Comments

Thanks Margaret. The point about implicit/explicit is that it wasn't necessarily company policy to include women - but something recognized as being beneficial (probably both intrinsically - for women themselves, and instrumentally - for the company and the broader community) by company leadership. It would be fascinating to unearth more research with other mining company representatives to see how they see it (if at all) and what factors are important for their decision making. In parallel it might be useful to foster better theories and evidence on the possible impacts of women's inclusion (in both processes and outcomes). Does it, in fact, lead to broader community support? Does it lead to better use of benefits? Does it lead to better environmental mitigation strategies? If responses to these questions showed positive developmental gains (or not) that would be useful for both companies and governments - as well as development practitioners.

Dear Nick and Georgia This is really interesting research. Thanks for doing a blog to bring it to the attention of the Devpolicy audience. It raises so many issues that it’s hard to know where to start. One issue that stands out for me is your argument that mining company management recognised implicitly (how does that work? doesn’t someone have to recognise something ‘explicitly’ for it to become company policy?) that development benefits would be more likely to be achieved if women were involved so women’s involvement became part of the business case during the community negotiations. It isn’t usually women who are responsible for disruptive activities when local communities are dissatisfied with some aspect or other of mining operations, but your research suggests the company thought that women were important for building broader community support for this troubled mine. Yet in the event there is little evidence of positive development impacts in the villages. So we’re left wondering why women in other mining communities envy Ok Tedi women’s ‘gains’. The only conclusion I can draw is the rather sober one that women’s expectations in PNG are so low that anything is better than nothing. Women frequently gain very little from the enormous wealth and benefit flows generated by mining projects and they bear most of the costs, see recent research by the Porgera Environmental Advisory Komiti cited in my <a href="https://devpolicy.org/benefits-from-mining-in-papua-new-guinea-where-do-they-go/" rel="nofollow">blog</a> of 10 September. The second issue your research raises for me flows from this – if it was clear to the Ok Tedi company that positive development gains required more women’s engagement, why is women's participation not a much greater focus for mining companies in general? Granted they will face opposition from male beneficiaries and maybe even the state, but if mining companies were to adopt common approaches to women’s participation in negotiations and benefit streams, wouldn’t this lead to greater acceptance of women as more equal participants? It would be great to get a comment from mining company representatives or the PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum on the feasibility of an industry approach.

ODE and its technical partners (Professors Patricia Rogers and Howard White) should be commended for a very clear, methodologically sound and informative discussion paper for AusAID practitioners on impact evaluation (IE). AusAID has asked for comments and observations; mine are only minor. 1) Perhaps the team could provide a short note (potentially in a separate document) that highlights the difference between monitoring and evaluation and how they each add value to AusAID. 2) There is a recommendation that AusAID link with partners based overseas who place an emphasis on experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations. However there are likely to be academics scattered throughout Australian universities who could be implementing partners and sources of technical support, potentially at lower costs. 3) Highlight in the document a ‘one stop call’ for people within AusAID who want to undertake an evaluation and need to know what design would best suit their program. The evaluation options illustrated in Annex A are likely to require specialist knowledge to understand and implement.

Thanks Tess for your post. I agree that the distinction is important and by mentioning that "the donor could decide to reduce funding for certain activities that support the regime" I was including donor support provided for arms of regimes. Perhaps I should have mentioned a ‘termination of funding' - not just a reduction. It could be that Canberra views continuing support for Detachment 88 of greater national importance than terminating support based on allegations of human rights abuses. I’ll let others in more informed positions judge or comment on the merits of that decision. However, it does bring to the fore a broader question, should we stop funding for arms of regimes that have been proven (or alleged) to have committed human rights abuses regardless of the potential implications for our national security? On your second point, in my view reducing aid in certain areas (that support the regime) while maintaining aid for areas that support the most vulnerable people (if practical) should not be undertaken with the primary goal of pressuring the regime to change course. It should be more of an implicit donor statement along the lines of “We don’t agree with what you are doing so we are going to stop funding certain activities. However, we remain committed to helping your most vulnerable citizens and would like to continue aid activities in certain areas”. Targeted non-aid sanctions may be used for the purposes of pressuring the regime although, as you point out, it might lead to unexpected consequences.

