainville, John Momis, has wisely called to address this problem by educating the 'crisis generation' (Jackson, 2016). Education has been shown to help minimise the threat of political violence from youth bulges (Bakarat & Urdal, 2009).

Young people will have a significant role to play in the outcome of the independence process. The government must address the problems of the youth bulge, and Bougainville has already taken promising steps to address this issue. In March 2017, it staged a mock Parliament for youths to participate in decisionmaking about the future of the country (Winterford, 2016). John Momis has also begun to address the problem of poor education among youth which will improve stability, economic performance, governance and the hopes for future independence (Jackson, 2016). Youth play a role in the two key constraints to Bougainville gaining independence. First, a proviso of the peace agreement is that Bougainville must have all weapons disposed before the referendum can take place (Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001), The challenge is convincing disaffected youth that forfeiting their means of using violence for political outcomes is a good thing. This is difficult. Second, Bougainville ought to be a viable state if it is to achieve independence. A viable state needs to be able to effectively govern throughout the country and that requires a revenue source. Bougainville is endowed with a rich and diverse abundance of resources that ought to be harnessed in a way that grows the formal sector and provides broad-based economic growth. But this also means addressing the 'crisis generation' and harnessing the potential that youth provide to rejuvenate the economy. The challenges the youth bulge presents to the prospect of independence are significant, but there are opportunities too. It seems that Bougainville is working well to address these issues and there are lessons to be applied elsewhere in PNG. The process of state-making in Bougainville is complex. If the independence referendum is to be successful, Bougainville must adequately address the challenges, and harness the opportunities, that the youth bulge presents.

An urbanising youth population

Challenges and opportunities

Papua New Guinea has the smallest proportion of its population living in urban areas of all countries in the Asia-Pacific (World Bank, 2016). Urbanisation, while happening slower than in other Asia-Pacific countries, will place increasing stress on Papua New Guinean society, and there exists a significant and widening urban/rural divide in terms of health and education outcomes, service delivery, and economic opportunity. PNG's population is growing at about 2.5% per year, and will double by 2045. Though only about 13% of the population live in urban areas, and the urban population is increasing in size by 9% per year, it is expected that the trend towards urbanisation will pick up further into the 21st century. We therefore devote significant space here to a discussion of the youth bulge in an urban context, which will exacerbate stresses in terms of service delivery, as well as risks related to political stability.

Urban residents are often disconnected from their community, and their livelihoods are often more precarious than those living in rural areas. The dense concentration of people increases the likelihood of political instability. This section gives a broad overview of urban-dwelling young people in PNG: who they are and why they are there. We will look at how the problems of the youth bulge are intensified in urban areas. We will also look at why youth in urban areas should be seen as a reservoir of untapped potential for the amelioration of these challenges. Urbanisation has been relatively slow in PNG. The percentage of the world's population living in cities has gone from 33% in 1950 to 54% today (United Nations 2014, p.1). Much of this growth has been in developing countries. PNG is an exception - urbanisation has happened very slowly in PNG. Until recently, migration was the main cause of urban growth in PNG, but natural increase has since outpaced migration (Connell, 1996, p.190). Migration, however, persists as a significant factor in the changes taking place in PNG. A recent analysis by Swan and Singirok (2010) found that 61% of residents in urban areas were migrants. Rural-to-urban migration occurs in PNG for a variety of reasons. People migrate to urban areas because of a wage differential between rural and urban work, and the availability of employment in urban areas. Wage earning opportunities are scarce in rural areas, which has created significant movements of labour to urban areas (McMurray, 2002, p.15). Levantis (1997) suggested that urban migration was the result of crime in rural areas. Migrant communities are often comprised of youth who have left their village to seek opportunities in the cities. These youth have formed squatter settlements on the outskirts of cities like Port Moresby and Lae, which are popularly seen as centers for crime and violence. The depiction is 'unfairly negative' (Kassman, 2017). These settlements survive on the basis of informal employment. A lack of formal sector employment opportunities contributes to high levels of informality in the urban economy. Connell (1996, p.191) describes many permanent urban youth as being 'trapped' and 'dispossessed'. There does however exist a small middle class of university educated youth living mostly in Port Moresby that have become increasingly politically active.

The destabilizing effects of the youth bulge will be intensified in urban areas. Without significant action, the youth bulge will result in increased incidence of political protest and social dysfunction as well as a deterioration in service delivery. In rural areas, youth have stronger social ties to the community, they have a more well-defined role to play and, though subsistence farming presents fewer opportunities for economic advancement, youth have a higher degree of security. Many youth in urban areas lack access to this informal social safety net. Youth largely move to urban areas seeking greater economic opportunities and meaningful employment in the formal sector, but the opportunities available in formal sector employment, either in professional services or manufacturing and construction has not kept pace with urban population growth in PNG. The government has prioritised extractive industries, which employ relatively few local workers, over the rest of the formal sector. In combination with other strong global economic forces, this failure to diversify the economy has left many youth in urban areas with little option but to seek income through working in the informal economy. Some have started growing fruit and vegetables in the settlements to sell informally in roadside stalls. Others have turned to crime as life has become increasingly desperate. Youth are turning to crime for a variety of reasons:

unemployment, poor educational quality, exposure to violence in the immediate community, the disconnection from wantoks, and poverty (Nobel et al, 2011, p.74). Unless there are significant changes to the formal sector economy of PNG, the growing youth population is likely to become increasingly disenfranchised and prone to bouts of protest, which can escalate into violence, as protests at the University of Papua New Guinea in June 2016 demonstrated. Higher population density in urban areas also allows people to organise more effectively.


Urban youth present a promising development opportunity for PNG. As indicated before, two types of urban youth exist in PNG: migrants and youth who were born in the cities. Both of these groups seek employment in the urban formal sector. The current population of youth in PNG have access to education - gross enrollment in primary school was 114% in 2012, the highest ever (World Bank, 2017). But many leave school without developing adequate literacy and numeracy, or the soft skills that many employers value. Many young people have the courage and determination to leave the security of their rural lives behind, seeking opportunities in the urban areas. A young, educated, and determined labor force in urban areas is a potential asset to businesses seeking expansion. Currently, most migrant youth are involved in the informal sector, which, while having no impact on food and income security, has reduced the capacity of households in their home communities to support themselves (Yamarak, 2013, p.13). The population of Port Moresby is only 6% of the country's total - while 30% of all crime is committed in Port Moresby. Crime costs businesses there 9% of their revenue (Nobel et al, 2011, p.76). Improving the livelihoods of young people through better service delivery and increased formal sector employment opportunities would help reduce crime. The large-scale student protests against the O'Neill government, which were suppressed by the police, are symptomatic of the challenge youth political mobilization is presenting to the political establishment (Filton, 2016). Should they turn violent, the consequences for the stability of the region would be significant. Moreover, youth are already engaged in movements such as the Youth Against Corruption Association that are changing the social and political fabric of the country. Urban youth present the most significant opportunities for development in PNG. These opportunities ought to be seized.

