Comments

I'm afraid Felicity Herbert has provided a very rose-tinted perspective on the PNG Government's performance in responding to the 2015-16 El Nino induced drought, which can only be described as too late, too little and inappropriately applied. The responsiveness and capacity of the National Disaster centre during the last major El Nino period of 1997/8 was better, including the readiness to request external assistance in a timely manner, without finding this a matter for shame. The shame comes from the delay and continued delays until lately, including the recognition that it's not a case simply of dishing food or funds to districts or main centres, but getting it delivered to those in need mostly in very remote locations. The churches (and some NGOs, plus the wider community of PNG - or wantoks) were markedly ahead in the game, both in undertaking assessments and responding to need, especially in remoter locations, but clearly their resources were limited. That said, some provinces and districts and some public sector workers have certainly been performing better and substantial effort in supporting their communities in time of need. The drought affected the whole country to varying degrees, although the impact was only potentially catastrophic in some areas, and for some communities and especially for those most at risk (notably young children, nursing mothers, the elderly etc). Good work was undertaken in some provinces and districts, but these weren't necessarily those most severely impacted, and there was much greater need to target the limited resources to those in greatest need, or where the drought (and frost) impact was continuing longest, and to ensure that the food and other support wasn't misdirected to the less needy, or misappropriated by cronies along the way. All in all, whilst some commendation may be merited for some, many lessons must be learnt from this experience; the warnings were there and being given early on, and there was no reason to have ignored them until so late, even if big events were occurring. Budgets were certainly being squeezed from mid-year, but keeping Papua New Guinea's population alive and healthy should surely be one of the highest priorities for a government, and be relatively shielded from the fiscal squeeze (except in terms of ensuring the cost effectiveness of the relief efforts), but with a readiness to ask for financial and logistical assistance to complement the domestic effort.

Like other commenters, I am struggling to see the 'not bad' news in this. It's all well and good to have a National Disaster Office, and some sort of systematic response from them... but it clearly hasn't been enough. I found your point about the National Agriculture Research Institute raising the alarm, yet being ignored, particularly troubling. It shows that as long as these kinds of attitudes continue, history could well repeat. Having systems and institutions in place is one thing... mounting an effective response to a crisis, or better still trying to avoid one, is another thing altogether. And ultimately the response is what affects the people on the ground.

The allocation of drought relief from DSIP funds is, in my own opinion, a serious mistake and little more than a PR exercise. The lack of preparation and low priority given to this essential issue in human security is acknowledged in the article above, which admits that the PNG government chose to concentrate on other matters despite warnings from NARI and others. It is important to note in addition to this that in practice, very little has in fact been done to allocate funds to the drought. First, DSIP funds were already not restricted to the guidelines, so in practice what has happened is an announcement that existing funds could be allocated to drought relief - although this was already the case in practice. At the same time, the funding problems noted above - the competition between NARI and other sectors - are no less serious at the district level, where there are problems of over-commitment. Secondly, DDA's supervision of DSIP spending is a nice theory, but in practice, DDAs are dominated by MPs and their affairs are not transparent. It is not clear how the average voter is supposed to assess their performance. The politicisation of DSIP spending also opens up the possibility of MPs being reelected precisely for distributing their drought relief to their own supporters. Thirdly, democratic principles are essential, but at the same time it is not reasonable to excuse an ineffective response to a crisis with the prospect of electoral punishment sometime in the future. By then, for some, it will be too late. Finally, if anything requires national planning and consolidated oversight, it is a response to a national disaster. Devolving responsibility for this to local authorities imposes on them a very onerous task. This might be described as a 'passing the buck', except that no new bucks are in fact being passed. In sum, serious questions should be asked about a decision to fund drought relief through DSIPs: it is not a secret to anybody, least of all O'Neill, that DSIPs are political in character.

Jonathan, I absolutely agree with your comments and was about to say something similar. The work that Mike Bourke has been doing is excellent and I hope that the PNG authorities will draw more on his analysis to target relief. At the same time more details on the delivery of relief are needed: to facilitate coordination among disparate actors; to identify whether relief is getting to where it is needed; and to evaluate and correct the performance of various agencies. If the PM's department has the data, then perhaps it could start by publishing a table in the newspapers of what relief is being provided and where (down to the village level) and a timetable of the roll out of ongoing relief. In terms of feedback, the photos shared by Sally Lloyd have had a powerful effect on relief efforts: perhaps shaking off some of the complacency. It would be good to get more stories and feedback from remote areas: how and where relief is getting through; where it's not and why; how people are being affected etc. Perhaps this information and feedback challenge is something that PNG's active social media can help solve--to drive accountability and better relief efforts. A lot more can and needs to be done.