Hi Biman, I would suggest some members of the so-called ‘anti-growth coalition’ are based in Canberra and that ‘breaking’ the coalition would be a tricky business. Australia’s announcement that the Seasonal Worker Scheme will only take 2,600 workers per annum for example, while 37,000 backpackers work in Australia’s agricultural sector each year, is scandalous. Much greater commitment to ‘regional integration’ is needed in this regard. I agree with you that there may be opportunities to pursue economic opportunities through internet-based service provision (legal counsel, accounting, music production etc). However I think we need to ask whether Pacific states exhibit the necessary preconditions for this to be an area of genuine comparative advantage (at least in international trade). Ie. are telecommunications affordable?, is there domestic and regional telecommunications infrastructure? Do local workforces have specialist knowledge in ICT?, are wages competitive? Etc. Maybe some of these conditions exist in Fiji (?) – but do they exist across the region? Even if all the necessary preconditions are met, a key question remains as to whether service provision reliant on ICT would provide sufficient (or even significant) employment generation for growing island populations? Maybe there needs to be a greater emphasis on labour-intensive sectors like agricultural exports. While ‘old hat’ to some, agriculture is still a key source of export earnings for far more Pacific islanders than services provided over the internet. Agricultural exports also link to other key sectors – such as tourism and the ‘traditional economy’ of local food production – and are vital for generating livelihoods. Pacific agricultural exports are still dominated by traditional commodities – like sugar, coffee, cocoa, copra etc – and more could be done to ‘value add’, or to find ‘niche markets’ for higher-value Pacific products. Perhaps here there is a role for improved marketing to consumers in Australia, New Zealand, China etc? (and any new marketing should probably be pretty tech-savvy). I note that Pacific governments could do a lot more to ameliorate quarantine issues for agricultural and horticultural exports. Australia and New Zealand could also do a lot more to assess new products for market entry. However this may require ‘political leaders to pursue reform, particularly of monopolistic structures’ – such as local ginger grower associations, or north-Queensland taro lobby groups. Again, more commitment to regional integration needed here. Finally, the Australian and New Zealand governments should urgently review the rules of origin requirements for Pacific exporters. This would show practical support for ‘regional integration’ and may provide some certainty for Pacific manufacturing exports (for textiles, clothing and footwear exports from Fiji in particular). See: https://devpolicy.org/new-rules-to-expand-pacific-exports-only-if-action-is-taken-fast/ Wesley Morgan

I would suggest that the review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat is a particularly sensitive document in the context of the upcoming review of Pacific Plan (to be undertaken in 2013). The draft review of the Forum Secretariat argues that the Pacific Islands Forum should develop a 'second generation Pacific Plan’. The review’s authors argue however that Forum member states need to take greater responsibility for the Plan and that one practical way this might be done is to establish a new ministerial level group to oversee the Plan’s implementation (in addition to the annual leaders' meeting). They suggest such a ministerial group could meet in conjunction with the existing annual Forum Economic Ministers’ Meeting and that this would help to ensure that regional initiatives are better reflected in the national priorities of Pacific governments (and vice-versa). Whether these recommendations will be supported by Pacific governments remains to be seen. I think it's fair to say that political commitment to the Pacific Plan has been tested in recent years. The diplomatic stoush between Fiji and Australia and NZ has drawn away some of the oxygen from Forum-wide initiatives, and the 'gains' to island countries from regional trade negotiations have been less-than-inspirational so far. Political energy has also been put into 'subregional' initiatives - like the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the Polynesian Leaders Group - and Forum consensus is being tested by how the region deals with non-independent territories (New Caledonia and French Polynesia for example). It's good to see that public consultations about a 'second generation' Pacific Plan are planned, and that public submissions can be made directly online. The next couple of years will be very interesting with regard to the future of Pacific regionalism, and the future role of the Forum Secretariat is likely to be up for discussion for some time yet.

Ah yes - the lifestyler. That was always what I wanted to achieve from surfing. Not so sure about aid work. I think I agree with most of what you write. Although I'm not sure about B (that the small savings involved would produce net benefits). Also I think that the dichotomy in point C is not really a false one. You will always need expat staff -- like it or not they often possess capacity lacking in developing countries. And they can actually benefit from being outsiders too -- free from the norms and informal institutions that may complicate the position of locals. Also, the incentives that expats operate under (at least in the case of permanent staff) are quite often more easy to align in the direction of good outcomes than are the incentives faced by local staff. And if you are going to have expat staff you are eventually going to have to pay them vis a vis the labour markets in their home country. And if you pay local staff the same rates you will severely distort local labour markets. Maybe some narrowing of the gap, but it will always be there. On point E do many aid staff really get paid more than 300k a year? Really? We hear about the outliers because they make the media, but I think the median wage is much much lower. Re the proper role of the state in developing. Like you I think it varies depending on state capacity. And in the Solomons case I agree with you about the need for a mix. Cheers Terence