Access to formal sector employment

Access to formal sector employment is considered in the literature on the youth bulge as a predictive factor in assessing the likelihood of manifestations of civil unrest and political instability arising. It is therefore worthwhile considering how opportunities in the formal sector of the economy (or lack thereof) are fundamental to young people fulfilling their goals and achieving the visions they have for their future. The formal sector is comprised of organisations that are recognised by the government as economic actors, primarily in terms of regulation and taxation. The informal sector involves small scale peddling of goods and services, as well as subsistence agriculture and related economic activities. Countries characterised by an abundance of informal firms suffer from low aggregate productivity (Hsieh & Klenow, 2008). Likewise, the prevalence of employment in informal businesses tends to decrease as countries become richer (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014). Based on 2008 figures, the total population of unemployed and underemployed is 2,970,000 (Hughes & Sodhi 2008, p.13). Only 5% of PNG's working age population is employed in the formal sector (Asian Development Bank, 2014, p.55). This section will examine how access to formal sector employment is integral to determining the effects of PNG's youth bulge. First, it will look at the difficulty many young Papua New Guineans face in transitioning from education to employment. Second, it will examine unemployment, crime, and work in the informal sector. Meaningful formal sector employment is essential for development, and the management of the youth bulge in PNG. As discussed, youth is seen as a transitional time of *becoming*, where people forge their identities and achieve independence and self-sufficiency. These perspectives on youth and adulthood are socially constructed; ironically, many aspects of society prevent young people from fulfilling their aspirations. Employment is a fundamental part of the hoped-for identity that many young people construct for themselves. An inability to achieve the idealised version of themselves creates an intense psychological pain, which can find expression through organised violent behaviour.

Prospects for transition from education, especially higher education, to employment in PNG are low for many young people. In contexts where young people attain higher levels of education, the opportunity cost associated with engaging in organised violence is higher - countries experiencing youth bulges that invest less in secondary education experience higher rates of organised violence (Barakat & Urdal, 2009). This can be partially explained by reference to relative deprivation theory. This theory posits that frustration arises when the rift between people's expectations and their reality widens (Gurr, 1970). For young people who had high expectations about the value of their educational achievement, disappointment awaits the vast majority. Disappointment accompanies shame in cases where parents have invested significantly in their child's education and were expecting to be supported when they become employed. In addition, the widespread and growing use of social media and internet technology has allowed people greater insight than ever into the lifestyles of others, both within their own country and across the world. A sense of perceived unfairness among young people regarding their lot in life, leading to dissatisfaction with current political and economic arrangements is a logical theoretical direction that should be explored in further research.

In terms of gross enrolment in secondary education, PNG sits at the lower end of the league table - in 2012, gross enrolment in secondary education was 40%. After leaving education many young people move to urban areas, where many perceive the quality of life to be higher, and prospects for employment are greater (McMurray, 2002, p.15). Unemployment in urban areas of PNG is around 18% (Asian Development Bank, 2014). Contemporary, accurate statistics on youth unemployment are difficult to come by, and should be a priority in terms of further research. In 2009-10, it was estimated to be 31% - but anecdotal evidence suggests that this may have increased in the 7 years since then. For young people, much like the broader population, unemployment limits opportunities for economic advancement - it means that lives are lived 'day-to-day' with little direction and meagre cash income: 29% of young people lived on less than US\$3.10 per day in 2009-10 - and 'the situation for these young people is increasingly desperate' (Thomas, 2017) - 'Youth just want jobs' (Kassman, 2017). Crime is pervasive in the urban centres of PNG and is particularly prevalent among youth. With 6% of the country's population, 30% of all crime committed in PNG is in Port Moresby, where crime costs businesses an average of 9% of revenue each year (Nobel et al, 2011, p.76). A recent report estimated that the homicide rate in the capital city of Port Moresby was 33 per 100,000 persons in 2010, which would rank among the top



Source: RPNGC crime summary statistics.

50 cities in the world today. The commitment of youth commit crime for a variety of reasons, but unemployment is a notable factor (Nobel et al, 2011, p.74). Iso Yawi (2017) describes what it's like as a youth without employment in PNG: 'since no door had opened for me, all sorts of thoughts started entering my head. I felt I wanted to rob people or sell marijuana to earn a living. I never

did.' By causing a significant reduction in business revenue, crime undermines legitimate economic opportunities for youth. Instead, crime has become a prominent avenue of informal sector employment in the Pacific where rates of robbery and incidents of organised criminal activity such as racketeering, prostitution, gambling, drug-dealing, arms-dealing, and violence are rising (Hughes & Sodhi, 2008, p.16).

While crime is a part of the informal economy, much of the informal economy is comprised of legitimate activity. The informal sector maintains the livelihoods of many youth in urban centres. Major activities in the informal sector include: selling betel nuts, lime, mustard, cigarettes, and store goods (Kavan, 2013, p.iv). In many ways, the informal sector is attractive for young people: it is where the majority of opportunities for economic advancement lie. Entrepreneurship in the informal sector is one of the enduring characteristics of economic activity in PNG. However, the day-to-day uncertainty and insecurity associated with working in the informal sector tends to act as a mitigating factor. Life remains unstable and tenuous. For young people unable to access formal sector employment, the alternatives are frustrating, insecure, and often stagnant.

