Comments

Hi Christopher, Thank you for your comment. I am aware of the research associated with the Justice for the Poor Programme. And I agree it is very promising. And that the World Bank and AusAID deserve credit for at least beginning investigations in this area (while we're at it the World Bank deserves credit for its work with the RDP programme too). Yet you write: "Our team in the Solomons would be happy to provide additional information, but they regularly travel into these communities and offer a dfferent kind of service that is not based around delivering from the capital and embraces informal systems of governance. The service delivery program is still in its infancy, but there is reason to be optimistic we can make it happen." This is written in the present tense, which suggests that active programme work (as opposed to research and scoping) is already happening. If so can you please advise me where? And what issues it is being geared to tackle? There was no sign of any such work in progress when I visited the Weather Coast. However, if it work has started three since then, that would be excellent news.

Terence, in response to your concerns I would encourage you to visit the World Bank's Justice for the Poor program website where you will see some of the innovative work being done on precisely the issues you raise. In fact, we are currently in the process of designing a program in the Solomon Islands to provide a pilot 'advisory services' arrangement for these communities in their dealings with more powerful commercial interests. This work seeks to use analysis and research to better engage with communities where there are sites of conflict and injustice. Essentially this means actually resourcing, researching and mediating the relationships you refer to. Our team in the Solomons would be happy to provide additional information, but they regularly travel into these communities and offer a dfferent kind of service that is not based around delivering from the capital and embraces informal systems of governance. The service delivery program is still in its infancy, but there is reason to be optimistic we can make it happen. The World Bank deserves some credit for taking this work on (particularly when it falls outside its normal set of aid modalities) and AusAID deserves credit for providing funding to make it happen. Encourging these approaches is essential if we are to get things like the EITI commitments beyond the meeting rooms. <em>Christopher Nelson is an M&E specialist with the World Bank in Sydney and works on the Justice for the Poor program.</em>

Robert, thanks for the insight. I have also been intrigued by where notions of learning might sit in a broader development context. No doubt we need to think carefully abut the quality of learning that takes place within education programs, but we rarely look further to how it plays a role in the full spectrum of aid interventions. My doctoral research took up this challenge by applying a phenomenographic methodology (built around Marton's work) to an agricultural program in Mozambique. What was particularly interesting in using this approach was the surprising diversity of ways that stakeholders engaged with the project. Putting these observations into a learning hierarchy was helpful in highlighting how different the impact of a development program can be for members within the same community. Understanding these differences can be particularly powerful, but only if we allow for diversity in how programs are delivered and designed. This means using research in the area to encourage donors to allow innovative and alternative development models to be trialled as an additional and necessary part of their standard programmatic work. We set aside a designated proportion of funds for monitoring and evaluation (M&E), so why not look at having a percentage set aside for learning and innovation that is properly thought through and recorded.