Thanks Rhianon and Kay, Interesting points. Thank you. Kay, your comments reminded me of an article I read by Allan Kaplan. He explored the development of civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, for CARE. He reflects on the potential for simply providing space for a society to engage in dialogue and conversation that enable it to "engage critically with its own limitations... and so begin to stimulate its own potential to determine and influence its own future". Well worth a look: http://www.proteusinitiative.org/Writings/engaging%20with%20civil%20society%20in%20bosnia%20and%20herzogovina.pdf Warmest, Jo

Terence, I too, was once engaged directly by the evil One for some years. Even now I live by the good grace of the evil One. But for the sake of utility, i'll try and stay on-topic. Firstly, I believe, and the evidence supports the contention that high-performing individuals and organisations have a 'sense of mission'. Low performing individuals and organisations do not. When seeking to achieve a team objective, give me a "techie" that believes in what they are doing any day, over one who believes mostly in growing their bank account and investment portfolio. Now, following my earlier posted examples, I think that the development quality of aid TA, and the appropriateness of remuneration, would be better served by TA design and procurement following these principles: 1. TA design should first ask, "is this really what will get us where we need to go, and will it deliver the best development bang for our buck?" Especially considering that most public sector institutional challenges are a matter of sovereign will, not the sheer ignorance of developing country civil servants. 2. TA procurement should seek value-for-money by focusing on the task, and getting the required skills set and experience for the best available price, regardless of nationality or citizenship. 3. TA design and procurement should reject the pressure of the spending imperative. e.g. "We've got A$3 million to spend on fiscal governance in the Department of Finance before the end of this financial year. Let's get some bodies in there whilst we work out what to do, or until my posting ends, and then it’s someone else’s problem”. I propose that following these principles would lead to: A: more hybrid forms of engagement...volunteeers, PACTAM, straight HR recruitment from better value labour markets than Australia, locally-engaged expatriates who don't require all the bells and whistles, working more with churches / NGOs, etc. B: reduced average and median remuneration of aid-funded positions. C: the dilution of the false dichotomy of international / local designations (AKA "we pay according to your passport"). D: longer-term human engagement between the individuals involved, and less of the short-term expatriate citadel culture. E: less A$300k+ aid jobs that exist to tick a box and provide fodder for a media release or Ministerial brief, and not actually change anything in respect of the human development equation. I would reject your comparison of similarity between the avarice of private sector corporate remuneration, and soft fraud within the public sector, through the lens of concern for the integrity of the body politic. 50 CEOs getting paid more than A$2 million a year will not fracture the Australian nation-state. However systemic informal defrauding of the public estate and its Treasury presents an existential threat to the nation-state's viability. I'm partly influenced in this regard by the writing of the Polish sociologist Stanislav Andreski, and in particular his book, "Parasitism and Subversion", published in 1966, and partly by how I would feel personally if I was an ordinary citizen and I was paying for a state that exists to serve small groups of insiders, and not the interests of the many. As usual, I think we would agree on most of the core issues, but we probably diverge when it comes to the proper role for the state. I think you have a preference for state agency, whereas I prefer the pluralist agency of non-state actors as the engine room of human development, and I prefer my state to be “steering, not rowing”. However, I acknowledge that this is contextual, and I would be happier to dish up my sovereignty to the New Zealand state before I do so to the Solomon Islands state. Both positions require a little faith and can never be entirely based on logic and empiricism alone. P.S. I’m told I should add another category to my taxonomy: “the lifestyler”.

There is a distinction missing here and that relates to countries such as Australia providing aid or assistance (such as funding or training) to agencies and arms of regimes whose daily work involves human rights violations - the support for Detachment 88 in Indonesia is an obvious example of this. Also, 'smart sanctions' as applied to Fiji have certainly influenced the behaviour of the military leadership although not necessarily in ways envisaged or appreciated by Canberra.