Economic transition is complex. Population growth increases the supply of labour. If this increase in labour supply can be absorbed by the economy, all else being equal, average income per capita should increase - a net positive for the economy and society. However, if the economy cannot absorb the increased labour supply, un- and under-employment will grow, and wage growth will be depressed, with negative consequences for the population. This is one way in which the demographic youth bulge can pay dividends or cause distress, depending on contextual factors. There are significant disparities between different sectors of the economy in the relationship between rates of output and increases in formal employment. Successive PNG Governments have prioritised extractive industries as the dominant source of economic growth, but this has come at the cost of broad-based formal sector growth. PNG's development plan has been described as 'dig it up, ship it out, then build the infrastructure, education and health system with the profits'. However, 40 years on from independence, the mining sector employs few people from PNG, accounts for 80% of exports and 34.3% of government revenue (Barma et al., 2012). Many workers are expatriates or operate on a 'fly-in-fly-out' basis. The industry is dominated by large multinationals. Forestry is the same story, the growth of which has barely increased formal sector employment for Papua New Guineans (Gabriel & Wood, 2015). Paul Flanagan (2016), a leading authority on PNG economics notes that the biggest policy mistake has been an emphasis on natural resource development at the expense of human resource development, the latter being a catalyst for widespread and inclusive growth, as opposed to the dual-speed economy that has arisen.

The outside role of extractive industries

Resource extraction dominates the economy of PNG with adverse consequences. PNG's economy bears many hallmarks of the 'resource curse': countries endowed with abundant natural resources experience slower development than resource poor countries (Auty & Mikesell, 1998, p.26). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) demonstrated that countries endowed with plentiful natural resources have a higher susceptibility to civil conflict for a number of reasons. First, the resources provide incentives for rebellion, particularly in areas where the state is already weakened and distribution of royalties or other benefits has been perceived to have been inequitable. Second, once acquired, wealth obtained through the control of resources can be used to fund ongoing rebel operations. An economic system with an outside share of productive capacity dedicated to extractive industries also creates many opportunities for corruption, undermining the quality of governance institutions and leading to a declining tax income and standards of service delivery. In PNG, this problem is particularly acute - the mining sector alone provides 34.3% of government revenue (Barma et al, 2012). Second, the revenue stream funds corruption and patronage networks, political behaviour that is reinforced by the prevailing leadership culture and institutional environment (Allen and Hasnain, 2010). The presence of extractive industries accentuate corruption and patronage by providing a steady and seemingly inexhaustible revenue source that, given the autonomy exercised by provincial MPs over funds, allows elites to entrench their power. Avalos et al. (2015, p.353) demonstrate that the development of the extractive

industries have correlated with declining standards of governance. Countries with higher levels of corruption are more vulnerable to capital flight, for example. (Le & Rishi, 2006). Inefficient allocation of resources within the economy undermines the government's capacity to deliver services that would improve opportunities for young people. In one case, Koyama (2005) and Haley and May (2007) show that mismanagement of revenue from oil projects in the Southern Highlands Province brought the provincial government close to collapse as rent-seeking and corruption resulted in conflict between local communities over royalties. The corrosive effect extractive industries have on governance in PNG is particularly problematic in the context of the youth bulge. The youth bulge will exacerbate bottlenecks in service delivery and may increase the likelihood of instability, particularly where competition over scarce resources is acute.

Extractive industries play a major role in conflict in PNG, intensifying the risks of political violence associated with the youth bulge. This is related to the nature of much conflict in PNG. Countries like PNG that are highly ethnically heterogeneous are less susceptible to large scale civil conflicts - as opposed to countries or regions with two strong, rival factions. However, strong ethnic identity and the presence of large resource endowments are a significant predictor of conflicts (Riley, 2004). Smaller, protracted conflicts localised to areas around major resource extractive projects are both more likely, and more difficult to predict. Current and historical examples of this in PNG include disturbances and low-level inter-tribe fighting in Southern Highlands Province; the Bougainville Civil War; and conflict between groups of people with interests in the LNG project in Hela Province. In all three cases, large extractive projects have brought immense wealth to the region, but that wealth has not been distributed in a way that can create sustainable and proportionate benefits for the local people. In Hela province, the PNG military have been deployed to protect the Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) operations from - mostly young - fighters, disgruntled because of long delays in the distribution of royalty payments. The increased risk of violence presented by the growth of the youth bulge can be mitigated by education and employment programs (Barakat & Urdal, 2009). Extractive industries must operate differently in order to reduce the risks of conflict exacerbated by the youth bulge. This means ensuring landowner benefits, the employment and training of locals, and minimising the impact of operations on the natural environment.

The dominance of extractive industries has created a dual-speed economy in PNG. Development is thought to be stifled by an over-reliance on extractive industries through three mechanisms. Dutch disease is a situation where the wealth acquired during an export boom appreciates the local currency leading to a contraction in other tradable activities (Kojo, 2015, p.2). The decline in manufacturing in PNG is symptomatic of Dutch disease. The real exchange rate of the Kina against a basket of other currencies appreciated 35% between 2007 and 2011, driven by increases in natural resource exports, while manufacturing as a percentage of GDP fell from 8% to 5% between 2005 and 2015 (Avalos et al, 2015, p.352). Given that manufacturing becomes more efficient and productive as time and repeated cycles of capital investment pass, employing many people in the formal sector, in the context of a rising youth population the decline in the manufacturing sector is problematic because the economy is less able to absorb its youth population into productive activity. Secondly, commodity prices are volatile. That volatility often leads to a situation where an economy will cycle labour, capital, and land between sectors, which diminishes productivity by increasing transaction costs (Frankel, 2012). After American Samoa and Mongolia, PNG has the largest terms of trade volatility in East Asia and the Pacific, which worsens the business and investment climate by exacerbating macroeconomic instability (Avalos et al, 2015, p.353). Demand in the labour market is overly influenced by these fluctuations in economic motivation. The temporary windfall for government coffers of a resources boom led the government of PNG to commit to extra spending over what was expected to be a period of strong growth. However, when commodity prices fell, the government was forced to borrow to fund promised spending. This has created recessionary pressures within the economy (Flanagan, 2016). A further consideration to add is that extractive companies employ few people from PNG, often requiring foreign workers with highly technical qualifications, so the growth of the extractive sector does not result in significant increases in formal sector employment (Barma et al. 2012). And, where jobs are created for local people, they are often only temporary, during the construction phase of the project.


