Comments

This is a strong contribution to the debate, and I agree with the central point that migration has been a net positive for much of the Pacific. But I think there’s a bigger system dynamic here that’s still being underplayed. What we’re really looking at is not a set of isolated national labour markets, but an uneven and incomplete regional one. The examples cited — Cook Islands, Niue and Palau — are instructive, but not just because of migration alone. They’ve had structured, relatively frictionless access to larger, higher-income economies through free association arrangements. That has allowed them to relieve domestic labour constraints, lift household incomes, and maintain viability despite very small domestic bases. But that model comes with trade-offs that are often glossed over. In the case of the Realm countries, access to labour mobility has also meant constraints in other areas — including limited access to institutions like the UN, IMF and World Bank, which in turn shapes their fiscal sovereignty and long-term development pathways. It’s not a neutral arrangement — it’s a negotiated one, with costs as well as benefits. What’s missing from the broader Pacific picture is that this level of mobility has not been replicated regionally. Instead, labour mobility is fragmented — largely bilateral, externally driven, and often tied to specific sectors like seasonal work. So we end up with a structural imbalance: underemployment in some Pacific countries, acute labour shortages in others, and no mechanism to efficiently move labour within the region itself. That’s where remittances need to be understood differently. They’re not just a passive outcome of migration — they are, in many cases, a core economic stabiliser and a medium-term tool for managing these imbalances. Dismissing them as a development dead-end risks overlooking their functional role in how Pacific economies are currently holding together. The point raised in the comments about the type of migration is critical. Mobility that is either highly restricted (seasonal, temporary) or fully permanent doesn’t create a flexible regional labour system. What’s missing is something in between — pathways that allow Pacific people to move, work, return, and reintegrate more fluidly across the region. Arrangements like the Falepili Union between Tuvalu and Australia also show that mobility is increasingly being negotiated under pressure, and not always from a position of equal choice. Not all Pacific countries are entering these arrangements with the same options available to them. So I don’t think the question is whether migration is good or bad — the evidence is pretty clear on that. The real question is whether the Pacific can move faster toward a more coherent regional labour mobility system — one that balances outward migration, inward flows, remittances, and domestic capacity — rather than continuing with the current patchwork of arrangements. Until then, we’ll keep seeing the same tensions play out across the region.

The judgment of the PNG National Court on the Panguna mine case Miriori v Rio Tinto was handed down on 26 Sept 2025. Mr Justice Anis dismissed the case and awarded costs against the plaintiffs, Martin Miriori and others. Miriori v Rio Tinto Ltd [2025] PGNC 354; N11498 (26 September 2025) https://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGNC/2025/354.html Commentary on the judgment can be found here - https://www.academia.edu/165023268/The_Disjunction_Between_Judicial_Sophistry_and_Customary_Adjudicative_Reality Vailala

An excellent article and comment from Watna. Prasad’s claim ‘No country has ever got rich from remittances’, is a bit of a stretch. Remittances are a central part of the Philippines economy, and the more successful states of India such as Kerala are likewise high remittance receivers. I’m not sure where Tonga fits in this picture. The Pacific is not the only country with clientelism: the US is currently showing how its done.

All four high income Pacific countries are in free association with developed countries. So it's not a question of whether migration is a problem for the Pacific or not, we have always migrated! It's about the type of migration that’s allowed to happen. The migration policies of Australia & co have a lot of impact on Pacific economies and incomes. Pacific people are happy for PALM, PEV etc...because that is all those countries are willing to offer us. We either come to do seasonal labour on strict conditions and return with no flexible migration options or we are immediately locked into permanent migration that basically has Pacific people there for 4 straight years before they can obtain citizenship (and structural inequalities mean only certain people access this) and then the freedom to move back or around again. Meanwhile what Pacific people are calling for are migration pathways that allow us to freely and securely move , live, get educated, do business within OUR region, this would likely result in what you’re seeing in those free association states. And to do so without having to hand over sovereignty to Australia & co through security treaties. I’m glad you mentioned Nauru- why, when NZ and Australia took so much from Nauru in phosphate pre-independence, did Nauru not benefit from beneficial migration pathways with them? And in their destitute phosphate depleted “post-colonial state”, Australia uses this to negotiate their abhorrent detention centres which was apparently a good thing from an economic pov as you’ve pointed out. In all of this we have to ask, where is the relationality?? The reciprocity? Finally, your reference to Tonga and Samoa as being too isolated to become “viable” is not a new criticism or belittlement from the West, something Pacific people keep countering over and over again, not least by Epeli Hauofa when he said, “The idea that the countries of Polynesia and Micronesia are too small, too poor, and too isolated to develop any meaningful degree of autonomy is an economistic and geographic deterministic view of a very narrow kind that overlooks culture history and the contemporary process of what may be called world enlargement that is carried out by tens of thousands of ordinary Pacific Islanders right across the ocean-from east to west and north to south, under the very noses of academic and consultancy experts, regional and international development agencies, bureaucratic planners and their advisers, and customs and immigration officials-making nonsense of all national and economic boundaries, borders that have been defined only recently, crisscrossing an ocean that had been boundless for ages before Captain Cook’s apotheosis.”