Robert Cannon’s blog ‘A deep or surface approach to development – what can learning research teach us?’ points to the potential shallowness of cascade training approaches, especially when carried out as ‘one-shot’ training exercises, and emphasises the need to take a deep approach to learning. He raises important issues that affect capacity development, change management and the achievement and sustainability of good development practices. The essential pre-condition for capacity development and for effective change programs is that a supportive environment exists or can be developed. It is not enough that the proposed program be supported by senior officials, it must also be supported by those closer to the action. Clearly, people will only support change programs if they at least conditionally accept the need for change. They also need to see that there is a realistic way forward to achieve the change, that they have or will acquire the necessary knowledge and skills, and they need to be supported throughout the change process. A one-shot surface approach by program implementers is unlikely to meet these conditions. Training alone is not capacity development. True capacity development requires much more than the training of specified target groups. Supporting changes to systems, process and procedures will almost certainly be needed, as well as parallel development activities for other stakeholders than those initially identified. The development process will be iterative and based on on-the-job learning and continuous quality improvement is therefore essential. All of these issues require deep understanding and engagement by the people involved. Post-program sustainability depends on local ownership and requires deep commitment by local stakeholders. Also, simply mainstreaming new practices is not a sufficient test of sustainability. True sustainability requires that these practices can be updated and improved even when no external support is available. Again, people need to have a deep understanding be able to do this, which is unlikely to be achieved through conventional cascade-training. These are serious problem for program planners, who will likely face time and budget constraints. The issue with cascade training is that the training of a particular target group (e.g. 1,000 science teachers) is seen as being the priority. Part of the answer for planners is to conceptualise the key task as one of trainer/mentor development, with the initial teacher-training activity being part of that development program rather than being the end in itself. I was part of a team working with District Education Services to support the implementation in schools of the Indonesian Government’s policies on active learning, school-based management and community participation; as well as to support the capacity development of the Services. Rather than pursuing targets for project-support training, we emphasised the development of a group of local trainers in each District. We modified the cascade approach to include a mentoring stage. Our national consultants ran the initial trainer training, then mentored the trainers as they planned and delivered their first few cycles of cascaded training, supporting ongoing improvement in the quality of the courses. With our ultimate goal being that all potential stakeholders were trained (and not just the relatively few funded by the project), these initial courses were primarily seen as a way to train the trainers – and we did meet our training indicators. This linked training/mentoring approach was repeated by the local trainers, who followed up their formal training with in-school mentoring. This proved to be a successful way to minimise the potential losses and distortions likely in cascade training. Over time and with mentoring support our trainers developed competence and confidence as professional trainers, able to continue the project-initiated training and mentoring programs, adapt and improve them over time, and design and deliver local, low-cost programs for other stakeholder groups. Being local, they could be effective in influencing teachers, parents and the community to support the changes, providing ongoing local support and serving as ‘change champions’. In effect, this approach applied the strategies supporting deep and sustainable development summarised in the Cannon blog. It aligned with government policy and earlier initiatives; provided several cycles of training, mentoring and feedback; allowed for whole-school and whole-system development and built communities of professional practice in Districts and across the Province. From a planning and implementation point of view, this is a relatively low-cost strategy. The major expenditure is at the beginning of the process, with the selection, training and mentoring of trainers through the first cycles of training. The actual cost of training and mentoring teachers, school committee members and principals by local people, carried out locally, is low and allows for near-100% coverage over time. The time demands on project consultants are heavy at the beginning and decline over time. This decline in cost and time demands on a project provides for an easily-understood exit-strategy and allows for resources to be diverted to new Districts. Nevertheless, as the blog points out, some modest continuing technical support after the formal exit, perhaps utilising a peer district system, is likely to support sustainability and improvement.

Thanks for articulating so succinctly how we NGO's in developing countries experience the shift in NZ aid approaches. It is abundantly clear that no matter now much good we are doing addressing critical community issues in developing countries, there is no way that we can access support from NZ unless we are an NZ agency... the "lip service" to partnerships between NZ based organisations and NGO's in developing countries actually appears to be rhetoric maze that we emerge from, blinking, right back where we began.

Hi Terence. The essence of what I’m on about might well be enunciated in your statements. Whether it’s a chicken and egg situation about which comes first, the fact is that pollies in so called developed countries are able to excuse any accountability for overseas aid projects by merely stating the bottom line and hoping to bask in the reflected glory. Most people in Australia for example, have absolutely no idea what happens to our aid money in practice. Why? Well that leads me onto your point about there being not a lot of evidence. Exactly right. Where do we really go to see any real evidence of any long term results from aid being spent? Billions spent in PNG over the last decades but no real improvement in the lives of the rural population and the urban poor. Before I get howled down for saying that we shouldn’t spend it, that’s not what I’m on about. What we must see is accountability for results. How, you may well ask? Well it’s simple really. No project should be commissioned without an agreed benchmark being established prior to the project commencing. There should then be transparent reporting and auditing of the results achieved. Surely that’s only common sense? The fact that aid monies end up in the pocket of dictators and corrupt officials is well documented. PNG’s Deputy Commissioner of Police is on record for publically stating that at least half his nation’s budget is lost to corruption. Is it any wonder nothing seems to change in today’s PNG? Even the previous PNG PM Somare is on record for acknowledging that the PNG public service is notorious for demanding a six pack before actioning a simple request. It’s common knowledge that many public servants almost never turn up for work yet still collect their pay. Their appointments are reputedly not made on merit but on family or cultural ties. Am I guilty of overstating my points? All I’m doing is stating what is common knowledge in today’s PNG and consistently reported in the local media. What’s the answer? I have previously written a submission to AusAID (that is posted on the Web) making some practical suggestions on how a valid aid scheme might work. That presumably disappeared into the Black Hole that all suggestions to government seem destined to end up in. There is one more aspect that’s terribly important. Any aid worker who really wants to make a difference must be prepared to learn the local language and customs. This doesn’t happen overnight. Australia previously had a facility for providing some initial training at the International Training Institute in Mosman, Sydney. That establishment is now history and the building falling apart. If an aid project officer from Australia stays in better accommodation than the people he/she is working with, that might well be accepted if the worker is able to effectively communicate directly with those they are attempting to assist. There is no bigger issue in my view than this. Many short term aid workers are disconnected from those they are ostensibly trying to assist by an impenetrable barrier of a true lack of understanding each other’s language and culture. This barrier only breaks down when aid workers get out of their barb wire surrounded compounds and security guarded forts and sit down in the dust with the people we are really trying to help. If anyone wants an example of how this actually works, try contacting Lydia Kailap and her husband in PNG’s Port Moresby who run a self-funded school for the capital’s poor and homeless. I’m sure you’ll get some good, practical advice.

