Comments

Much of this discussion is about the concern that Western NGOs engaging in international development can be coopted by their own governments (or other Western governments). While there may be concerns about this as a distraction from the founding mission of social change organizations, I am curious if the writers could address the issue of local, developing-country, NGOs being overly influenced by their own or outside governments? In the Lao PDR, a nascent civil society struggles to find flexible support without strings attached. They find themselves pulled by international assistance and their dollars asking for clearer financial accountability, transparency, and equity; and pushed by the national and local governments to be accountable only to local officials. There is scarcely room for accountability to original interest groups in the equation. Most NGOs here end up serving an agenda set by international development assistance and/or local governments. I have several specific questions on which I would be very interested to read people's comment: 1) How, as international development assistance organizations, are we to support self-determination in the face of near overwhelming pressure for alignment in one direction or the other? 2) What are we to do when local culture and interests do not coincide with our values of organizations accountable to membership and managed with transparency? 3) There was much discussion about whether iNGOs provide value for money, but I would be interested to see if we can justify organizational capacity development assistance to local NGOs focused on accountability, participation, and transparency with any clear indication that this capacity building leads to greater performance? Thanks. MJ

Marcus P - I have just discovered your entry of Feb 21. There is no feature on this blog to get email notification of a new comment. I didn't propose "simple and neat solutions to the development challenges of PNG." You are attributing something to me which is easy to repudiate since no reasonable person would suggest such a thing. I pointed out a prerequisite for a functional democratic polity. That is all. The idea—the whole idea—is that with a proper structure the locals can develop themselves. I have nothing to say about their development challenges, let alone offer solutions. I am cheered to see you think PR is an obvious reform but you think it won't revolutionise behaviour. I think it would. It has done so everywhere else. But that's a bit off the point. I can't guarantee a new dawn. The point is that without constitutional reform there is no chance of any new dawn. I made no "strong claim that culture ... is irrelevant to political behaviour." Culture IS behaviour. Culture, I said (many times in several thousand words) is irrelevant to political structure. Structure. My claim that culture is irrelevant to political structure is wide open to falsification: just find a (successful, democratic) structure that reflects the culture of the country. Every country's constitution will contain fancy cultural sentiments but the political design will be just a political design similar and dissimilar to other countries but not reflecting local culture. The corollary is that PNG can take any structure that is working somewhere else and it will work for PNG. More than that: PNG MUST take a structure that is working somewhere else. And it must forget about taking any alleged PNG cultural feature into account in that design. Let the elected representatives worry about the culture. They will handle it well if they are operating within a viable structure. Finally, what "most informed observers say about political behaviour in PNG and everywhere else" may be wrong. In particular, pejorative assertions about culture in the context of political behaviour are not only arrogant but ultimately incorrect. It was not religious culture in Northern Ireland that caused the Troubles. It was not New Zealand's dysfunctional culture that caused their problems. In both cases it was dysfunctional political structure. Similarly it was not culture that caused the Bougainville tragedy; it was the structure, namely the uninterested colonial authority and later the unbridled majoritarian PNG assembly.

