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Narratives, information and immigration policy preferences

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Abstract

Exposure to quantitative information about immigrants or narratives around the costs and benefits of immigration can alter people's immigration policy preferences. Using a survey experiment with a representative sample of over 5,000 respondents in Australia, we find substantial and contradictory misperceptions across the number, origins and labour market attributes of immigrants. Most respondents prefer less immigration overall, but favour increased high-skilled immigration. Support for increased immigration rises by 4.5-7 percentage points when respondents are shown narratives on how immigrants can help improve housing affordability. Conversely, highlighting the perceived negative impacts of immigration on housing affordability reduces support for increasing or maintaining current immigration levels. Providing quantitative information on immigrants' characteristics generates smaller increases in support for more immigration than narratives. For immigration from Pacific Island countries, exposure to quantitative information increases support for relaxing visa requirements but there is no evidence that narratives have any effect.

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1 Introduction

While more people are migrating around the world than ever before (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou 2021), misperceptions about immigrants remain entrenched (Alesina et al. 2023) and support for immigration is at best stable or waning in key receiving countries (Dennison and Dražanová 2018, Jones 2024, Neelam 2024 and Oliver 2014). What drives support for or opposition to immigration and can policy preferences be shifted? The relative importance of economic, social and cultural factors in shaping attitudes towards immigration remains contested (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, Dražanová et al. 2024, Mayda 2006) and the extent to which providing information or changing narratives around immigration changes views remains unclear (Grigorieff et al. 2020, Dylong and Uebelmesser 2024, Hopkins et al. 2019). This paper provides new evidence from Australia on the extent of misperceptions around immigrants and how different types of information can shape policy preferences for different types of migration.

Australia is an ideal setting to investigate what influences support for immigration. With 30% of the population immigrants, this share is the second largest among OECD countries and over twice the OECD average of 14% (OECD 2023). Its largely skill-based immigration system is hailed as an exemplar by other developed countries, including the United States (Acharya 2017) and the United Kingdom (Sumption 2019), and often perceived as the main reason why popular support for immigration in Australia has remained relatively strong over recent decades.

We fielded a nationally-representative survey to 5,282 respondents in Australia measuring perceptions of immigrants and immigration policy preferences. We first investigate the accuracy of perceptions held by survey respondents around how many immigrants come to Australia, on what type of visa, where immigrants come from, and immigrants' labour market attributes. We do this by comparing respondents' estimates to the actual characteristics of immigrants recorded in official data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).

By embedding a randomised experiment in the survey, we test whether people's policy preferences are immediately shifted by (a) one-shot narrative information treatments on the costs or benefits of immigration for the receiving country population, or (b) a bundle of factual quantitative information about immigrants' characteristics. Three groups of respondents were randomly assigned to receive one of three narrative information treatments on the perceived costs or benefits of immigration in relation to housing affordability—a prominent policy issue when the survey was fielded—before being asked about their immigration policy preferences (i.e. how many migrants of various characteristics should be accepted by Australia). Each narrative reflects often-discussed 'positive', 'balanced' and 'negative' potential impacts of immigration on Australia's housing market, and is constructed from actual newspaper headlines and quotes. A fourth group received a bundle of quantitative information on the current characteristics and composition of immigrants in Australia (drawn from ABS data) before being asked policy preference questions. A control group received no treatment.

We find that survey respondents hold large and often contradictory misperceptions across virtually all immigrant characteristics. On average, respondents underestimated the scale of the recent post-pandemic immigration boom, but overestimated arrivals and net overseas migration over the last decade or so. Respondents underestimated the proportion of immigrants arriving in Australia on temporary visas, while believing there were twice as many full-time student immigrants than actually recorded. Respondents perceived immigrants in Australia to be earning more than they do, but also more likely to be unemployed and lower-skilled than they are. Some of the largest misperceptions are around where immigrants are born: respondents overestimate the proportion of immigrants from all regions except Europe and Asia. Respondents thought that there are 2–3 times more immigrants from the Middle East and the Pacific Islands region than is actually the case.

Examining the immigration policy preferences of the control group—which serves as a baseline for Australia more broadly, given the nationally representative nature of the survey—shows that the majority expressed a preference for lower immigration in total, and for immigrants with different characteristics. 53% of control group respondents reported that the total number of immigrants coming to Australia every year is 'too high', while 34.7% believed that current levels are 'about right'. There are two exceptions to this pattern. The first is high-skilled immigration, for which a majority of control group respondents preferred 'more' or 'a lot more' immigrants. The second is immigration from Pacific Island countries (PICs), where around half of the control group preferred 'no change' or measures being kept the same when asked if visa requirements should be relaxed for this particular group. The current focus on skills and the Pacific thus enjoys more popular support than other types of immigration. When asked about others' beliefs, respondents tended to think that other people wanted less immigration than suggested by the aggregated responses of the control group on their own preferences.

The experimental results suggest that exposure to either one-shot narratives or a bundle of quantitative information can shift immigration policy preferences, at least in the short-term. While narratively informing respondents of the perceived 'negative' impacts of immigration on house prices does not substantially change the likelihood that respondents prefer more immigration, it decreases the probability that respondents express support for immigration levels remaining the same or increasing by around five percentage points. Showing respondents a narrative vignette emphasising immigrants' positive contributions generates larger increases in the likelihood of supporting *more* immigration than providing quantitative information (between 4–7 and around 2 percentage points, respectively). Overall, policy preferences on total and permanent immigration appear most malleable to narrative and quantitative information treatments, while preferences on other aspects of immigration policy (e.g. skilled migration) appear stickier. The 'positive' narrative and quantitative information treatments also generate statistically significant 'cross-learning' effects, making respondents more likely to believe that most other Australians would also prefer more of certain types of immigrants, and to relax visa requirements for immigration from the Pacific.

Policies around immigration from the Pacific region present a notable exception to the effectiveness of narratives in changing preferences. Providing quantitative information about existing Pacific immigration engenders precisely estimated increases in support for more immigration from PICs, of around five percentage points. We find no compelling evidence that policy preferences in this area systematically respond to the different types of narratives provided.

Exploratory heterogeneity analysis suggests that emphasising the costs and benefits of immigration through narrative information treatments may have larger effects on people with exposure to immigrants (proxied by having a friend or acquaintance who was born overseas), consistent with 'contact theory' (Allport 1954, Bentsen 2022). Further evidence of potential heterogeneous treatment effects is limited. Our narrative and quantitative information treatments tend to have similar effects across the political spectrum, in line with Haaland and Roth (2023), and in metropolitan and regional areas (i.e. rural areas and towns outside the greater capital regions).

Our first two contributions relate to the emerging body of research in economics and adjacent social sciences using information experiments to study migration. First, we focus on how one-shot narrative interventions can immediately change immigration policy preferences, and compare the effectiveness of these to a standard quantitative information treatment (Alesina et al. 2023, Grigorieff et al. 2020, Dylong and Uebelmesser 2024). The effects of narratives on policy preferences are understudied (Haaland et al. 2023) despite their pervasiveness in society, especially around immigration, which is often subject to emotive and slanted media reporting and public discourse (Barrera et al. 2020). The narrative treatment effects we find help inform how governments communicate immigration policies, and has broader applicability to standards of impartiality around media reporting.

Second, by comparing the effects of narratives that emphasise the costs and benefits of immigration on housing affordability in Australia, we also build on and extend recent work examining how support for immigration varies when highlighting immigrants' positive contributions (Facchini et al. 2022, Allen et al. 2024), impacts on the welfare state (Dylong and Uebelmesser 2024, Lergetporer et al. 2021), and personal economic circumstances (Haaland and Roth 2020, Lergetporer et al. 2021, Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Mayda 2006 and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). These results may be relevant to other countries where immigration and housing remain controversial, such as Canada (Mehler Paperny 2024).

Our remaining contributions relate to the evidence and contemporary policy debate on immigration in Australia. While public opinion survey experiments documenting attitudes towards immigration have been conducted extensively in other Western immigrant-receiving countries, such as the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany (e.g. Alesina et al. 2023, Allen et al. 2024, Grigorieff et al. 2020), to the best of our knowledge this is the first survey experiment on immigration in Australia, despite the global significance of the setting and salience of the issue domestically. Existing surveys covering migration, including the annual Scanlon Foundation Research Institute's

Mapping Social Cohesion study (O'Donnell 2023) and the Lowy Institute Poll (Neelam 2024), tend to only document current views on particular issues, and what causes these views and can shift them. Here, we offer the first rigorous assessment of the extent of misperceptions around immigration (Alesina et al. 2023) and preferences towards many aspects of immigration policy in Australia, and provide direct causal evidence on how these views may be changed. Finally, Pacific labour mobility and migration has for almost a decade been a bipartisan strategic priority for Australia, with major policy changes in recent years and likely significant further changes into the future. This paper offers the first careful measurement of public perceptions and policy preferences in Australia regarding Pacific migration, including on specific policy initiatives, and novel experimental evidence on what shifts these preferences relative to immigration policy preferences more generally.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the basis for public support or opposition to immigration, the Australian context, and how providing narrative or quantitative information might alter views on immigration. Section 3 details the questionnaire and experiment design. Section 4 documents the scale of misperceptions about immigration held by Australians, in aggregate and within different subgroups. Section 5 presents the experimental results and Section 6 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 How immigration's benefits and costs affect public support

International migration has long been considered by economists as broadly beneficial for both sending and receiving countries.[1] Just as freer markets and international trade are thought to facilitate the most efficient allocation of resources and therefore maximise economic output, the gains of removing barriers or distortions in the global labour market have been estimated to be around 50–150% of world GDP (Clemens 2011).[2]

Popular support for immigration in receiving countries is predicated on the perception that its benefits exceed its costs for the domestic population. Accepting immigrants has been shown to lift receiving countries' economic output by increasing the size of the working-age population, bringing more and complementary skills and filling labour shortages (IMF 2020, Borjas 1995). Benefits for productivity and innovation are also well-documented (Burchardi et al. 2021), with immigrants often bringing and creating fresh ideas (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010) and more trade and investment opportunities (Combes et al. 2005, Javorcik et al. 2011).

[1] Domestic or internal migration is also thought to be Pareto-improving (Lewis 1954), as is reflected in recent empirical evidence (e.g. Beegle et al. 2011).

[2] From the perspective of immigrants, emigration can lead to increased incomes and better lifestyles (e.g. McKenzie et al. (2010) find wage increases of above 250% in the case of Tongan workers migrating to New Zealand). The continued occurrence of immigration globally points to immigrants themselves both perceiving and realising the benefits of leaving through a revealed preferences approach.

Discussion of the costs of immigration typically focus on labour market competition (Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and the potential fiscal burden of immigrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, Gerber et al. 2017). Increasing labour supply could lower relative wages for competing workers in immigrant-receiving countries (Borjas 2003), though it may also increase relative wages for complementary workers (Borjas 2014). Empirical evidence on such wage impacts is largely inconclusive (Dustmann et al. 2016, Borjas 2003), with effects typically neutral or small in magnitude (Ottaviano and Peri 2012, Manacorda et al. 2012, Breunig et al. 2017). Evidence is similarly mixed on fiscal impacts but appears to be small globally (Hennessey and Hagen-Zanker 2020). In Australia, immigration has been shown to have minimal wage effects (Breunig et al. 2017) and increase labour productivity and the employment of Australian-born workers (OECD 2023, Crown et al. 2020). Immigrants in Australia also generate a large fiscal dividend in the long-run (Varela et al. 2021).

Another concern is the impact of increased immigration on housing prices (e.g. Daley et al. 2018, Mehler Paperny 2024, Kelly 2024, Day 2024, Johnson 2024 and Verrender 2023). Population growth—as a result of immigration or otherwise—may drive up demand and the price of housing if housing supply does grow commensurately, as recent evidence suggests may be the case in Australia (Moallemi and Melser 2019, Wokker and Swieringa 2016). Another compounding factor is 'group conflict theory', where groups facing economic insecurity in receiving-countries may see immigrants through the lens of 'ethnic competition' and consequently exhibit anti-immigration sentiments (Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Billiet et al. 2014).

Symbolic threats around culture and morals, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes may also influence views on immigration (Stephan et al. 1998, Zárate et al. 2004, Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Receiving country populations may perceive immigrants as threatening their society's values and national and cultural identity (Dražanová et al. 2024). Conversely, 'contact theory' suggests that direct contact can induce more favourable views of immigrants if contact occurs under optimal conditions (Bentsen 2022, Lebow et al. 2024), such as both groups being of relatively equal standing, having common goals, the occurrence of intergroup cooperation and support from authority or laws (Allport 1954). The relative importance of economic, social or cultural factors in driving people's attitudes of immigration remains contested. While several reviews emphasise the importance of social or cultural factors over personal economic circumstances (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, Dražanová et al. 2024), other studies argue the opposite (Mayda 2006).

2.2 Immigration to Australia: history and existing views

The first Australians were the indigenous Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (HREOC n.d.). Modern immigration to Australia began with the arrival of European convicts and settlers from 1788 (Parliament of New South Wales n.d.). Chinese immigrants followed soon after; labourers sought work at Australia's goldfields from

1850 until the outbreak of anti-Chinese racial violence,[3] and the enactment of the White Australia policy in 1901, which restricted immigration to Australia to largely Western sources until its abolishment in 1973 (Mo and Mo 1988, National Museum of Australia 2023, Boucher and Davidson 2019). Nonetheless, Australia pursued a 'populate or perish' policy in the wake of the Second World War, where immigrants, refugees and displaced people from Europe as well as 'Ten-Pound Poms' from the United Kingdom were allowed to migrate to Australia to boost population and strategic standing (National Museum of Australia 2022). Following the abolition of the White Australia policy, Australia has largely relied on a skills-based system to select potential (permanent) immigrants (Boucher and Davidson 2019). While precise selection methods have varied over time, Australia has maintained a list of occupations with demand for immigrants and used a points-based system to rank and select applicants (Boucher and Davidson 2019).

Separate to these arrangements, there has also been increasing policy interest in recent years in facilitating immigration from PICs through largely temporary labour mobility schemes. Salient recent developments include the launch of the Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV), which allows 3000 citizens from Pacific Island countries (PICs) and Timor-Leste to move permanently to Australia and receive benefits such as access to Medicare if they secure a job offer (DFAT n.d., Howes and Clarke 2024). The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty offers 280 permanent visas for Tuvaluans without any work requirement (Howes and Clarke 2024). There has also been significant movement around temporary immigration schemes, with the Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS) and Seasonal Work Program (SWP) merged into the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) scheme in 2022 (Love 2023) and many changes to the scheme since.

This long history of immigration has resulted in a substantial first and second generation immigrant population in Australia. Over 8 million people in Australia were born overseas (30.7% of the total population, ABS 2024), and close to half of all Australians (48.2%) have a parent that was born overseas (ABS 2022b) according to the 2021 Australian census. In 2019, Australia had the second-highest share of immigrants (30%) within the population amongst OECD countries, which is more than twice the OECD average of 14% (OECD 2023). Many recent immigrants have come from Asia—particularly China and India—with a significant cohort also coming from Europe (mostly from the United Kingdom) and New Zealand (ABS 2016a). Immigrants are typically more educated than Australian-born workers (Brell and Dustmann 2019).

Immigration has long been a controversial issue in Australia, especially in recent years. Increases in asylum seekers arriving by boat in the early 2010s led to widespread public debate and immigration policy changes (McAdam 2013). Following the Covid-19 pandemic, attention has turned towards high rates of net overseas migration into Australia following pandemic-led declines (Wind 2023). There has been particular interest in the number of international students migrating to study at Australian universities, and the effects of this and other types of immigration on inflation, house prices, rents and the economy at large (Kelly 2024, Day 2024, Johnson 2024 and Verrender 2023).

[3] E.g. the 1861 Lambing Flat riots (Mo and Mo 1988).