Environmental degradation associated with resource extraction is one of the major barriers to sustainable development in PNG (UNDP, 2014). It places great pressure on communities and the state. In local contexts, the environmental degradation caused by extractive industries are often severe. Take the OK Tedi mine, operated by the Anglo-Australian mining company BHP Billiton. Since the mid 1980s, the mine has discharged over a billion tons of mine waste and tailings into the OK Tedi and Fly rivers (Kirsch, 2007). This has had devastating impacts on the downstream environment: the dramatic increase in sediment content destroys downstream aquatic ecosystems; the sediment smothers and kills the vegetation on the riverbanks during floods; and chemicals and heavy metals discharged from the mine contaminate drinking water (UNDP, 2014, p.66). Alex Maun, a lead plaintiff in a civil case against BHP noted that for 50,000 people who live along the banks of the affected watershed, 'What was fertile customary land was eroded away and was replaced with sediment. The lives of all the people along the Ok Tedi river are completely disastrous' (UNDP, 2014, p.66). The destruction of such a potent store of both traditional economic power, gardening land and inheritance, led to many young people leaving the area, to seek opportunities in larger towns and regional centres, contributing to the challenges of an urbanising youth population as previously discussed (Jell-Bahlsen & Jell, 2012, p.329). A reduction in the available land further exacerbates conflict over resources as more people must make do with less. The Ok Tedi case was resolved when BHP agreed to pay a K150 million settlement paid to landowners. The local environmental effects of extractive industries can have devastating impacts on the livelihood of young people in PNG. Climate change also poses significant challenges in PNG. The country is home to the first official climate refugees: the Carteret Islanders (Connell, 2016). This group became the first entire community to be displaced by climate change: the atoll they once called home is now underwater. Though the number of displaced people is small, only 1500, it represents the impending dramatic upheaval that PNG will experience as a result of climate change. According to the Asian Development Bank (2013), PNG will incur the greatest economic losses from climate change of any country in the Asia-Pacific (15% of GDP by 2100). These losses further reduce the size of the available 'pie', which will lead to increasing conflict over resource allocation.

Prospects for health and education service delivery as the effects of the youth bulge are felt

Many issues related to the health of young people require urgent attention in PNG. In recent years, PNG has seen deteriorating infrastructure at health clinics, a shortage of basic medicines and medical supplies, and too few medical workers (WHO, 2016, pp. 7-8). Without significant action from the PNG government, the youth bulge will increase pressure on the health system by creating institutional bottlenecks in places where the system cannot keep up with the increase in demand. Howes (2016) highlights the case of Angau Hospital, which has seen budget cuts which mean that 'Adjusting for inflation, as one needs to do for comparisons over longer periods of time, Angau's budget for 2017 will be just over half of what it was in 2014'. The population of Lae, where Angau Hospital is located, has probably grown by around 9% since then. Communicable diseases are a growing health crisis in PNG. PNG has one of the highest rates of tuberculosis (TB) in the world with a prevalence of 529 per 100,000 (ChildFund Australia, 2016). TB is both preventable and curable - it is primarily a disease of poverty, the spread of which is facilitated by overcrowded housing, poor diet, and poor sanitary conditions. With urbanisation of the population set to continue, the rising youth population will continue to move into densely populated settlements in urban areas where risk factors associated with TB are more prevalent. Addressing TB through vaccination and treatment programs alone will become increasingly difficult. A fast growing population with a high youth dependency ratio will make it hard for the underfunded health system to cope with health emergencies. The country must focus on bringing young people out of poverty as a primary means of preventing the spread of TB. PNG has the highest rates of HIV in the Pacific with a prevalence rate of 0.8% of the population (United Nations AIDS, 2017). The HIV epidemic can be curbed with significant investment in education on reproductive health and infrastructure. Investment in reproductive health will be increasingly pertinent (White, Merrick & Yazbeck, 2006). While indicators such as the maternal mortality rate have been trending towards improvement, PNG failed to meet Millennium Development Goal targets. From 2008-2012, it sat

at approximately 703 deaths per 100,000 live births. Although it is a complex issue, the primary obstacles to reducing maternal mortality in Papua New Guinea include the inaccessibility of adequate maternal health care facilities and the lack of sociocultural awareness of the difficulties women endure during pregnancy and childbirth.

PNG has made significant strides in the development of education since independence. Education was not a priority of the Australian administration in the early colonial years. For example, in 1921, spending on what was called 'native education' came to a total of AU\$24 (Dorney, 2016, p.16). In the 1960s, Australian education policy in Papua New Guinea gave priority to secondary and higher education (Haihuie, 2003, p.227). The focus of the Australian administration was the development of an elite class who could staff the lower and middle levels of the bureaucracy. As the momentum towards independence grew, it was this group of people that came to assume government positions and would be responsible for the stewardship of the country post-independence. However, this policy of 'picking winners' by ensuring only narrow participation in primary and secondary education led to very low enrolment and attendance rates. At the time of independence in 1975 PNG had an elite moneyed class ready to govern a country where gross primary school enrollments were at only 56% (AusAid, 2003, p.7), and there were significant discrepancies in participation rates between districts, with remote districts like the Southern Highlands having only 18% attendance (Megarrity, 2005, p.15). Education outcomes improved dramatically in the decades after independence, with 72% gross enrollment in primary schooling in 1988. Moreover, by 1989 girls constituted 44% of that enrollment (AusAid 2003, p.7). During the 2000s, access to education was broadened significantly. Between 2001 and 2012, the average primary school saw a cumulative enrollment increase of 85%. This increase was even greater for girls: the average primary school has 144% more girls enrolled in 2012 than it did in 2002 (Howes et al, 2014, p. v). In 2012 the PNG Government implemented the Tuition Fee Free (TFF) policy to reduce the financial impediments for people sending their children to school. Though this policy resulted in an total enrollment increase of 17%, interestingly it did not reduce the significant enrollment gender gap (Ryan et al, 2017, p.29). Moreover, the implementation of the TFF policy was riddled with issues of implementation - many schools had difficulty accessing funds, and much of these funds find their way into the wrong pockets. Further development of



the education system is challenged by a variety of stress conditions - from distance from schools, to high opportunity costs of education, the 40 years since independence has demonstrated that while significant gains were made for education in PNG, it has a long way to go. PNG's education sector faces mounting pressures from the youth bulge. PNG's population is expected to grow from 7.6 million to 10 million by 2030 (United Nations, 2015, p.21). Without