Dr Bal, you have essentially said it all. Our politicians are placed in an ackward position everytime they're cornered by one of the bigger guys in the Pacific. Our leaders or put better our PNG, the Solomon's and others in the region has a pig rope around its hind legs asking, if want to eat Kaukau, you have to follow me. So I guess PNG, the Solomon's etc may never have a choice, but to be led anywhere - it may seem.

Thanks BK on this post, now we see what it means when PNG founding fathers adopted the foreign policy "friends to all enemies to none". Latest young PNG politicians became emotional and excited to go over and above the benchmark, to Beijing and Canberra at selective times and under selective circumstances, are running risks, should digest this post.

I liked a lot about this blog—particularly the critique of how “strategic” is often mis- and over-used, conferring unearned authority on whoever invokes it. The emphasis on identifying root causes (not just symptoms), and on designing responses that are politically and technically feasible—not just wishful thinking—also resonated (that temptation must be especially acute for short-term posted officers). And the “graveyard” of public service and governance reform programs is a sobering reminder of how hard being strategic and effective is in practice. Graham’s principles translate directly to inclusive economic growth. A grounded understanding of political economy, gender and disability dynamics, and power structures within markets is non-negotiable. The real skill lies in navigating these constraints carefully—working within them, and occasionally around them—to catalyse durable change. Paradoxically, the piece also reinforces the value of interventions that don’t always sound especially “strategic”. The debates in the 2000s around promoting growth and private sector development come to mind, when the dominant narrative was that aid should focus on creating that elusive “enabling environment,” rather than engaging directly with markets or firms. Experience has shown the limits of that approach: regulatory and legal reforms alone rarely shift outcomes, as entrenched interests adapt to preserve their position. More recently, there’s been a shift in aid programming towards pragmatic partnerships with businesses, industry groups, and governments. These often start with a narrow, highly specific problem—hardly grand or “strategic” at first glance—but can generate tangible, scalable change that endures beyond project support. The most successful examples are, in fact, strategic in the ways Graham describes: locally grounded, realistic about constraints, but designed with a clear pathway to scale and sustained impact beyond program support—delivering strong value for money as a result.

I agree with the core messages of this article. However, I am concerned by the use of LLIN effectiveness in malaria control as an example of a tested assumption directly informing policy. Evidence generated through RCTs in a particular context (for example, Africa) should still be treated as an assumption when applied to different epidemiological, social, and implementation contexts. While RCTs and systematic reviews have demonstrated strong effectiveness of LLINs in controlled settings and in many African contexts, more recent evidence points to declining effectiveness elsewhere due to multiple interacting factors: increased outdoor transmission, variability in net quality linked to economic and logistical constraints, and challenges in sustained and appropriate use. In such settings, evidence that appears robust because it relies on a “gold‑standard” methodology (RCTs) becomes incomplete when confronted with complex real‑world conditions. Rather than presenting LLINs as an unqualified success story of evidence uptake, the disconnect between RCT‑based evidence and implementation realities could strengthen the article’s argument. It illustrates why evidence must be contextualised, continuously tested, and adapted—particularly when transferred across regions. Evidence of success in Africa, for instance, cannot be assumed to translate directly to the Pacific or parts of Southeast Asia. In this sense, the LLIN experience may be more powerful as an example of the limits of linear evidence‑to‑policy models, rather than as a simple validation of them. Sources: Systematic review on LLIN effectiveness in Africa: https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/22/7/1045 Limited use of LLINs in PNG two years after mass distribution: https://www.malariaworld.org/scientific-articles/coverage-determinants-use-and-repurposing-long-lasting-insecticidal-nets-two-years-after Decreased LLIN bioefficacy in PNG: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1471492221000568 Vinit et al. (2020). Decreased bioefficacy of long-lasting insecticidal nets and the resurgence of malaria in Papua New Guinea. Nature Communications, 11, 3646. Herdiana et al. (2025). Shrinking the malaria map in Indonesia. BMC Medicine, 23, 512.

Hi Osourne, I hope this message finds you well today. I am interested in getting to know you as I'm assisting you a sister female candidate for PNGs National General Elections next year 2027 next. Please reply should you have free time. Best wishes Brother Francis Gako POM 🙏🙏

I agree. Having a strategy means (among other things) articulating a clear theory of change, identifying the problem and designing your program to address it. It does not mean the program should be focused at high levels of government. Part of the problem seems to be the word strategic which should have the same basic meaning as "strategy". But it has come to be used as a synonym for acting at high levels of government. Bottom-up interventions can be just as "strategic". We really should be starting with the problem not the level at which we want to operate.

I wonder if the Grey Listing may also contribute to futher delays.

I can't understand why PNG is not joining other Pacific countries and calling for urgent phase out of fossil fuels. New gas developments are completely incompatible with climate change obligations, regardless of which country they are in. PNG is hugely vulnerable to ocean acidification and sea level rise, storms and landslides, and temperature increases. It has no credibility calling for climate change action while developing its own gas resources.