Comments

Hi Nathan, Great comment thanks. I completely agree with you on the influence of domestic vested interests on aid giving, and New Zealand provides some examples from recent years of the power of domestic interests to win out over altruistic aid (although in our case it isn't NGOs or contractors so much as our own domestic business interests, and generally I would see NGOs as a healthy countvailing force to the pull of, for example, our farmers on how our aid is given.) I also think this influence does play a role in driving the simplification of aid. Although the primary harm it does, I think, it how it makes aid about what we want to give, not what is needed. And I also think that risk aversion and the simple sell are probably the primary domestic causes of aid given without adequate consideration for the complicated world we live in. Thanks Terence

Hi Ben, Thank you for your comment, and clarification. In the episode of DD you definitely convinced me that complexity science is a useful tool in a a development intellectual tool kit. So we're in agreement on your first point. (Although I would only view it as one tool amongst many and still be reaching for other tools first in many instances.) On the second point, my response would be: if the problem is institutional rather than idea-based, why do we need a new intellectual tool, rather than - say - political economy analysis of world of aid donors? Thanks again for taking the time to comment. Terence

Deborah has put her finger on the problem. Far too often, when donors talk about capacity development, it turns out we are obsessing about ourselves - our culture, our expectations, and our vision of development. We are not really listening to the clients, and not clearly seeing or understanding what is actually going on in the organisations we are typically trying to transform. Many donor interventions end up being as irrelevant as 'dancing about architecture" (to quote Frank Zappa). We are offering apples, our partner agencies ask for oranges - and everyone generally ends up with coleslaw. This trend does not let our partner agencies off the hook, however. Partner agencies are just as responsible for this outcome as donors. Just because donors tend to display disturbing levels of cultural tunnel vision and often work off the wrong hymn book, does not imply that partner agencies are entitled to sit around disconsolately waiting for someone else to "understand them" better. When capacity development works (and surprisingly often it does) it is usually because there is proactivity on the part of the recipient partner (at a number of levels) in terms of translating what is on offer into what is needed for reform. In other words, the focus of capacity development needs to be on effective communication, by all parties, and at all levels - and not just by leaders. Like most forms of aid, capacity development functions best when the people most affected feel empowered to take charge and successfully articulate what will work best for them. Regrettably, real communication around capacity building does tend to become truncated by excessive bureaucracy (long and arcane reports that nobody reads or sees, pointless and ineffective workshops that the wrong people go to, monitoring and evaluation frameworks that nobody understands or implements, and travel arrangements that mean senior personnel absent themselves far too often from what is really going on). In many cases, partner organisations would seriously benefit from rejecting some of the routine approaches donors tend to favour. And if the issue is how to build capacity building approaches in (and by) economic agencies, a greater degree of humility might not go amiss. The bottom line is it is very difficult to get this right. And sometimes good capacity (or the lack of it) in economic agencies is simply not a critical determinant in the outcome. Improving organisational capacity is one thing, but developing capacity across a decision making framework often transcends the specific organisational context.

Dear Terence, thank you for a great article - I really enjoyed it. I did want to clarify a couple of points: I don't believe that complexity science provides all the answers to the afflictions of aid, but that these broad families of approaches / methods are proving useful and valuable, and are a worthy focus for further experimentation and learning. I also don't claim that it is individual beliefs that sustain the damaging simplicity of aid, but rather that these stem from aid institutions, namely the 'rules of the game' in aid. Thanks again, and would love to hear what you think if you do get a chance to read the book! Ben

Great post and summary of their debate. Even having listened to it, I think this crystallized key points in a more coherent way than what I took away of my own accord. When you got to the last two paragraphs, discussing the "cause of this simple linear thinking..." I was expecting you to go in a different direction. Or rather, an additional one. The points about donor preferences and politician risk aversion are well taken, but... When you mentioned "political economy," I thought you were going to go to a more structural point, about the contractors, NGOs, and industry interests who influence aid allocation choices (via, for instance, the Council of International Development Companies). There are famous examples like the shipping industry/agricultural industry/food aid "iron triangle," but the issue definitely extends beyond that. On balance, it strikes me that the influence of these actors tends to move the system towards more simplistic interventions, which take less account of context (and more of US commercial interests). And it seems to me that the influence here would be large, given Congress' need to (internally) justify aid in terms of national security interests, commercial interests, and *then* humanitarian interests - in that order (although I don't know how they do it in New Zealand...). I'm curious to what extent you think these structural political economy barriers are relevant? Or perhaps I am off the mark, in which case I would love to hear more.

