Comments

"... it is only in the interest of the elite to cede power to inclusive institutions when they are confronted by something even worse." You imply, and I agree, that the elite will only act in their interest. They might be bribed for example. Otherwise, politicians are professional power brokers and cede power when they have to, when it is the least-worst option—i.e., when they fear that not ceding it would lead to even bigger losses of power. This is a most important matter, particularly in PNG where the ever-increasing shambles will only be halted by constitutional reform. I wrote at some length on this on the comments section in <a href="https://devpolicy.org/governance-in-png-what-can-donors-do-20130124/" rel="nofollow">this blog</a>. You suggest "a ‘fiscal cliff’, or a debt crisis or civil protest" but I doubt these things would lead to ceding power. I don't think they are fundamental enough. I know of no such instance. They might lead to change of policy which will likely be a manoeuvre toward keeping power. I think politicians cede power either (i) because they are bought, or else (ii) because they see it as a least-worst option. A classic instance of the former was the Scottish parliament voting itself out of existence in 1707—the members were bribed by Westminster. Comparable was abolition of the Queensland upper house in 1922 and the NZ upper house in 1950. In those cases a large number of members were suddenly appointed by the respective premiers to the house as a "suicide squad" and they voted to abolish it—as they were paid to do. (It may seem they relinquished power they did not have but when Premier Jack Lang tried the same tactic in NSW, the supposed suicide squad reneged and sat on as members of parliament.) For cases of ceding power as a least-worst option we have the transformation of Australian upper houses to proportional representation (Senate 1949, NSW 1978, SA 1963, WA 1987, Vic 2003). In each case the politicians of the major parties changed the constitution to allow minor parties to hold the balance of power. So the institution became, as you put it, more inclusive. By extension this ceded power to the voters since they became more accurately represented. As such, the changes were increments in democracy. In each of those cases the upper house voted to change the 50 to 150 year-old system, so that Democrats or Greens or Shooters would be able to win seats. Why? Because the alternative was worse. The alternative, in all cases, was that their political opponents might win great power in the future. But if Party A had an opportunity to change the system to prevent Party B from getting power, why did it not take it for itself? Why cede it to as yet unrepresented, almost non-existent minor parties? Because they had no choice. Because the only way they could take the power was if they didn't keep it. WA 1987 illustrates the idea. Labor and the Nationals together could out-vote the Liberals to change the constitution to introduce PR and thereby prevent (probably) the Liberals from ever getting a future majority. Of course, the Nationals were not going to permit Labor to get a future majority. The Nationals reckoned they could set themselves up for the balance of power if there was a PR system. Labor accepted that. I think that is the general rule: the members are either paid to relinquish power or they do it in circumstances where it is their least-worst option. (Note that in none of these cases was there any public crisis or significant public activism and for the most part the public took no interest whatever.) In the Pacific, parties are weak so there is little fear of domination by an opposing party. That would mean reform will require an appeal to members' pockets. It is very important. The political design in the Solomons, Vanuatu and PNG has never been known to work. Australia permitted that model to be installed. There was no precedent for it in the colonial design of the Australian and NZ parliaments and there were (and are) no successful precedents for it anywhere. There are several catastrophic failures. If Australia doesn't rectify it, RAMSI will be for nought and PNG will continue its decline into chaos. See the discussion <a href="https://devpolicy.org/governance-in-png-what-can-donors-do-20130124/" rel="nofollow">here</a>.

Hi Colin, Thanks for raising this very important subject. I echo the concerns raised by Rabunaf Levi. There are a number crucial factors that impact on the effective delivery of value for money at the delivery end of the public finance continuum. Firstly, there must be ongoing and continuing availability of public funding so that any project, resource or staffing is funded for the life of the project. That means effective costing and ongoing maintenance programs that don’t earn much ‘political capital’. The delivery mechanism and public administration officers must have the training, responsibility and opportunity to undertake what programs are funded and approved without being sidelined through political opportunism. An accountability mechanism/s must be fully funded and effectively operating to ensure any deviations from official policy and finance legislation is identified and entirely followed up within a reasonable time frame. ‘Justice deferred is justice denied’. Effective accountability includes government auditing and ombudsman operations. Those performing these roles must feel able to perform their roles without fear or favour. Look at how Judge Barnett was treated and how the last Chief Ombudsman was also attacked. Were their findings and efforts ever followed up and prosecutions made? All those in the service delivery process must know and expect they will be held responsible and accountable otherwise there will always be an expectation that any breach can or may be overlooked. Criminal activity is often due to 95% opportunity and 5% intent. Any deviations from finance policy and legislation must be followed up and if necessary, followed through to allow effective legal action to reclaim misspent funds and convict any or all that may be culpable and liable to prosecution. In the past, any public funds allocated for use in the MP’s electorate have been observed to often become a publically recognised slush fund to allow MP’s to promote their our re-election or to provide implied influence and prestige at the electorate level. Government cheques for public facilities have been reportedly presented amid much media attention and then the proceeds requested to be personally returned to the giver. While there has been a start at identifying previous malfeasance and Mr Koim’s Task Force Sweep has started to operate, this has only just scratched the surface of what needs to be done. Public statements encouraging positive action to overturn many years of official inaction and myopia cannot be overturned without practical plans and effective management starting at the top. We have yet to see this ‘new start’ commence operating effectively at all levels of the PNG Public Service. The delivery of effective government programs is dependent of the three arms of government, legislature, executive and judiciary being able to operate independently and without any blurring of roles and accountability. Government is therefore like a three legged stool. No matter what surface you stand such a stool on, it will be stable and stand up. ‘White ant’ or weaken any one of the legs however and as soon as any weight is put on the stool it will collapse.