Mirroring these sentiments, surveys have shown that Australians remain ambivalent towards immigration. The annual Lowy Institute Poll shows that the share of Australians who think the total number of immigrants coming to Australia is 'too high' has increased from 37% to 48% over the last ten years (Neelam 2024 and Oliver 2014). Kassam (2019) found that between 40-48% of Australians agree with the statements 'immigrants are a burden on our social welfare system' and 'immigrants take away jobs from other Australians'. This is despite 67% also agreeing that 'overall, immigration has a positive impact on the economy of Australia' (Kassam 2019). 75-89% of respondents in the Scanlon Foundation's annual social cohesion survey agree that 'accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger' and 'multiculturalism has been good for Australia' (O'Donnell 2023).

2.3 Shifting people's attitudes to immigration

Providing information can change the views people express on immigration, and numerous other topics, by exogenously varying respondents' information sets (Stantcheva 2023, Haaland et al. 2023).[4] A key advantage of information experiments is introducing exogenous variation in perceptions of immigrants in lieu of changing the characteristics of immigrants themselves (Haaland et al. 2023). This may cause people to update their beliefs (Haaland et al. 2023), which may then change preferences and actions.[5]

Importantly, information provision is rarely in a vacuum. News and media coverage on immigration, amongst other topics, is often framed in different ways (Lawlor and Tolley 2017), which may affect people's views. These kinds of narratives can alter people's beliefs about the private and social costs and benefits (Bénabou et al. 2018) around immigration. For example, Schneider-Strawczynski and Valette (forthcoming) demonstrate that increasing the salience of immigration through increased news coverage polarises attitudes to immigration.

Interventions based on providing information have been conducted across many topics in economics, including inflation (e.g. Armantier et al. 2016, Coibion et al. 2022), inequality and redistribution (Kuziemko et al. 2015), health (Alsan and Eichmeyer 2024) and female labour force participation (Bursztyn et al. 2020). The empirical evidence on how information provision affects attitudes towards immigration specifically is mixed. In regards to quantitative information provision, Grigorieff et al. (2020) show that providing information about the characteristics of immigrants in receiving countries results in more positive attitudes towards immigrants. Dylong and Uebelmesser (2024) find that providing different types of information about immigrants reduces concerns about the impact of immigrants on the welfare state. Haaland and Roth (2020) show that informing respondents of research evidence that there are no adverse labour market effects from immigration improves support for immigration. Conversely, Hopkins et al. (2019) find

[4] In addition to the information itself, the *source* of such information can also change people's views (Coibion et al. 2022).

[5] Those with the greatest uncertainty recorded in the perceptions part of the survey should be the most responsive to the information treatment, consistent with Bayesian updating (Armantier et al. 2016).

little impact from presenting accurate, quantitative information about immigration on attitudes, despite people's beliefs becoming more accurate. This suggests that attitudes to immigration may be formed early in life, reinforced over time, and difficult to change. We extend this work to by comparing the effects of quantitative information provision to effects from exposure to narratives.

A subset of immigration information experiments show that emphasising immigrants' contributions to receiving countries improves support for immigration. Allen et al. (2024) use text, visualisations and video to demonstrate the positive economic impacts of immigrants to the United Kingdom to survey respondents and find that this improves both attitudes towards and policy preferences around immigration. Similarly, Facchini et al. (2022) demonstrate that subtly providing information on immigrants' contributions to solving social and economic problems increases support for immigration. Here we compare whether such effects differ to those from emphasising the costs of immigration for receiving countries, as is often more common in public discussions, or providing neutral quantitative information on current immigrants' characteristics.

3 Survey design and implementation

People's perceptions of and attitudes towards immigration are largely intangible: not fully captured by observing behaviour, thus requiring survey data (Stantcheva 2023). We conduct an online survey of 5,282 respondents in Australia. The survey was fielded between 10–27 September 2024 by the multinational market research firm Ipsos, using a randomly selected sample from its pre-existing 'panel' of respondents at least 18 years old and residing in Australia.[6] Participation was voluntary, with respondents free to withdraw at any time (including after completion) and rewarded with credits (redeemable for gift cards and vouchers) for completion of the survey. It took the median respondent just under 10 minutes to finish the survey.[7]

Respondents were representative of Australia's adult population by gender, state and territory, and capital city and regional areas. The proportion of respondents who were born overseas (29.8%) is similar to that in the general population (30.7%, ABS 2024), as is the proportion of respondents with at least one parent born overseas (49.2% in the sample compared to 48.2% in the general population, ABS 2022b). A larger proportion of the sample (44.8%) however have a bachelor degree or higher than the general population (21.5%, ABS 2022c and ABS 2022d). The sample is also somewhat skewed towards high-income earners compared to the distribution of individual gross annual income in Australia recorded in the 2021 census (see Table A1), as expected with an online survey and predetermined pool of respondents. Sample statistics by experimental group are shown in Table 1.

[6]Panel is the term the firm uses to refer to this pool of potential respondents which they maintain, as distinct from a panel data structure.

[7]The mean completion time was 17.2 minutes. Figure A2 shows the full distribution of time spent by respondents on completing the survey.

3.1 Survey structure

The survey includes three sets of questions: socio-demographics, perceptions of immigrants' characteristics, and immigration policy preferences. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the survey and staging of its embedded experimental treatments. The complete survey text is provided in Appendix D.

Section 1: Socio-demographics. The survey begins with questions on respondents' gender, age, location, income, educational attainment, employment status, and political orientation. Two additional questions measure exposure to immigration: 1) whether respondents or their parents were born overseas, and 2) if they have any friends or acquaintances who were born outside of Australia. All variables generated from these socio-demographic questions are categorical.

Section 2: Perceptions of immigrants in Australia. The second section asks respondents to report their perceptions of the number of immigrants in Australia, both overall and with particular characteristics. These questions were designed so responses could be compared to Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data, including the population census, to measure the accuracy of respondents' perceptions of immigration to Australia in comparison to reality. To allow comparisons with other major Western immigrant-receiving countries, many questions are adapted from Alesina et al. (2023).

We begin by asking a set of questions on recent immigrant *flows*. We first ask how many immigrants respondents think arrived in and left Australia a) recently, between July 2022 and June 2023, and b) over the last ten years or so. This allows us to compare participants' responses to actual data on arrivals and departures of immigrants over these periods from the ABS (available up to June 2023). We then ask respondents to estimate how many out of every 100 immigrants who arrived in Australia in the last ten years or so came on a temporary visa, and how many were full-time students (specifically for immigrants aged between 15 and 64 years).

The next set of questions focus on immigrant *stocks*. We nominate 'the last ten years or so' as a temporal reference point throughout this section to ground respondents' thinking and ensure responses are as comparable to 2016 census data as possible. We ask respondents how many out of every 100 immigrants aged 15-64 years are a) high-skilled (having a bachelor degree or higher) and b) employed (full-time or part-time), unemployed, or out of the labour force.[8] We also ask respondents to estimate the median or average income for immigrants aged 15 years or older. For these questions, we provide domestic benchmarks relating to the whole Australian population from the 2016 census, following Grigorieff et al. (2020).[9] This reduces measurement error in how respondents interpret the questions (Haaland et al. 2023), while further allowing us to measure perceived differences between the immigrant and broader Australian populations.[10]

[8]The question on employment status requires respondents to allocate 100 points across the three categories, with responses required to sum to 100.

[9]We mostly use data from the 2016 rather than the 2021 census to avoid any potential bias from the Covid-19 pandemic, which affected immigration levels and composition at the time.

[10]Further information on the construction of these domestic benchmarks can be found in Appendix C.

Finally, we ask respondents to estimate a) the proportion of people in Australia born overseas and b) for every hundred immigrants in Australia, how many come from: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific Islands region, and the rest of Oceania (including New Zealand).[11]

All data generated from this section of the survey are continuous, as respondents estimate numbers and proportions. As all respondents answer these questions before receiving any treatment, we use the full sample of 5,282 respondents to generate more precise estimates of misperceptions.

Treatments. At this point in the survey (i.e. after the first two sections on socio-demographics and perceptions but before the third section on policy preferences), participants were randomly allocated into one of four different treatment groups or to a control group receving no treatment. Three treatment groups received one of three different once-off, narrative information vignettes on the perceived costs or benefits of immigration on housing affordability (discussed further in Section 3.2). The fourth treatment group received factually correct quantitative information on immigrants' characteristics immediately before most immigration policy preferences questions (i.e. on the same screen). The fourth treatment is best considered as a bundle of information to inform their responses to all questions in Section 3 (cf. any specific question).

Section 3: immigration policy preferences. The third section of the survey asks respondents for their views on what Australia's immigration policy should look like going forward. First, we ask respondents to share their opinions on the current number of immigrants coming to Australia, and how many temporary, permanent, student, high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants Australia should accept going forward. We also ask respondents how many immigrants should be accepted from different regions. Response options are along a bipolar five-point scale: '*a lot more, more, no change, less, and a lot less*'. '*No change*' functions as the implicit 'zero point' on the scale (Stantcheva, 2023) and a '*don't know*' option is provided for each question.

The second set of questions in this part of the survey focuses on policy preferences specifically around immigration from the PICs to Australia, given the recent emphasis placed on this immigration channel in recent years by successive federal governments. Here, we ask a) whether Australia should relax visa requirements for PICs citizens to make it easier for them to migrate both temporarily and permanently;[12] b) how many Pacific immigrants Australia should accept under the new Pacific Engagement Visa, a new permanent immigration lottery; and c) whether agreements such as the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty, a more general open labour market access and security agreement, should be expanded or reduced in the Pacific.[13]

[11] Similar to the employment status question, answers for each region must sum to 100.

[12] These questions are adapted from the 2024 Lowy Institute Poll (Neelam 2024).

[13] Further details on the response options for these questions, which differ in some cases to other policy preference questions, can be found in Appendix D.

In addition to asking respondents about their own policy preferences and views, we also ask respondents what view they think most Australians hold. This allows us to compare how the policy preferences espoused by respondents compare to their perceptions of preferences in the country more broadly. The response options for these questions are the same five-point bipolar answer scale as when respondents share their own views, except with the '*don't know*' option changed to '*Don't know what most Australians' views are*'.[14] All questions in this third and final section of the survey generate ordinal (categorical) data.

3.2 Experimental treatment arms and staging

We embed a 'between-subject' randomised experiment in the survey, where every respondent is subject only to one experimental condition (Stantcheva 2023). Three groups received a different once-off narrative information treatment, a fourth group received a bundle of quantitative information on immigrants' characteristics, and a control group received no treatment.[15] The narrative information treatments are provided before the third section of the survey on policy preferences, while the quantitative information bundle is provided directly in front of relevant questions in the same section.

3.2.1 Narrative information treatments on housing and immigration

Does emphasising the perceived costs or benefits of immigration on housing affordability in Australia change immigration policy preferences? To test this, treated respondents are shown one of three narrative 'vignettes' in Box 1. Each provides a positive, balanced or negative narrative on how immigration affects housing and was drawn directly from news articles published by different Australian media outlets in 2024.[16] Importantly, respondents are not shown the name of the media outlets to avoid (a) potential treatment effects from different sources of information (Coibion et al. 2022), and (b) any perceptions of bias based on respondents' prior beliefs around each outlet.

Treatment 1 in Box 1 is an excerpt from an ABC News article telling respondents that immigrants are responsible for only a small proportion of house purchases in Australia (Khadem 2024).[17] This 'balanced' narrative seeks to provide respondents with a balanced and neutral representation of the connection between immigration and housing as presented by the Australian media.

[14] This aims to avoid confusion from respondents thinking that most Australians don't have a clear view on a particular issue, compared to respondents themselves not knowing what the views of most Australians are.

[15] All treated participants only received one treatment: participants receiving one of the narrative information treatments did not receive the quantitative information treatment, and participants receiving the quantitative information treatment did not receive narrative information.

[16] While there is a risk of 'information equivalence'—i.e. different people may interpret narrative and quantitative information differently to how one expects the experimental treatment to change views (Stantcheva 2023, Dafoe et al. 2018)—vignettes were designed to be as unequivocal as possible to minimise this risk.

[17] The ABC is Australia's national public interest broadcaster, similar to the BBC in the United Kingdom and the PBS in the United States.

Box 1: Narrative information treatment vignettes

Treatment 1: 'balanced' narrative

Foreign demand for Aussie property running hot, but it's just a fraction of Australia's lucrative real estate market

"The latest data from the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) shows foreign buyers made 5,360 house purchases worth a total of $4.9 billion in 2022–23, compared to 4,228 worth $3.9 billion in 2021–22. But foreigners still make up only 1 per cent of all house purchases in Australia."

Treatment 2: 'negative' narrative

Worrying number of immigrants arriving in Australia every week - and why it's bad news for our housing crisis

"House prices in Australia's capital cities have surged by up to 20 per cent in the past year as immigration hit an all-time high. Property values are now at record levels in Perth, Adelaide and Brisbane, while Sydney is only 1.4 per cent below its peak two years ago."

Treatment 3: 'positive' narrative

Foreign tradies wanted to fix housing shortfall

"Australia will fall well short of its target to build 1.2 million homes over five years and should consider boosting the intake from overseas of construction workers to help solve the problem, according to economists."

Treatment 2 combines a headline and an excerpt from two separate news articles published by the Daily Mail Australia (Day 2024 and Johnson 2024). This 'negative' narrative emphasises that an increasing number of immigrants are coming to Australia while house prices are rising, implies a causal relationship and exemplifies a potential 'cost' associated with immigration for receiving country populations.

Treatment 3 is taken from a news article published by the Australian Financial Review (Lenaghan 2024). This 'positive' narrative highlights the lack of housing supply in Australia, and that immigrants could make a positive contribution towards building more houses. This is designed to highlight a potential 'benefit' for the receiving country population.

Figure A3 shows the distribution of time spent reading the narrative information treatment vignettes. The median respondent who received one of the three narrative treatments spent 19 seconds reading a given vignette; the mean time spent reading a given vignette was 42 seconds.

3.2.2 Quantitative information treatment on immigrants' characteristics

The quantitative information treatment group received a bundle of factually correct quantitative information on the current number and composition of Australian immigrants from the 2016 population census and other ABS data.[18] The quantitative information treatment differs from the narrative information treatment vignettes in length and frequency. The narrative vignettes are significantly shorter than the information treatment and provided in one 'short and sharp dose', while the information treatment is provided in front of all relevant questions in the third section of the survey on Australia's immigration policy going forward (i.e. on the same screen; see Appendix D).

3.3 Survey design issues

Statistical power. Each of the treatment and control groups (five groups in total) is approximately equal sized to maximise power (Duflo et al. 2007). The smallest group comprised 1,054 respondents, implying that we have 80% power to detect a treatment effect of 12.2% of a standard deviation at a 5% significance level.[19] Our power exceeds the recommended benchmark in Haaland et al. (2023) of a minimum detectable treatment effect of 15% of a standard deviation, and consequently a sample size of 700 or more respondents per treatment arm.

Defining immigrants. We provide the following definition of migrants throughout the survey to ensure respondents have a common understanding of who immigrants are:

"By 'migrants', we mean people who have come from overseas to Australia on a visa and have stayed or intended to stay for 12 months or more. This includes people who were born overseas and have since become Australian citizens."

The definition excludes short-term overseas visitors to Australia, defined by the ABS as "temporary visa holders who indicated in the census that they usually lived in another country and were visiting Australia for less than one year" (ABS 2023a). It instead focuses on temporary and permanent immigrant residents defined by the ABS as "temporary visa holders who either have stayed or intended to stay in Australia for twelve months or more" (ABS 2023a) and "people who have migrated to Australia under a permanent Skill, Family, Humanitarian or Other Permanent visa stream" (ABS 2018).

Maximising attention and engagement. We take six steps to maximise the extent to which respondents pay attention and provide well-considered answers. First, we randomise or randomly flip the order of responses shown for questions on the survey screen to ensure respondents do not select the same response option on all questions to finish the survey quickly (e.g. selecting the first response option of 'a lot more' for many questions in a row).[20] The random flipping of response orders was kept consistent

[18] Details on the construction of the quantitative information treatment can be found in Appendix C.

