Comments

Hi Terrence I have to say I admire your willingness to engage in robust discussion even before reading the case study ; ) Firstly, on public expenditure. Check out the government expenditure database available from the World Bank open data portal. Yes, I'm sure that government non-grant expenditure on health and education increased exponentially over the post RAMSI period. Health expenditure increased from around SBD90 million in 2006 to around SBD290 million in 2014. Education spending increased from SBD174 million to SBD695 million – a huge increase even excluding scholarships (which accounted for about 25% of education spending in 2016). Overall patterns of public spending are fairly well-aligned with MDG-type outcomes, and were especially so prior to the recent explosive growth of scholarships and CDFs since around 2012. If ‘national elites’ are only interested in ‘strengthening the national scale’ why were they so responsive to donor priorities in setting expenditure allocations? Please take another look at my review: I don’t think anyone who has worked on Solomon Islands in the past decade could fail to understand how CDFs function as patronage tools, and I wasn’t questioning that. I was trying to point out that if national level MPs are only interested in distributing patronage, then it is difficult to explain the radical expansion of non-CDF expenditure aligned with international goals. If we explain the radical expansion of MDG-type expenditure on the (incorrect) assumption that all government expenditure can be used to distribute patronage and therefore supports the ‘primacy of the national’, then there is no particular need for CDFs. You can’t have it both ways. I am also very confused by what value this framework brings to discussions of decentralization. As I tried to point out, the big-picture constitutional review process has fizzled, but national MPs quite explicitly provided additional resources to provincial governments through increasing provincial grants (both in nominal terms and as a share of the budget) and through co-financing capital grants under the PGSP. Again with this example, MPs acted to protect the ‘primacy of the national scale’ - except when they didn’t! As for electoral commissions - do we need a ‘politics of scale’ framing to understand that it’s easier to monitor centralized functions and agencies than decentralized/deconcentrated ones? This is a consistent finding from the decades-old literature on public administration reform. Check out Nick Manning’s review of the Machinery of Government Program in Sols for a discussion of this. Much more generally, I’m just not convinced that talking in such monolithic terms as “national”, “local” or “international” is very helpful. Most recent work on state-building emphasizes that ‘national elites’ have divergent and competing objectives. Is a Solomon Island MP a ‘national’ actor? And what does that mean in tangible terms? He might be connected to Chinese businessmen or Malaysian loggers – so presumably he also cares about security at the local scale where they do business? He might have business interests in the expat rental market or a water supply business in Honiara, in which case he will have an interest in the presence of donors, presumably linking him to the international scale, and giving him an interest in the quality of the local business environment. He might even be seeking to build credibility with the international development community to mobilize aid resources, in which case he presumably has an interest in achieving the global goals and targets that we are allegedly fixated upon. He could be in a coalition with or seeking to undermine any number of other MPs who have various configurations of these interests. This just all seems to suggest we are better off mapping real elite coalitions and interests, including trying to understand specific patronage networks, rather than relying on the categories provided by the scale framing. To me, all work in this area is valuable and welcome. I have no problem with ‘politics of scale’ as a way of kicking up some new ideas. But I’m not at all convinced by the authors’ claim that it is superior to other frameworks of analysis (whether measured in terms of either predictive or explanatory power).