Thanks Marcus, That is a very astute comment. And I take your point that aid workers are far from a homogeneous group -- while "techies" may live very opulent lives the same is rarely true of "missionaries". Your taxonomy of aid worker types works pretty well for me too, particularly as you allow for people to fall into more than one category at the same time. However, I wouldn't diss "missionaries" quite so much. Sometimes their enthusiasm and ideals meet a very important niche, and when they have the right skills, their asking price makes them much more cost-effective than old hands. And cynics aren't always right; nor are the naive and idealistic always wrong. As for bureaucrats: as a former member of this tribe I'm glad to hear that you think my time spent toiling in Wellington was necessary as well as evil. More seriously, I think you miscategorise the work of govt aid agency staff who actually need (and usually possess) extensive skills to allow them to manage the disjunct between the complex realities of aid work in developing countries and the equally complex realities of the political and spheres back home. Sure some aid agency staffers are poor at their job (as in every profession) but the good, committed ones (the majority I think) produce what is on balance positive impacts by being the uncomfortable link between aid recipients, and the capricious world back home of politicians and an only very marginally interested tax-paying, voting public. As for the article in the Telegraph: I wonder if they ever focus similar ire on the salaries of corporate consultants? Because I would say that this particular market failure is not at all unique to the world of aid. I agree with your economic diagnosis though. Although I would also add that risk aversion plays an important role here. The typical aid agency staffer has more money than time and so will, I think, be willing to pay over the odds for someone they know will at least produce reasonable work, won't stuff things up, knows what's needed, and won't require a whole heap of time to manage. Personally, I think the idea of contracting out work rather than having your own staff do it is, with the exception of very specialised services, a free market fairy tale. And that we'd get better aid work done if aid agencies had fewer contractors and more of their own permanent staff. Permanent staff are, on the whole, better because they are more deeply entwined in a multi-shot game, and are incentivised by group norms not just pay checks. I don't blame aid agencies for this though. The problem is a by-product of the depressingly simplistic way that civil servants and aid agencies are talked about in the public sphere's of donor countries. I.e. bureaucrats are bad, overheads must be as low as possible, markets are wonderful. So long as the Telegraph keeps peddling this sort of guff, it basically only has itself to blame for overpaid aid contractors.

Thanks Terence for this thought provoking article. Having been in this sector for some years, ranging in and out of NGOs, consultancies, research, and for-profit project management with central government agencies, I have a few comments that fit into two broad themes, that others have touched upon: 1. "AID WORKER" IS TOO BROAD A TERM TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS. The term “aid worker” seems to conflate what is actually a more complex labour market. I have noticed that the expatriates engaged in the aid sector can be crudely sub-categorised five ways...A: "the techie", who has no interest in development issues in general, and is employed for their technical skills, e.g. tax policy, IT, roads engineering. "The techie" is solely focused on the material benefits to be had; B: "the contractor", who knows the game well, understands the many information and power asymmetries in the market, and plays it to their advantage, and feigns an interest in "development" so as to maintain the revenue pipeline. Like "the techie", "the contractor" is focused on self-interest, but by necessity is involved in a grubbier, less honest trade; C: the "hard-headed development specialist", who is both cynical and knowledgeable enough to know the system's failings, but not so cynical that they don't keep trying to make it better. The "DS", who is really a public policy wonk, will work partly for self-interest, partly out of intellectual curiosity, partly from a sense of service to others, and sometimes for free; D: "the missionary", who in the purest form are innocent, gullible, and intellectually flaky, but will work for nothing if they think they are doing the right thing; and E: "the bureaucrat". A necessary evil. In reality most people in the sector are a combination of at least 2 of the above. But if you want to work with a government or people to deliver, for example, fresh water and sanitation, you will do better with more type A, B, and C, than D. The latter are cheap, but highly variable in both input, output, and outcome. Type E write briefs for their superiors, who write briefs for their superiors, who write briefs for their superiors, etcetera, etcetera. 2. THE SYSTEM IS DEEPLY OPAQUE AND GAMED BY INSIDERS. The foreign aid market is notoriously asymmetric and opaque. This explains why such distorted remuneration outcomes are reached for jobs, that when the tasks are unpicked, would fetch often 50%+ less in an efficient and transparent labour market. e.g. see <a href="http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/rich-execs-get-cut-of-our-foreign-aid-program-under-siege/story-e6freuy9-1225870267807" rel="nofollow">this populist news article</a> ...yes it's not very nuanced, but there are jobs mentioned there that would pay less than NZ$100,000 before tax in Wellington. Clearly arbitrage is at play and being exploited ruthlessly at the taxpayer's expense. Anyone who knows how these services are procured can tell you how easily they are gamed by insiders. Of course, because of the opacity who is going to critique such a system? Not me (not in public and in such raw terms, at least). I have to make a living too!