Hi Tess Thanks so much for your comment and other commentary on related posts. You raise a very good point about opportunities for improved accountability with MPs likely to spend more time in their districts to make decisions, ensure their projects are on track and of course, give the keynote speech at the launch when their projects are eventually completed. While I agree there will be more dialogue about local issues that could extend to national level policy, I also think there will be a lot of frustration with the time it will take to implement projects. This could lead to a lot of finger pointing and perhaps create an incentive to work outside the system to try and get projects completed faster. Another very important accountability mechanism for devolved funding that is often overlooked is the requirement for a ‘bottom up’ Five Year Development Plan starting at the ward level. JDP/BPC decisions are supposed to be based on priority projects in these plans rather than the JDP committee or MPs themselves. If there is genuine community dialogue in the formulation of these plans, I think it could be an important tool to promote community engagement and accountability for JDP projects. Cheers Colin

Dear Rabunaf Thank you for your encouraging comments. I also appreciate your questions about the implications of devolved funding for the public financial management act, particularly in regards to implementation and accountability processes. Specifically, you mention a major roadblock to effective spending might be the length of time it takes to procure projects through the Provincial Supplies and Tenders Board (PSTB) and the Central Supplies and Tenders Board (CSTB), depending on the amount. I agree this will be very challenging, especially for larger provinces like the Eastern Highlands that have 8 districts and therefore 8 JDP/BPCs receiving K10m each, not to a mention a PSIP allocation of K40m and LLGSIP funds. Added together, that is a lot of project funding to procure in one province in one financial year, which I think will mean significant delays between deciding on projects to be funded and actual implementation. Both JDP and JPP projects will also be dependent on the Provincial and District Treasuries to access funding, many of which probably do not have the capacity to manage much larger volumes of funds. You also raise another important point about the limited financial delegations of District Administrators even though they are CEOs to the JDP/BPC and responsible for implementing its decisions. The District Administrator will need to rely on the Provincial Administrator, who has higher financial delegations and is therefore ultimately accountable for approving spending on larger projects that were agreed by the JDP. I am not sure that all Provincial Administrators will feel comfortable approving spending on large projects when they were not part of the decision making process. I will continue to look into these issues more specifically as the year progresses. Thanks again, Colin

Dear Collin, Thank you for the post and I hope Papua New Guineans can grasp and understand the underlying facts in your post; but critically, I agree that drastic base level developments need to start in the country. It is the implementation aspect in terms of the financial procedures and processes of accountability within the PFMA and concurrently with the provisions of the OLPG&LLG that need to be consulted. Firstly, how can the provisions of Section 33A & 33B of OLPG&LLG be implemented when PFMA does not recognise JDP&BPCs as it does with PSTBs and the CSTB? This will mean that to comply with PFMA, all projects above K100,000 Certificate of Works level will be referred to PSTB (below K3 million level) and to CSTB (above K3 million and less than K10 million)...how long will that take? Secondly, does the JDP&BPC have financial powers to deliberate upon how much is allocated against projects? If so, do they and their MP have financial powers such as Section 32 or 29 within PFMA to execute decisions with financial implications. Thirdly, does the District Administrator have Section 32 financial powers of PFMA to be CEO to JDP&BPC and advise on finance above the delegatory limit of K10,000? Finally, given the large shift of finances to Districts and Local Level Governments and the large roles given to MPs as Chairpersons the following legislatures have to be amended to instill greater accountability and governance: 1. 89 Electorate MPs should cease to be given Ministerial Portfolios but become ordinary MPs; and, 2. 22 Governors be automatically made Ministers and from within them they vote a PM and DPM since they are the only ones voted in by the whole province! Collin, accountability and governance are not the same face of the coin...the latter smiles while the other grinds like the edge of a K1 coin. God Bless Brother, Speak loud and strong for PNG!