significant investment in supporting primary education in PNG, the ability for the government to respond to the needs of young people, particularly as societal values around education and employment shift, will come under increasing strain. With low formal sector employment and a high youth dependency ratio, government will find its ability to allocate resources effectively will be curtailed. Primary schools will continue to face problems, namely a lack of resources, crowded classrooms, and inadequate infrastructure, unless these problems are seriously addressed. Moreover, if low levels of formal sector employment continue, the opportunity costs for parents sending their children to secondary schools will remain high, which will push down high school enrolment. Stronger links between higher education and employment must be established in order to reduce the opportunity cost associated with higher education. Young people are 2.5 times more likely to be unemployed compared to adults, and 49 per cent of people registered as unemployed are aged under 25. Addressing the problems of the education system in PNG requires more than simply an increase in funding. It requires a national policy that takes the future pressures of the youth bulge into serious consideration. Consultation which ensures the meaningful participation of young people would be a good way to begin to address these issues. In addition, the inclusion of young people at various levels in the administration of the education system, from school boards on up can improve the relevance and effectiveness of education. Researchers in university governance have pointed out that dialogue between students and decision-makers builds a healthy organizational atmosphere and ensures all-important trust between the two groups (Menon, 2003). Zeldin also established that involving youth in governance structures made adult board members feel that their decisions were more legitimate and reassured them that they were planning the most appropriate actions to accomplish their mission effectively (Zeldin, 2004).

Youth participation as a policy response

What is youth participation?

This report advocates a model of youth participation which is developed in the Oaktree-ACFID Practice Note Youth Participation in Development, and highlights the unique strengths and skills of young people. The report adopts a definition of youth which acknowledges the difficulty of generalising across the world and throughout history. Broadly, youth can be understood as the period of time in which person makes various life transitions from dependence to independence. It is during this period where young people make important decisions about studying, finding employment, starting a family, taking responsibility for their health and lifestyle and exercising active citizenship (Furlong, 2013). Culturally, the youth age bracket is often defined by specific roles, and involvement in the community.

Most forms of participatory development aim 'to give the poor a part in initiatives designed for their benefit', with a view to superior effectiveness and sustainability, given local engagement with the project or program in question. There are two strains of thought which are prominent in discourse about participatory development (Brock & Pettit, 2007). The social movement perspective defines participation as mobilisation - of people, knowledge, ideas, and capital - to eliminate unjust hierarchies of power. The goal of participation is seen to be a process of empowerment which allows people to handle challenges and influence the direction of their own lives (Tufté & Thomas, 2009). This leads to joint decision making about what should be achieved and how. The only way to identify critical issues and arrive at appropriate solutions is through dialogue between primary stakeholders and outsiders. Ownership and control of this process must rest with primary stakeholders (Mohan, 2007; 2008). The institutional perspective, in contrast, defines participation as the consultation of relevant groups in the design and implementation of a program. The input and opinions of these stakeholders is considered a tool to achieve a predefined goal established externally to the process of consultation itself. This perspective emphasises discrete stages in a project life-cycle - research, design, implementation and evaluation (or, monitoring, evaluation, learning) (Tufté & Thomas, 2009; Chambers, 2008).

To promote effective participation of young people, a twin-track approach is necessary. This requires both youth-targeted programming (programs or projects that focus directly on building the capabilities of and opportunities for young people) and youth mainstreaming (the inclusion of young people in internal governance or programmatic decision-making processes outside of youth-targeted programs.) Each of these approaches may adopt different types of participation, though partner and youth-led participation will generally lead to results that are more appropriate and meaningful for young people.

Why youth participation?

The world now has the largest generation of young people in history - and 90% of this population live in the Global South. In Papua New Guinea, 53.8% of the population is 24 years old or less. This population is still growing. The implications of this youth bulge are treated in detail in the foregoing sections. Despite this numerical supremacy, young people in PNG are not adequately represented in development programs and processes - and this lack of representation also finds expression in the political system. Systems and services have been unable to meet the needs of young people, excluding youth from vital opportunities in areas such as education and employment. This exclusion not only results in increased poverty, but disenfranchisement from, and disengagement with, the political arrangements in PNG on a generational scale. Countries with large populations of unemployed young men risk increased civil unrest and organised criminal violence. Increasing population is often talked about in the context of aspirations to harness 'demographic dividends'. It is the contention of this report that an increase in the

proportion of young people in a given population can pay dividends, given the correct norms and policy settings.

The articles of the United Nations General Assembly's Universal Declaration of Human Rights cite rights to free participation in political (Article 21), economic (Articles 23-26), and social life (Articles 26-29). Other formulations of fundamental human rights include a right to self-determination - which grants individuals a right to influence the decision-making processes that affect their lives. These principles are commonly articulated in the catch-cry 'nothing about us without us', which found popular expression in the fight for rights for the disabled. Such appeals to equality and participation can also be found in articles of the Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea. Young people can and should be treated as a group which has historically faced barriers to the full exercise of these rights, and this deficient situation can and should be corrected as a means of resolving this. As with all participatory development approaches, this will also foster greater trust, accountability and transparency, and will ultimately prevent young people from feeling either that they have nothing valuable to contribute or that their perspectives and priorities are not being taken into account (ACFID, 2013).

Young people know best how to craft changes that are appropriate. Young people are best placed to identify their own needs and priorities, and make assessments about whether project or policy plans will successfully address these needs and priorities. With support from experienced partners, space to have their opinions heard, and power to influence decision-making, young people will ensure that programs that affect them are relevant (UNDP, 2013). Studies have shown that youth participation will also lead to greater ownership over, and legitimacy of programs (Hoy et al., 2008), both of which drive the sustainability of positive social changes (London et al., 2003).

Young people experience connectivity like no other population group. Never in history have young people had such easy and rapid access to the world around them. Through technological advances and increased availability of mobile phones, internet and social media, young people are able to connect with one another, their own communities and the rest of the world on an entirely new scale. This allows for young people to both access and disseminate information faster and further than ever before, creating new opportunities for how young people can increase participation and ownership at the community level, and strengthen accountability at a local, national and international level. This connectivity means that young people are well positioned to be responsive and adaptive to changes in their environments.

Young people readily adopt the new. In a 2016 ACFID paper titled 'Innovation for Impact', the authors discussed a number of 'megatrends' and 'disruptive changes' that have and will transform the landscape of aid and development at all levels. While innovation is by no means the exclusive domain of young people, they are one of many important groups that can contribute to a greater diversity of thinking on how to respond to this changing landscape. Young people have an intuitive understanding of, and are readily able to adopt new technologies that can be key to unlocking development gains (Puybaraud, 2012). Those privileged to have received a higher education will also be key agents in the translation of research and theory into practice. These traits mean that young people have unique skills and ways of thinking that, if nurtured and supported, can be leveraged to challenge the status quo and contribute to the innovation agenda.