Stephen, Just found your comment. Glad to take up your three points. Point 1a. Majoritarian unicameral is doomed to fail. First thing is that Botswana is bicameral. See e.g., http://www.bartleby.com/151/fields/59.html Lijphart in "Thirty-six democracies" (highly recommended) rates Botswana with the UK as "between medium-strength and weak bicameralism." He rates India along with Canada, Spain, France and Venezuela as "medium-strength bicameralism." As far as I know no country has made the unicameral majoritarian structure work. Point 1b. The upper house has next to no power. Many people have remarked on this—and yet it curbs. Upper houses like UK, Canada and the former NZ have virtually no formal power and are disgracefully undemocratic. They tend to be sinecures for senior people being "kicked upstairs." It seems, though, that they have enough prestige that the government avoids their criticism. The evidence is that even those appalling upper houses are doing some curbing. If you're interested, the best reference is probably Meg Russell, "Reforming the House of Lords: lessons from overseas." NZ was immediately in trouble when, after a century of complaining about it, they managed to abolish the upper house around 1950. Forty years later they threw their Westminster heritage in the bin and changed to West German PR. Lucky to pull it off, actually. Point 2. PNG pollies won't want reform. So true. I did make the point in a previous post ("Electoral reform is a thankless undertaking..."). Power is seldom relinquished and especially not by professional power-brokers. Power is taken, not granted, and yet all those Australian houses did the switch. The politicians hated it. In most cases it was a huge saga and they had to be dragged backwards into it, kicking and screaming, wailing and gnashing their teeth. In NSW the saga spanned 50 years with many wondrous twists and turns. In WA it took 16 very angry years. Politicians hate reform. In opposition they will give it lip service to embarrass the government and when they win power they'll do anything not to pursue it. Yet it has actually happened six times: Senate, NSW, SA, WA, NZ, Vic. So it can be done. It has to be done. In PNG it is vital that there come a day, as in those other six polities, when, after all the arguments and acres of newsprint and hundreds of pages of Hansard, a majority in the legislature raise their hands and vote for a proper system. It will be an hour of high drama with the losing minority in a state of grief and the winning majority grim-faced, devoid of victory exultation. Crucial to the reforms in Australia and NZ was the presence of two strong parties whereby one of them felt it was missing out. That is not the situation in PNG so reform won't happen unless there is outside pressure. That means Australia. The guts of the message has to be: "Dear PNG Polly, Your structure has never been known to work. You know that in practice it is crooked. Do the right thing for your country." Their patriotism will have to be reinforced with inducements—Australia again. It was Australian negligence before independence that caused the situation. Australia has to fix it. The situation must not be allowed to go on. Were it not for the mineral wealth, PNG could just continue to crumble with Australia mitigating the worst effects. But the resource curse is going to strike and present donors will count for nothing. Without reform, if history is a guide the reasonable prognosis is: coup d'état, Torrens title, genocide in Bougainville, refugee camps in Queensland. Australia will spend decades bleating impotently and cringing in the UN and then in 40 years or so: truth and reconciliation commission, resettlement of refugees, excavation of mass graves—and a PR electoral system. Point 3. Donors shouldn't influence. Who are these donors? I thought it was basically Australia—who else? Why shouldn't donors exercise influence? Don't they want the best for the country?

The Australian Council for International Development has conducted their <a href="http://www.acfid.asn.au/resources/docs_resources/aid-diversion-summary" rel="nofollow">own analysis</a> of the diversion, identifying in each country/region the sectors from which projects will be deferred (drawn from the AusAID website). Unfortunately AusAID still hasn't provided details about what specific projects will be deferred or cancelled.

Tony - great piece, and I strongly recommend that people go and read your full submission at the Review website. One minor point (with both your article and the submission) is that, along with SOPAC, it was SPBEA that was 'absorbed' into SPC, not SPREP. The less-than-satisfactory outcome of the RIF review process captures pretty well the weaknesses inherent in the regional political architecture. Those organisations that were able to secure the support of a strong political champion managed to survive, while a few orphan children were left as a token gesture towards consolidation. The description in your submission of PICTs as "a group of individually insignificant developing countries standing in a circle facing outwards, backs to each other" really touched a chord with me. Thank you.

I think this is a good point. Many years ago (very many if fact) a program of small bridges for rural roads (in many countries as I recall) was seen as a success, and yes good rural roads makes sense (not thought about so often, but school buses become more reliable and parent send their kids, girls in particular, to school), so the bridges were probably a good idea. The issue with schools and clinics is whether they are staffed at the end of the day. AusAID has history of white elephants of unused hospitals and the like since the 1950s I expect. But how do we know there is the capacity to fill them (schools that is) with both teachers and students. If something is offered for nothing then it will be taken (human nature!). The question then is whether the evaluation process is robust enough to see if at the end of the day (or several years down the track) are these things being used.

