Comments

Thank you, Professor Aqorau, Dr Bugoro, and Associate Professor Ride, for this excellent and timely contribution. The article rightly highlights that free education is anything but free. Beyond the direct fiscal costs you identify, resources allocated to education necessarily come at the expense of other priorities such as health, infrastructure, and public security—what economists refer to as the opportunity cost of public spending. There are useful lessons from Fiji, which has operated a free education policy for more than a decade. Under this policy, tuition fees, textbooks, and student transport are funded from the national budget at significant cost to taxpayers. While these financial commitments were anticipated, one unintended consequence has been a degree of parental disengagement from their children's education. When households no longer make a direct financial contribution, some parents may perceive education as primarily the responsibility of the state rather than a shared responsibility between schools, families, and communities. This experience suggests that policymakers should consider not only the fiscal sustainability of free education, but also its potential effects on parental engagement and educational outcomes.

I hope that with the PEV I can go to Australia to find a job.

Hello Sonya, Congratulations and it’s very inspiring. God Bless you, Could you send me some details for opening a coffee shop in Timor Leste?

I am from Pakistan. I need a job very badly. There is a lot of poverty here. I have to go out and work hard and do something for my family.

The nexus between spies, security and aid is real between PNG and Australia - two close allies in which the former is the largest aid recipient of the latter. In defense and security cooperation spying work is well entrenched disguised in the bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements between Australia and PNG. With the recently concluded Treaty of Mutual Defence and Security Cooperation with Papua New Guinea intelligence and spy tasking are happening in communications infrastructure, surveillance, border security and more importantly in the strategic resource development agreements. These are triggered by the fear of China and Chinese investments in Papua New Guinea in lucrative extractive sector. The collection of critical information is then used against PNG's national development. The aid then becomes a double edged sword.

Thank you Wendy.

Thanks for parts 1 and 2 about the differences one road can make. The handwritten note in the teachers' room at Bema Primary school brought tears to my eyes, with its messages of such hopes.

I'm applying same higher school but NID card and birth certificate are required so I'm already apply NID but yet to receive so please make it fast for me.

Hear Hear!

This information is certainly highly useful for Papua New Guinean leaders, policy makers and for decision-making. Appreciate it 🙏.

Bravo Dr Ataneka for urging the people of Tungaru to take back their own name!

Excerpts from the findings of the commission of inquiry into the Sandline saga related to Jerry Singirok. He one of the key person behind Sandline Internation in the first place togehter with the then Defence Minister , late Mathias Ijape. 6.5 The evidence shows (and is not disputed) that Brigadier General Singirok was involved in the dealings with Sandline from the beginning. In Easter 1996, he travelled to Cairns, accompanied by the defence minister , Mr Ijape, and the Department of Defence Secretary, Mr Melegepa. They constitute the Papua New Guinea Defence Council. Brigadier General Singirok, as Commander of the P.N.G.D.F., was the Chief Military Advisor to the Defence Council and the Government. There they met Colonel Spicer, who was accompanied by Mr Buckingham. Mr Spicer says he explained his organisation and its relationship with Executive Outcomes (E.O.) The Defence Council explained its requirements, especially the need for helicopters as well as budgetary requirements, and it was agreed that there would be another meeting in London with Brigadier General Singirok. 6.6 In April 1996 Mr. Spicer handed his proposal to Brigadier General Singirok in London. Mr Spicer said that the indications he got from Brigadier General Singirok were that he was pleased with the proposal, and he said that it was what he was expecting, and that he would take it back to Papua New Guinea to discuss it, and that a copy should go to the defence minister. The Commander said that he briefed the Minister on his return, “that the offer looked good", although he raised doubts about the ability to fund it. There seems to be some inconsistency in the Commander's evidence when he said that he went to London at the direction of the defence minister to follow up on the proposal of E.O. and then said that he was not keen to see Mr Spicer in London. The proposal really related to helicopter support for a counterinsurgency operation, which would be procured and operated by Mr Spicer's group on behalf of the Government of Papua New Guinea. 6.7 Throughout all negotiations the situation remained the same in that Sandline personnel would be under the control of the Commander of the P.N.G.D.F. in conjunction with the P.N.G.D.F. 6.8 The equipment listed in the Sandline contract was essentially listed in the April 1996 proposal. 6.9 On Mr. Spicer's evidence no-one on behalf of the Papua New Guinea Government ever asked for any justification of the costing of the equipment. The pricing schedule was the basis for that in the Sandline contract signed some nine months later and the Government could thus evaluate the prices if they wished to do so. 6.10 These early contacts with Sandline lay dormant because the Prime Minister said no. A need, however, was identified to acquire more helicopters that were unrestricted, i.e., which could be converted to attack and not restricted to unarmed transports (N.E.C. decision 9th September 1996 Policy Submission 179/96 Recommendation 2). 6.11 The Sandline negotiations were revived in September/October 1996 when the Deputy Prime Minister was contacted by Mr Spicer. This led to an invitation from the Deputy Prime Minister to Mr Spicer to visit Papua New Guinea in November 1996. At this time, the long list of peace initiatives (listed in Chapter 2) had failed and the situation in Bougainville had deteriorated badly in the latter half of 1996, with increased rebel activity. Sandline was contracted to provide a consultancy report on possible action. The Commander considered the idea of obtaining a report to be a good idea. It was completed and presented in very late December 1996/January 1997. The Commander agreed with the military options proposed in the report as suggested by Sandline. Source: https://pngiportal.org/directory/commission-of-inquiry-into-the-engagement-of-sandline-international Pages 77-79 You can read more incriminating evidence regarding his involvement with Sandline in the report.