[19] This is in line with other immigration information survey experiments; for example, Alesina et al. (2023) are powered to detect a treatment effect of approximately 7% of a standard deviation at the same levels of power and significance.

[20] Specific examples include randomising the order in which regions are listed when respondents are asked to estimate the proportion of immigrants born by region and randomising the order in which

for individual respondents to avoid confusion. For example, respondent A would receive the ordering '*a lot more, more, no change, less, a lot less*' throughout the survey, while respondent B would receive the ordering '*a lot less, less, no change, more, a lot more*' throughout.

Second, we vary the on-screen formatting of questions and other text (e.g. information treatment or other expository text). Question text was always bolded and key information for the treatment or otherwise was put into a box to separate it from the question. The amount of text for each question was also minimised to retain attention.

Third, we include tools to assist respondents with their answers for questions that require numerical answers summing to 100.[21] These include providing a reference to the '100 points' that respondents must allocate and adding a feature that automatically sums numerical responses as they are entered in. More cognitively demanding questions requiring respondents to estimate the number of immigrants with a particular characteristic were also placed towards the start of the survey.

Fourth, to ensure respondents take sufficient time to digest the narrative vignettes, a 10 second delay prevents respondents from progressing to the next survey screen while the vignettes are being shown.

Fifth, we include a reminder for respondents to give their best attempt at answering a question even if they don't know the answer. The prompt "*Even if you're not sure, please give your best guess.*" appears on all screens. We further provide an option for respondents to report '*don't know*' as a response to all questions, to avoid respondents selecting options that do not reflect their genuine beliefs (Stantcheva 2023).[22]

Finally, 'time stamps' in the survey back-end allow measure how long respondents take to complete each section. This allows us to see whether individual respondents are (a) spending enough time on the survey to be giving well-considered responses and (b) paying attention to the various information treatments.[23]

4 Measuring (mis)perceptions about immigrants

Our first set of results quantify misperceptions about immigrants, defined as the difference between perceptions held by survey respondents and immigrants' actual characteristics in ABS data (Alesina et al. 2023). We measure these differences across different types of

various employment statuses are provided; and randomly flipping the order of response options along a scale between these two orderings:'*a lot more, more, no change, less, a lot less*' and '*a lot less, less, no change, more, a lot more*'.

[21] These questions are on where immigrants in Australia were born or the proportion of immigrants who were employed.

[22] The exact format of the '*don't know*' response option varies across questions; in some questions, respondents can provide a '*don't know*' response to one subsection of a question, while in others they can only provide a '*don't know*' response for all subsections of questions. For questions where we ask respondents to select the option that best describes the view of most Australians, the '*don't know*' response option is changed to '*don't know what most Australians' views are*' to avoid confusion.

[23] See Figures A2 and A3 for details.

immigrant flows and stocks, including immigrants' labour market attributes and origins.[24] These results provide a baseline of how well-informed people are and complement the experimental results presented later in the paper.

We use the full sample of 5,282 survey respondents to calculate misperceptions, as all respondents answer these questions before receiving any treatments. Respondents who nominate '*don't know*' are excluded when comparing perceptions to actual figures. We consider misperceptions within two sets of variables:

1. Recent *flows* of immigrants to Australia[25]
    (a) Arrivals and departures of immigrants i.e. net overseas migration, i) recently (July 2022–June 2023) and ii) over the last ten years or so
    (b) Proportion of immigrants who arrived on temporary visas over the last ten years or so
    (c) Proportion of immigrants aged 15–64 years who are full-time students
2. The *stock* of immigrants in Australia:
    (a) Proportion of immigrants who are high-skilled (bachelor degree or higher)
    (b) Proportion of immigrants who are employed (full-time or part-time), unemployed or out of the labour force
    (c) Median (average) income of immigrants aged 15+ years
    (d) Proportion of people in Australia born overseas
    (e) Proportion of immigrants in Australia born in different regions

4.1 Main misperceptions results

We find that respondents hold large and often conflicting misperceptions around the numbers, origins and labour market characteristics of immigrants in Australia. As Figure 2 shows, misperceptions vary in size and direction, with some of the largest (in relative percentage terms) relating to where immigrants come from. Further details of average perceptions of respondents are presented in Table 2. Additional summary statistics and response distributions are provided at Table A1 and Appendix B.

A significant proportion of respondents responded '*don't know*' to perceptions questions (see Table A1), suggesting that many people know that they lack an accurate understanding of immigrants' characteristics. The highest rate of '*don't know*' answers was recorded for questions on how many immigrants arrived and departed from Australia across various time periods, where '*don't know*' responses accounted for between 40-54% of all responses. Respondents were more confident in answering questions on immigrants'

[24] Appendix C details how we construct measures of actual immigrants' characteristics.

[25] See section 3.3 below for a detailed explanation of how we define immigrants consistently throughout the survey for respondents.

labour market characteristics and origins. For these questions, '*don't know*' responses accounted for between 21-30% of all responses provided.

Misperceptions of immigrant flows. Figure 2 shows that respondents overestimated the number of immigrants arriving in Australia over the last ten years or so, but underestimated the scale of the recent post-Covid boom in immigration. Respondents' estimates of immigrant arrivals were on average 57% lower than ABS estimates for the period July 2022–June 2023. Respondents also underestimated immigrant departures in this period by 36%. Taken together, this led to an underestimate of net overseas immigration in the 2022–23 financial year of 61%. When considering immigration over the last decade or so (July 2013–June 2023), respondents instead overestimated the number of immigrants who arrived in Australia by 20%. Underestimates of immigrant departures in this period (31%) were of a similar magnitude to those in the last year (36%). Altogether, respondents overestimated levels of net overseas migration over the last ten years by 59%.

Turning to specific visa types, respondents underestimated the number of immigrants arriving in Australia on temporary visas and significantly overestimated the proportion of immigrants who are full-time students (for those aged 15–64 years). On average, respondents estimated that 57% of immigrants arrived in Australia on temporary visas, compared to an actual proportion of 78%. Respondents further posited that 38% of immigrants aged 15-64 years old were full-time students, almost double the actual proportion of 20% recorded in the 2016 Australian census.

Misperceptions of immigrant stocks. Respondents underestimated the extent to which immigrants are highly-skilled (i.e. have a bachelor degree or higher) by 12%. This underestimate is smaller than those recorded in the United States and United Kingdom but larger than those in major immigrant-receiving countries in mainland Europe (e.g. France, Germany and Sweden, Alesina et al. 2023).

Turning to immigrants' labour market outcomes, respondents underestimated the proportion of immigrants employed full-time by 12% and overestimated the proportion of immigrants in part-time employment by 22%. The magnitude of misperceptions around the proportion of immigrants who are unemployed is however much higher. On average, respondents believed that 15% of immigrants were unemployed, compared to 6% in the 2016 census. In other words, respondents thought that immigrants were close to two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than they actually are. Respondents also perceive immigrants' median earnings per week to be 26% higher than they actually are, despite overestimating immigrant unemployment.

Though these misperceptions appear large, they are smaller than that recorded in other Western immigrant-receiving countries. Alesina et al. (2023), for instance, find that respondents in the United States, United Kingdom and Germany on average report perceptions that 26%, 27% and 39% respectively of immigrants in each country are unemployed, compared to actual immigrant unemployment rates of around 5.5-7%.

In line with respondents overestimating immigrant arrivals in the last ten years, respondents also report a higher proportion of the Australian population being born overseas (42.8%) than is recorded by the ABS (30.7%, ABS 2024). This overestimate is slightly smaller than beliefs around the share of immigrants in other Western receiving countries (Alesina et al. 2023).

Misperceptions about where immigrants come from are amongst the largest of all mistaken beliefs around immigrants' characteristics reported by respondents. The lower section of Figure 2 shows that respondents overestimated representation of immigrants from all regions except Europe and Asia (underestimates of 55% and 32%,respectively). The scale of misperceptions is substantially larger for other regions. Respondents estimated that 9% and 15% of immigrants in Australia were born in PICs and the Middle East regions, compared to true values of 2% and 5%. People in Australia perceive there to be 2–3 times the number of immigrants from the Pacific and the Middle East than there actually are. Respondents also thought that there were close to 75% more immigrants from Africa, the Americas and the rest of Oceania (including New Zealand and excluding PICs) than there are in reality.

Comparing perceptions of immigrants to the domestic population. To evaluate the differences respondents perceive between immigrants and the domestic population at large, we compare average estimates of immigrants' characteristics to the benchmarks for the whole population provided in the survey (Grigorieff et al. 2020). Respondents thought that a much larger proportion of immigrants aged 15–64 were full-time students (38%) than in the whole population this age (13%), and that a higher proportion of immigrants had a bachelor degree or higher (i.e. high-skilled, 34%) than the domestic population as a whole (28%). Respondents believed immigrant unemployment rates were higher (15% compared to 5.6%) but that the median income of a immigrant aged 15 years or older (over the last ten years or so) was higher than that of the median person aged 15 years or older ($775 per week compared to $662 per week).

4.2 Do misperceptions vary by respondent type?

Do the size and direction of misperceptions vary across respondents with different levels of exposure to immigration, political alignments and locations? Table A2 shows that the direction of misperceptions (i.e. whether respondents over- or underestimate immigrants' characteristics) are remarkably stable across different types of respondents and immigrant characteristics. There is some variation in the size of misperceptions, but these differences are generally small.

To test whether misperceptions vary by exposure to immigration in line with 'contact theory' (e.g. Allport 1954 and Bentsen 2022), we compare the size of misperceptions for those who report having a friend or acquaintance who was born overseas (i.e. have been exposed to immigration), and those who don't. Respondents who reported *not* having a friend or acquaintance born overseas reported larger overestimates of the proportions of immigrants born in PICs and the Middle East, and overestimated the

proportion of unemployed immigrants by 40 percentage points more than respondents overall (and 50 percentage points more than respondents who reported having a friend who was born overseas). Respondents without exposure to migration also reported larger underestimates of the number of immigrants who departed Australia over the last ten years or so.

To elicit respondents' political alignment, we ask respondents which major party they would be most likely to vote for at the next federal election.[26] Right-leaning respondents tended to report larger overestimates of the proportion of immigrants unemployed or from the Middle East, as well as larger overestimates of immigrant arrivals over the last ten years or so (30%) than left-leaning respondents (7%). Left-leaning respondents underestimated the recent post-pandemic boom in arrivals more than right-leaning respondents.

Respondents from regional (i.e. rural) areas reported larger overestimates of immigrant arrivals and therefore net overseas migration over the last ten years or so compared to respondents in metropolitan areas. Regional respondents also overestimated the proportion of immigrants from PICs more than metropolitan respondents (358% for regional respondents compared to 295% for metropolitan respondents), as well as from Africa. Respondents in metropolitan areas reported slightly larger overestimates of the proportion of immigrants (aged 15–64 years) who are full-time students.

5 Changing immigration policy preferences

5.1 Estimation of treatment effects

As treatments in the survey experiment are randomly assigned, causal effects are simply the differences in average policy preferences between each treatment group and the control. We estimate the four treatment effects with the equation:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_1 + \beta_2 T_2 + \beta_3 T_3 + \beta_4 T_4 + \Pi \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where Y_i is an outcome variable representing the policy preferences of respondent i (i.e. support or otherwise for immigration). T_j are binary treatment indicators where $j = 1, ..., 4$ for each treatment arm. $\mathbf{X}_i$ includes respondent's educational attainment (if they have a bachelor degree or higher), political alignment (defined as leaning left, right or other), whether the respondent is born overseas and if at least one parent of the respondent is born overseas. These covariates are chosen to address slight imbalances between the treatment and control groups (Table 1) and increase the precision of estimates.[27] Standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary heteroskedasticity throughout.

[26] Full details are available in the survey questionnaire text in Appendix D. We collapse responses into a categorical variable with 'right-leaning' (those who responded *Liberal party*, *The Nationals* or *One Nation*), 'left-leaning' (*Labor party* or *The Greens*), and 'other' (people who responded *Other party* or *Independent*).

[27] Estimates including all socio-demographic variables or none yield similar results, as expected with

We estimate the impacts of each information treatment on two sets of outcomes. The first set of outcomes focuses on how many of the following types of immigrants Australia should accept, with response options in parentheses:

1. Total number of immigrants coming to Australia each year *(too high, about right, too low)*
2. Temporary *(a lot more, more, no change, less, a lot less)*
3. Permanent *(a lot more, more, no change, less, a lot less)*
4. Full-time students *(a lot more, more, no change, less, a lot less)*
5. Low-skilled (no bachelor degree) *(a lot more, more, no change, less, a lot less)*
6. High-skilled (bachelor degree or higher) *(a lot more, more, no change, less, a lot less)*

The second set of outcomes centres on immigration from PICs:

1. Whether Australia should relax visa requirements for PICs citizens on i) temporary and ii) permanent immigration *(relax visa requirements, no change, make visa requirements stricter)*
2. How many permanent Pacific immigrants should be accepted under the Pacific Engagement Visa[28] *(a lot more, more, no change, less, a lot less)*
3. Whether arrangements like the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union[29] should be extended to other PICs *(expanded to all PICs, expanded to some PICs, no expansion, reduction from Tuvalu)*

We estimate Equation 1 with a simple linear probability model to recover easily interpretable average treatment effects. To do so, ordinal (categorical) dependent variables are collapsed into binary indicators of 'support' for immigration (Wood and Hoy 2022).[30] Our first definition of 'support' focuses on whether respondents express a preference for *more* immigration. Since most policy preference questions in the survey have the ordinal response options '*a lot more, more, no change, less, a lot less*', a binary 'support' indicator takes the value of 1 if a respondent answers '*a lot more*' or '*more*' immigration, and 0 if a respondent answers '*no change*', '*less*' or '*a lot less*'.[31] For

random assignment.

[28]The Pacific Engagement Visa is a new permanent immigration lottery not dissimilar to the Diversity Visa in the United States and the Pacific Access Category in New Zealand.

[29]The Falepili Union is a broader open labour market and security agreement between Australia and Tuvalu.

[30]Ordered logistic regression results, where the dependent variable is not collapsed, are also provided in Section 5.4. Results are similar.

[31]The binary variable showing support for more *total* immigration takes the value of 1 if respondents report that the total number of immigrants coming to Australia is '*too low*', and 0 if they select the options '*about right*' or '*too high*'.

questions on temporary and permanent immigration from the Pacific, which have different response options, the binary outcome variable of support for *more* immigration takes the value of 1 if respondents choose '*relax visa requirements*' and 0 for '*no change*' or '*make visa requirements stricter*'. Similarly, with regard to questions on agreements like the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union, the binary outcome variable for support of *more* immigration equals 1 if respondents report that agreements like it should be '*expanded to all Pacific Island countries (PICs)*' or '*expanded to only some more PICs*', and 0 if respondents choose '*kept the same*' or '*not expanded*'.

Our second definition of 'support' for immigration accounts for Australia's comparatively high immigration levels, where expressing a preference for the status quo (e.g. by selecting *'no change'*) could indicate support for immigration. For the majority of the policy preference questions, the binary outcome variable associated with this broader definition of support for immigration levels staying the same or increasing assigns the value of 1 if a respondent answers '*a lot more*', '*more*' or '*no change*', and 0 if a respondent answers '*less*' or '*a lot less*'. For Pacific immigration questions with different response options, this second indicator equals 1 when respondents choose '*kept the same*'.

5.2 Baseline policy preferences

We begin by considering the policy preferences reported by the 1,055 respondents randomly assigned to the control group, who receive no treatments. These can be considered as a baseline representing the migration policy preferences of people in Australia, given the nationally representative nature of the sample.[32]

Overall, control group respondents expressed a preference for fewer migrants to be accepted by Australia, both in total and for migrants with various characteristics. It was only for high-skilled migrants that '*more*' migration was the most frequently nominated response option. Respondents had stronger opinions on migration writ large to Australia as compared to migration from Pacific Island countries; a higher proportion of respondents chose '*no change*', '*keep the same*' or '*don't know*' to questions relating to Pacific migration than for other types of migration.

