In the wake of the 2026 Pacific leaders’ meeting in Palau, it is timely to reflect on their endorsement in 2023 of the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility. Since that time, considerable attention has been focused on regional policy commitments and implementation. But an equally important development has been the growing number of bilateral agreements between Australia and Pacific Island countries which acknowledge the importance of migration.
Two starting points shape how we read these agreements. The first is that people rarely move for a single reason — there are always multiple considerations at play. The second is that movement can be a positive form of adaptation, including in the context of climate change. Migration can strengthen households and communities both at home and abroad, giving people choices and opening up new opportunities.
The Falepili Union (2023) between Australia and Tuvalu has received worldwide media attention because of its so-called “climate mobility” pathway, examined below. However, at least five other bilateral agreements also highlight the importance of movement, including those with Vanuatu (initialled August 2025, signed June 2026), Samoa (March 2023), Fiji (July 2026), Naoero (Nauru) (December 2024) and Papua New Guinea (August 2020), and this may feature in a future arrangement with the Solomon Islands as well. Mobility is viewed not only as a means of supporting economic development and skills diversification, but also as a tool to enhance peace, security and economic prosperity in the region.
The Falepili Union contains a provision creating “a special human mobility pathway for citizens of Tuvalu to access Australia” (article 3), enabling them to “live, study and work in Australia” and “access Australian education, health, and key income and family support on arrival” (article 3(1)). In concrete terms, this is reflected in a new visa called the “Pacific Engagement visa (subclass 192) – Treaty stream (Tuvalu)“. At present, up to 280 visas are available each year.
Although the treaty is framed by the “existential threat posed by climate change” (article 2(1)), recognising “the special and unique circumstances faced by Tuvalu and that climate change is Tuvalu’s greatest national security concern” (preamble), neither the treaty provision nor the Australian visa requires movement to be linked to the adverse impacts of climate change. In fact, the visa contains very few limitations: movement can be for any reason, requires no prior connection to Australia and is without upper age restrictions.
Despite the media headlines, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that climate change is a significant driver of movement from Tuvalu (although it may form part of the decision-making process). Demand for the pathway itself is high: in the first ballot, which opened in June 2025 and closed the following month, 8,750 people registered, more than half of Tuvalu’s citizens, at a cost of A$25 each. That figure needs care in interpretation. Registration is cheap, entry to the ballot is not a decision to leave, and a successful applicant may hold a permanent visa without using it. What the ballot shows is a widespread wish to keep the option of moving open, or to move temporarily for work or education, which is not the same as an intention to migrate forever.
Far less attention has been given to several other agreements that also support enhanced mobility. The Fiji-Australia Vuvale Union (2026) commits the parties to “deepen[ing] their economic and human development partnership by enhancing … cultural and people linkages, including through mobility” (article 3(3)(c)). More specifically, under article 4(4)(b), both countries “commit to the enhancement of their individual and collective peace and security through … supporting adaptation and mobility with dignity for Pacific peoples, recognising the existential threat posed by climate change”. While this has not (yet) been translated into a dedicated visa, it builds upon existing labour mobility pathways, such as the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) scheme and the Pacific Engagement Visa, which respectively offer temporary and permanent employment opportunities in Australia.
These two labour mobility schemes are also open to people from Samoa, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, with whom Australia also has agreements referring to the importance of mobility.
For instance, the Australia-Samoa Bilateral Partnership Arrangement (2023) acknowledges “the important contribution labour mobility makes to the economy of both our countries”, and both parties “commit to maximise the benefits of labour mobility and minimise any negative impacts on families and businesses domestically in Samoa” (para 19).
In the case of Papua New Guinea, the main mobility commitment sits within the Papua New Guinea-Australia Comprehensive Strategic and Economic Partnership, signed on 5 August 2020. In that partnership, both countries “recognise the mutual benefits of improved labour mobility for our countries and commit to expand cooperation in resourcing and capacity building, including increasing the number of Papua New Guineans participating in the Pacific Labour Scheme and Seasonal Worker Program” (para 32). Two subsequent instruments have since been added to the relationship: the Bilateral Security Agreement of December 2023 and the Pukpuk mutual defence treaty of October 2025. While neither has a general mobility provision, the Pukpuk Treaty provides that the two countries can recruit each other’s citizens into their defence forces.
Finally, the Vanuatu-Australia Nakamal Agreement, initialled in August 2025 and signed in June 2026, has a standalone provision on “Enhanced Mobility” (article 6) whereby Australia commits to providing Vanuatu “with enhanced mobility arrangements for Vanuatu visitors to Australia”.
The preamble of the Nauru-Australia Treaty acknowledges “the enduring friendship and family ties between the people of Nauru and Australia, nurtured through generations through educational, cultural and sporting exchanges, and the movement and mobility of our people between our two nations”. Meanwhile, in a joint statement issued by the prime ministers of the Solomon Islands and Australia in June 2026, there was an agreement to double the number of Pacific Engagement visas offered to “Solomon Islands for the next year of the program”.
Taken together, these agreements emphasise the continuing importance of mobility in the Pacific and its contribution to economic development, human security, adaptation and regional solidarity, and they offer an important message in the lead-up to COP31: mobility can be part of proactive adaptation and resilience strategies, provided that people’s agency, dignity and human rights are respected.
Their value lies in the choices they create. Most people want to stay where they are for as long as they can, and support for staying should sit alongside the option of leaving.
Providing a migration pathway is also not the same thing as offering protection: none of these agreements says what happens to people who have to move suddenly after a disaster, or who cannot go home afterwards. Australia still has no specific visa designed for that situation, although some people may qualify for refugee status or complementary protection in certain circumstances.
Finally, the terms on which people move determine whether mobility helps or harms. If people are granted a secure legal status, have access to social supports, can bring their family with them, and have their qualifications recognised, then settlement is likely to be a far more positive and successful experience.