Hi Colin, Thanks for another great post which I found very thought provoking on a number of levels. One area that I have been thinking about since reading this item is that of accountability and whether the governance arrangements for devolved spending can indeed improve it. Accountability is, I feel, a bit like development - it is a process rather than a product. But the framework outlined here could add to that process I feel. It seems to me that one of the spin-offs of putting the MPs at the heart of the decision-making processes at various levels is that it would be reasonable to expect that MPs will spend more time in their constituencies than might previously have been the case (to do the decision-making, allocating, etc). This, in turn, creates an opportunity for MPs and their constituents to have ongoing dialogue about issues (sure starting out with local but possibly extending to national and even international) and thus a culture of accountability can be nurtured. Accountability is a two-way street. Constituents need information to inform their scrutiny and support to take on an assertive role in holding their elected representatives to account. MPs need information in order to address the questions raised by constituents and possibly learn to be comfortable with being asked questions. Facilitating dialogue around how these funds have been allocated and spent strikes me as a great way to develop improved political engagement more generally

Hi Charlie, Thanks for your comment, and sorry for the late reply. There were a number of reasons cited for the decline in community participation, including: monetary pressures, expectation that the government will provide everything, and suspicion and mistrust between school management and the community. Having said this the reasons for declining community involvement with schools does deserve some further in-depth research. Cheers Grant

Hi Paul, Thanks for the reply, and for raising some very interesting questions. Please forgive my rather late reply – I officially start work today, and just came across your comments. The schools I went to were in Port Moresby, which is atypical in a sense that it is an urban centre. But the issue about the fit between education and employment still came up. Teachers in particular were concerned that parents didn’t value schooling because the jobs their children were likely to get in didn’t require higher levels of education. One primary teacher said that some parents preferred their kids sell buai and other items on the street rather than attend school. The monetary pressures on parents are certainly contributing to their lack of engagement with schools - as the teacher from Hohola said, ‘now everyone needs money to survive’. It makes sense that not seeing a link between education and employment also contributes to the community’s lack of willingness to contribute to schools. The LNG project is not going to come close to providing the jobs that PNG needs – in fact the current cohort of 8000 Papua New Guinean employees is being downsized. As you suggest, Papua New Guineans need opportunities to be involved in a range of skilled and unskilled work outside of these large extractive industries. Perhaps Australia could help by expanding the Pacific Seasonal Workers program to include semi-skilled and skilled jobs in industries where Australia has a shortage of labour? This could be linked to Papua New Guinean TAFEs, Universities and Schools. Just a thought. While I agree there is a bigger picture to consider, we shouldn’t undervalue addressing problems in primary schools. As has been shown in many developing countries, basic education has positive benefits well beyond the classroom. Cheers, Grant

Hi Tess, I fully agree. I would argue that the country or community that is likely to be impacted by any development path or change participate in taking the decisions on that path. The subsequent development should also be fully transparent and accounted for so that the impacted community can make sure it stays on path. The same argument underpins participatory budgeting. And it works! I will talk about this some more and give examples in my final blog. Steve

What follow up has been undertaken by the relevant parties since the Economic Dialogue Meeting? Is it possible for the Reserve Bank or the relevant responsible authorities to let people know what action has been undertaken since the Dialogue meeting. The excellent presentation by the women led by Robina Nakao and Aloma Johannsen and their team had some specific sensible suggestions. Regular releases on action taken since the meeting would generate some "ownership" of the problems, builld confidence among the wider commnity and stimulate discussions and possible solutions that can be implemented. I am sure that there has been some good work done since the meeting. Who is on the National Growth Committee, how many times have they met? What have been the results? There were some interesting challenges to the accuracy of the statistics provided by Government with regards to remittances, value of agricultural exports and tourism earnings which were going to be looked into by the relevant parties. News on the progress made in these areas would be much appreciated. And if there is a record of themeeting with follow up action points indicating who is responsible for the follow up, this would also be useful Look forward to receiving any information you may be able to provide. Stephen Vete Hala Sipu, Kolomotu'a

Hi Steve, I would add another question which is that of 'why'? Why is this development path being pursued rather than another one, why is this 'solution' better for our country or community? The 'why' of change is often hard to articulate and communicate but I can't help feeling that a shared understanding around 'why' is a prerequisite for buy-in whether political or otherwise and needs to underpin any meaningful attempt at implementation. Tess

Hi Judy, What were the details of the outcomes the people themselves came up with? Would or could they work elsewhere? 'Workshops' per se are great to air everyone's views but must lead to practical solutions otherwise they just end up being self actualizing talk fests. Either that or they end up becoming opportunities for some to lecture others about what their audience is supposed to know. I do hope the workshop mentioned didn't just become a flash in the pan and not end up being carried through to some workable and ongoing practical solutions? People need to see that any potential solution to this problem that can and will make an impact must be culturally acceptable and therefore able to be implemented by those affected. BTW - Isn't Kaugere where Lydia and Peter Kailap are running their amazing children's music school without any help from AusAID?