Young people are our future leaders; investing in them is critical. When it comes to investments in individual capabilities, the earlier the investment, the greater the return (World Bank, 2007). Young people, through their involvement in the design and implementation of policies and projects, can benefit from education, training and experience that is positive for their professional development (DFID, 2010). Furthermore, inclusive and participatory development practice can instil a passion in young people to take action on a cross-section of social justice issues. This has significant positive effects, whether young people go on to work in international development sector, the public sector, or the private sector. It can also drive intergenerational behavioural change, reshaping the way that entire constituencies think about corruption, human rights and social change. Including young people in development organisations and programs can create spaces for them to build networks with other young people in the same or similar fields. It will

also build an understanding of development as a complex system, helping people to identify how they might position themselves to best contribute to positive social changes early in their lives. In order to harness the potential of young people, it is crucial to dramatically increase the participation of young people in development programs and processes. Young people are in the best position to come up with effective and creative solutions to issues that affect them. Including youth in development programs allow young people to realise their rights, increases the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of programming, and represents an opportunity to invest in their current and future capabilities. In addition to this argument from instrumentality, there is an argument for youth participation which proceeds on the basis of intrinsic rights. The articles of the United Nations General Assembly's Universal Declaration of Human Rights cite rights to free participation in political (Article 21), economic (Articles 23-26), and social life (Articles 26-29). Other formulations of rights include a right to self-determination - which grants individuals a right to influence the decision-making processes that affect their lives. These principles are commonly articulated in the catch-cry 'nothing about us without us', which found popular expression in the fight for rights for the disabled. To extend this logic, young people can and should be treated as a group which has historically faced barriers to the full exercise of these rights, and this deficient situation can and should be corrected as a matter of resolving this. As with all participatory development approaches, this will also foster greater trust, accountability and transparency, and will ultimately prevent young people from feeling either that they have nothing valuable to contribute or that their perspectives and priorities are not being taken into account (ACFID, 2013).

What does youth participation look like in practice?

Participation, and in particular youth participation, is discussed in terms of 'levels' of participation, where interventions can be described as featuring at least passive youth participation, through to interventions which can be said to be youth-led.

- *Passive:* Passive participation occurs when young people are the targets of a initiative but have no opportunity to influence outcomes or decision-making. This includes initiatives that treat youth as the target stakeholder of a particular change or benefit without including these stakeholders in the decision-making. It also includes situations in which young people are informed about decisions and processes that have, or will, occur. Passive participation may also be tokenistic - where young people are made to feel as though they are contributing to decision-making, but their involvement has no meaningful impact on outcomes.
- *Consultative:* Consultative participation involves the sourcing of information from young people by an external actor. The subject matter of a consultation can be limited or broad in scope, and consultation may occur once or multiple times. While the information provided by young people will be considered, it will not necessarily determine the ultimate decision.
- *Partner:* Viewing young people as partners in a development process involves collaboration with young people through sharing decision-making power and providing opportunities for young people to actively influence how decisions are made. Either youth representatives make particular decisions, or decisions are made through a collaborative process where young people are considered partners.
- *Youth-led:* Young people are leaders when they initiate a particular process, or when ultimate decision-making power and authority is transferred to them. While other stakeholders may still have a significant role in influencing decision-making, young people will have ultimate ownership and control over key decisions.

It is crucial to note that these levels of participation are not normative in the sense that more 'intensive' participation is always right or good for any individual development intervention. Rather, different interventions will benefit from different levels of participation. However, at minimum, young people should be meaningfully (broadly) consulted about development interventions at each stage of the project cycle.

In order to establish what level of participation 'intensity' would be most appropriate for a particular intervention, it is often wise to start by taking a youth audit. That is, seek to establish a baseline based on current practice. Many areas of organisational practice can be interrogated in this manner. Common questions to ask as part of a youth audit could include:

To what extent are young people being affected by this intervention? Generally, the more that young people are being affected, and the more they are beings specifically targeted, the greater their level of participation should be.

What skills, attributes or perspectives will benefit this intervention? Some interventions will have easy entry-points for young people to add value, while others may require specialised experience or expertise. While extensive youth participation may not always be appropriate, creative thinking will often reveal approaches to youth participation that will add value at little cost.

What barriers might young people face in participating, and how can these barriers be removed? It is important to identify key barriers that may prevent young people from participating, such as the opportunity costs of participating (e.g - money and time) or a lack of confidence. Addressing these barriers to create an 'enabling environment' for participation should be viewed as the responsibility of those leading the particular intervention.

How will young people be affected by participation? Participation should always have a benefit on an individual level, through positive experiences, building networks or strengthening the capabilities of young people. Due to hierarchical social structures, in some contexts young people will be particularly vulnerable to exploitation. As such, it is essential that the benefits of participation received by individuals always outweigh the costs of participating. To promote effective participation of young people, a twin-track approach is necessary. This requires both youth-targeted programming (programs or projects that focus directly on building the capabilities of and opportunities for young people) and youth mainstreaming (the inclusion of young people in internal governance or programmatic decision-making processes outside of youth-targeted programs). Each of these approaches may adopt different types of participation, though partner and youth-led participation will generally lead to results that are more appropriate and meaningful for young people.

Policy Recommendations

This report also makes the following policy recommendations, targeted at both policy-makers and practitioners within government generally, and at the aid sector specifically - with a view to increasing the engagement of young people in social, political and economic life in PNG.

PNG's National Youth Policy and National Population Policy

The government needs to recognise the role of young people and their voices. They should be given the platform to speak about their vision for the direction of the nation. The National Youth Development Authority should be advocating more on behalf of young people, which they're not currently doing. That requires adequate resourcing from government and stronger, more structured processes with regard to interaction between government and civil society. PNG's national youth policy and population policy should provide clear guidance to actors within the aid sector emphasising the importance of youth participation in decision-making.

Organisations working within the aid sector should develop strategies for working more effectively with young people, particularly in contexts where project outcomes are designed to impact young people, either directly or indirectly.