Thanks Paul, Andrew, Deg and Beth for your comments and sorry for my delayed reply. Just a couple of points to note. Paul - most survey data that I'm aware of suggests that publics in developed countries believe that their governments should and do give more aid than they actually do. So I'm not sure if our aid budgets can really be accurately viewed as a product of politicians pandering to public sentiment. Also, the claim that aid helps politicians in recipient countries enrich themselves and also that it puts off any potential day of reckoning when citizens of these countries might hold politicians to account has a grain of truth to it. Certainly, in the past (and even in the present in the case of some donors) aid that has been primarily given for geostrategic rather than humanitarian reasons has ended up lining the pockets of tyrants and dictators. But this is much less prevalent (at least for the better donors) these days as conditionality and other control mechanisms are applied to try and ensure aid spending helps the needy. Similarly, there's not a lot of evidence to suggest that modern era aid leads to more rather than less corruption in developing countries. In short, the world of aid has changed somewhat for the better in the last two decades and while your concerns are valid, I think it would be easy to overstate them. Beth and Andrew, For the most part I think Andrew is right. Aid work is hard and comes with its particular set of stresses and if it is really poorly paid people with the best skills for the job (particularly when they reach the age of kids and a mortgage) won't do it. On the other hand, while this goes some way to excusing the lifestyles of aid workers I do also think Beth has a point and that, at some point, this line of thinking becomes a convenient excuse for salaries and luxuries that can't be justified. How often this point is passed, I'm not sure. Thanks for your comments.

