Comments

Ah yes - the lifestyler. That was always what I wanted to achieve from surfing. Not so sure about aid work. I think I agree with most of what you write. Although I'm not sure about B (that the small savings involved would produce net benefits). Also I think that the dichotomy in point C is not really a false one. You will always need expat staff -- like it or not they often possess capacity lacking in developing countries. And they can actually benefit from being outsiders too -- free from the norms and informal institutions that may complicate the position of locals. Also, the incentives that expats operate under (at least in the case of permanent staff) are quite often more easy to align in the direction of good outcomes than are the incentives faced by local staff. And if you are going to have expat staff you are eventually going to have to pay them vis a vis the labour markets in their home country. And if you pay local staff the same rates you will severely distort local labour markets. Maybe some narrowing of the gap, but it will always be there. On point E do many aid staff really get paid more than 300k a year? Really? We hear about the outliers because they make the media, but I think the median wage is much much lower. Re the proper role of the state in developing. Like you I think it varies depending on state capacity. And in the Solomons case I agree with you about the need for a mix. Cheers Terence

Thanks Rhianon and Kay, Interesting points. Thank you. Kay, your comments reminded me of an article I read by Allan Kaplan. He explored the development of civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, for CARE. He reflects on the potential for simply providing space for a society to engage in dialogue and conversation that enable it to "engage critically with its own limitations... and so begin to stimulate its own potential to determine and influence its own future". Well worth a look: http://www.proteusinitiative.org/Writings/engaging%20with%20civil%20society%20in%20bosnia%20and%20herzogovina.pdf Warmest, Jo

Terence, I too, was once engaged directly by the evil One for some years. Even now I live by the good grace of the evil One. But for the sake of utility, i'll try and stay on-topic. Firstly, I believe, and the evidence supports the contention that high-performing individuals and organisations have a 'sense of mission'. Low performing individuals and organisations do not. When seeking to achieve a team objective, give me a "techie" that believes in what they are doing any day, over one who believes mostly in growing their bank account and investment portfolio. Now, following my earlier posted examples, I think that the development quality of aid TA, and the appropriateness of remuneration, would be better served by TA design and procurement following these principles: 1. TA design should first ask, "is this really what will get us where we need to go, and will it deliver the best development bang for our buck?" Especially considering that most public sector institutional challenges are a matter of sovereign will, not the sheer ignorance of developing country civil servants. 2. TA procurement should seek value-for-money by focusing on the task, and getting the required skills set and experience for the best available price, regardless of nationality or citizenship. 3. TA design and procurement should reject the pressure of the spending imperative. e.g. "We've got A$3 million to spend on fiscal governance in the Department of Finance before the end of this financial year. Let's get some bodies in there whilst we work out what to do, or until my posting ends, and then it’s someone else’s problem”. I propose that following these principles would lead to: A: more hybrid forms of engagement...volunteeers, PACTAM, straight HR recruitment from better value labour markets than Australia, locally-engaged expatriates who don't require all the bells and whistles, working more with churches / NGOs, etc. B: reduced average and median remuneration of aid-funded positions. C: the dilution of the false dichotomy of international / local designations (AKA "we pay according to your passport"). D: longer-term human engagement between the individuals involved, and less of the short-term expatriate citadel culture. E: less A$300k+ aid jobs that exist to tick a box and provide fodder for a media release or Ministerial brief, and not actually change anything in respect of the human development equation. I would reject your comparison of similarity between the avarice of private sector corporate remuneration, and soft fraud within the public sector, through the lens of concern for the integrity of the body politic. 50 CEOs getting paid more than A$2 million a year will not fracture the Australian nation-state. However systemic informal defrauding of the public estate and its Treasury presents an existential threat to the nation-state's viability. I'm partly influenced in this regard by the writing of the Polish sociologist Stanislav Andreski, and in particular his book, "Parasitism and Subversion", published in 1966, and partly by how I would feel personally if I was an ordinary citizen and I was paying for a state that exists to serve small groups of insiders, and not the interests of the many. As usual, I think we would agree on most of the core issues, but we probably diverge when it comes to the proper role for the state. I think you have a preference for state agency, whereas I prefer the pluralist agency of non-state actors as the engine room of human development, and I prefer my state to be “steering, not rowing”. However, I acknowledge that this is contextual, and I would be happier to dish up my sovereignty to the New Zealand state before I do so to the Solomon Islands state. Both positions require a little faith and can never be entirely based on logic and empiricism alone. P.S. I’m told I should add another category to my taxonomy: “the lifestyler”.