Preferences for total immigration and by immigrant type. Figure 3 plots the policy preferences of the 1,055 control group respondents around different types of immigrants. 53.0% of control group respondents reported that the total number of migrants coming to Australia each year is '*too high*', a similar level to results from the 2024 Lowy Institute Poll (48%, Neelam 2024). 34.7% responded that current levels were '*about right*', 4.6% believed current levels were '*too low*' and 7.8% of respondents responded '*don't know*'.

[32]These do not necessarily represent the policy preferences of Australian *citizens* but rather people in Australia.

45.9% of control group respondents favoured '*less*' or '*a lot less*' temporary immigrants being accepted by Australia, and 49.6% wanted '*less*' or '*a lot less*' permanent immigrants. However, '*no change*' was the most common response (28.0%) for temporary immigration and the second most common response (23.7%) for permanent immigration.

One third of control group respondents (33.7%) reported a preference for the number of full-time student immigrants to stay the same, making '*no change*' the most common response option. 35% would prefer '*less*' or '*a lot less*' full-time student immigrants compared to 24% who would like '*more*' or '*a lot more*'.

The largest divergence in policy preferences amongst control group respondents was around skilled immigration. 44.2% of respondents thought Australia should accept '*more*' or '*a lot more*' high-skilled immigrants, while just 11.9% of respondents preferred '*more*' or '*a lot more*' low-skilled immigrants. Conversely, 58.3% of respondents wanted '*less*' or '*a lot less*' low-skilled immigration, while 20.9% of respondents preferred reduced high-skilled immigration. The share of respondents who reported '*no change*' was high for both high- and low-skilled immigration, (27.8% and 22.2%). This result is consistent with evidence from the United States, where workers tend to be more supportive of high-skilled immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).

Immigration from PICs. Figure 4 shows that control group respondents largely indicated a preference for policy settings to remain the same for immigration specifically from PICs. '*No change*' or '*keep the same*' was the most frequent response for all Pacific immigration questions, with these options more common for Pacific questions than for immigration writ large. Around one third of respondents responded '*no change*' or '*keep the same*' to questions around whether visa requirements should be relaxed for permanent and temporary immigration for PICs citizens, and if arrangements such as the Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV) and Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union should be expanded.

The remaining two thirds of respondents were almost equally split between '*relax visa requirements*' and '*make visa requirements stricter*' in relation to both permanent and temporary immigration from PICs and on more specific arrangements like the PEV. While 38.5% of respondents supported expanding agreements like the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union to either some or all PICs, the proportion of control group respondents choosing '*don't know*' was the highest for this question amongst all immigration policy preference questions in the survey. Notably, a higher proportion of respondents answered '*don't know*' on questions relating to Pacific immigration than on questions about broader immigration policy settings, suggesting a more limited exposure to or understanding of immigration from the Pacific amongst the general public.

Respondents' views compared to their perceptions of the view of most Australians. In addition to asking respondents to report their own policy preferences, we asked them to select the response option that they believe best describes the view of most Australians. Figures A4 and A5 show that respondents think others in Australia prefer less immigration than they actually do. Across all types of immigration, respondents overestimated the extent to which people preferred '*less*' or '*a lot less*' immigration, and underestimated the extent to which people wanted '*more*' or '*a lot more*'.

5.3 Experimental results

5.3.1 Effects on support for more immigration

The effects of both types of treatments on support for *more* immigration are shown in Tables 3 and 4, as well as Figures 5 and 6.[33] Overall, the experimental results suggest that respondents' views on immigration policy can be shifted—at least in the short-term—by exposing them to different narratives about immigration's impact on housing, or a bundle of quantitative factual information. Alerting respondents to the benefits of immigration narratively appears to be more effective at increasing support for more immigration than providing quantitative information, despite the short and once-off nature of the narrative treatments. In contrast, showing respondents a narrative around the 'negative' impacts of immigration on house prices does not seem to decrease support for more immigration by much. Thus, at least when it comes to support for more immigration, responses appear to be highly asymmetric, potentially as the general public narrative around the time of the survey tended to be quite negative. Although narrative information generally has larger effects than quantitative information, the exception to this is Pacific migration policy, where preferences are more sensitive to the provision of quantitative information than narratives. This is likely to reflect limited awareness around this narrow but important aspect of Australia's immigration policy.

Changes in preferences for total immigration and by immigrant type. Figure 5 shows that the likelihood of expressing support for increased levels of total immigration rose amongst respondents who were exposed to the 'balanced' narrative, the 'positive' narrative and the quantitative information treatment. The increase in the probability of support for more total immigration was largest (4.5 percentage points (pp)) among those who received the 'positive' narrative that highlighted the contribution immigrants could make towards solving housing affordability (see Column 1 of Table 3, and the bottom left coefficient plotted in Figure 5).[34] Column 1 of Table 3 shows that the 'balanced' narrative and quantitative information treatments generated 3.7pp and 2.3pp increases respectively in the likelihood of support for more immigration in aggregate. The effects of the 'balanced' and 'positive' narratives effects are precisely estimated (statistically significant at the 1% level) and remain statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels using Anderson (2008) sharpened q-values to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing (the fourth row for each explanatory variable in Table 3). The effect of quantitative information is statistically insignificant when considering sharpened q-values.

The group exposed to the 'positive' narrative information treatment were also more likely to support more temporary and permanent immigration (7.1pp and 5.6pp increases), while the 'balanced' narrative did not meaningfully affect support for either (columns 2 and 3 of Table 3). The quantitative information treatment drove a 4.3pp

[33] Estimates for covariates (excluding q-values) are available in Appendix A Table A9.

[34] Tables A3 and A4 show that the 'positive' narrative information treatment induces a statistically significant larger increase in the likelihood of supporting more temporary, high-skill and total immigration than the quantitative information treatment.

increase in support for higher levels of permanent immigration (statistically significant at the 5% level) and the 'negative' narrative decreased the likelihood of preferring more permanent immigration by 3.5pp (imprecisely estimated). Views on the number of permanent immigrants Australia should accept are more malleable than views on temporary immigration.

Only the 'balanced' narrative information treatment had a positive effect (3.8 pp) on support for Australia accepting more full-time student immigrants, but this is imprecisely estimated (column 4 of Table 3). A potential explanation could be the 'balanced' narrative countering the often espoused view that students are partly responsible for rising housing costs, rentals and purchases. That the 'negative' and 'positive' narratives had no discernible effect on the preferred number of full-time student immigrants may also reflect respondents understanding that most international students are not in the position to buy or contribute to building property in Australia.

The final two columns of Table 3 consider high and low skilled immigration. The 'balanced' narrative increased the probability of supporting more low-skilled immigration by 4.8pp, while the 'positive' narrative increased the likelihood of support for high-skilled immigration by 6.0pp. The 'negative' narrative decreased how likely respondents were to support more high-skilled immigration by 4.0pp, but this effect is less precisely estimated.

Immigration from PICs. Figure 6 and Table 4 present analogous results on responses related to migration to Australia from PICs. None of the three narrative treatments had any statistically discernible impacts on Pacific immigration policy preferences. This may be due to the narrative treatment effects fading by the time respondents were asked about Pacific immigration, as the vignettes were short in length and located in the middle of the survey and the questions on Pacific migration were near the end.[35] Alternatively, respondents may have perceived the narrative vignettes on housing as largely irrelevant to their preferences on Pacific immigration. This may reflect a perception that relatively few immigrants come to Australia from the Pacific (see Table 2), or that the most prominent programs Pacific-centric migration programs, such as the Pacific-Australia Labour Mobility Scheme, are not focused on cities where housing concerns more salient.

Conversely, the quantitative information treatment substantially increased the likelihood that respondents preferred that visa requirements be relaxed for immigrants from PICs. The specific information provided in front of the first two questions (out of four) on Pacific immigration policy preferences was: "In the 2016 census, people from Pacific Island countries accounted for around 2% of the Australian population and were more likely than the rest of the Australian population to be in full-time employment and the labour force." Providing this information generated large and precisely estimated increases in the likelihood of expressing support for relaxing visa requirements for PICs citizens migrating to Australia permanently (5.5pp, column 1 of Table 4) and temporarily (5.9pp, column 2). Column 3 of Table 4 shows that this treatment also increased support

[35]Specifically, 19 questions on other aspects of immigration were asked between the vignettes being presented to respondents and the questions on Pacific immigration.

for expanding the PEV by 4.0 percentage points, statistically significant at the 10% level, despite no additional information being added in front of this question as part of the quantitative information treatment. In Column 4 we find no evidence that any of the treatments had any effect on support for expanding the Tuvalu agreement, which enjoys a relatively high level of baseline support. Combined with the baseline results—where respondents largely prefer 'no change' or for immigration policy settings to be kept the same—it appears that (a) respondents know relatively little about immigration from the Pacific, and (b) providing information on it can increase support for this aspect of Australia's immigration program.

5.3.2 Effects on support for increasing or maintaining immigration levels

Here we also present results using the broader definition of 'support' including expressing a preference for immigration levels to either increase or remain unchanged. Table 5 shows that when using this broader definition for 'support', the 'negative' narrative treatment generates a precisely estimated decline in the likelihood of expressing support for total immigration, full-time student immigrants and temporary immigrants in general and from the Pacific. Highlighting potentially negative aspects of immigration on housing, as is common in media reporting and the public discourse, does not change the extent to which people express 'strong' support for immigration (as defined by expressing a desire for 'a lot more' or 'more' immigrants), but does substantially decrease the extent to which people are willing to maintain the status quo on immigration.

Table 5 shows that 12 of the 14 statistically significant results in Tables 3 and 4 remain precisely estimated using the broader definition. The two exceptions are the quantitative information treatment becoming statistically insignificant for total immigration, and the 'positive' narrative not affecting preferences around high-skilled immigration. The 'balanced' narrative has a more precisely estimated positive impact on the likelihood of respondents expressing a preference for immigration levels staying the same or increasing.

5.3.3 Cross-learning: effects on perceptions of others' views

Immediately after providing their policy preferences, we ask respondents to report what view they think most Australians hold on the same aspect of immigration policy. Examining the effects of the narrative and quantitative information treatments on responses to these questions allows us to test the extent of 'cross-learning'. More specifically, we examine whether respondents update their beliefs not only on their own immigration policy preferences but also on other variables (Haaland et al. 2023), in this case their perceptions of what most Australians prefer.[36]

Table 6 shows that the 'positive' narrative and quantitative information treatments make respondents more likely to believe that most Australians would prefer accepting more immigrants of certain types. Those who are shown the 'positive' narrative

[36]Recall from section 5.2 that overall, most respondents think that other people in Australia tend to be more hostile to various types of immigration than them.

information treatment are more likely to think most Australians want more temporary, full-time student and high-skilled immigrants. The quantitative information treatment makes respondents more likely to believe most Australians want more temporary, permanent and full-time student immigrants.[37]

In regards to Pacific immigration (Columns 7–10 of Table 6), the quantitative information treatment again appears to have stronger effects. Respondents are more likely to think that most Australians want visa requirements to be relaxed for both temporary and permanent Pacific Island country immigrants and for the Pacific Engagement Visa to be expanded when exposed to the quantitative information treatment. The 'positive' narrative makes respondents more likely to believe that most Australians want visa requirements to be relaxed only for temporary Pacific immigrants. Less precisely estimated treatment effects from the 'positive' narrative are also detected on permanent immigration from the Pacific, and around accepting more immigrants under the Pacific Engagement Visa.

5.4 Robustness of the main experimental results

We conduct four main sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our main experimental results. First, to account for multiple hypothesis testing, we compute sharpened false discovery rate (FDR) q-values to reduce the likelihood of false rejections of the null (Anderson 2008) and compare these to our original p-values.[38] The large number of hypotheses being tested as a result of the many outcome variables and multiple treatment arms may lead to a higher likelihood of type one errors or 'false discoveries' (McKenzie 2021, Duru and Kopper 2023). Q-values taking this into account are shown in Tables 3 and 4.

All statistically significant results of the 'positive' narrative treatment on support for more immigration remain so when considering the q-values. This was also the case for the precisely estimated effects of the 'balanced' narrative treatment. The quantitative information treatment's statistically significant effects on the likelihood of supporting more temporary and permanent Pacific immigration also remain intact when considering q-values instead of ordinary p-values, though effects on total and permanent immigration more generally become statistically insignificant.

Our main results around support for *more* immigration are also robust to using a reduced sample, which excludes observations from respondents who spent too little or too much time on the survey (Table A5). Specifically, we remove observations in the top or bottom 5% by survey completion time, as these respondents may have provided 'careless answers' (Alesina et al. 2023). The effects of the 'balanced' and 'positive' narratives are similar using this reduced sample, but the 'negative' narrative induces a relatively precisely estimated reduction in the likelihood of support for more permanent

[37] Recall from section 4 that respondents underestimate the number of temporary immigrants by around 27% but overestimate the number of full time student immigrants by 95%.

[38] We compute q-values using the first, more narrow definition of support for *more* immigration.

and high-skilled immigration. The effects of quantitative information provision on Pacific immigration policy preferences remain similar to the original specification, but effects on preferences around total and permanent immigration are less precisely estimated with the reduced sample.

To potentially increase precision, we further run different versions of the original linear probability model using the full set of socio-demographic control variables. The treatment effects on support for *more* immigration from the original model are similar to those from the more saturated model (Table A6) and when no covariates are included (Table A7).

Finally, we exploit all the variation in the original ordinal outcome data using ordered logistic regressions (Table A8). The sign and significance of most treatment effects are generally consistent but with a few important exceptions.[39] The quantitative information effects on views around total immigration are statistically insignificant using an ordinal logistic regression, although the sign on the coefficient remains unchanged, and the 'negative' narrative generates a decline in support for total immigration. Imprecisely estimated declines stemming from exposure to the 'negative' narrative are also observed in support for temporary immigration in general and for temporary and permanent immigration from the Pacific, as well as support for the PEV. These accord with the main results described earlier when using a binary outcome variable where 'support' for immigration includes respondents expressing a preference for '*no change*', '*more*' or '*a lot more*' immigration.

5.5 Exploratory heterogeneity analysis

Following Grigorieff et al. (2020), we add dummy variables for subgroups of interest and an interaction term between each of the subgroups and treatment indicators to Equation 1.[40] This heterogeneity analysis should be considered exploratory, as the study was not formally designed to test heterogeneity and statistical power is therefore limited. Both narrative and quantitative information treatments appear to operate similarly across most of Australia's population.

Exposure to immigration. To test whether exposure to immigration affects treatment effects, in line with 'contact theory' (Allport 1954, Bentsen 2022), we compare treatment effects across respondents who have been exposed to immigration by having a friend or acquaintance who was born overseas, and those without such exposure. With just 22-24% of each treatment group and the control group not reporting having a friend or acquaintance born overseas, power is limited.

Table 7 shows that the 'balanced' narrative treatment engenders more support for various types of immigration—temporary, full-time students, PICs immigration (permanent and temporary) and expansion of agreements like the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union—in respondents who report having a friend or acquaintance who was

[39] The coefficient sizes between OLS and logistic regressions are not directly comparable, and so are not commented on here.

[40] We include one less dummy variable than there are groups of interest to avoid the dummy variable trap.

born overseas. The magnitude of these heterogeneous effects is large, ranging from 7.9pp to 13.5pp, with most of statistically significant at the 5% level. Other heterogeneous effects are detected for the 'negative' narrative and quantitative information treatments, but estimates are noisier and the story less clear.

