Afghanistan’s restrictions on girls’ secondary and higher education are the immediate barrier to women’s education. But even if these restrictions are eventually removed, access will also depend on attitudes within households and communities. In a new study published in Review of Development Economics, we look at the demand side of women’s education, which has been less prominent in discussions on this issue. We argue that the demand side is as important as the supply side.
Our study adds a household political-economy perspective on women’s education in Afghanistan. Social norms and household bargaining will influence whether restored rights can be exercised in the future. Even if formal bans were lifted tomorrow, entrenched attitudes in households and communities could remain an important constraint on enrolment, which is why the demand side matters for the sustainability of any future policy reversal.
We use nationally representative Asia Foundation surveys covering more than 69,000 respondents across all 34 provinces between 2014 and 2021. Respondents were asked whether women should have equal educational opportunities at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, and whether they should be able to study in another province or abroad.
Men and women answered similarly on primary education, but the gap between them widened at each higher level. After accounting for socioeconomic characteristics of respondents, province-related factors and survey-year shocks, men were 6.2 percentage points less likely than women to support secondary education, 12.6 points less likely to support tertiary education, 14.8 points less likely to support study in another province and 15.3 points less likely to support study abroad. Rural respondents were also less supportive of women’s secondary and tertiary education and of study in another province, though urban men were the most opposed to study abroad. Support rose modestly for both men and women across the 2014 to 2021 period, indicating that attitudes are not static. Ethnic differences were also marked: Hazara respondents were substantially more supportive of higher education and mobility, while Pashtun respondents were the least supportive, patterns the paper links to the Pashtunwali code of honour and seclusion and to the Hazara community’s history of migration and investment in schooling.
These results suggest that acceptance of basic education does not necessarily extend to forms of education that increase women’s mobility, qualifications and potential economic independence.
Men’s attitudes towards higher education for women have cultural, historical, religious and ethnic roots that are difficult for policymakers and international organisations to influence directly, and shifting them is a long-term project. But these attitudes are not fixed. Our analysis shows they are systematically associated with women’s financial contribution and perceptions of insecurity across Afghanistan. Where women contributed to household income, men’s opposition to their education was lower. The estimates imply related reductions in men’s negative attitudes of about four percentage points for secondary education, 5.3 points for tertiary education, 4.7 points for study in another province and 3.1 points for study abroad. The deeper cultural sources of these attitudes may be slow to change, but the attitudes themselves appear to vary with economic circumstances.
This pattern is consistent with an intra-household bargaining mechanism. When women contribute economically, education may be seen as producing tangible household benefits, and women may acquire greater influence over family decisions. Our results also show that women’s income contributions moderated the association between insecurity and restrictive attitudes. Fear of insecurity was linked to lower support for women’s schooling, particularly at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, but this negative association was weaker where women contributed financially. On our reading, a woman’s earnings help legitimise her participation in education and work and raise the household cost of withdrawing her, so families weigh security concerns against a more visible economic loss.
Reading causal relationships into the results is not straightforward. Households that allow women to work may already hold more supportive views on the role of women in society. We controlled for a wide range of individual and household characteristics, but unmeasured factors, such as unobserved progressive household norms, could still drive both women’s earnings and men’s stated attitudes. The association we document is robust, but a causal interpretation would require research designs we cannot implement with these data. Women’s economic participation may help shift household attitudes, but it cannot be treated as a stand-alone solution.
There are lessons for policy. First, women’s right to education is the central objective and does not depend on any economic case for it. Evidence that education also brings large economic and social gains can help build broader support but should not be used to imply that these rights are conditional on women’s earnings. UNESCO has estimated that a prolonged suspension of women’s higher education could impose very large long-run economic losses on Afghanistan. The social costs extend further, including weaker health, education and professional capacity.
Second, international programs should protect the limited economic spaces still available to Afghan women and connect skills to realistic livelihood opportunities. Recent International Labour Organization programs show that context-sensitive recruitment, community engagement, adapted worksites and entrepreneurship support can enable women to earn income under severe restrictions and can contribute to gradual changes in community attitudes. UN Women initiatives similarly combine business support, access to finance and markets, and women-only safe spaces.