Effective service delivery in health and education

Even a cursory glance at the foregoing sections of this report would inform the reader of the importance of effective service delivery in dealing with the challenges of the youth bulge. If young people can be adequately educated in a way that allows them to achieve their goals, this will produce a net benefit for the development of the country. The reader may be familiar with the decades of research which has pointed out the link between education and sustainable economic development. While various mechanisms and relationships have been posited, the overall thrust of the research is a correlation between an increase in human capital - represented by education, both technical and academic - and an increase in the economic output of a country. The idea that educating the population could create long-term growth was one of the features of the 'new growth' literature initiated by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). More recently, the link between human capital and education has been shown more clearly: human capital is an exponential function of years of schooling. There is a log-linear correspondence between income and years of schooling (Cohen & Soto, 2007). Barro (1991) finds that low levels of educational enrolment are a substantial impediment to growth. Addressing the problems of the education system in PNG requires more than simply an increase in funding. It requires a national policy that takes the future pressures of the youth bulge into serious consideration. Consultation with the meaningful participation of young people can assist. In addition, the inclusion of young people at various levels in the administration of the education system, from school boards on up can improve the relevance and effectiveness of education.

The issues faced by young people in accessing health services in PNG have been discussed in previous sections of this report. To recap, the youth bulge will increase strain on an underfunded health system. Communicable diseases are a growing health crisis in PNG. PNG has one of the highest rates of tuberculosis (TB) in the world with a prevalence of 529 per 100,000 (ChildFund Australia 2016). TB is both preventable and curable, it is primarily a disease of poverty, resulting from overcrowded housing, poor diet, and insufficient sanitary conditions. With urbanisation of the population set to continue, the rising youth population will continue to move into densely populated settlements in urban areas where risk factors associated with TB are more prevalent. Addressing TB through vaccination and treatment programs alone will become increasingly

difficult. A fast growing population with a high youth dependency ratio will make it hard for the already deteriorating health system to cope with health emergencies. The country must focus on bringing youth out of poverty to create an environment where TB is less likely to spread. The country has the highest rates of HIV in the Pacific with a prevalence rate of 0.8% of the population (United Nations AIDS 2017). The HIV epidemic can be curbed with significant investment in education on reproductive health and infrastructure. Investment in reproductive health will be increasingly pertinent (White, Merrick, & Yazbeck, 2006). With regard to reproductive health more broadly, while indicators such as the maternal mortality rate have been trending towards improvement, PNG failed to meet Millennium Development Goal targets. From 2008-2012, it sat at approximately 703 deaths per 100,000 live births. Although it is a complex issue, the primary obstacles to reducing maternal mortality in Papua New Guinea include the inaccessibility of adequate maternal health care facilities and the lack of sociocultural awareness of the difficulties women endure during pregnancy and childbirth.

Doing development differently - thinking and working politically

Many symptoms of a malfunctioning aid and development system in PNG are highlighted by the Doing Development Differently manifesto (DDD Manifesto Community, 2014).

'Schools are built but children do not learn. Clinics are built but sickness persists. Governments adopt reforms but too little changes for their citizens... Solutions are not simple or obvious; those who would benefit most lack power, those who can make a difference are disengaged and political barriers are too often overlooked.'

In theory, policy and planning follows a linear path from problem identification to solution design, to implementation, and finally evaluation. In practice, actors and groups continually redefine people and ideas to fit within prescribed categories (Crewe, 2014).

Doing development differently means a couple of things:

Work close to the ground: Grassroots, participatory development interventions can be a powerful way to build trust and legitimacy in communities. Taking locally-produced ideas and solutions and investing in them can ensure the ongoing relevancy of programmatic work to the communities in which it is embedded. Focus on solving problems that local agents in government and communities care about.

Learn and adapt rapidly: make small bets on potential solutions, see what works, and then go to scale. Evaluate in terms of hard improvements in people's lives, without ignoring the soft gains. It's important to capture successes and failures in outcomes. But government and its partners can implement feedback systems that allow important information and local perspectives to filter up. Instead of subsuming unexpected insights in mountains of quantitative data - which is easier to analyse but tends to obscure the unexpected - and minimise the voice of the community.

The DDD philosophy highlights common features of successful interventions:

- They focus on solving local problems that are debated, defined and refined by local people in an ongoing process.
- They are legitimised at all levels, building ownership and momentum throughout the process to be 'locally owned' in reality.
- They work through local conveners who mobilise all those with a stake in progress... to tackle common problems and introduce relevant change.
- They blend design and implementation through rapid cycles of planning, action, reflection and revision (drawing on local knowledge, feedback and energy) to foster learning from both success and failure.
- They manage risks by making 'small bets': pursuing activities with promise.

Youth-led good governance initiatives

Improving governance is an extremely complex political, economic, social and cultural process. Good governance is crucial for enabling all other development progress. Weak capacity and inadequate skills in the public service are the most critical inhibitors to development in PNG. Approaches that focus on long-term change, are locally-led and foster ownership and participation are required in order to circuit-break these challenges. This requires a different kind of investment. It requires agile and responsive approaches that are politically nuanced and fostered through grassroots empowerment. Young people represent a huge opportunity in harnessing this approach. Governance assistance must focus on strengthening institution. Institutional strengthening is ineffective when external structures are imposed and there is over-reliance on individual capacity building within existing institutions. Policy strengthening can only go so far, particularly where policy frameworks are already strong while poor governance persists. Improvement requires greater social accountability through stronger democratic processes. Massive youth populations in many partner countries mean that institutional strengthening necessarily requires social accountability from strong engagement with young people.

In any new youth-led good governance initiative, change should happen at three levels:

Individual Transformation: Young people can be empowered with the tools and spaces needed to engage in constructive dialogue with decision-makers, identify and propose solutions to the key challenges that affect them, and reduce corrupt and nepotistic practices. They could harness new technologies to collect data and represent localised challenges in real time. Being engaged as active citizens can inform how they view their role in contributing to their societies for the rest of their lives and empower them to learn more about their own rights within their particular communities - at local, and national level. This can build confidence and broadening horizons for individuals to see themselves as part of a generation with promise.

Collective Transformation: Youth-led organisations and networks of individuals can form coalitions to strengthen the voices of young people. Collective action strengthens and refines advocacy messages - capturing a diversity and defining the issues that are important. Through collective action and collaboration, the capacity of individuals and organisations is enhanced through sharing skills, knowledge and experiences. These coalitions focus on civic education to ensure that local communities are aware of their rights and are empowered to exercise them.

Institutional Transformation: Young people could organise to contribute to and strengthen decision-making at a national level, both through the formal political process and by engaging with political bodies, the private sector and civil society to ensure that youth perspectives are understood and taken into account. The activities of these organisations in engaging with, and representing, the views of young people increases institutional accountability, fosters greater transparency and contributes to democratisation. Coalitions that form at provincial level within PNG can foster narratives of national identity.