Isn't the answer to your title question Ashlee that Australia is an AID scrooge? Our low levels of humanitarian funding reflect our low levels of aid funding overall, exacerbated by a policy which focusses more on small countries that are geographically close to us than countries with the greatest needs. I am not sure that a large increase in the share of aid to humanitarian assistance is a good solution, for two reasons. I fear the Government's focus on the Pacific might mean that this would further reduce funding to effective multilateral development programs and to effective development programs in non-Pacific countries. My second reason is that there appears to be considerable scope to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance through better disaster prevention and preparedness and more direct support of people and NGOs in disaster areas, with less use of imported civilian and military personnel. However I certainly think the effectiveness and impact of the aid program would be significantly improved if we removed the artificial separation of humanitarian and development programs. We should apply humanitarian principles to the whole aid program and thus: - provide assistance on the basis of need and our capacity to make a difference - prioritise poor people's survival and focus on ensuring everyone has access to basic services and is safe - ensure local people are at the centre of decision making and action. This is what we expect and largely achieve for Australians in Australia but we don't seem to apply these principles across our aid program.

Thank you Thiago for your excellent reply to the query from Tess regarding the politicization of the DDA model. Prima facie (a fleeting glance) the DDA sounds orthodox enough as far as good practice in public administration - closer to the grassroots, accountable to local people, etc. Time will tell whether it works or not, but the weight of evidence from PNG and elsewhere doesn't seem in its favour. Perhaps what will be more profound is the writing of a new chapter in PNG governance, and the change to a quasi-federal structure made up of 89 semi-sovereign entities with different approaches to governing. From communitarian democracies, to feudal princedoms. As usual, fascinating from an academic perspective!

Felicity, The PNG government’s response to the worst drought affecting their nation in the past two decades has been an unmitigated failure. As social media shows multiple cases of people literally starving in Western Province to argue that a ‘targeted’ response of a meagre 25 million Kina is not bad news is indefensible and offensive to the citizens of Papua New Guinea. The untargeted and unmanaged response through DSIP, where an MP from East New Britain has the same amount to spend as one from Hela or Western also needs much clearer justification. Is this the level of response the people of PNG should come to expect from their elected officials? Of course, I would be the first to admit PNG is in a very challenging fiscal situation, but this is where donors can help. External actors are poised to assist, and anywhere else in the world we would be calling this a humanitarian disaster. But lack of a diverse donor community in PNG, combined with a cautious Australian government has muted external criticism. There should be no shame in PNG admitting it needs external assistance to manage a disaster of this scale. Even developed country governments welcome external offers of cooperation in times of disaster. Meanwhile, families in Western Province and other drought struck regions will continue to suffer because of the PNG government’s pride in assuming it can do everything unassisted. The drought response in PNG has been nothing but bad news, and to say otherwise is an insult to those that have needlessly suffered in rural and remote parts of the country. Jonathan

Great work Ashlee! I managed to ace the quiz, but I think I have an advantage in that I was involved in much of this data collection, but I doubt I could have made it anywhere near as accessible as you have. So again, well done.

Thanks for these excellent resources, DevPolicy. This serves a range of different purposes for different audiences. For the record, at 66% on the quiz I'm an aid novice.

Oxfam report stated that alcohol and drug abuse is one of the of causes of gender based violence, I am one of the few like voice in the wilderness trying to assist to reduce the problem. However, international donors like Oxfam pour a lot of money into HIV AIDS programs and not drug awareness and rehabilitation programs. Can International donors change their policy and assist in drug awareness and training as well. To create a sober environment, free from drug problems would also reduce gender based violence and create happy families. Philip Kai Morre director Alcohol and Drug Rehab Kundiawa Simbu Province.

Thanks Devpolicy. This is an excellent resource. I enjoyed the Aid101. I obviously need to read the rest of the site, as I only got 44% in your quiz on Australian aid!

I agree with you Ian. Innovation can of course be a good thing, however the main reason people are still hungry, millions of people are still dying from preventable and treatable diseases and children are not learning enough in schools is not a deficit of knowledge or effective strategies. We know how to defeat all these problems and programs around the world have had great success. The main reason these problems are still with us is that politicians in developing and developed countries have not been willing to adequately fund programs. By far the most important innovation required is to increase the empathy and commitment of politicians to the poor.