There is a distinction missing here and that relates to countries such as Australia providing aid or assistance (such as funding or training) to agencies and arms of regimes whose daily work involves human rights violations - the support for Detachment 88 in Indonesia is an obvious example of this. Also, 'smart sanctions' as applied to Fiji have certainly influenced the behaviour of the military leadership although not necessarily in ways envisaged or appreciated by Canberra.

Thanks Marcus, That is a very astute comment. And I take your point that aid workers are far from a homogeneous group -- while "techies" may live very opulent lives the same is rarely true of "missionaries". Your taxonomy of aid worker types works pretty well for me too, particularly as you allow for people to fall into more than one category at the same time. However, I wouldn't diss "missionaries" quite so much. Sometimes their enthusiasm and ideals meet a very important niche, and when they have the right skills, their asking price makes them much more cost-effective than old hands. And cynics aren't always right; nor are the naive and idealistic always wrong. As for bureaucrats: as a former member of this tribe I'm glad to hear that you think my time spent toiling in Wellington was necessary as well as evil. More seriously, I think you miscategorise the work of govt aid agency staff who actually need (and usually possess) extensive skills to allow them to manage the disjunct between the complex realities of aid work in developing countries and the equally complex realities of the political and spheres back home. Sure some aid agency staffers are poor at their job (as in every profession) but the good, committed ones (the majority I think) produce what is on balance positive impacts by being the uncomfortable link between aid recipients, and the capricious world back home of politicians and an only very marginally interested tax-paying, voting public. As for the article in the Telegraph: I wonder if they ever focus similar ire on the salaries of corporate consultants? Because I would say that this particular market failure is not at all unique to the world of aid. I agree with your economic diagnosis though. Although I would also add that risk aversion plays an important role here. The typical aid agency staffer has more money than time and so will, I think, be willing to pay over the odds for someone they know will at least produce reasonable work, won't stuff things up, knows what's needed, and won't require a whole heap of time to manage. Personally, I think the idea of contracting out work rather than having your own staff do it is, with the exception of very specialised services, a free market fairy tale. And that we'd get better aid work done if aid agencies had fewer contractors and more of their own permanent staff. Permanent staff are, on the whole, better because they are more deeply entwined in a multi-shot game, and are incentivised by group norms not just pay checks. I don't blame aid agencies for this though. The problem is a by-product of the depressingly simplistic way that civil servants and aid agencies are talked about in the public sphere's of donor countries. I.e. bureaucrats are bad, overheads must be as low as possible, markets are wonderful. So long as the Telegraph keeps peddling this sort of guff, it basically only has itself to blame for overpaid aid contractors.

Thanks Terence for this thought provoking article. Having been in this sector for some years, ranging in and out of NGOs, consultancies, research, and for-profit project management with central government agencies, I have a few comments that fit into two broad themes, that others have touched upon: 1. "AID WORKER" IS TOO BROAD A TERM TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS. The term “aid worker” seems to conflate what is actually a more complex labour market. I have noticed that the expatriates engaged in the aid sector can be crudely sub-categorised five ways...A: "the techie", who has no interest in development issues in general, and is employed for their technical skills, e.g. tax policy, IT, roads engineering. "The techie" is solely focused on the material benefits to be had; B: "the contractor", who knows the game well, understands the many information and power asymmetries in the market, and plays it to their advantage, and feigns an interest in "development" so as to maintain the revenue pipeline. Like "the techie", "the contractor" is focused on self-interest, but by necessity is involved in a grubbier, less honest trade; C: the "hard-headed development specialist", who is both cynical and knowledgeable enough to know the system's failings, but not so cynical that they don't keep trying to make it better. The "DS", who is really a public policy wonk, will work partly for self-interest, partly out of intellectual curiosity, partly from a sense of service to others, and sometimes for free; D: "the missionary", who in the purest form are innocent, gullible, and intellectually flaky, but will work for nothing if they think they are doing the right thing; and E: "the bureaucrat". A necessary evil. In reality most people in the sector are a combination of at least 2 of the above. But if you want to work with a government or people to deliver, for example, fresh water and sanitation, you will do better with more type A, B, and C, than D. The latter are cheap, but highly variable in both input, output, and outcome. Type E write briefs for their superiors, who write briefs for their superiors, who write briefs for their superiors, etcetera, etcetera. 2. THE SYSTEM IS DEEPLY OPAQUE AND GAMED BY INSIDERS. The foreign aid market is notoriously asymmetric and opaque. This explains why such distorted remuneration outcomes are reached for jobs, that when the tasks are unpicked, would fetch often 50%+ less in an efficient and transparent labour market. e.g. see <a href="http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/rich-execs-get-cut-of-our-foreign-aid-program-under-siege/story-e6freuy9-1225870267807" rel="nofollow">this populist news article</a> ...yes it's not very nuanced, but there are jobs mentioned there that would pay less than NZ$100,000 before tax in Wellington. Clearly arbitrage is at play and being exploited ruthlessly at the taxpayer's expense. Anyone who knows how these services are procured can tell you how easily they are gamed by insiders. Of course, because of the opacity who is going to critique such a system? Not me (not in public and in such raw terms, at least). I have to make a living too!