First, citizens need to have a clear understanding of the mandate of the institution they are assessing, in order to effectively participate in monitoring and evaluating the performance of that institution. In order to build effective participation, education on the rights that people possess and the role of institutions, how they work and how they allocate resources, both de facto and de jure is required. This would be tailored to local contexts and implemented in different ways according to capacity and need. Second, the evaluations and opinions that result from social accountability activities need to be aggregated and articulated. Participatory Action Research will be used, leveraging the local knowledge of individual organisations to reach youth in both urban and remote rural areas. In order to amplify the voice of young people in rural areas, technology will be used to gather perspectives and identify issues which are of importance. Information and communications technology (ICT) can be developed which amplifies deliberative processes and helps forge consensus among individuals, especially in light of the challenges presented in PNG

with geographic isolation. Assistance to analyse data and establish causal relationships could come from non-youth NGOs, other aid actors, or consultancy groups, but their influence must be facilitative, not authoritative. Third, action-based on consensus is required, in order to effect change and actually enhance governance outcomes. Oaktree and PNG partners will facilitate a process to clarify the priorities of young people across the country and translate this into collective agreements for solutions. Key to this change will be engaging in constructive and peaceful dialogue with key decision makers. ICT will be used to support this facilitation process and enable people to engage more easily with each other.

Young people can be empowered with tools to advocate for change at local level by influencing government officials and members of the legislature. Adversarial relationships between organisations and government need not arise, and experience elsewhere has shown that collaboration with government is possible and potentially fruitful. However, challenges are likely to arise where increasing social accountability entails conflict and control issues between government officials and civil society groups. Traditional advocacy and campaigning methods will prove useful here, but where blockages in the formal power structure are identified, alternative strategies can be developed and will emerge through collaboration. Synergies can be identified with existing goals and pillars of the PNG Governance Facility, which will enhance the outcome of implementation.

The primary goal is to strengthen governance in Papua New Guinea through youth-led social accountability. However, the investment and engagement of young people has many flow-on benefits that supports other aid program objectives. In particular, greater participation of young people will lead to:

- Greater employment prospects (both in terms of employability and entrepreneurship)
- Supporting education objectives (engaging young people in critical, applied learning experiences)
- Increased representation and inclusion of marginalised young people, particularly young women and youth living with a disability
- Stronger social cohesion and peace-building structures through fostering constructive engagement and dialogue between young people
- Greater leadership capabilities for young people, both in the present and for their future involvement in government, the private sector and civil society
- Exposure to Australian academic institutions through research capacity building
- Fostering 1-to-1 connections between young people across the Asia-Pacific.

One example of a successful social media intervention is the Department of Finance's Phones Against Corruption Initiative. It is a SMS interactive system, free of charge for users, 100% anonymous, used in simple mobile phones, and no internet is required. It is an inclusive tool for populations in rural areas. Participants were encouraged to text in and report instances of corruption in their dealings with the Department, and by the end of 2015, more than 20,000 SMS were received, and 251 cases of alleged corruption were under investigation. What the Phones Against Corruption program showed was that people will participate in a system of that nature if given the opportunity. However, it also uncovered a problem which may be inherent to many social accountability measures: the lack of support to clear bottlenecks in the court system which prevent the timely prosecution and hearing of cases. If citizens do not feel that their reporting of corrupt behaviour results in timely consequences, they may reject participation in future accountability measures. Thus, social accountability mechanisms cannot exist in a vacuum, without considering how support can be provided to the institutions that ensure justice and the rule of law are maintained.

Priority programs for job creation in the formal sector

Recent estimates show that the number of formal sector jobs doubled over the last decade.

However, the majority of PNG's population remains excluded from formal job markets. Many studies document a systematic negative relationship between the prevalence of informal employment and economic development, and attribute aggregate income differences across countries to inefficient allocation of inputs across sectors and firms. Policymakers may be inclined to search for additional ways to improve the transition out of informality in low-income countries. Such policies would need to account for the impact of global markets (McCaig & Pavcnik, 2014), industrial policy, and preferences for small and medium enterprises (Martin et al. 2014). Support for civil society organisations and coalitions of actors.

Work done in Vietnam by McCaig and Pavnik (2015) showed that younger workers make a key contribution towards aggregate declines in informality. Young workers are less likely to work informally than older workers, highlighting the extent to which the changing composition of a country's workforce has an influence over the degree of informality extant within the broader economy. In McCaig and Pavnik's work, 69% of the reduction in aggregate informality was due to the increase in young workers. Transitional employment measures that get young people working in the formal sector of the economy should be prioritised. In order to do this, government and its partners should strengthen links between education and employment, to smooth pathways between high- and further-education completion and entry into the job market. Such measures as currently practiced often offer only tokenistic roles to young people, or temporary employment during the lifetime of the program. More research needs to be done to investigate how more permanent employment opportunities can be created for the cohort completing high school and university. One avenue for this research could be to look at the barriers young people face in accessing the job market or positioning themselves within it. Another may be to look to social and cultural activities that encourage job creation, such as support for artistic entrepreneurs and businesses.

Support for civil society organisations and coalitions of actors

Currently, the civic space available to young people - in which they can make their views known, define problems and propose solutions - is quite small. While much has been made of the explosion in the use of social media (53% of men between 18-24 use Facebook each month, and 46% of women in the same age group), the toxicity that can arise in these digital spaces was on display for many during the 2017 elections, when participants in online debates were threatened, slandered, and had their reputations rubbished by people opposed to their views. There have also rightly been concerns raised about the depth of debate and participation that can be generated in online spaces.

We argue that while the ability to access information quickly and to discuss it over long distances with people from all over the country is a net positive for Papua New Guinea's young people, there is no substitute for the grassroots civil society organisations that meet every day across the country, giving their members the opportunity to learn, debate, collaborate, campaign and act in a coordinated way.

We call on government and its partners to create structured programs of support that build the capacity of civil society organisations and coalitions of actors that:

- Foster youth leadership
- Facilitate interface between young people and decision makers; and
- Promote linkages with youth-led movements in the wider Asia-Pacific region for skills-sharing and advocacy on issues of regional concern, such as climate change.
- This support must be, within reason, agnostic with respect to the purpose or intended outcome of the activity of the groups which receive it.

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