Dear David, Thank you for your response to my post, which originally appeared on ADBI’s Asia Pathways blog and linked to ANU’s Development Policy Blog. I appreciate your clarification and comments. It is my great honor to receive comments from the author of CDI, which I mentioned in my post. Let me re-clarify the points you commented on. 1. Prioritized region and selectivity Although I did not mention the reasons donors have prioritized regions due to space limitations of blog posts, it is true that many donor nations have their priorities in delivering aid. The priority may come from donors’ motivations to satisfy their altruism for the poorest people, or to share the burden to provide global or regional public goods, or to strengthen political and economic ties with certain countries and regions. These motivations back the delivery of aid. As ODA relies on the taxpayer money of donor countries, the aid should be of some value to the people of donor countries in addition to the people of recipient countries. For example, Japan’s ODA Charter states, “The objectives of Japan's ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity” (1. Objectives), and, “In light of the objectives stated above, Asia, a region with close relationship to Japan and which can have a major impact on Japan's stability and prosperity, is a priority region for Japan” (4. Priority Regions). I am not suggesting “ignoring” the “poverty selectivity” that indicates more aid should go to poorer countries. But what I am suggesting is the need to examine selectivity in more detail rather than evaluating it by looking at aid “in total” alone. Although Japanese ODA has been primarily directed at middle-income countries due to more ODA loans being allocated to them as they have higher debt sustainability, more Japanese “grant” aid has been allocated to lower-income countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. 2. Ranking of selectivity in CDI We appreciate the high ranking of selectivity of Japanese aid in your recent publications. The point of my working paper and blog post, however, is to see this measure more closely with by taking different types of aid into account, and from the long-term and regional perspective, i.e. “one size may not fit all.” I appreciate your recent efforts to evaluate each donor by its regional contribution, but more elaboration may be needed to reflect the effectiveness of the aid delivered by each donor. 3. Proliferation in the size of the project Yes, there is no contradiction in saying that Japan funds smaller projects in fewer countries. But there is also no contradiction in saying that smaller projects from a donor may not cause a heavier burden on the recipients than the burden that larger projects from numerous donors with different procedures may cause. Which is more burdensome? Having developing countries deal with a number of projects with the same procedures, or having them deal with fewer projects that have numerous different procedures because of the differences in donors? The transaction costs of aid recipients who handle more donors would be higher, as the “government effectiveness” (measured by a part of KKZ governance indexes) is negatively affected by the diversion of donors (measured by index of aid fragmentation, i.e. inverse Herfindahl Index of aid shares of donors in a recipient). Government effectiveness, in turn, negatively affects the growth performance of the recipient countries. (The 2SLS regression results are shown in the appendix of my working paper). 4. The impact of aid on growth I understand you have pessimistic views on growth regression of aid (as is seen in the title of your working paper) Through the Looking-Glass (2008). However, your colleagues at CGD, Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (Counting Chickens When They Hatch: The Short Term Effect of Aid on Growth. First version. 2004) identified ”short-impact aid” (SIA) that can have a growth-enhancing impact on a country within four years. Although my blog post only mentioned the aid-growth nexus of Japanese aid in rank-order correlations, I also re-estimated in my working papers and Japanese articles the impact of SIA on growth for different sample periods and for Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa by following the method Clemens et al. (2004) employed (2SLS method with lagged explanatory variables to handle endogeneity). I found there the similar results as they found, in that the SIA has two to three times greater growth impact than using aggregate aid (net or gross ODA). Furthermore, as mentioned in the blog post, Japan has consistently provided its recipients with SIA, which has constituted more than 70% of Japan’s ODA since the early 1970s. While other major donors reduced their share of SIA in the 1990s and early 2000s, Japan maintained its share, which indicates Japan helped sustain the economic growth of recipient countries. Counting Chickens When They Hatch: Timing and the Effect of Aid on Growth (Clemens et al. Revised version. 2011) is not so straightforward, but admits that “increases in aid have been followed on average by modest increases in investment and growth.” 5. Net ODA “minus” per GDP It is true that the “very low net aid volume as a share of the economy” is the major contributor to the low ranking of Japanese aid in CDI. “Net aid” in CDI is the gross ODA minus ODA repayments and net interest payments, which is less than net ODA, which does not subtract the interest payment. “Net aid” does not count the forgiveness of the “other official flows “ (OOF) (e.g. untied loans from JBIC) debt and “offsetting entry for ODA debt relief,” which net ODA counts. As such, the loan-oriented ODA, which is a characteristic of Japanese aid, is penalized and the effort to reduce the debt servicing burden is not well valued. The regional Commitment to Development Index for Japanese “aid” to East Asia and Pacific scored “null” (zero), which may also be because of this “net aid” concept as substantial repayments have come from the aid recipients of this region. But the real point is whether this “net aid/GDP of the donor” has differentiable impacts on growth, poverty reduction, or welfare enhancement of the recipient countries. Is the 10 times smaller (in GDP) donor’s $1 worth 10 times more for the recipients than the $1 of the 10 times larger (in GDP) donor? For the recipient, each $1 may be almost the same regardless if it was received from a small donor or a big donor. That is why I put “result-oriented perspectives” to evaluate the quality of aid. There has been a long standing commitment of major donors to provide ODA at a volume of more than 0.7% of their GDP, but the commitment is for securing ample aid and not for ensuring the effectiveness of aid. As for the quality of aid, recent literature ranks Japanese aid as high as 8 out of 39 donors (Easterly and Pfutze. 2008), or 7 out of 31 donors in Fostering Institution and Maximizing Efficiency in Birdsall, Kharas and Perakis (2011), the first name of the authors is the president of CGD. As one size or type of aid may not fit all regions or recipients, one size or measure may not fit when evaluating commitments, contributions or aid effectiveness of all donors.

Thank you for this piece. These are issues that I am presently struggling with. Security concerns are used to justify accommodation within gated communities but the accommodation I have been provided with is in some ways better than I could afford in my home country (including access to a pool). There are two major issues for me, the first being the disparities between local staff salaries and those of international staff. Such a complex issue when local staff are already being paid well relative to the local context and there is some argument behind paying salaries high enough to attract highly skilled international staff. However, given the mission of INGOs in relieving poverty and inequality it is difficult to stomach a system that pays people doing the same or very similar jobs at a different level. The second difficulty is the separation from the local community. I have purchased a push bike to get round town (which has the added exercise benefits) as a small way in which to reduce that separation. I know there will always be a gap between international staff and the local community but living in such disparate conditions increases this tenfold. I think one other issue that hasn’t been mentioned is the funding model. I am working on an incredibly well funded project so staying in top hotels, hiring cars needlessly etc. are not only possible but are encouraged by a funding model which would require us to return any unused funds and reduce our likelihood of securing similar levels of funding in the future. I agree with Terrance’s arguments but I think there is also an element of ‘group think’. Yes, the work can be tough, and there is a need to attract ‘good’ people but by continuing with the mantra of ‘because I’m worth it’ there seems to be little reflection. In my current organisation there has only recently been a plan to move towards having a national as country director. We each like to be valued and most of us like life’s luxuries so it is understandable that those on good salaries and benefits will argue that they are necessary, but I don’t think that means that they always are. I wonder if the donors need to scrutinize to a greater degree where the finances are being spent and push for increased nationalisation within delivery partners(?)