My 20+ years in development suggests Ramalingam is right about the prevalence of linear logic or, as he says "Newtonian thinking" in the heads of "aid workers". I think you are right though when you suggest that the characteristics of the way aid works is possibly the deeper problem. My guess is that many aid workers learned how to think linearly in order to succeed in aid agencies (which, by the way, Ramalingam writes about). Ramalingam suggests this problem can be usefully combated through more understanding and use of the tools and theories of complexity science. I think he is right, but overly optimistic about what those tools will get us. Take a moment and ask yourself: when was the last time I read a good analysis of the linkage between the way aid agencies work and the observable problems in the delivery of development assistance on the ground? [I will give you a moment] [Do you need more time?...] Time is up. The last, and only, analysis I have read (besides the superficial stuff you can find in various McKinsey and BCG assessments of agencies' operation and activities) was in 2005 - in a book by Elinor Ostrom, Clark Gibson and others called "The samaritan's dilemma", Oxford University Press. http://cs5937.userapi.com/u11728334/docs/6f9c48772f9a/Clark_C_Gibson_The_Samaritans_Dilemma_The_Po.pdf The team used institutional economic analysis - many of the tools developed by Ostrom and others associated with the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University - to examine how aid agencies are structured and operate and how that links to problems observed in the delivery of aid. I highly recommend the book. If you know of another high quality study on this topic, please let me know. Upshot: Ben's conclusion that we need some new social science methods and thinking is surely right. I believe that we should be looking to institutional economics for those methods - not instead of complexity science, but, in addition.

It is interesting to see yet another list of lessons learned from an Australian perspective about the experience of trying to contribute to the capacity of people or organisations in Pacific countries. Any consideration of ‘capacity development’ (which I agree is largely unhelpful as a concept given how it is now used to mean anything) requires a much deeper understanding about the perspectives of those whose ‘capacity’ is being developed and about the concept of ‘capacity’ itself than is evident from most of these types of analysis. In my 30 years of experience, it is very clear that capacity looks different in different contexts: many context-specific factors, particularly cultural values, have a major influence on the nature and extent of capacity and on changes in capacity over time. Even though there is a perception that all public services around the world share common values, in fact, the socio-cultural values in which they operate have enormous influence in practice. Capacity in Pacific institutions is not the same as capacity in Australian or any western institutions. Even though you may hear the same words in many Pacific institutions, such as ministry, secretary, administration, workforce, strategic plans, transparency, human resource systems and financial management, their meanings and the values accorded to them can be completely different in different cultural contexts. For cultures which are largely future-oriented, such as Australia, then a sophisticated strategic plan and an innovative leader can be highly relevant to an organisation’s capacity. In cultures which prioritise the maintenance of certainty and stability, a strategic plan can simply be a nicely presented document to satisfy a donor and an innovative leader could be quickly sidelined. Deeply held values relating to hierarchy and leadership in each cultural context have significant influence on the way that decisions are made and who makes them both within and outside the public service. While in Australia, an ideal leader may be a resourceful democrat, in many Pacific contexts, an ideal leader could be a benevolent autocrat (Hofstede 1980). Australian aid workers rarely understand the implications of these kinds of differences for their own agendas or try to test out the particular values that influence capacity in each context. They usually can't see the signs of capacity they are familiar with in their own contexts so start from a perception that the Pacific institution 'lacks capacity' when in fact, it may have a wide range of other capacities. Values relating to individualism/collectivism also influence the likelihood of changes occurring: in collectivist societies, there is little prospective of sustainable change if only one person is interested or even highly committed. But in individualist societies (Australia is one of the highest ranking), we each believe that we can ‘make a difference’ and change the world. Perhaps most importantly, in cultures where relationships are more important than ‘task’, any changes that have perceived negative effects on the maintenance of harmonious relationships are going to be resisted. Changes in capacity in Pacific organisations and communities will more likely occur when leaders (traditional, community, church as well as formal leaders) and whole groups (collectively) commit to changes and determine their own pathways, consistent with their own values. When this is the case, then externally-funded contributions might be useful, if respectfully offered and undertaken in trust-based collaborative partnerships. But in my experience, sustainable changes in capacity in other cultures are rarely achieved when driven by the agendas and timeframes of people or organisations who hold divergent cultural values. My book 'Capacity Across Cultures: Global Lessons from Pacific Experiences' provides detailed analysis and case studies about these issues and would be helpful to all those thinking that they are involved in contributing to capacity in a context other than their own.

