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Please have a look at the regulations that have just been issued. https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2024L00327/latest/text. According to Schedule 1, para 1140(3)(c), you can apply if you are on a Subclass 010 Bridging A visa.

Hi Richard, Obviously not Natasha. But we have some numbers to 2022 that are correct in chapter two here https://devpolicy.org/publications/reports/Pacific-temporary-migrant-workers-Nov2023.pdf And there is Charlotte's great blog published just before Natasha's with some updated numbers, still 2023 though https://devpolicy.org/pacific-labour-mobility-over-the-last-year-continued-growth-20230808/ There isn't anything official online yet from DEWR as you note, as far as I am aware. I certainly can't find updated figures anywhere publicly yet. Best, Ryan

I fully support the idea because currently political interference does appear when national MP handle these funds .

Tony was always Kuria's sounding board and true rock. Kuria also has led a pioneering life. I worked with her in the YWCA when she first took on the YWCA Executive Director position. If possible, please send my love to Kuria.

There were some voices in Japan asking why the Crown Prince came to Defence Meeting in Japan. This article explains everything. Malo.

Hi Richard, my novice view on this issue of brain drain. Because Australia's minimum wage is much higher than most of the Pacific Island countries, the wage gap between those without a university or college going to the Labour Mobility Scheme is more likely to be higher relative to educated ones back home, exerting pressure on the educated population to migrate out of their countries, which also raises the possibility and fear of brain drains, especially in small island countries outside of PNG. Less educated people participating in labour mobility schemes are more likely to make more money in Australia than degree holders struggling back in the countries. Given the carrots, there should be some sticks to penalise such a huge wage gap. People are after money, so put reasonable sticks around money, and more carrots can have non-monetary forms such as skill development, etc.

Hi, I am Joao Freitas. I’ve been in Australia since 2019 till now and I am really interested. However I am bridging visa A holder.

For Papua new Guinea, police clearance certificates normally take a while. Hopefully the eight months grace period can be enough.

Hi Natasha, A really interesting article. I am trying to establish firm figures on the growth of PALM workers in Australia. You wrote for 2023: PNG received only 1,459 visas. What was your source? I have tried to get trend data from the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations in Australia and PALM in Port Moresby without much success. I don't doubt your data. I would like to provide a data source for the figure. Thanks, Richard

The age restriction 18-45 is already a barrier to those who have just turned 46 and are currently on the PALM scheme in Australia for one or two years now and will be there for 4 years. Will they be given an opportunity to apply as I am sure this visa will be of very high interest to them as well. Can there be special considerations for under 50 ? (Solomon Islands case).

What happens in the event the quota for country A is met, but the applicants fail to meet the post-selection process such as English language test, failure to secure a job, or character and health checks? Will there be a second (or third) rounds of random selection process to fill the quota? The post selection requirements, which seem easy to many, are actually difficult for a region where English is not the first language, have huge rural populations - most without formal IDs, and police and health clearance/checks combined which cost half of minimum wage (in PNG’s case).

Thank you for your comments, Paul. Definitely if the GDP deflator is only 2.4%, then GDP per capita growth in the Plan is positive, even given its high population growth target. This is not something analysts could have been expected to guess. It definitely should have been made explicit within the Plan. Indeed, that is one of our main points – that much greater clarity is needed around the Plan’s economic assumptions. But we also need to look at non-resource GDP, which we say in the blog should be the focus and which the <a href="https://www.thenational.com.pg/inflation-easing-treasurer/" rel="nofollow ugc">government has repeatedly said</a> is a much better indicator of living standards than total GDP. Since GDP per capita growth seemed to be negative in the Plan, we assumed the same for non-resource GDP especially given the three big resource projects. However, if GDP per capita growth is positive, we need to double-check what is being projected for non-resource GDP. Using Table 3.2, which you drew our attention to, annual average nominal non-resource GDP growth in the Plan between 2022 and 2027 is 7.5%. The Treasury deflator for this variable is 4.8% in the 2023 budget, so real non-resource GDP growth is 2.7%. So with the Plan’s population growth target of 4.8%, non-resource GDP per capita growth is negative. We are back with the conclusion that the Plan is projecting negative living standards. Yes, 4.8% is high as a population growth target, but it is the target in the Plan and we are assessing what it in the Plan. And even with a lower population growth, 2.7% real non-resource GDP growth could well translate into negative per capita GDP growth. The Plan is more pessimistic than Treasury regarding non-resource GDP, with the former giving nominal average growth over the 2022-2027 period of 7.5% for this variable and the latter 9.8% (2023 budget). This is odd, and too pessimistic. In fact, for the approximately 50% of GDP that excludes resources, agriculture, forestry, fishing and manufacturing the Plan is projecting negative real growth. It is not clear why as one would expect a construction boom with three new projects. Your additional insights have certainly been helpful and we have a better understanding of the Plan’s projections now. Now said, these new findings do support the original conclusions which is that the Plan is projecting declining living standards and that, more broadly, the economic analysis underpinning the Plan is weak. The numbers should have been scrutinised before and not only after the Plan was published. And, to repeat the other main point made in our blog, the idea in the Plan that aggregate imports should fall makes no sense.