Comments

Too good, Anna and Stephen.

Thank you for the piece. it was helpful in our writing at UOG.

The FMTF focuses on AML/CTF across transactional crimes and ratings, how about those corrupt transactions that are structured and ordered by people in authority through the normal systems?

Hi there, please provide information so I can be well informed of the latest events from your end. Best regards. Lazarus Apso

Timely highlights. Thanks, Mike.

Thanks for this timely blog. Don't forget the impact on some Pacific Island government budgets through their Trust Funds (FSM, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, RMI, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu) with earnings negatively impacted by the global fall in the stock markets.

Thanks, Maho. The links we provided refer to major 2024 money laundering investigations and convictions—amounting to billions—mostly in the Global North. In the Global South, the largest case last year was in Australia. To clarify, it’s not about the share of GDP. The FATF greylist doesn’t necessarily reflect the volume of money laundered. Instead, it assesses “technical compliance” and, more recently, “effectiveness” or “outcomes.” This means a country can have billions being laundered but still avoid the greylist if it has implemented most AML/CTF standards and shown evidence of successful prosecutions. In contrast, many developing countries lack both—due to capacity constraints, limited resources, and often political will. As a result, even without clear evidence of large-scale money laundering (as is the case for most if not all greylisted countries), they can still be greylisted for failing to meet technical standards.

Another timely article, thanks to the authors. For the billions you mention being laundered in the global north, have you quantified how much is estimated to be laundered? The share of GDP (or size of financial sector) of money laundered would allow for global comparisons to see the extent to which money laundering is potentially destabilising, and if FATF is justified in pursuing poorer countries (if indeed their share was higher).

This article is a good reflection.

As I commented elsewhere on this site, the self-help of microfinance seems to have dropped off the western "aid radar" - and local, it seems. The BRAC report (referenced by Stephen on his "Aid Update" post) made no explicit comment on its work on microfinance, otherwise its oldest project: “Microfinance, introduced in 1974, is BRAC’s oldest programme. It spans all districts of Bangladesh.[ It provides collateral-free loans to mostly poor, landless, rural women, enabling them to generate income and improve their standards of living. BRAC’s microfinance program is estimated to give out around the equivalent of one billion dollars a year in loans.” Are BRAC’s microfinance loans underpinging this part of that current Brief: "1 in every 4 households who lifted themselves out of extreme poverty in Bangladesh in the last 13 years did so with Australia’s support. Approximately four million households lifted themselves out of extreme poverty in 2012-2024,.... " What was that form of "Australian suppport" referenced ? It would be useful to remember that 20 years ago: 2005 was the International Year of Microfinance – Bangladesh’s interim head of Government, Mohammad Yunus, being a well-known pioneer of microfinance.

There are proposals before parliament for alternative forms and systems of government. A consultation was conducted by the Constitutional Law Commission in 2023-2024. Parliament has not tabled and debated it yet.

Dear Fredrick, Good to read your comments. Interestingly, Papua New Guinea and Kenya share a notable similarity in the use of constituency funding. Kenya is often cited as a positive example of how the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) can be effectively implemented—whereas PNG is frequently regarded as a bad case. For instance, PNG’s CDF is allegedly used to secure political support in votes of no confidence. Unlike Kenya, which has a standalone CDF Act providing a legal framework and oversight, PNG lacks such legislation. This absence leaves significant room for misuse—such as rewarding Members of Parliament who back the Prime Minister with access to funds, while delaying or withholding the share meant for opposition MPs.