Hi Tobias, Thanks for the review. As someone who's reading the book it's useful to encounter other people's takes while reading. As someone who works on Solomons it's great to know I can weigh up the authors' take, my take, and your take on that particular case study. I haven't gotten to the Solomons chapter yet; perhaps when I do, your take will make more sense to me. However, as a conceptual insight the idea that different actors gain competitive advantage from shifting the scale of contestation strikes me as very useful. For example, it helps highlight potential problems with decentralisation (and not just in developing countries.) This an improvement given decentralisation is still often sold as an efficient technical fix. To give another example, aid actor's who were cognisant of the scale of different power dynamics might have been considerable more alarmed about the decentralisation of (some) electoral powers to provinces in the lead up to the 2017 elections in PNG. Donors, unless they want to invest very heavily in placing their staff on the ground, have much less ability to work as a countervailing power against electoral subversion at a provincial level than they do when dealing with a single national electoral commission. On the other hand, powerful local actors will probably find it much easier to capture provincial electoral commissions than they will the national body. Decentralisation was only partial in the lead up to the 2017 election, and we are yet to fully diagnose the problems that occurred, but the dynamics of scale ought to be brought to bear as actors undertake diagnosis and look to future proposals. To give another example, scale does a good job of explaining why federal models of governance are often talked about in Solomons and PNG, but are unlikely to ever be legislated for by national MPs, unless regional political blocks develop or perhaps during crises of succession. Why would actors at a national-level give resources and power to actors at the provincial level? Scale seems useful to me. Briefly, on empirical matters, you write: <em>"Government expenditure on basic public services (including health and education) grew exponentially over the RAMSI period, with such expenditures consistently accounting for a large share of the annual budget, and a much larger share than CDFs."</em> With respect to government expenditure I think the most appropriate baseline is pre-state collapse. Even setting this aside, are you sure that *non-aid-funded* government expenditure in health and education has grown exponentially? Also, in education's case, it's worth noting that much of the growth that did occur was in scholarships, which are a tool of patronage plain and simple. Also, you write, <em>"Further, if we are to accept the argument that all public expenditure provides patronage channels for national elites, then why did national elites go to the trouble of establishing and resourcing CDFs in the first place?"</em> There's an obvious answer to this question. CDFs provide MPs with funds that are more electorally useful than central resources. The state has very little reach into rural areas in Solomons. And most Solomon Islanders are not going to be employed by the state. Therefore it is hard, notwithstanding the special case of scholarships, for MPs to put conventional state tools to work to their electoral benefit. As a result, it's difficult for MPs to win votes through these state-based avenues of patronage. On the other hand, cash for solar panels, tin roofs, and OBMs is very useful. It can be targeted and it's easy to deliver. No mystery. Finally, now in the realms of outer nerd land, I want my regressions to have "predictive power", but I'm not so sure that this is a necessary demand of an initial theory based on case studies. I'll be happy if--when I read the book--I find that the idea of scale adds additional <em>explanatory power</em> to the cases vis a vis the counterfactual of conventional political economy analysis. On the basis of the authors' talk last week, I'm hopeful.

Thanks for the comments on ducks - was news to me at least. Interesting - would be keen to hear if others in Solomon Islands have similar, or other, success stories. But I still fear in many areas infestation is just so high that comprehensive approaches to control are needed.

Paper by Sam Koim is very important for every policy practitioners to adhere to because it reveals a fundament universal law: a sick cannot help another sick; a good person does not need a physician but only the sick. I am so interested to hear how Sam will expound that principle, but of anything, we need a Physician who is not sick to help the sick. Who is that Physician? Think about it.

As commendable as it is to see further attention being paid to the appalling state of child nutrition in PNG, understanding of its causes might be assisted by providing some historical depth to the current research. A 1947 Nutrition Survey of the indigenous population by the Australian colonial administration stated : `When the intake of foods is expressed as nutrients it is seen that the calorie intake is slightly lower, and the protein intake much lower than amounts recommended as desirable to ensure adequate nutrition amongst people of Caucasian origin.' Eleven years later, legendary colonial official Dr John Gunther, formerly Director of the Department of Public Health and now Assistant Administrator pointed out that even after all the efforts at post-war reconstruction: `The population is not healthy: the expectation of life is half of what it should be; the infant mortality rate twice to ten times what it should be...These indigenous people of the Territory are only 80 per cent well...This [is] the physical condition of the people which has to be improved so that their country may progress, for they are the only labour force available to achieve development'. (Source for quotes: see my Securing Village Life Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2013, pp.48-53 ). Perhaps something else is required than targeted interventions. Maybe the `crisis' isn't all that new and is largely a continuity?

Interesting piece, thank you Nilima. In answer to 'what should be done', I think the role of civil society in donor countries is an important part of the solution. Donor's domestic politics may have a greater impact upon their government's actions than global standards. Or at least the two can work in tandem more powerfully than either alone. Domestic NGOs were active policy influencers in my research into ODA policy change in New Zealand, and Svant Ivanyi and Lightfoot (2015) found similarly in their study of the Czech Republic (and other new European donors).

Great job Dr Hukula, this is sister Thecla. This is late reading for me as some of us are way back in latest tech. Loved reading the perspectives presented. See you around pom city.

Hi Hubert, Thanks for your comment. Both you and Patrick quibble with the claim that aid is a 'dirty' word. And while I agree I may have taken some literary license in my usage of 'dirty', I do see donors deliberately positioning themselves as engaged in a project that goes well 'beyond' aid and rejecting the terminology of aid. Their strategy documents talk about them as 'development actors' and pitches the importance of moving aid away from a charitable model to something that embraces innovation, flexibility and policy coherence. Nonetheless, there are others for whom the business model of aid is perceived as a failed social experiment that needs to end, now (consider Moyo, Easterly and other notable right-of-centre aid sceptics including the editorial board of the UK's Daily Mail newspaper though there is also a notable group on the left-leaning scholars arguing the same thing). If you want to read more check out my article <a href="https://nilimagulrajani.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/gulrajani-the-great-aid-debate-online-version2.pdf" rel="nofollow">here</a>.