Political alignment. Table 8 shows no systemic differences in how any of the treatment arms affect respondents with different political alignments, despite right-leaning respondents being systematically less likely to support immigration. People across the political spectrum in Australia respond largely uniformly to both narrative and quantitative information treatments. These comparisons are better powered than those for exposure, as each treatment and control group consisted of around 37-41% right-leaning, 49-53% left-leaning and 7-11% 'other' respondents.[41]

While Grigorieff et al. (2020) find that information treatment effects on immigration policy preferences are stronger for American respondents who identify as Republican (right-leaning) or as neither Democrat or Republican (left or right-leaning) than for Democrats, our results align more closely with Haaland and Roth (2023), who find that information treatments can change immigration policy preferences on for Republicans and Democrats alike.

Metropolitan vs regional areas. Table 9 shows little difference in how any of the treatments affect respondents in metropolitan and regional areas. This is somewhat surprising, as housing—the subject of the narrative information treatments—is largely an urban issue. While these comparisons are slightly better powered than those on exposure, all heterogeneity analysis should be interpreted cautiously.[42]

6 Conclusion

This paper presents the results of a new, nationally representative survey and randomised information experiment on perceptions of immigrants and immigration policy preferences in Australia. We first quantify the scale of misperceptions on the size and characteristics of the immigrant population in Australia and establish a baseline of immigration policy preferences. By randomly providing either a bundle of quantitative information or narrative information on the costs and benefits of immigration in relation to housing, a key economic issue, we provide experimental evidence that immigration policy preferences can be meaningfully shifted easily, at least in the short run.

We find that respondents lack an accurate understanding of immigrants' attributes, ranging from aggregate flows of immigrants in and out of Australia, their skills, employment status and income, and where immigrants come from. Misperceptions are often conflicting. For example, respondents believe immigrants are more likely to be unemployed and lower skilled than they actually are, despite overestimating their earnings.

[41] Further details on the construction of these indicators can be found in section 4.

[42] Approximately one third of each treatment and control group reported living in a regional area.

With these misperceptions in hand, most control group respondents would prefer lower levels of immigration in aggregate and across almost all types of immigrants. The two exceptions are high-skilled immigrants, which most respondents want more of, and immigrants from the Pacific Islands region, for whom close to half of respondents reported preferring '*no change*' when asked if visa requirements should be relaxed. Respondents also believe that the majority of Australians want less immigration than suggested by the actual baseline policy preferences expressed by the control group. In other words, they perceive others to be more negative about immigration than themselves.

The experiment highlights the malleability of immigration policy preferences, especially to salient narratives. Preferences around total and permanent immigration are most open to change, while preferences on other aspects of Australia's immigration program appear relatively sticky. We find that support for more immigration can be induced by exposing people to 'positive' narratives that highlight the contributions immigrants can make to boosting Australia's housing supply. Narratives like this appear to be more effective at engendering support than providing quantitative information on the current levels and composition of Australia's immigrant population, which shifts preferences by a smaller amount. Presenting 'negative' narratives around housing and immigration has little effect on the likelihood of respondents expressing support for increased immigration, but decreases the likelihood that respondents prefer immigration levels to stay the same or increase.

Support for more immigration from the Pacific rises with the provision of quantitative information. While there is no evidence that narratives can change preferences around this part of Australia's immigration program, increasing knowledge from a relatively low baseline of public awareness appears to be an effective strategy to build support for Pacific immigration.

Both narrative and quantitative information treatments appear to work similarly across the political spectrum, and in metropolitan and regional areas alike. We do however find suggestive evidence that narratives are more effective at changing policy preferences for people with prior exposure to immigration through friends and acquaintances born overseas.

While our findings are short-run by nature and we are unable to test the persistence of these effects, our results are robust to a wide range of reasonable checks and sensitivity analyses. To further expand our understanding of how immigration policy preferences can be influenced, future research could consider if highlighting different contributions of immigrants (for example in different sectors of the economy such as healthcare or agriculture) generates similar increases in support for immigration, and if the amount of support predicated on immigrants' contributions varies on the perceived importance of various sectors or policy issues. Further research on what drives Australia's preferences for high-skilled immigrants would also be of use, as would including and comparing refugees and family-related migration in the various exercises we conducted in this paper.

Although many in Australia have indicated a preference for a lower level of immigration than is currently in place, this paper reveals two important exceptions to this general rule. First, the survey results show that the composition of Australia's migration program matters and there is still significant appetite for certain types of immigration. Skilled immigration remains popular, and the lack of opposition to Pacific immigration also can be read as a positive endorsement given preferences for reductions in other parts of Australia's immigration program. Second, immigration policy preferences are not set in stone and highly malleable. Support for immigration can be easily increased by highlighting the contributions of immigrants or providing quantitative information. Policymakers wishing to lead the public and maintain support for a robust immigration program should actively highlight how immigrants can contribute to key domestic issues and how immigration can benefit the incumbent population more broadly.

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Figures

Figure 1: Survey structure



Note: This figure provides a schematic overview of the survey's overall structure and the treatment arms of the randomised information experiment. The complete questionnaire is provided at Appendix D.

Figure 2: Misperceptions of immigrants' characteristics

Note: This figure shows the % difference between actual immigrant characteristics, usually in the 2016 census but with exceptions detailed in Appendix C, and those reported on average by respondents. Table 2 shows these differences in level terms, along with the characteristics of the domestic population where appropriate.

Figure 3: Baseline immigration policy preferences for different types of immigrants



Note: This figure shows the distribution of policy preferences on Australia's broad immigration policy program reported by 1,055 control group respondents. See Appendix D for specific wording and the complete questionnaire.

Figure 4: Baseline immigration policy preferences for immigrants from the Pacific



Note: This figure shows the distribution of policy preferences for Pacific-focused immigration policy settings reported by 1,055 control group respondents. See Appendix D for specific wording and the complete questionnaire.

Figure 5: Treatment effects on likelihood of supporting *more* immigration



Figure 6: Treatment effects on likelihood of supporting *more* immigration from the Pacific



Note: Figures 5 and 6 show the percentage point change (95% confidence intervals) in the likelihood of supporting *more* immigration after being exposed to the narrative and quantitative information treatments, which are recovered by estimating Equation 1. Controls are included for whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment. Note that in each Figure the four coefficients for each colour come from a single regression using that outcome (e.g. the four blue dots, with total migrants as the outcome, are the four coefficients obtained from the regression shown in Column 1 of Table 3).

Tables

Table 1: Sample characteristics and balance tests across experimental groups

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(2)-(1)		(3)-(1)		(4)-(1)		(5)-(1)	
	Control		'Balanced' narrative		'Negative' narrative		'Positive' narrative		Quantitative info		Pairwise t-test (mean differences)							
Variable	N	Mean/(SE)	N	Mean/(SE)	N	Mean/(SE)	N	Mean/(SE)	N	Mean/(SE)	N	Diff	N	Diff	N	Diff	N	Diff
Age	1055	47.793	1054	47.613	1054	47.657	1057	47.453	1062	47.459	2109	-0.180	2109	-0.137	2112	-0.340	2117	-0.335
		(0.530)		(0.535)		(0.530)		(0.529)		(0.526)								
Metro (urban)	1055	0.687	1054	0.674	1054	0.687	1057	0.677	1062	0.670	2109	-0.014	2109	-0.000	2112	-0.010	2117	-0.017
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)								
Female	1055	0.503	1054	0.502	1054	0.500	1057	0.498	1062	0.500	2109	-0.001	2109	-0.003	2112	-0.006	2117	-0.003
		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)								
Born overseas	1053	0.327	1052	0.281	1052	0.303	1054	0.289	1059	0.288	2105	-0.045**	2105	-0.023	2107	-0.037*	2112	-0.039*
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)								
Parent born O/S	1042	0.518	1042	0.465	1043	0.516	1044	0.485	1054	0.478	2084	-0.053**	2085	-0.002	2086	-0.034	2096	-0.040*
		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)								
Friends born O/S	1036	0.778	1037	0.762	1031	0.765	1023	0.767	1040	0.771	2073	-0.016	2067	-0.013	2059	-0.011	2076	-0.007
		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)								
High income	1055	0.381	1054	0.384	1054	0.382	1057	0.391	1062	0.365	2109	0.003	2109	0.001	2112	0.010	2117	-0.016
		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)								
Bachelor degree	1055	0.466	1054	0.461	1054	0.450	1057	0.437	1062	0.424	2109	-0.005	2109	-0.017	2112	-0.029	2117	-0.043**
		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)								
Political left	912	0.731	919	0.674	920	0.696	912	0.697	947	0.714	1831	-0.058**	1832	-0.036	1824	-0.034	1859	-0.018
		(0.021)		(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.021)								

Note: This table shows descriptive statistics for sociodemographic control variables across the five experimental groups. Differences in means in the right portion of the table are pairwise t-tests. Stars denote statistic significance at the * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$ levels. Robust standard errors.

Table 2: Differences between domestic benchmarks and respondent perceptions

	Actual migrant characteristic	Actual domestic characteristic	Average estimate from respondents	% Misperception vs actual migrant attributes	% Perceived diff between migrants and domestic pop
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(3)/(1)	(3)/(2)
Migrants arriving, FY22-23	674,530		290,098	-57%	
Migrants departing, FY22-23	115,590		74,545	-36%	
Migrants arriving, 2013-23	406,925		486,475	20%	
Migrants departing, 2013-23	178,343		122,772	-31%	
Net overseas migration, FY22-23	558,940		215,553	-61%	
Net overseas migration, 2013-23	228,582		363,703	59%	
% of migrants who are...					
Arriving on temporary visas, 2013-23	78.4		57.0	-27%	
Aged 15-64 years and are full-time students	19.6	13.1	38.2	95%	192%
High-skilled	38.4	27.8	33.9	-12%	22%
Employed full-time	45.1	46.4	38.9	-14%	-16%
Employed part-time	21.6	23.5	26.3	22%	12%
Unemployed	6.2	5.6	15.0	143%	169%
Out of the labour force	27.1	24.5	19.8	-27%	-19%
Median income of migrants aged 15+	615	662	775	26%	17%
% of immigrants born in... Africa	6.3		10.9	73%	
...the Americas	4.3		7.7	73%	
...Asia	39.8		27.1	-32%	
...Europe	34.0		15.1	-55%	
...the Middle East	4.9		15.0	205%	
...the Pacific Islands region	2.3		9.4	315%	
...the rest of Oceania (including NZ)	8.4		14.7	74%	
% of population born overseas		30.7	42.8		39%

Table 3: Treatment effects on the likelihood of supporting *more* migration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Total	Temp	Perm	Students	High-skill	Low-skill
	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q
'Balanced' narrative	0.037***	0.020	0.017	0.038*	0.005	0.048***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.002	0.296	0.363	0.071	0.837	0.005
	0.003	0.422	0.486	0.203	0.794	0.041
'Negative' narrative	0.007	-0.026	-0.035*	-0.018	-0.040*	-0.003
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.529	0.147	0.056	0.384	0.090	0.837
	0.545	0.284	0.186	0.486	0.239	0.794
'Positive' narrative	0.045***	0.071***	0.056***	0.015	0.060**	0.027
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.477	0.011	0.100
	0.007	0.007	0.041	0.545	0.054	0.251
Quantitative information	0.023**	0.005	0.043**	0.026	0.000	0.010
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.046	0.809	0.028	0.220	0.992	0.527
	0.167	0.794	0.111	0.383	0.903	0.545
Constant	-0.006	0.056***	0.053***	0.116***	0.316***	0.029**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
	0.477	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.033
N	4281	4307	4314	4332	4367	4334

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses and * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, against coefficients, are based on the p-values reported below the standard errors in the third row for each explanatory variable. Sharpened false discovery q-values (Anderson 2008) are shown below the p-values, in the fourth row for each explanatory variable, but not for the constant. All columns include as controls: whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment. Coefficients on covariates (excluding q-values) are provided in Appendix A Table A9.

Table 4: Treatment effects on the likelihood of supporting *more* migration from the Pacific

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q
'Balanced' narrative	0.033	0.033	0.024	-0.008
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.132	0.146	0.270	0.743
	0.284	0.284	0.422	0.794
'Negative' narrative	-0.026	-0.015	-0.019	-0.026
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.221	0.488	0.356	0.291
	0.383	0.545	0.486	0.422
'Positive' narrative	0.015	0.008	0.022	-0.004
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.503	0.707	0.297	0.876
	0.545	0.794	0.422	0.816
Quantitative information	0.055**	0.059***	0.040*	0.026
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.012	0.009	0.064	0.292
	0.054	0.053	0.197	0.422
Constant	0.156***	0.198***	0.152***	0.301***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	4238	4242	4238	3976

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses and * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, against coefficients, are based on the p-values reported below the standard errors in the third row for each explanatory variable. Sharpened false discovery q-values (Anderson 2008) are shown below the p-values, in the fourth row for each explanatory variable, but not for the constant. All columns include as controls: whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment. Coefficients on covariates (excluding q-values) are provided in Appendix A Table A9.

Table 5: Treatment effects on the likelihood of supporting migration levels *staying the same or increasing*

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Total	Temp	Perm	Students	High-skill	Low-skill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
'Balanced' narrative	0.049**	0.041*	0.056**	0.038*	0.027	0.052**	0.029	0.003	0.016	-0.027
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Negative' narrative	-0.063***	-0.060***	-0.040*	-0.052**	-0.036*	-0.012	-0.035	-0.046**	-0.035	-0.021
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Positive' narrative	0.053**	0.047**	0.063***	0.001	0.005	0.030	0.021	0.029	0.021	-0.027
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Quantitative info	0.016	0.001	0.070***	0.014	0.029	0.038*	0.045**	0.047**	0.049**	-0.017
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.182***	0.270***	0.198***	0.456***	0.650***	0.169***	0.591***	0.622***	0.546***	0.709***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	4281	4307	4314	4332	4367	4334	4238	4242	4238	3976

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable here is a binary indicator of support including the "middle" response, whereas previously reported estimates use only the positive categorical responses. All columns include as controls whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment.

Table 6: Cross-learning: Treatment effects on the likelihood of believing most *other* Australians support *more* migration

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Total	Temp	Perm	Students	High-skill	Low-skill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
'Balanced' narrative	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.043**	0.031	0.012	0.028	0.047**	0.021	0.013
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Negative' narrative	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.016	-0.000	0.005	0.010	0.006	-0.003	0.002
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Positive' narrative	0.001	0.051***	0.009	0.038**	0.060***	0.020	0.034*	0.041**	0.034*	-0.017
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Quantitative info	0.003	0.035**	0.039**	0.040**	0.027	0.017	0.044**	0.046**	0.037**	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.014*	0.051***	0.054***	0.054***	0.212***	0.033***	0.093***	0.116***	0.103***	0.218***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	4046	4023	4055	4010	3992	4090	3870	3861	3846	3526

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All columns include as controls whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment.

Table 7: Heterogeneous treatment effects: exposure to migration

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Total	Temp	Perm	Students	Highs-kill	Low-skill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
'Balanced' narrative	0.007	-0.058*	-0.020	-0.023	-0.035	0.002	-0.067	-0.054	-0.003	-0.118**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
'Negative' narrative	-0.030*	-0.027	0.004	-0.043	-0.031	0.020	-0.036	-0.042	-0.006	-0.027
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
'Positive' narrative	0.027	0.046	0.068*	0.016	0.051	0.018	-0.045	0.004	0.039	-0.048
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Quantitative info	0.012	-0.022	0.053	0.001	-0.004	0.006	-0.049	-0.014	-0.026	-0.033
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Exposed to migration	-0.001	0.010	0.055*	0.005	0.126***	0.024	0.046	0.071*	0.056	0.104**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
'Balanced' × exposed	0.038	0.099**	0.048	0.079*	0.054	0.059	0.125**	0.109**	0.031	0.135**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
'Negative' × exposed	0.048**	-0.000	-0.052	0.030	-0.013	-0.032	0.013	0.034	-0.019	-0.002
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
'Positive' × exposed	0.027	0.030	-0.017	0.004	0.016	0.012	0.072	0.001	-0.023	0.053
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
'Quantitative' × exposed	0.012	0.031	-0.014	0.031	0.004	0.005	0.133***	0.088*	0.079	0.068
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Constant	-0.002	0.056**	0.020	0.120***	0.241***	0.016	0.142***	0.164***	0.123***	0.247***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
N	4219	4245	4253	4268	4306	4273	4178	4184	4179	3920

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is the primary binary indicator of of support for *more* migration. Controls for whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment are included throughout, and exposure a binary indicator equal to one if respondents have a friend or acquaintance who was born overseas.