Interesting post, and on the whole I'm inclined to agree with you. I have yet to read A&R's book. However, I note that your counter-arguments (1) and (2) do not come equipped with supporting evidence. I think that both such arguments could easily be over-played. E.g. if challenged I suspect many an aid bureaucrat could claim that (1) and/or (2) applied to every single one of the programmes s/he funds. To conclude: it seems to me that you have defended some aid, whilst leaving probably the majority as unlikely to lead to significant economic development. A better defence is that a lot of aid will not generate economic development but, done properly, can at least make life substantially less miserable to millions of people who live below the poverty line. Alas I think too much aid is not 'done properly' but that is another story ...

Very nicely put Lotti. And I think you are basically correct WRT typical NGO staff. Although I think their situation is perhaps different from that of consultants and aid agency staff who tend to live in considerably more opulent surrounds and who do arguably live too well. Thanks for your comment.

I'm going to go against the flow here. In 6 years I've worked in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Solomon Islands and lived on and off in Fiji. One of my pet hates is the "Cult of the Self flagellating NGO" I work in rough locations and to be honest, I expect to be paid accordingly to compensate for austere/insecure living conditions, poor RnR and incredibly poor job security and work/life balance. Furthermore, I've seen my fair share of shallow ingratiation and now see it as the first step towards disillusionment simply because it serves as a band aid the patently obvious. By all means embrace the local culture, but don't think you're in with the locals because the unspoken truth is, you're just the latest in a revolving door of well meaning foreigners. Sustainable living conditions is key IMHO. I'm beginning to see strong indications that the deliverance of aid and capacity development within beneficiaries communities would be more effective if INGO's could retain specialist staff to provide consistency . Thats not the case as the staff turn over I see is directly attributable to poor renumeration and living conditions combined with a captured staff culture that embraces The Cult at a country management level. The current model is great if you want to turn over 80% of your international staff within 2 years, but that turn over comes at a cost to programme capacity and continuity. Something to think about.

I echo the concern... sadly we NGO's working on the ground find we are ever more bound by restrictive funding parameters, and country strategies which don't reflect the priorities we see on the ground. 2012 appears to be tighter than even in terms of what will be funded and what will not. And New Zealand Aid? humph. Where is it?? How on earth is it possible to access in any way that isn't according to New Zealand's internal benefit....

Thanks Garth. I think in some ways the Economist is almost worse than Lord A. At least his attack is fairly transparently ideological and opinionated, whereas the Economist seems to (perhaps unconsciously) be smuggling its own ideology into a putatively factual piece of reporting. The casual reader might quite likely spot Ashcroft's priors and discount appropriately but still be swayed by the apparent objective reporting of a supposedly reputable publication.

Yes Terence, The Economist certainly drew a strange conclusion from the Demombynes and Trommlerova paper saying: "The broad moral of the story is different: aid does not seem to have been the decisive factor in cutting child mortality". Yet the Demombynes paper identifies greater use of insecticide treated bednets as central to the drop in child mortality saying "Most of these programs have been funded by international development initiatives" (p16).