Dear Stephen We read with interest your claim in this Devpolicy Digest February 2013 that contractors thought the recently released AusAID Annual Review of Aid Effectiveness was “wonderful”. Your claim is a little misleading, though we thank you for linking to the exact statement we made so others can interpret for themselves. As you are aware from our statement, we simply commented that we were pleased with the range of outcomes presented in the Review, and that we were proud of the fact that IDC members’ efforts have assisted to create many of these positive outcomes. We did not suggest the Review is wonderful, however we value your critical commentary of the Review for further depth and discussion is certainly warranted, and some of your suggestions for future iterations are valid. In commenting about the existence of the Review, our intent was to highlight that where there are claims in the Review of lives saved, improved education outcomes and so on, in many cases it is members of the IDC who are key contributors to such results, through our management of activities on behalf of the Australian Government’s aid program. It is a shame, however, that the efforts of our members, large and small, and development professionals all, so often go unrecognised. The development landscape as you are well aware is complex, and it requires true partnership to achieve all that is possible – analysis, advocacy, policy, implementation are each important, and no single vehicle is the panacea across such a range of priorities. Importantly, as hopefully Devpolicy demonstrates, healthy debate is also positive. Mel Dunn Chair, International Development Contractors (IDC)

Dear Stephen and Wesley, I thought I would add a little more to what has already been said. I had an intimate involvement with the project so will only make general comment. In my mind, the project was conceived (as Wesley points out) as a response to Pacific Island governments wanting greater access to the Australian labour market for their citizens. The Australian government were never going to agree to this so to appease PIC, created APTC instead. The qualifications gained are vocational in nature and the chances of Pacific islanders qualifying to migrate are slim at best anyway. Nevertheless, a scheme that is a brain drain on PICs already facing skills shortages is nothing short of expedient and abhorrent. Building their capacity then shifting this to Australia or NZ is anti-development in my mind, notwithstanding the possible flows of money back to the islands. I feel the direction that the APTC has taken is a valid one. Perhaps a scheme similar to the AusAID Development Scholarship scheme requiring at least two years service at home before being eligible to migrate is appropriate. As for labour mobility schemes, I find it curious that the Australian government gives young European, and American working holiday makers (or backpackers for want of a better word) far greater access to the Australian labour market then Pacific Islanders. I would've thought it would be fitting to see it the other way around i.e. privileging islanders critical livelihoods above funding the travel of backpackers. In closing, I doubt the Australia Government was ever serious about giving islanders access to the Australian labour market. Australia's immigration policy is still inherently biased against immigrants from developing countries, especially the Pacific Islands who are considered high risk of breaching visa conditions. Keeping skilled Pacific Islanders at home will have a far greater development impact then having them migrate to Australia which is self-serving for Australia, and somewhat disingenuous because this would bring into question the idea of this being nothing then another form of "boomerang aid". PICs need sustainable industries at home and this can only be achieved if their skilled citizens stay at home. Any development program targeted at poaching skilled islanders is nothing short of selfish, serving Australia's needs only at the expense of island countries. The APTC program should privilege PICs and their citizens, and assist their development, not fill Australia's skills gap. It is a program worthy of long term support but must be depoliticised and undertaken in a spirit of generosity and not self-serving to Australia's needs. Of course I am assuming (perhaps naively) that aid of this nature has nothing but good intentions - depoliticised and focused on building the capacity of PICs so that they become less reliant on Australia and NZ and have more assured futures.

