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The nexus between spies, security and aid is real between PNG and Australia - two close allies in which the former is the largest aid recipient of the latter. In defense and security cooperation spying work is well entrenched disguised in the bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements between Australia and PNG. With the recently concluded Treaty of Mutual Defence and Security Cooperation with Papua New Guinea intelligence and spy tasking are happening in communications infrastructure, surveillance, border security and more importantly in the strategic resource development agreements. These are triggered by the fear of China and Chinese investments in Papua New Guinea in lucrative extractive sector. The collection of critical information is then used against PNG's national development. The aid then becomes a double edged sword.

Interesting perspective. Face-to-face dialogue often helps build trust and understanding in ways that virtual communication cannot fully replace, especially when discussing important regional issues.

Thank you Wendy.

Thanks for parts 1 and 2 about the differences one road can make. The handwritten note in the teachers' room at Bema Primary school brought tears to my eyes, with its messages of such hopes.

I'm applying same higher school but NID card and birth certificate are required so I'm already apply NID but yet to receive so please make it fast for me.

Hear Hear!

This information is certainly highly useful for Papua New Guinean leaders, policy makers and for decision-making. Appreciate it 🙏.

Bravo Dr Ataneka for urging the people of Tungaru to take back their own name!

Excerpts from the findings of the commission of inquiry into the Sandline saga related to Jerry Singirok. He one of the key person behind Sandline Internation in the first place togehter with the then Defence Minister , late Mathias Ijape. 6.5 The evidence shows (and is not disputed) that Brigadier General Singirok was involved in the dealings with Sandline from the beginning. In Easter 1996, he travelled to Cairns, accompanied by the defence minister , Mr Ijape, and the Department of Defence Secretary, Mr Melegepa. They constitute the Papua New Guinea Defence Council. Brigadier General Singirok, as Commander of the P.N.G.D.F., was the Chief Military Advisor to the Defence Council and the Government. There they met Colonel Spicer, who was accompanied by Mr Buckingham. Mr Spicer says he explained his organisation and its relationship with Executive Outcomes (E.O.) The Defence Council explained its requirements, especially the need for helicopters as well as budgetary requirements, and it was agreed that there would be another meeting in London with Brigadier General Singirok. 6.6 In April 1996 Mr. Spicer handed his proposal to Brigadier General Singirok in London. Mr Spicer said that the indications he got from Brigadier General Singirok were that he was pleased with the proposal, and he said that it was what he was expecting, and that he would take it back to Papua New Guinea to discuss it, and that a copy should go to the defence minister. The Commander said that he briefed the Minister on his return, “that the offer looked good", although he raised doubts about the ability to fund it. There seems to be some inconsistency in the Commander's evidence when he said that he went to London at the direction of the defence minister to follow up on the proposal of E.O. and then said that he was not keen to see Mr Spicer in London. The proposal really related to helicopter support for a counterinsurgency operation, which would be procured and operated by Mr Spicer's group on behalf of the Government of Papua New Guinea. 6.7 Throughout all negotiations the situation remained the same in that Sandline personnel would be under the control of the Commander of the P.N.G.D.F. in conjunction with the P.N.G.D.F. 6.8 The equipment listed in the Sandline contract was essentially listed in the April 1996 proposal. 6.9 On Mr. Spicer's evidence no-one on behalf of the Papua New Guinea Government ever asked for any justification of the costing of the equipment. The pricing schedule was the basis for that in the Sandline contract signed some nine months later and the Government could thus evaluate the prices if they wished to do so. 6.10 These early contacts with Sandline lay dormant because the Prime Minister said no. A need, however, was identified to acquire more helicopters that were unrestricted, i.e., which could be converted to attack and not restricted to unarmed transports (N.E.C. decision 9th September 1996 Policy Submission 179/96 Recommendation 2). 6.11 The Sandline negotiations were revived in September/October 1996 when the Deputy Prime Minister was contacted by Mr Spicer. This led to an invitation from the Deputy Prime Minister to Mr Spicer to visit Papua New Guinea in November 1996. At this time, the long list of peace initiatives (listed in Chapter 2) had failed and the situation in Bougainville had deteriorated badly in the latter half of 1996, with increased rebel activity. Sandline was contracted to provide a consultancy report on possible action. The Commander considered the idea of obtaining a report to be a good idea. It was completed and presented in very late December 1996/January 1997. The Commander agreed with the military options proposed in the report as suggested by Sandline. Source: https://pngiportal.org/directory/commission-of-inquiry-into-the-engagement-of-sandline-international Pages 77-79 You can read more incriminating evidence regarding his involvement with Sandline in the report.

This is interesting research based on current changing technological world. AI is taking over, with people either using it academically or personally. Most students and non-students used it for study purposes as well as to answer their daily problems, for example, they use it to ask about relationships issues, family issues etc. Apart from using it only on academic AI is their friend leading to lesser number visiting student counsellors. Further research should also look at the non academic usage of AI to see if it helps students.

Dear Maho, Thank you for your interest in our research. Last year, the regulator released a report that indicated that there are now 4.3 million mobile subscribers in Papua New Guinea. Please note that this figure does not equate to individual people because some people have more than one active mobile telephone number (for instance, one for work and one for personal use). That report is available at the link below. https://www.nicta.gov.pg/national-ict-indicators-report-2025/ That latest figure does seem to suggest that there has been growth in mobile telephone uptake because a 2019 industry report indicated that there were 2.5 million unique subscribers in the country at the time (see https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/resources/digital-transformation-the-role-of-mobile-technology-in-papua-new-guinea/ ). Thank you also for your second question, about the pricing of handsets. We do not look into handset pricing in our project but it would be another interesting topic to perhaps pursue in the future. Importantly, the regulator’s 2025 report highlights that affordability remains a key constraint. While our study does not directly analyse subscriber or handset price trends, regulatory evidence points to mixed outcomes in coverage expansion alongside continued affordability constraints. These may be valuable areas for further research. Amanda, Hafford, Loretta and Jonathan

Purchase of credits through Digicel PNG CellMoni is probably giving better value for your Kina - for some users at least.