Comments

Dear Matt, I agree with the points you made on using internet and social media to monitor projects and get feedback from beneficiaries. I made a reference to your article in a blog I have just published on the UNDP web site: What role for social media in monitoring development results? http://ow.ly/5zy44 Regards.

You make an excellent point on the importance of effective aid to fragile states and I agree that understanding context and having staff capacity for analysis are important. Yet I'd argue that the Aid Review report does help to address these in several important ways: First, it makes it clear that the aid program should be driven by country programs, rather than pre-determined sector targets (recommendation 7), and this is essential for making aid more sensitive to context. Secondly, the aid review points to some ways to improve the effectiveness of aid in countries with weak governance (p47-48), and recommends improving the quality of government and strengthening civil society as a thematic focus (recommendation 9, point 3), an increased emphasis on NGOs and the private sector as a delivery mechanism (recommendation 10), and a 'whole-of-ODA' approach (recommendation 30). Thirdly, throughout the report, the aid review recommends ways to create head space: it stresses the need to geographically focus the bilateral program (recommendation 14), to select fewer sectors (recommendation 8), to increase resourcing (recommendation 32) and to streamline processes and reduce paperwork' (p29). As you highlight high quality analysis is essential, and the recommendations above are necessary to create the space for this to happen. Fourthly, the demand for high quality analysis on fragile states and better country programs could, at least in part, be driven by more transparent aid (recommendation 37) and quality evaluation (recommendations 35 and 36). These are just my interpretations of how the Aid Review's recommendations could help to improve the effectiveness of aid in fragile states. Thanks again for flagging a critical issue for the aid program, and drawing attention to international good practice, especially the DAC principles. I hope that your comments will solicit a fuller response from the Aid Review team.

Satish does not seem to have noticed the effect of PNG’s new ‘land grab’ on the proportion of land which is now held under ‘customary tenure’. It may be true that 97% of the land was customary land at the time of independence in 1975, but over the course of the last eight years, more than 5 million hectares of land has apparently been leased by its customary owners to the State, and then leased back to private companies which the customary owners supposedly approve of, normally for the maximum allowable period of 99 years. Section 11 of the Land Act clearly states that ‘an instrument of lease in the approved form, executed by or on behalf of the customary landowners, is conclusive evidence that the State has a good title to the lease and that all customary rights in the land, except those which are specifically reserved in the lease, are suspended for the period of the lease to the State’. What this means, in effect, is that the proportion of PNG’s land area under customary ownership has now declined from 97% to 86%. It is true that the Acting Prime Minister recently announced a moratorium on the operation of the ‘lease-leaseback scheme’, but this does not mean that all of the existing leases are instantly revoked. Anyone wishing to read more about the new land grab in PNG should ask Mr Google to find my recent paper entitled ‘The Political Construction of a Land Grab in Papua New Guinea’.

The Australian quarantine or the SPS requirements are real concern to the Pacific Island Countries PICs). There are significant costs to the PICs to try to match up or meet these Australian requirements in order for trade to exist in this region. Nevertheless, now that the PACER Plus is being negotiated, it is hoped that the PICs will be able to negotiate an arrangement that is favourable to them.

HI Satish, interesting article; I enjoyed reading it! I am curious though...where has land reform benefitted people who depend on plantations for income and food security? Also, following from your Fiji example, matai (chief) titles in Samoa are tied to the land and the aiga (extended family). Therefore, as in other parts of the Pacific island region, must social change precede any form of codification framework for customary land? And how will this impact on settlement change?

Hi Alex, Thanks for your comments. I agree: econ has got the jump on the other social sciences when it comes to forcing their students to learn quantitative methods. Although, nowadays there are definitely very strongly quant oriented sociology and pol-sci departments around, particularly in the US, which are equally capable of teaching such knowledge. IMHO, the optimal space for political science to be in would be teaching these methods, and teaching their shortcomings, and maintaining the best of the qualitative stuff. Economics is strong on the quantitative side of things but it is also, I think, hamstrung somewhat by an excessive focus in this direction. Thanks for your comment. Terence

I am a political science graduate and I have felt the same as Kristof for many years. But the reason that an economics degree would have helped me more that poli sci is not its subject matter but its methods. The economics students were forced to complete statistics and quatative methods classes. In contrast I graduated without ever having used a graph or chart or table in any of my essays or assignments. not one. I have managed to pickup a fair knowledge of economic theory through osmosis, but I am still woefully underqualified in the most effective tools for assessing complexity. The solution is rather simple: political science courses need to start teaching analytical tools and quantative methods. This will undercut the current monopoly that economists have on this method and inject some much needed rigour into political science.

"Supposing what is needed happens to be something we are no good at providing?" Then either give our money to a donor who can provide it and let them provide it or, if what's needed is something aid simply can't achieve, then do nothing (i.e. don't give aid to that country) or do something that is less acutely needed but which still helps. For example: in country X the central issue is governance, yet donors have little traction in improving this so, instead, they provide vaccines, which are still needed, even if they're not the fundamental development issue.

"we should choose based on what is needed and what is likely to actually work." Supposing what is needed happens to be something we are no good at providing? This is where the 'comparative advantage' argument seems to have some merit. Developed countries should be willing to sometimes admit that they can't do everything well, offer what they can do well, and let developing country people decide if they want to take up the offer, or go elsewhere if what is on offer doesn't fit with their needs.

Hi Sam, I's pretty sure I am explaining a shift away -- at least from the concept as it is used in Leigh's speech and in New Zealand aid documents. To re-cap -- I have suggested that choosing what type of aid to give to a country based on what we believe our own countries to be good at is not a good idea and that, rather, we should choose based on what is needed and what is likely to actually work. Context, not comparative advantage should drive aid. What you suggest -- letting countries themselves decide, already takes place to a degree through aid partnerships. But, issues of power imbalances remain, and - also, as you rightly note - the issue of representation (who ought actually speak for the poor of country X) is a major one.

Hi Terence, You don't seem to be proposing to move away from the concept of comparative advantage in aid, it's just (as usual) a matter of who has the power. If 'aid recipients' come to Australia for its expertise in mineral extraction, that's fine. If donor governments decide developing countries must have Australia's expertise in mineral extraction, or New Zealand's ovine veterinary skills, whether they want them or not, then that's a problem. The political difficulties lie in persuading donor countries to give up their power in the relationship (which is unlikely) and in finding representatives of 'aid recipients' who genuinely represent their interests. Cheers.

The thrust of this policy brief is how do we (donor community and development partners) support and strengthening partner country systems, in this case the public health supply chain system. How do we respond to the issue of sustainability, which I would argue is both financial and operational sustainability. PNG may be increasing its financial sustainability (i.e. increased govt exp to procure medicines) but, its operational sustainability is weak (i.e. cannot maintain order fill rate improvements, inventory mgmt, etc.). A question would be for donor funding and, specifically, in PNG how did AusAID prioritize their funding? That is did it aim to (1) ensuring access & availability of commodities or (2) strengthening the system to function more effectively. These objectives are necessarily the same thing or mutually reinforcing.