Hi Patrick, Thanks for this comment. Agreed, our paper defines 'new donors' in quite a restrictive sense (post-2009 accession to the DAC) and many of these donors have a long history providing aid (see our Table 1 where we acknolwedge this). But we also believe they might be viewed as 'new' to the extent that there is a more forceful and coherent articulation of their identity as aid providers on global and regional platforms. In other words, this donor identity is now projected internationally and with strategic intent that makes these donors 'new' as compared to Northern donors (the latter having exploited this identity for diplomatic advantage for much longer). Our sample didn't look at China per se, mainly due to the data issues you allude to but also because the paper was meant to offer a high-level view of the new donor landscape rather than a detailed exploration of any actor. From what I know, I have no doubt the achievemnets are many and the standards different. But while this may be the case, our argument is there has to be some intrinsic essence to 'being a donor' (or aid provider if you prefer that language) that transcends the various distinctions between Northern and Southern provider, old vs. new, etc. While I know the politics are tricky, this is where we have to get to. Just like the declaration of human rights, I think there are critical core functions that should be the ambition of all bilateral donors if their real aim is to serve the world's poor. This paper attempted to define such a standard from our (admittedly Western-centric) perspective and while not perfect (we are limited in terms of data) it provides an opportunity to kickstart a conversation. Acting like a donor is not meant to be about conforming to either DAC standards or any other donor's standards for that matter but about recognising an essential shared purpose across the entire universe of aid providers and holding donors accountable for achieving it.

I live in the Solomon Islands and can vouch that the GAS are everywhere! However, there is a simple and cheap way of getting rid of them and that is purchasing a few ducks as they love them. Within 2 months of getting 3 ducks I have zero snails in my garden as they have devoured them.

Talofa lava Mitiana, I thank you for this interview. I am Agafili Shem Leo - CEO of the Ministry of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (MPMC). For your information the Seasonal Employment Unit (SEU) handles all seasonal employment matters namely the NZ RSE and Australia's SWP for Samoa. The SEU was housed under the MPMC since its inception in 2007 until this year when it was moved to the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Labour as part of government's labour mobility reform. In essence the MPMC was handling the RSE for 10 years and was at the forefront in developing policy guidelines, plans, operating manuals etc... for the SEU in collaboration with the NZ MBIE and the Australia's DOE. You asked a question on the process one has to go through to become a worker? For clarity purposes the government of Samoa has an established recruitment and selection process for RSE workers. The criteria encompasses; 1. Form that the applicant is required to fill. 2. Confirmation from the village Mayor and village Clergy that the applicant lives in the village and that he/she actively participates in village developmental activities and church 3. A police clearance (nb: no one with a previous criminal record is eligible for consideration for both the RSE and the SWP). This has been the government of Samoa's policy from the genesis of its participation in the RSE and SWP. 4. A medical report including the chest x-ray. 5. Recently this year,the fitness test has been added to our recruitment and selection process. 6. Upon submission of the above documents and passing the fitness test, the SEU runs thorough interviews before the successful workers are selected. Its important to note that the SEU liaises with the employers in undertaking the R & S process. Apropos the workers visas, the government of Samoa does not pay for any visa costs. The workers are responsible for their visa costs. In many cases, the employers make direct arrangements with workers to pay for their visas in advance and the workers are required to reimburse such costs to their employers when they start their contracts. My comment is really to set the record straight on Samoa's R & S process as it is not correctly captured in your respondent's answer. We would appreciate if the SEU could be consulted in future at least for clarity purposes when ever a matter relating to Samoa's participation in the NZ RSE and Australia's SWP is discussed. Faafetai lava Agafili Shem Leo CEO Ministry of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Samoa

Regarding your story concerning Giant African Snails in Solomon Islands. I was recently back in Honiara and saw the damage done by these nasty beasts. However, there seems to be an answer…namely, ducks. I stayed with a friend who had brought some ducks into his garden and they had destroyed every GAS. He told me that ducks pecked into the shells of the GAS and ate the snail flesh. He had not one snail in his garden, neither did his neighbours, who also had ducks roaming in their garden. Is this an environmentally friendly way to defeat these pests? Or was it just coincidence that ducks in the garden meant no GAS in the garden?