Abstract:

Institutions are central to political life, yet institutional dysfunctionality remains endemic in many developing countries. In postcolonial settings, institutions inherited through decolonisation have often proved inappropriate to new states, either because of mismatches between institutional form and long-standing authority patterns or because these legacy institutions created incentives for destructive behaviours. These problems are not confined to the postcolonial space, but have also appeared in contexts of multilateral state-building and institutional design.

This paper examines how institutional design can incentivise cooperation, competition, or conflict by analysing cases of civil service administration in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021 and in Papua New Guinea after independence in 1975. It argues that a neutral, politically impartial civil service is itself a political objective, but that institutional design has not been able to overcome broader social and political incentives fostering patronage and networking. Careful reflection is therefore required before new arrangements are put in place.