Thanks Tobias for this, well presented and well grounded. The issues you raise in relation to Solomon Islands arise elsewhere in the region as we know. The cultural norms you identify contribute to the political environment of Solomon Islands as it is and it is only by accepting and understanding that can there be any meaningful dialogue about how to work with and within that environment to contribute to development, economic and otherwise.

Dear Takashi, Thank you for this analysis. As the person who runs the <a href="http://www.cgdev.org/cdi" rel="nofollow">Commitment to Development Index</a>, I would like to make several corrections: 1. The post says that "since many donor countries tend to focus their aid allocation in their prioritized regions or countries, it is more appropriate to estimate selectivity in the aid allocations of a donor by region than to estimate it world-wide." But the text does not explain why. If a donor gives all its aid to relatively rich countries, why should we ignore that in measuring selectivity? Are poor people in Africa less deserving of aid because they are farther away? 2. Your results on selectivity do not contradict those in the CDI. The <a href="http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/?country=JPN&component=&w=0" rel="nofollow">Japan page of the CDI</a> decribes selectivity as a "Japan Strength" and ranks Japan #4 overall on selectivity. 3. The discussion of proliferation confuses two different concepts. The CDI measures <em>project proliferation</em>---the tendency to fund small projects---while the analysis you cite measures <em>country-level proliferation</em>---the tendency to give aid to many countries. There is no contradiction in saying that Japan funds smaller projects in fewer countries. 4. It is not surprising that Japan's aid recipients, predominantly in Asia, have grown faster. But that does not prove that Japanese aid <em>caused</em> faster growth. The cross-country statistical approach to assessing the impact of aid on growth is no longer taken that seriously. 5. The post rightly points out that Japan (like the United States) gives very little aid for the size of its economy. I think it is worth emphasizing that <em>this</em> is the major reason that Japan scores low on the aid component of the CDI, not the selectivity and proliferation issues focused on in the post. And, along with high barriers to foreign rice and foreign workers, this is why Japan scores low on the CDI overall. --David

Hi Andrew, Your comment “what will be left behind (hopefully) will be the necessary knowledge and skills, not money” goes straight to the heart of the question of overseas aid. The correlation between the cost of providing overseas aid and the benefits accruing therefrom should be the nub of the debate. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. Providing significant overseas aid budgets seem to have become an end in itself and not a means to achieve an end. Successive Australian governments appear to have been very conscious of their ability to devote significant amounts of taxpayer funds each year without any subsequent evaluation of the results achieved. Each financial year, hundreds of millions of dollars are pumped into an amorphous and open ended bucket which apparently suffices to stifle any further debate on what Australia is doing to help other less fortunate countries. If the average Australian is either apparently unconcerned or disinterested enough to be able to discern any problem in this equation, one might think those countries that are supposed to be benefiting from these large amounts of money might want to know the details of what results are actually being achieved. The silence on this issue alone is deafening apart from a few who cast some vague aspersions about so called ‘boomerang aid’ as if the value of the aid money should in fact just be merely just handed over as a once off payment to the recipient country each year without any further accountable result or feedback loop. The launching of high profile aid projects is one beloved by both the donors and recipients. Much publicised media events on the ‘splash’ of the metaphoric ship’s launch and any associated and garnered prestige are to be milked to their limit. Yet when it comes time to consider ongoing maintenance, fuel and the crewing of the ship, no one at the launch apparently wants to know. So what is the obvious end result? Neither the donor country nor the receiving country apparently wants to challenge the process. Inevitably that creates a ‘black hole’ that each successive year of overseas aid budgets are dumped into where everything goes in but nothing apparently discernible comes out? That brings me back to my first point. The real question that should be asked is; ‘What tangible and permanent results are left behind after aid money is spent?’ The second obvious point must then surely be; ‘How can you effectively manage something not being realistically measured?’ For some reason, everyone associated with the so called ‘aid programs’ seem to be eggbound on these two crucial issues. Perhaps the real issue is that most governments seem to be unable to comprehend which end of the microscope you are supposed to look through.