Table 8: Heterogeneous treatment effects: political orientation

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Total	Temp	Perm	Students	High-skill	Low-skill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
'Balanced' narrative	0.043**	0.020	0.022	0.057*	-0.023	0.071***	0.062*	0.040	0.028	-0.019
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
'Negative' narrative	0.000	-0.029	-0.044	0.005	-0.029	0.006	-0.019	-0.023	-0.010	-0.027
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
'Positive' narrative	0.054***	0.094***	0.072**	0.037	0.079**	0.060**	0.053	0.012	0.018	0.020
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Quantitative info	0.024	-0.020	0.029	0.040	-0.005	0.001	0.055*	0.053	0.010	0.024
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Right-wing	-0.048***	-0.139***	-0.148***	-0.093***	-0.126***	-0.061***	-0.112***	-0.110***	-0.161***	-0.208***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Other	-0.013	-0.018	-0.021	0.025	0.041	-0.001	-0.005	-0.069	-0.026	0.031
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
'Balanced' × right-wing	-0.025	-0.004	-0.008	-0.033	0.074	-0.052	-0.063	-0.036	0.010	0.039
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
'Balanced' × other	0.041	0.027	-0.004	-0.041	0.007	-0.031	-0.047	0.074	-0.092	-0.054
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
'Negative' × right-wing	0.008	0.022	0.029	-0.023	-0.006	-0.024	-0.011	0.010	-0.004	-0.006
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
'Negative' × other	0.025	-0.059	-0.031	-0.132*	-0.078	0.006	-0.028	0.029	-0.062	0.041
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
'Positive' × right-wing	-0.021	-0.039	-0.024	-0.011	-0.011	-0.062*	-0.077*	-0.022	0.027	-0.033
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
'Positive' × other	-0.006	-0.082	-0.070	-0.187***	-0.146*	-0.080	-0.083	0.051	-0.062	-0.106
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
'Quantitative' × right-wing	-0.001	0.059	0.040	-0.007	0.036	0.023	-0.000	0.004	0.073	0.018
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
'Quantitative' × other	-0.010	0.013	-0.011	-0.105	-0.083	0.007	0.011	0.043	0.027	-0.047
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	0.047***	0.188***	0.194***	0.209***	0.423***	0.102***	0.284***	0.318***	0.296***	0.503***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
N	4281	4307	4314	4332	4367	4334	4238	4242	4238	3976

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is the primary binary indicator of of support for *more* migration. Controls for whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment are included throughout, and the base group for comparisons are 'left-wing' respondents.

Table 9: Heterogeneous treatment effects: metropolitan vs regional areas

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Total	Temp	Perm	Students	High-skill	Low-skill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
'Balanced' narrative	0.040*	0.024	0.048	0.037	0.012	0.051*	-0.017	-0.007	0.064*	-0.015
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
'Negative' narrative	0.005	-0.042	-0.027	-0.023	-0.062	0.000	-0.082**	-0.020	0.021	-0.062
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
'Positive' narrative	0.030	0.022	0.024	-0.031	0.050	0.004	-0.062*	0.000	0.030	-0.007
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Quantitative info	0.039*	0.011	0.035	-0.001	0.015	0.023	-0.002	0.045	0.065*	0.014
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Living in metro area	-0.004	0.002	0.011	0.008	-0.020	0.004	-0.059*	-0.007	0.037	-0.017
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
'Balanced' × metro	-0.005	-0.007	-0.046	0.001	-0.011	-0.004	0.072	0.058	-0.059	0.010
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
'Negative' × metro	0.002	0.023	-0.011	0.007	0.031	-0.005	0.081*	0.007	-0.057	0.053
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
'Positive' × metro	0.023	0.072*	0.048	0.068	0.016	0.034	0.113**	0.012	-0.010	0.004
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
'Quantitative' × metro	-0.024	-0.010	0.012	0.039	-0.022	-0.019	0.084*	0.021	-0.037	0.017
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.004	0.057**	0.048**	0.116***	0.327***	0.027	0.199***	0.205***	0.127***	0.313***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
N	4281	4307	4314	4332	4367	4334	4238	4242	4238	3976

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is the primary binary indicator of of support for *more* migration. We include as controls whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment. The base group for comparisons are respondents living in regional areas, which tend to be rural or small town, whereas metropolitan areas are greater capital cities.

Appendix A Additional figures and tables

Figure A1: Individual gross annual income distribution - sample and Australian population



Note: this figure shows the distribution of individual gross annual income reported by respondents in the sample and the Australian population at large in the 2021 census (ABS 2022e) without adjusting for inflation.

Figure A2: Distribution of time spent completing the survey

(a) Total completion time <120 minutes (98.96% of respondents)



(b) Total completion time ≥120 minutes (1.04% of respondents)



Note: this figure shows the distribution of time spent completing the survey. Panel (a) shows the frequency distribution of survey completion time for respondents that took less than 120 minutes to complete the survey, accounting for the vast majority of respondents. Panel (b) shows the distribution for the remaining respondents that took 120 minutes or more to complete the survey.

Figure A3: Distribution of time spent reading narrative treatment vignettes

(a) Total reading time <120 seconds (97.44% of respondents)



(b) Total reading time ≥120 seconds (2.56% of respondents)



Note: this figure shows the distribution of time spent reading the narrative treatment vignettes in the survey by respondents in the three narrative treatment groups. Panel (a) shows the frequency distribution of time spent reading the vignettes for respondents who spent less than 120 seconds reading the vignettes, accounting for the vast majority of respondents in the narrative treatment groups. The distribution begins at 10 seconds Panel (b) shows the distribution for the remaining narrative treatment group respondents that took 120 seconds or more to read the vignettes.

Figure A4: Baseline immigration policy preferences - different types of immigrants, own views compared to perceptions of majority's views



Note: this figure shows the distribution of policy preferences and perceptions of the majority's views as reported by 1,055 control group respondents.

Figure A5: Baseline immigration policy preferences - immigrants from the Pacific, own views compared to perceptions of majority's views



Note: this figure shows the distribution of policy preferences and perceptions of the majority's views as reported by 1,055 control group respondents.

Table A1: Perceptions of migrants' characteristics, summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Median	Standard deviation	N
Migrants arriving, FY22-23	290098.4	100000	852349.3	2769
Migrants departing, FY22-23	74545.18	10000	216319.3	2460
Migrants arriving	486475.4	100000	1547121	3154
Migrants departing	122772.4	15000	508562.4	2799
Net overseas migration, FY22-23	205338.7	40000	763017.5	2442
Net overseas migration, 2013-23	350195.2	50000	1261259	2790
% of migrants who are...				
Arriving on temporary visas, 2013-23	56.97	60	26.76	3770
Aged 15-64 years and are full-time students	38.22	30	25.02	3886
High-skilled	33.91	30	21.31	3818
Employed full-time	38.92	42	17.35	3880
Employed part-time	26.29	24	12.63	3880
Unemployed	15.02	10	13.46	3880
Out of the labour force	19.77	20	13.67	3880
Median income of migrants aged 15+	775.20	690	649.82	3697
% of immigrants born in... Africa	10.95	10	8.64	3671
...the Americas	7.70	5	6.57	3671
...Asia	27.15	25	15.40	3671
...Europe	15.12	10	11.18	3671
...the Middle East	15.03	10	11.69	3671
...the Pacific Islands region	9.39	10	7.70	3671
...the rest of Oceania (including NZ)	14.66	10	11.05	3671
% of population born overseas	42.81	40	23.95	4148

Note: this table presents summary statistics on respondents' perceptions of migrants' characteristics.

Table A2: % Misperception vs actual migrant attributes: heterogeneity analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Average estimate	No friend or acquaintance born overseas	Has friend or acquaintance born overseas	Political right	Political left	Regional area	Metro area
Migrants arriving, FY22-23	-56.99	-55.89	-57.11	-47.53	-67.97	-57.2	-56.9
Migrants departing, FY22-23	-35.51	-40.03	-34.3	-40.6	-40.39	-49.05	-29.49
Migrants arriving, 2013-23	19.55	9.1	22.95	30.2	6.91	33.86	13.03
Migrants departing, 2013-23	-31.16	-45.44	-27.56	-35.89	-30.7	-37.31	-28.4
Net overseas migration, FY22-23	-61.44	-62.55	-63.38	-52.83	-73.3	-66.52	-61.81
Net overseas migration, 2013-23	59.11	35.32	58.4	71.7	33.28	75.03	43.43
% of migrants who are...							
Arriving on temporary visas, 2013-23	-27.32	-27.66	-27.29	-28.3	-28.22	-27.07	-27.44
Aged 15-64 years and are full-time students	94.55	93.36	94.39	91.65	93.28	86.22	98.46
High-skilled	-11.71	-16.61	-10.77	-17.78	-7.8	-13.74	-10.78
Employed full-time	-13.63	-18.92	-12.3	-15.48	-12.35	-14.31	-13.32
Employed part-time	21.64	12.42	23.64	16.58	23.71	20.29	22.26
Unemployed	142.87	183.8	133.4	157.78	135.12	143.8	142.44
Out of the labour force	-27.16	-20.35	-28.8	-23.45	-29.17	-25.17	-28.07
Median income of migrants aged 15+	26.05	20.79	27.08	29.51	25.9	21.59	28.13
Born in Africa	73.46	81.72	70.99	86.12	64.59	83.83	68.77
Born in the Americas	77.91	92.46	73.54	68.93	86.39	74.23	79.57
Born in Asia	-31.74	-35.25	-30.79	-34.26	-30.76	-37.89	-28.96
Born in Europe	-55.48	-59.6	-54.44	-58.42	-52.38	-56.49	-55.03
Born in the Middle East	205	239.75	197.31	249.74	177.07	203.77	205.55
Born in the Pacific Islands region	314.98	343.53	308.79	309.27	312.63	358.25	295.44
Born in the rest of Oceania (including NZ)	73.84	65.34	75.42	68.07	75.99	90.17	66.47
% of population born overseas	39.45	37.87	39.55	42.39	34.87	32.88	42.51

Note: this table presents average misperceptions reported by respondents in aggregate and within different subgroups, defined by whether respondents have a friend or acquaintance born overseas or not (columns 2-3), political alignment (4-5) and whether respondents live in a regional or metropolitan area (6-7).

Table A3: Comparing narrative treatment effects to those from the quantitative information treatment effects

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	total	temp	perm	students	highskill	lowskill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
Control	-0.023**	-0.005	-0.043**	-0.026	-0.000	-0.010	-0.055**	-0.059***	-0.040*	-0.026
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Balanced' narrative	0.014	0.015	-0.026	0.012	0.005	0.037**	-0.022	-0.026	-0.016	-0.034
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Negative' narrative	-0.016	-0.031*	-0.078***	-0.043**	-0.040*	-0.014	-0.081***	-0.074***	-0.059***	-0.051**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Positive' narrative	0.023*	0.066***	0.013	-0.011	0.060**	0.017	-0.041*	-0.051**	-0.017	-0.029
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Quantitative info	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Constant	0.016*	0.060***	0.096***	0.142***	0.316***	0.039***	0.211***	0.257***	0.192***	0.327***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R-squared	0.022	0.054	0.058	0.039	0.042	0.033	0.034	0.022	0.038	0.049
N	4281	4307	4314	4332	4367	4334	4238	4242	4238	3976

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. We include the following control variables: whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment. Here, we test for differences between the quantitative information treatment effects (used as a base) and the narrative treatment effects on the likelihood of supporting *more* migration.

Table A4: Comparing 'positive' narrative treatment effects to other treatment effects

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	total	temp	perm	students	highskill	lowskill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
Control	-0.045***	-0.071***	-0.056***	-0.015	-0.060**	-0.027	-0.015	-0.008	-0.022	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Balanced' narrative	-0.009	-0.051**	-0.038*	0.023	-0.055**	0.020	0.018	0.024	0.001	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Negative' narrative	-0.039***	-0.097***	-0.091***	-0.033	-0.100***	-0.031*	-0.041*	-0.024	-0.042**	-0.022
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Positive' narrative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Quantitative info	-0.023*	-0.066***	-0.013	0.011	-0.060**	-0.017	0.041*	0.051**	0.017	0.029
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.039***	0.126***	0.109***	0.131***	0.376***	0.056***	0.170***	0.207***	0.175***	0.297***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R-squared	0.022	0.054	0.058	0.039	0.042	0.033	0.034	0.022	0.038	0.049
N	4281	4307	4314	4332	4367	4334	4238	4242	4238	3976

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. WE include the following control variables: whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment. Here, we test for differences between the 'positive' narrative treatment effects (used as a base) and all other treatments on the likelihood of supporting *more* migration.

Table A5: Treatment effects on likelihood of supporting *more* migration, reduced sample

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	total	temp	perm	students	highskill	lowskill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
'Balanced' narrative	0.035***	0.024	0.020	0.039*	-0.007	0.052***	0.031	0.031	0.020	-0.010
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
'Negative' narrative	0.007	-0.030	-0.043**	-0.022	-0.050**	-0.008	-0.026	-0.016	-0.027	-0.036
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
'Positive' narrative	0.039***	0.065***	0.039*	0.007	0.044*	0.027	0.009	-0.003	0.016	-0.011
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Quantitative information	0.022*	0.008	0.039*	0.032	-0.012	0.014	0.051**	0.056**	0.038*	0.029
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	-0.006	0.050***	0.057***	0.111***	0.334***	0.021	0.161***	0.205***	0.159***	0.307***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R-squared	0.022	0.055	0.059	0.040	0.041	0.036	0.034	0.024	0.036	0.052
N	3866	3904	3902	3926	3961	3926	3842	3843	3841	3615

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. We include the following control variables: whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment. Here, we estimate treatment effects on the likelihood of supporting *more* migration using a reduced sample where the top and bottom 5% of observations by time spent on the survey are removed.

Table A6: Treatment effects on likelihood of supporting *more* migration, saturated model

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	total	temp	perm	students	highskill	lowskill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
'Balanced' narrative	0.037***	0.017	0.016	0.037*	0.008	0.046***	0.031	0.032	0.021	-0.012
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Negative' narrative	0.007	-0.029	-0.039**	-0.021	-0.039*	-0.006	-0.024	-0.015	-0.021	-0.028
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Positive' narrative	0.047***	0.067***	0.052***	0.015	0.065***	0.024	0.014	0.007	0.019	-0.007
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Quantitative info	0.022*	0.000	0.040**	0.023	-0.000	0.008	0.057**	0.056**	0.035	0.020
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
age	-0.000	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.004***	0.001**	-0.003***	0.001**	0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
metro	-0.008	0.011	0.002	0.028**	-0.020	-0.001	0.010	0.012	0.001	-0.010
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
female	0.011	0.011	0.009	-0.040***	-0.054***	-0.010	-0.003	-0.016	-0.043***	-0.020
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
bornoverseas	-0.002	0.031*	0.051***	0.052***	0.045**	0.031**	-0.010	-0.010	0.004	0.002
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
parentbornoverseas	0.010	-0.013	-0.003	0.013	0.029	0.007	-0.014	-0.007	-0.043***	-0.047**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
friendsbornoverseas	0.024***	0.048***	0.053***	0.041***	0.141***	0.038***	0.114***	0.117***	0.074***	0.157***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
highincome	0.008	-0.028**	-0.006	-0.020	-0.013	0.011	-0.022	-0.014	-0.006	0.008
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
bachelordegree	0.031***	0.092***	0.079***	0.069***	0.120***	0.045***	0.071***	0.050***	0.082***	0.054***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
right-wing	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
left-wing	0.056***	0.111***	0.121***	0.084***	0.113***	0.067***	0.143***	0.123***	0.131***	0.201***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
political_other	0.052***	0.083***	0.096***	0.036	0.083***	0.059***	0.107***	0.086***	0.075***	0.199***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	-0.023	0.184***	0.176***	0.308***	0.205***	0.165***	0.027	0.065*	0.201***	0.230***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R-squared	0.025	0.070	0.072	0.061	0.059	0.053	0.046	0.035	0.045	0.066
N	4219	4245	4253	4268	4306	4273	4178	4184	4179	3920

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. We include the following control variables at the respondent level: age, whether the respondent lives in a metropolitan or regional area, gender, whether the respondent is born overseas, has at least one parent born overseas and has a friend or acquaintance born overseas, is a high-income earner (earns over $78,000 individual gross annual income; roughly the top 25% of the population aged 15+ earned $78,000 individual gross annual income in the 2021 census), has a bachelor degree or higher, and respondents' political alignment.