Third, beyond our own results, the wider evidence base points to the importance of addressing insecurity and mobility directly. Safe transport, locally accessible learning, female teachers, secure accommodation and community-based education can reduce the practical and perceived costs that families associate with women studying away from home. Remote education can preserve learning where access is blocked, but it should remain a bridge to accredited formal education rather than a permanent substitute.
The importance of these measures is borne out by a World Bank study based on interviews with more than 2,000 women and focus groups with women and men, which found that safety, transport and family concerns shaped women’s ability to travel for study and work. In Herat, male participants described security as influencing whether and when women in their households could leave home. One man described the difficulties faced by his sister, a veterinary university student, who needed a mahram to accompany her during fieldwork. In Kabul, participants reported that some girls did not attend school because the available buses were mixed gender.
Finally, engagement with community and religious leaders may be important because they can influence local attitudes. The marked ethnic and regional differences in our results also suggest that a uniform approach is unlikely to work, and engagement will need to be tailored to local institutions such as the Pashtunwali code in the south and southwest. Engagement should aim to reduce resistance and to make the household and community benefits of women’s education visible, while being clear that women’s right to education does not depend on male permission or on a demonstrated economic return.
Read the published paper “Men’s support for women’s education in Afghanistan: the roles of income and insecurity”, in Review of Development Economics.
Men opposing women and girls education is common in tribal and especially patriarchal societies globally. This is because of the tradition and lack of exposure what and how women education is able to transform the society. After a prolonged exposure of men and women to the virtues of education through targeted interventions, men slowly and steadily change their attitudes towards women education and girls schooling. The latest evidence unfolded in the the district of Upper Kohistan, Pakistan is briefly produced below.
The studies conducted in 2012 show that men have achieved 30% literacy whilst women literacy was zero. Similarly, girls schooling was around 10% compared with boys schooling of about 30%. Thirteen years into community support activities, a remarkable improvement in women literacy and girls schooling is seen. The impact assessment study conducted in 2025 has revealed that over 50% girls are enrolled in school whilst for boys the enrolment rate is 98%. Class attendance for girls and boys began regular at near 100%. Men who are working as labor in the construction project realized the value of education for their children. Many parents who opposed to their girls education since then began to enroll girls in school. Some parents have relocated to urban areas purely to support girls education. A number of private schools are found where both boys and girls are enrolled. The enrolment trend for both boys and girls is positive and is increasing in villages where activities relating to education and schooling are active compared to elsewhere such programs are absent. 2025 study shows that both men and women have improved their literacy, men reaching 50% whilst women 5%. Latest research shows a tendency where women are seeking employment opportunities as well, something unimaginable 10-15 years ago. There is also evidence that men are actively looking for establishments that can provide employment for their wives, a critical difference compared to some 12-13 years prior to the introduction of the community support program. The clear message is to continue with activities to support children schooling (for both boys and girls) and literacy improvement programs regardless of attitudes of men. One day we will see that men will change their attitudes towards girls schooling and their job seeking behavior for women. As we all know, education is the most powerful tool in the modern society and opportunity should be made available for every individual regardless of where they are.
Thank you for sharing this very interesting evidence from Upper Kohistan. It is consistent with one of the main messages of our study: attitudes toward girls’ and women’s education are not necessarily fixed and may change with greater exposure to education, economic opportunities and community-level interventions. The Pakistan experience is especially valuable because it shows how such changes can emerge gradually over time. At the same time, contexts differ, and our Afghanistan evidence is based on observational survey data, so we are cautious about causal interpretation. Still, the example you provide strongly reinforces the importance of sustained local engagement alongside formal education policy.
All excellent research. Next step please: convincing the Taliban of this importance. How will you do this?
Thank you. That is indeed the much harder question. Our study cannot tell us how to persuade the Taliban directly. What it does show is that sustainable access to education also depends on support within households and communities.
In the meantime, international organisations can help preserve educational opportunities through virtual learning, scholarships and internationally recognised certification. The Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education in Iran is one example of how alternative educational channels can sustain human capital when a group is excluded from formal higher education.
There may also be room for conditional international engagement. Humanitarian assistance should not be used as leverage against vulnerable households, but some forms of development assistance, reconstruction support or economic cooperation could be linked to concrete progress on girls’ education. These measures should complement continued political and diplomatic efforts to restore full access to formal education.