Paul, your article correctly highlights the dangers to PNG's long term economic growth by the a) reckless spending of the PNG government (running budget deficits) and b) BPNG resorting to unconventional monetary policy You are merely highlighting what the authorities already know. However, you might not be aware that given the kind of country PNG is Politically and Economically (its two principle underlying problems) most of PNGs macro-structural development agendas will never be realised. First, The electoral system of electing genuine legislators (leaders as they are referred to in PNG) in a functioning democracy is probably another 20 years away for PNG. When Democracy at its very core is broken and dysfunctional, it is not a democracy. Second, The unfavorable economic fundamentals underpinning the PNG economy. There has always been a net flow of wealth out of PNG (since the formation of the country). In order for a country to gain economic independence, wealth/capital must be reinvestment and recycled to build domestic capacity. When you have foreign dominance of the PNG economy and its wealth, the incentive is not there to reinvest (but rather repatriate offshore). Paul, it will do PNG a lot of good if we have more commentators who took a real serious look at these two broken systems, that are the pillars of any economically successful democracy. May I also add, that the economic principle/theory that you and many other economists, policy developers, and commentators prescribe for PNG has sadly been in use and is not working. Conventional or Unconventional monetary tools (call it whatever you will), does not work work (never has and never will) in a PNG type economy that operates outside the normal realms of national economic fundamentals.

Couldn't agree more Jason. When I hear donors and advisers moaning about 'lack of political buy-in' my standard response is 'what are you giving them to buy into' - makes for some very short conversations!! And the ability of 'capacity development' to build the skills that officials need to navigate the political realities in which they work is as yet untested.

Thanks for addressing this important topic Harry and Bede. I think that an important area to support each of your seven steps is to understand that capacity already exists. Quite often it has built up over a long time and it has deep social and cultural roots. A bit like Tess’s comments above, the best results come from such a strengths-based approach. This takes time and a lot of inquiry and listening.

Yep, 20+ years of capacity development and the basic problem remains the same - a lack of political will to actually implement evidence-based policies. This, as in developed countries, comes back to a lack of scrutiny surrounding resources, be they sea, land or air (aid) based. Donor countries have spent millions attempting to build internal governance capacity while neglecting external governance capacity, beginning with news media, which has been systematically stripped of resources over this timeframe. Without a well-informed citizenry, there will never be any political pressure to adhere to policy that builds good governance. Australia and others are still trying to build capacity for development while denying the informational tools to enable this to happen. In the light of the recent attacks on the ABC, this is as true at 'home' as it is 'abroad.' Given that most economies are led by provincial politicians, who are in turn answerable to party donors, mostly big business, do treasury officials need to focus more attention on dealing with political realities and less on process and procedures?

Thanks Paul. Good analysis. The problem the country will face about having the inflation rate higher than the growth rate in private sector investment must be critically considered by BPNG.