Table A7: Treatment effects on likelihood of supporting *more* migration, no covariates included

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	total	temp	perm	students	highskill	lowskill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
'Balanced' narrative	0.031***	0.008	0.009	0.025	-0.010	0.038**	0.025	0.021	0.027	-0.012
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Negative' narrative	0.001	-0.032*	-0.032*	-0.027	-0.049**	-0.011	-0.020	-0.016	-0.025	-0.041*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
'Positive' narrative	0.039***	0.061***	0.046**	-0.000	0.054**	0.027*	0.018	0.006	0.015	-0.012
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Quantitative info	0.016	-0.008	0.030	0.011	-0.007	0.006	0.054***	0.050**	0.033	0.021
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.049***	0.199***	0.209***	0.258***	0.476***	0.129***	0.268***	0.298***	0.262***	0.452***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
R-squared	0.004	0.006	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002
N	4876	4890	4910	4921	4964	4916	4784	4790	4783	4464

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. We include no control variables in this specification.

Table A8: Treatment effects on migration policy preferences, ordinal logistic regressions

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	total	temp	perm	students	highskill	lowskill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
'Balanced' narrative	0.264***	0.108	0.204*	0.262**	0.035	0.225**	0.182	0.084	0.146	-0.080
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.09)
'Negative' narrative	-0.255**	-0.191*	-0.214**	-0.175	-0.211*	-0.101	-0.258*	-0.240*	-0.201*	-0.119
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.09)
'Positive' narrative	0.301***	0.302***	0.230**	0.027	0.054	0.058	0.072	0.102	0.076	-0.047
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Quantitative info	0.107	0.006	0.342***	0.115	0.056	0.181*	0.347***	0.376***	0.207*	0.019
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.09)
N	4281	3047	3183	2803	3051	3285	2433	2439	2454	3976

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Standard errors in parentheses. We include the following control variables: whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment. Here, we use an ordinal logistic regression approach to utilise the full extent of the categorical data collected in the survey.

Table A9: Treatment effects on likelihood of supporting *more* migration, including covariate estimates

	Different types of migrants (1)-(6)						Pacific migration (7)-(10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	total	temp	perm	students	highskill	lowskill	Pacific perm	Pacific temp	PEV	Tuvalu
	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q	b/se/p/q
'Balanced' narrative	0.037***	0.020	0.017	0.038*	0.005	0.048***	0.033	0.033	0.024	-0.008
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.002	0.296	0.363	0.071	0.837	0.005	0.132	0.146	0.270	0.743
	0.003	0.422	0.486	0.203	0.794	0.041	0.284	0.284	0.422	0.794
'Negative' narrative	0.007	-0.026	-0.035*	-0.018	-0.040*	-0.003	-0.026	-0.015	-0.019	-0.026
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.529	0.147	0.056	0.384	0.090	0.837	0.221	0.488	0.356	0.291
	0.545	0.284	0.186	0.486	0.239	0.794	0.383	0.545	0.486	0.422
'Positive' narrative	0.045***	0.071***	0.056***	0.015	0.060**	0.027	0.015	0.008	0.022	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.477	0.011	0.100	0.503	0.707	0.297	0.876
	0.007	0.007	0.041	0.545	0.054	0.251	0.545	0.794	0.422	0.816
Quantitative info	0.023**	0.005	0.043**	0.026	0.000	0.010	0.055**	0.059***	0.040*	0.026
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.046	0.809	0.028	0.220	0.992	0.527	0.012	0.009	0.064	0.292
	0.167	0.794	0.111	0.383	0.903	0.545	0.054	0.053	0.197	0.422
bornoverseas	-0.000	0.028*	0.051***	0.046**	0.059***	0.028*	0.006	0.005	0.009	0.016
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.992	0.085	0.002	0.011	0.003	0.060	0.761	0.796	0.608	0.446
	0.992	0.085	0.002	0.011	0.003	0.060	0.761	0.796	0.608	0.446
parentbornos	0.012	0.005	0.013	0.034**	0.045**	0.021	-0.001	0.004	-0.028*	-0.025
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.182	0.711	0.365	0.031	0.011	0.104	0.974	0.794	0.085	0.177
	0.182	0.711	0.365	0.031	0.011	0.104	0.974	0.794	0.085	0.177
bachelordegree	0.035***	0.108***	0.103***	0.099***	0.121***	0.071***	0.069***	0.051***	0.097***	0.070***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
left_wing	0.055***	0.131***	0.140***	0.108***	0.106***	0.084***	0.143***	0.119***	0.139***	0.205***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
political_other	0.050***	0.091***	0.095***	0.040*	0.088***	0.065***	0.110***	0.085***	0.081***	0.205***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.082	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000
	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.082	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000
Constant	-0.006	0.056***	0.053***	0.116***	0.316***	0.029**	0.156***	0.198***	0.152***	0.301***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.477	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	0.477	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.022	0.054	0.058	0.039	0.042	0.033	0.034	0.022	0.038	0.049
N	4281	4307	4314	4332	4367	4334	4238	4242	4238	3976

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ based on p-values. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sharpened false discovery q-values (Anderson 2008) are shown below p-values but are not calculated for the constant. We include the following control variables: whether the respondent is a) born overseas, b) has at least one parent born overseas, c) has a bachelor degree or higher, and d) political alignment.

Appendix B Distributions of perceptions of immigrants

The below figures show the distribution of perceptions of immigrants reported by survey respondents. The green line labeled 'M' shows the actual immigrant characteristic as shown in ABS data, and the red line labeled 'D' shows the domestic benchmark provided in the survey text, which is also drawn from ABS data.

Figure A6: Perceived number of immigrants arriving in FY22-23



Figure A7: Perceived number of immigrants departing in FY22-23



Figure A8: Perceived number of immigrants arriving over last ten years or so



Figure A9: Perceived number of immigrants departing over last ten years or so



Figure A10: Perceived net overseas migration, FY22-23



Figure A11: Perceived net overseas migration, last ten years or so



Figure A12: Perceived proportion of immigrants arriving on temporary visas, last ten years or so



Figure A13: Perceived proportion of immigrants aged 15-64 who are full-time students



Figure A14: Perceived proportion of immigrants who are employed full-time



Figure A15: Perceived proportion of immigrants who are employed part-time



Figure A16: Perceived proportion of immigrants who are unemployed



Figure A17: Perceived proportion of immigrants who are out of the labour force



Figure A18: Perceived proportion of immigrants who are highly-skilled



Figure A19: Perceived immigrant income per week ($)



Figure A20: Perceived proportion of people in Australia who are born overseas



Figure A21: Perceived proportion of immigrants born in Africa



Figure A22: Perceived proportion of immigrants born in the Americas



Figure A23: Perceived proportion of immigrants born in Asia



Figure A24: Perceived proportion of immigrants born in Europe



Figure A25: Perceived proportion of immigrants born in the Middle East



Figure A26: Perceived proportion of immigrants born in the Pacific Islands region



Figure A27: Perceived proportion of immigrants born in the rest of Oceania (including New Zealand)



Appendix C Constructing benchmarks, actual characteristics and the quantitative information treatment

Domestic benchmarks and actual immigrants' characteristics

Number of immigrants who...

Question	Domestic benchmark	Actual immigrant characteristic
Arrived in Australia from July 2022 to June 2023		674,530 (ABS 2023b, Graph/Table 1.2)
Left Australia from July 2022 to June 2023		115,590 (ABS 2023b, Graph/Table 1.3)
Arrived in Australia over the last ten years or so		406,925 from July 2013 to June 2023 (ABS 2023b, Graph/Table 1.2)
Left Australia over the last ten years or so		178,343 from July 2013 to June 2023 (ABS 2023b, Graph/Table 1.3)

Note: excludes Australian citizens and unknown visas.

Proportion of immigrants who...

Question	**Domestic benchmark**	**Actual immigrants' characteristics**
Arrived in Australia on a temporary visa over the last ten years or so		78% from 2013-2023, excludes Australian citizens and unknown visas (ABS 2023b, Graph/Table 1.2)

Are full- time students (FTS), for immigrants aged 15-64 years	13.1% in 2016, computed as: $$\frac{\text{FTS}}{\text{Population}}$$ for the Australian population aged 15-64 years old as in the 2016 Australian census (ABS 2016a). Excludes responses where student status was listed as 'not stated'.	19.6% in 2016, computed as: $$\frac{\text{FTS temporary immigrants + FTS permanent immigrants}}{\text{Temporary immigrants + Permanent immigrants}}$$ for immigrants aged 15-64 years old as in the 2016 Australian census (ABS 2016b, 2016c). Excludes responses where student status was listed as 'not stated'. Note: the question focuses on immigrants who arrived in the last ten years or so. As a result, we construct the actual immigrant characteristic based on the Australian Census and Migrants Integrated Dataset ('ACMI dataset', ABS 2016b) and Australian Census and Temporary Entrants Integrated Dataset ('ACTEI dataset', ABS 2016c) which documents outcomes from the 2016 census for temporary and permanent immigrants (for permanent, those who arrived between 2000 and 2016). We do not include the subset of the immigrant stock in Australia who may have already gained citizenship in the construction of actual immigrant characteristics for this question.

Are high-skilled (bachelor degree or higher, for immigrants aged 15-64 years)	27.8% in 2016, computed as: $\frac{\text{Bachelor + Grad Dip or Cert + Postgraduate}}{\text{Population}}$ for the Australian population aged 15-64 years old as in the 2016 Australian census (ABS 2016a). Note: calculations excluded census observations with response 'not stated' and 'supplementary codes'.	38.4% in 2016, computed as: $\frac{\text{Bachelor + Grad Dip or Cert + Postgraduate}}{\text{Immigrant population}}$ for those in the Australian population who were born overseas, aged 15-64 years old as in the 2016 Australian census (ABS 2016a). While this definition of immigrants includes overseas visitors, it is preferable to excluding the subset of the immigrant population who have become Australian citizens and would be excluded if using the ACMI dataset (ABS 2016b) and ACTEI dataset (ABS 2016c).
Are employed (full-time, part-time), unemployed or not in the labour force	Employed (full-time): 46.4%. Employed (part-time): 23.51%. Unemployed: 5.58%. Not in the labour force: 24.51%. Computed as: $\frac{\text{Employment status}}{\text{Population}}$ for the Australian population aged 15-64 years old as in the 2016 Australian census (ABS 2016a). Note: calculations excluded census observations with response 'not stated'.	Employed (full-time): 45.06%. Employed (part-time): 21.62%. Unemployed: 6.18%. Not in the labour force: 27.14%. Computed as: $\frac{\text{Employment status}}{\text{Immigrant population}}$ for those in the Australian population who were born overseas, aged 15-64 years old as in the 2016 Australian census (ABS 2016a). While this definition of immigrants includes overseas visitors, it is preferable to excluding the subset of the immigrant population who have become Australian citizens and would be excluded if using the ACMI dataset (ABS 2016b) and ACTEI Dataset (ABS 2016c).

Are born in the each region listed		Africa (6.3%), Americas (4.3%), Asia (39.8%), Europe (34.0%), the Middle East (4.9%), Pacific Islands Region (2.3%) and rest of Oceania (including New Zealand) (8.4%). Computed as: $\frac{\text{Immigrants born in region X}}{\text{Immigrant population}}$ for those in the Australian population who were born overseas as in the 2016 Australian census (ABS 2016e). While this definition of immigrants includes overseas visitors, it is preferable to excluding the subset of the immigrant population who have become Australian citizens and would be excluded if using the ACMI dataset (ABS 2016b) and ACTEI Dataset (ABS 2016c). 'Africa' region constructed by summing values for North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. 'Asia' region constructed by summing values for North-East Asia, South-East Asia and Southern and Central Asia. 'Europe' region constructed by summing values for North-West Europe and Southern and Eastern Europe. 'Pacific Islands Region' constructed by summing values for Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia (excludes Hawaii) . 'Rest of Oceania (including New Zealand)' region constructed by summing values for New Zealand and Antarctica.
Are born overseas	30.7% of Australia's population were born overseas as at June 2023 (ABS 2024).	

Income of immigrants...

Question	Domestic benchmark	Actual immigrants' characteristics
Median total personal income per week in 2016	$662 (ABS 2016d)	$615 (Department of Home Affairs 2018)

Quantitative information treatment

Question	Information treatment
Do you personally think that the total number of immigrants coming to Australia each year is too high, about right or too low?	*On average, annual net overseas migration (the number of immigrants arriving in Australia, minus those number of immigrants departing) between 2013 and 2023 to Australia has been around 229,000 people.* From ABS (2023b), Graphs/Tables 1.2 and 1.3
Going forward, how many temporary immigrants do you personally think Australia should accept?	*Out of every 100 immigrants who arrived in Australia between 2013 and 2023, 78 were temporary visa holders.* From ABS (2023b), Graph/Table 1.2. Excludes Australian citizens and unknown visas
Going forward, how many permanent immigrants do you personally think Australia should accept?	*Out of every 100 immigrants who arrived in Australia between 2013 and 2023, 22 were permanent visa holders.*

	From ABS (2023b), Graph/Table 1.2. Excludes Australian citizens and unknown visas
Going forward, how many immigrants who are full-time students do you personally think Australia should accept?	*Out of every 100 immigrants in Australia in who arrived between 2011 and 2020, 21 were full-time students.* From the 2021 Australian census (ABS 2021a). Excludes responses where student status was listed as 'not stated'.
Going forward, how many high-skilled immigrants (i.e. have a bachelor degree or higher) do you personally think Australia should accept?	*Out of every 100 immigrants in Australia in 2016, 38 were highly-skilled (had a bachelor degree or higher).* See above in Appendix C section C on actual immigrants' characteristics for high-skilled immigrants.
Going forward, how many low-skilled immigrants (i.e. do not have a bachelor degree or higher) do you personally think Australia should accept?	*Out of every 100 immigrants in Australia in 2016, 62 were low-skilled (did not have a bachelor degree or higher).* See above in Appendix C section C on actual immigrants' characteristics for high-skilled immigrants; this (rounded to whole numbers) value is subtracted from 100 to produce the proportion of low-skilled immigrants.
Going forward, how many immigrants born in the following regions do you personally think Australia should accept?	*The number of people in Australia from each region per 100 immigrants recorded in the 2016 census is provided below. Africa (6), Americas (4), Asia (40), Europe (34), the Middle East (5), Pacific Islands Region (2), rest of Oceania (including New Zealand) (9).*

	See above in Appendix C section C on actual immigrants' characteristics for immigrants born in different regions. Values were rounded to whole numbers for tractability.
Australia currently allows citizens of Pacific Island countries to live, work and study in Australia on a mostly temporary basis. Going forward, should Australia relax visa requirements for citizens of Pacific Island countries to make it easier for them to live, work, and study in Australia permanently?	*In the 2016 census, people from Pacific Island countries accounted for around 2% percent of the Australian population and were more likely than the rest of the Australian population to be in full-time employment and in the labour force.* See above in Appendix C section C on actual immigrants' characteristics for immigrants born in different regions. Values were rounded to whole numbers for tractability. Statistics around employment and labour force participation are from Orton and Edwards (2020).
Australia currently allows citizens of Pacific Island countries to live, work and study in Australia on a mostly temporary basis. Going forward, should Australia relax visa requirements for citizens of Pacific Island countries to make it easier for them to live, work, and study in Australia permanently?	*In the 2016 census, people from Pacific Island countries accounted for around 2% percent of the Australian population and were more likely than the rest of the Australian population to be in full-time employment and in the labour force.* See above in Appendix C section C on actual immigrants' characteristics for immigrants born in different regions. Values were rounded to whole numbers for tractability. Statistics around employment and labour force participation are from Orton and Edwards (2020).