It's been an interesting discussion. I would like to make three points. First, I find it hard to accept Mike's point that PNG (or any other country for that matter) is doomed to fail as long as it has "majoritarian elections with unicameral legislature." India might have a bicameral legislature, but its Upper House has next to no power (it doesn't "curb" anything as far as I can tell), and it also has majoritarian elections. India isn't a total success story, but it isn't a failure either. Or, even more to the point, what about Botswana, a very successful African country that has both majoritarian elections and a unicameral legislature? I’m not a political scientist, so would welcome any clarification or corrections on these two comparisons. Second, MPs in PNG have become very powerful in relation to funds going to their own constituencies (look at the latest budget, which puts billions of Kina at their disposition) so I don't think they are going to support a constitutional change to move to multi-member constituencies. Third, constitutional reform in PNG is certainly worth discussing (after all, the Government has just announced a constitutional review), and perhaps it might be a good idea, but, to go back to the topic of the post, fundamental constitutional change from one type of democratic set-up to another is not something donors can or should influence.

Ray and Bob, Thanks for your comments. I've been away in PNG, hence the delayed response. I can see now Ray that our remarks might be read as implying that ACIAR relies only on Australian researchers. I fully accept, and have long understood, that it follows a collaborative model linking Australian and developing country researchers. I agree we should have been clearer on this, so thanks for bringing that out. My question remains though: why should always be a requirement of involvement from some Australian institute? Perhaps the best project might involve bringing together an American and an Indonesian institute. To mandate Australian involvement smacks of protectionism. Lots of countries use protectionist arguments, especially post-GFC. That doesn't mean we should. I'm glad that Bob agrees with me on this, but I also accept that it is an open question how much difference it would make. My question for Bob is this: If ACIAR has been spasmodic in promoting adoption, how does it get such high rates of return?

"If ... ... the justice system is not allowed to get bogged down in litigation..." The passive voice is emblematic. Who or what will not allow the justice system is not bogged down? God? The resilience and fibre of the people? "...the usual checks and balances of government and administration that are or should be in place to keep the MP’s honest." That's what's wrong with PNG? The public servants aren't keeping the politicians honest? In other countries it's the other way round: the electoral foundation supports parliament which shapes the executive which shapes the administration which shapes management (or "governance" to use the modish word). If the foundation isn't right, everything else will be shaky and any reform attempt will be papering over cracks. For example, when (if) RAMSI goes home the Solomons will immediately fall to bits because RAMSI isn't fixing the political structure. The Australian authorities give every appearance of not being aware that unless power is shared, those who think they are missing out will object. That is, the civil war will break out again and whole RAMSI venture will be for nothing. RAMSI officials are not interested. If anyone does suggest that the political structure is one which has never been known to work they are brushed aside. (Too hard. Anyway, why bother?) You say the people in PNG don't hold wantoks to account. Melanesians didn't invent tribalism. That is every culture. A topical example is the NSW Labor Party. They cannot hold their wantoks to account. They just can't do it. They have top-level inquiries but the reports are ignored. People know what's going on but they can't act against their own tribe. Or take the Lance Armstrong business: wantoks all over obeying the universal maxim: "Don't dob in your wantok." A rort only gets cleaned up when outsiders can exert power. Which is precisely why power has to be shared. This is not special to PNG, just more obvious. The remedy is also obvious: multi-member electorates. Then in each electoral district the different members of different tribes or parties can hold each other to account. You are concerned about boring the reader, Paul? Do you think it boring to tell them PNG politics is starting to come of age so the resilience and fibre of the PNG people will ensure objectives are practical and achievable and therefore PNG will move forward in a constructive way? That doesn't bore me. It frightens me.

Thanks Paul. I think you're correct that this dialogue may be starting to bore other readers. Mike, I think that one should be cautious about proposing that there are simple and neat solutions to the development challenges of PNG. Though you are probably right that some combination of an upper house, MMR and PR will push political behaviour in the right direction, and it seems an obvious reform for PNG, it is difficult to imagine that sub-state individual and group political behaviour will be altered in any revolutionary sense. And your strong claim that culture (conventions, customs, traditions, and codes of behaviour see Douglass North, 1990) is irrelevant to political behaviour seems too binary to fit with what most informed observers say about political behaviour in PNG and everywhere else. Thank you both for your valuable contribution to the conversation.