Appendix D Survey questionnaire

1. Were you born outside of Australia?

   (a) Yes

   (b) No

   (c) Don't know/prefer not to answer

2. Were either of your parents born outside of Australia? *[Response order randomised with 'Don't know/prefer not to answer' left as final response option]*

   (a) One parent born outside of Australia

   (b) Both parents born outside of Australia

   (c) Neither parents born outside of Australia

   (d) Don't know/prefer not to answer

3. What is your individual gross annual income? This refers to the total of all income you usually receive before taxes per year.

   This includes wages and salaries (including overtime), government pensions, benefits and allowances, business and rental property profits or losses, and any other income.

   (a) $182,000 or more

   (b) $156,000 – $181,999

   (c) $104,000 – $155,99

   (d) $91,000 – $103,999

   (e) $78,000 – $90,999

   (f) $65,000 – $77,999

   (g) $52,000 – $64,999

   (h) $41,600 – $51,999

   (i) $33,800 – $41,599

   (j) $26,000 – $33,799

   (k) $20,800 – $25,999

   (l) $15,600 – $20,799

   (m) $7,800 – $15,599

   (n) $1 – $7,799

   (o) $0 or nil income

   (p) Negative income

(q) Don't know/prefer not to answer

4. What is the highest level of education you have attained?

   (a) Postgraduate degree

   (b) Graduate diploma or graduate certificate

   (c) Bachelor degree

   (d) Advanced diploma or diploma

   (e) Certificate level III or IV

   (f) Completed secondary school

   (g) Year 10 and above

   (h) Year 9 and below

   (i) Don't know/prefer not to answer

5. Which of the below best describes your current employment status?

   (a) Employed full-time

   (b) Employed part-time (i.e. usually work less than 35 hours per week, including casual and seasonal work)

   (c) Unemployed and looking for work

   (d) Not in the labour force (not working and not looking for work - e.g. retired, studying full-time only)

   (e) Don't know/prefer not to answer

6. At the next federal election, who would you be most likely to vote for? If you're not sure, please tell us who you are leaning towards. *[Randomise response order, with options 6 → 8 anchored in place]*

   (a) Labor party

   (b) Liberal party

   (c) The Nationals

   (d) The Greens

   (e) One Nation

   (f) Other party

   (g) Independent

   (h) Don't know/prefer not to answer

7. Do you have any friends or acquaintances who were born outside of Australia? *[Randomly flip response order, leaving 'don't know/prefer not to answer' anchored last]*

(a) Yes

(b) No

(c) Don't know/prefer not to answer

8. Consider the period from July 2022 to June 2023.

   How many migrants do you think:

   (a) Arrived in Australia from July 2022 to June 2023

   (b) Left Australia from July 2022 to June 2023

   By 'migrants', we mean people who have come from overseas to Australia on a visa and have stayed or intended to stay for 12 months or more. This includes people who were born overseas and have since become Australian citizens.

   Even if you're not sure, please give your best guess.

   [Valid numeric range: 0 → 27,000,000. Include don't know checkbox for each option. Add time stamp for when respondents start/first navigate to Q8]

9. Now consider the last ten years or so.

   On average, each year, how many migrants do you think:

   (a) Arrived in Australia

   (b) Left Australia

   Even if you're not sure, please give your best guess.

   [Valid numeric range: 0 → 27,000,000. Include don't know checkbox for each option]

10. Some migrants are allowed to live permanently in Australia. Others are only allowed to live in Australia on a temporary basis.

    Consider the last ten years or so. Out of every 100 migrants who arrived in Australia during this period, how many migrants do you think arrived in Australia on a temporary visa?

    Even if you're not sure, please give your best guess.

    [Valid numeric range: 0 → 100. Include don't know checkbox]

11. Australia allows a number of full-time students to live and study in Australia.

    For every 100 people aged 15-64 years in Australia, 13 were full-time students per the 2016 Australian census.

    Consider the last ten years or so. Out of every 100 migrants aged 15-64 years who arrived in Australia during this period, how many people do you think were full-time students?

    Even if you're not sure, please give your best guess.

    [Valid numeric range: 0 → 100. Include don't know checkbox]

12. Australia allows a mix of high-skilled migrants (i.e. have a bachelor degree or higher) and low-skilled migrants (i.e. do not have a bachelor degree or higher) to live in Australia.

    28 in every 100 people aged 15-64 years in Australia held a bachelor degree or higher per the 2016 Australian census.

    Consider the last ten years or so. Out of every 100 migrants in Australia aged 15-64 years, how many people do you think were highly skilled (i.e. have a bachelor degree or higher)?

    Even if you're not sure, please give your best guess.

    Remember: by 'migrants', we mean people who have come from overseas to Australia on a visa and have stayed or intended to stay for 12 months or more. This includes people who were born overseas and have since become Australian citizens.

    [Valid numeric range: 0 → 100. Include don't know checkbox]

13. For every 100 people aged 15-64 in Australia:

    - 46 were employed full-time;
    - 24 were employed part-time;
    - 6 were unemployed and looking for work; and
    - 24 were not in the labour force, per the 2016 Australian census.

    Consider the last ten years or so. Out of every 100 migrants in Australia aged 15-64 years, how many people do you think were:

    (a) Employed full-time

(b) Employed part-time (i.e. usually work less than 35 hours per week, including casual and seasonal work)

(c) Unemployed and looking for work

(d) Not in the labour force (not working and not looking for work - e.g. retired, studying full-time only)

Even if you're not sure, please give your best guess. Note that your answers must sum to 100.

[Valid numeric range: 0 → 100. Include don't know checkbox]

14. People aged 15 years and over in Australia had a median (average) total personal income of $662 per week in 2016, per the 2016 Australian census.

    Consider the last ten years or so. What do you think was the median (average) total personal income per week for a migrant in Australia aged 15 years or older?

    Even if you're not sure, please give your best guess.

    [Valid numeric range: 0 → 999,999. Include don't know checkbox]

15. Consider the last ten years or so. Out of every 100 people living in Australia, how many do you think were born overseas?

    Even if you're not sure, please give your best guess.

    [Valid numeric range: 0 → 100. Include don't know checkbox]

16. Consider the last ten years or so. Out of every 100 migrants in Australia of all ages, how many do you think were born in each region listed below:

    - Africa
    - Americas
    - Asia
    - Europe
    - The Middle East
    - Pacific Islands region
    - Rest of Oceania (including New Zealand)

    Even if you're not sure, please give your best guess. Note that your answers must sum to 100.

[Valid numeric range: 0 → 100. Include don't know checkbox. Randomise order of response options. Add time stamp for when respondents start/first navigate to Q16]

NARRATIVE INFORMATION TREATMENTS HERE - SEE SECTION 3.2 FOR FULL DESCRIPTION OF NARRATIVE INFORMATION TREATMENTS. NO NARRATIVE INFORMATION TREATMENT FOR CONTROL GROUP OR QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION TREATMENT GROUP.

[Add time stamp for when respondents start/first navigate to vignette/treatment page, and add second time stamp for when respondents leave vignette/treatment page. Only display 'next' button after 10 seconds has elapsed]

Information in green (additional to base survey questions) is provided to the information treatment group only.

17. On average, annual net overseas migration (the number of migrants arriving in Australia, minus those number of migrants departing) between 2013 and 2023 to Australia has been around 229,000 people.

    Do you personally think that the total number of migrants coming to Australia each year is too high, about right or too low?

    (a) Too high
    (b) About right
    (c) Too low
    (d) Don't know

    [Randomly flip response order, leaving 'don't know' anchored last. Add time stamp for when respondents start/first navigate to Q17]

18. Which option best describes the view of most Australians on this issue?

    (a) Too high
    (b) About right
    (c) Too low
    (d) Don't know what most Australians' views are

    [Same response order as previous question]

19. Out of every 100 migrants who arrived in Australia between 2013 and 2023, 78 were temporary visa holders.

    Going forward, how many temporary migrants do you personally think Australia should accept?

    (a) A lot more
    (b) More
    (c) No change
    (d) Less
    (e) A lot less
    (f) Don't know

    [Randomly flip response order, leaving 'don't know' anchored last. Randomise order that Q19+20 and Q21+22 are asked]

20. Which option best describes the view of most Australians on this issue?

    (a) A lot more
    (b) More
    (c) No change
    (d) Less
    (e) A lot less
    (f) Don't know what most Australians' views are

    [Same response order as previous question]

21. Out of every 100 migrants who arrived in Australia between 2013 and 2023, 22 were permanent visa holders.

    Going forward, how many permanent migrants do you personally think Australia should accept?

    (a) A lot more
    (b) More
    (c) No change
    (d) Less
    (e) A lot less
    (f) Don't know

    [Randomly flip response order, leaving 'don't know' anchored last. Randomise order that Q19+20 and Q21+22 are asked]

22. Which option best describes the view of most Australians on this issue?

    (a) A lot more
    (b) More
    (c) No change
    (d) Less
    (e) A lot less
    (f) Don't know what most Australians' views are

    [Same response order as previous question]

23. Out of every 100 migrants who arrived in Australia between 2011 and 2020, 21 were full-time students.

    Going forward, how many migrants who are full-time students do you personally think Australia should accept?

    (a) A lot more
    (b) More
    (c) No change
    (d) Less
    (e) A lot less
    (f) Don't know

    [Randomly flip response order, leaving 'don't know' anchored last]

24. Which option best describes the view of most Australians on this issue?

    (a) A lot more
    (b) More
    (c) No change
    (d) Less
    (e) A lot less
    (f) Don't know what most Australians' views are

    [Same response order as previous question]

25. Out of every 100 migrants in Australia in 2016, 38 were highly-skilled (had a bachelor degree or higher).

    Going forward, how many high-skilled migrants (i.e. have a bachelor degree or higher) do you personally think Australia should accept?

(a) A lot more

(b) More

(c) No change

(d) Less

(e) A lot less

(f) Don't know

[Randomly flip response order, leaving 'don't know' anchored last. Randomise order that Q25+26 and Q27+28 are asked]

26. Which option best describes the view of most Australians on this issue?

(a) A lot more

(b) More

(c) No change

(d) Less

(e) A lot less

(f) Don't know what most Australians' views are

[Same response order as previous question]

27. Out of every 100 migrants in Australia in 2016, 62 were low-skilled (did not have a bachelor degree or higher).

Going forward, how many low-skilled migrants (i.e. do not have a bachelor degree or higher) do you personally think Australia should accept?

(a) A lot more

(b) More

(c) No change

(d) Less

(e) A lot less

(f) Don't know

[Randomly flip response order, leaving 'don't know' anchored last. Randomise order that Q25+26 and Q27+28 are asked]

28. Which option best describes the view of most Australians on this issue?

(a) A lot more

(b) More

(c) No change

(d) Less

(e) A lot less

(f) Don't know what most Australians' views are

[Same response order as previous question]

29. The number of people in Australia from each region per 100 migrants recorded in the 2016 census is provided below.

    Going forward, how many migrants born in the following regions do you personally think Australia should accept?

    - Africa
    - Americas
    - Asia
    - Europe
    - The Middle East
    - Pacific Islands region
    - Rest of Oceania (including New Zealand)

    [Randomise country option list. Randomly flip response order scale, leaving 'don't know' anchored last. Response options are as follows - a lot more; more; no change; less; a lot less; don't know]

30. Australia currently allows citizens of Pacific Islands countries to live, work and study in Australia on a mostly temporary basis.

    In the 2016 census, people from Pacific Islands countries accounted for around 2% percent of the Australian population and were more likely than the rest of the Australian population to be in full-time employment and in the labour force.

    Going forward, should Australia relax visa requirements for citizens of Pacific Islands countries to make it easier for them to live, work, and study in Australia permanently?

    (a) Relax visa requirements

    (b) No change

    (c) Make visa requirements stricter

    (d) Don't know

31. Which option best describes the view of most Australians on this issue?

(a) Relax visa requirements

(b) No change

(c) Make visa requirements stricter

(d) Don't know what most Australian's views are

32. Australia currently allows citizens of Pacific Islands countries to live, work and study in Australia on a mostly temporary basis.

In the 2016 census, people from Pacific Islands countries accounted for around 2% percent of the Australian population and were more likely than the rest of the Australian population to be in full-time employment and in the labour force.

Going forward, should Australia relax visa requirements for citizens of Pacific Islands countries to make it easier for them to live, work, and study in Australia temporarily?

(a) Relax visa requirements

(b) No change

(c) Make visa requirements stricter

(d) Don't know

[Randomly flip response order, leaving 'don't know' anchored last. Randomise order that Q30+31 and Q32+33 are asked]

33. Which option best describes the view of most Australians on this issue?

(a) Relax visa requirements

(b) No change

(c) Make visa requirements stricter

(d) Don't know what most Australian's views are

[Same response order as previous question]

34. Australia has recently announced the Pacific Engagement Visa, which will allow up to 3,000 citizens of Pacific Islands countries to permanently move to Australia each year, if they find a job.

Going forward, how many permanent migrants from Pacific Islands countries do you personally think Australia should accept under the Pacific Engagement Visa?

(a) A lot more

(b) More

(c) No change

(d) Less

(e) A lot less

(f) Don't know

[Randomly flip response order, leaving 'don't know' anchored last]

35. Which option best describes the view of most Australians on this issue?

(a) A lot more

(b) More

(c) No change

(d) Less

(e) A lot less

(f) Don't know what most Australians' views are

[Same response order as previous question]

36. Australia has recently signed an agreement with Tuvalu—a small Pacific microstate home to about 11,000 people and extremely vulnerable to climate change—to allow 280 Tuvaluans to move to Australia permanently each year, separate from the Pacific Engagement Visa.

Going forward, do you personally think agreements like this should be:

(a) Expanded to all Pacific Island countries

(b) Expanded to only some more Pacific Island countries

(c) Kept the same (i.e. keep existing arrangements for Tuvalu only)

(d) Not expanded, and numbers from Tuvalu should be reduced

(e) Don't know

[Randomly flip response order, leaving 'don't know' anchored last]

37. Which option best describes the view of most Australians on this issue?

(a) Expanded to all Pacific Island countries

(b) Expanded to only some more Pacific Island countries

(c) Kept the same (i.e. keep existing arrangements for Tuvalu only)

(d) Not expanded, and numbers from Tuvalu should be reduced

(e) Don't know what most Australians' views are

[Same response order as previous question]

38. Please say whether you personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements about immigration:

    (a) Overall, immigration has a positive impact on the economy of Australia

    (b) Immigrants strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents

    (c) Accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger

    (d) Australian cities are already too crowded

    (e) Immigrants are a burden on our social welfare system

    (f) Immigrants take away jobs from other Australians

    [Randomise order in which statements appear. Randomly flip response order scale, leaving 'don't know' anchored last. Response options are as follows - strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree; don't know]

    [Add time stamp for when respondents finish survey]