Comments

Hi Grant Thanks for the response. On the evidence of actual practice - the criteria of backing up with 'cold hard Kina' you mention - there was no boom. The anti-corruption expenditure share of the budget fell in the first three years of the O'Neill government. By 2017, it had been cut by over a third. 'A lack of capacity' to deliver on 'political will' is not an issue here - higher shares were actually expended in both 2009 and 2011. So the O'Neill government early years appear to be very big on promises while actually cutting expenditure despite the capacity being present. Is this a boom? Not when tracing the 'cold hard Kina' trail. And is it a basis for saying the new Marape government is demonstrating less of a commitment? Maybe the 10% increase (from 0.3 to 0.33%) is just more realistic? Another interesting comparison will be the current UBS Inquiry and how it goes relative to the abandoned UBS Leadership Tribunal inquiry (and subsequent moves in senior personnel). With respect Paul

Hi Paul, Thanks for your comments. You are right, the graph presented in the blog shows that as a percentage of the budget spending reduces slightly during the O’Neill government’s first years in office. However, as you will see in the full paper, spending increased for key anticorruption agencies – the Auditor General’s Office and Ombudsman for example. Still, I think it is important to pay attention to allocations as a key indicator of a ‘boom’ for a few reasons. First, as we note in the paper, underspending can be a function of a lack of capacity as much as political will. Second, as you note we have not seen the actuals for the Marape period which means we cannot compare spending for these two governments. Third, allocations are one (but certainly not only) indication of intent (even if not followed through) and generally get the lion’s share of attention from media and policymakers. Having said this, in the paper and elsewhere - https://devpolicy.org/anti-corruption-and-the-2018-png-budget-20180214/ – we do examine the problem with the gap between allocations and spending. The O’Neill government did not get the ICAC bill through two Parliamentary readings, but did lay the legal groundwork for the ICAC. In the full paper, we note that the Marape has taken a number of positive anti-corruption measures. For example, the government has commissioned an inquiry into the UBS loan scandal, and appointed anti‐corruption activist MP Bryan Kramer as minister of the country's police force. We also note that O’Neill also set up Taskforce Sweep in his government’s first year, which was initially successful in investigating corruption. Taskforce Sweep was lauded at the time (a part of the boom period) before it was defunded (as a part of the ‘bust’). Will we see the same dynamic with the new Marape government? Too early to tell, but our analysis and that from elsewhere suggests policymakers and others should be looking out for a bust and be ready to respond to it if/when it comes. Best, Grant

This was an unprecedented situation created by the pandemic. Hence, at least some form of rescue agreements should be drafted by Australia and participating countries for incentives instead of giving more responsibility to Australia. For any emergency for that matter.

Spot on, David.

Thanks Grant and Husnia. The graph is interesting. Could you add to the analysis the trend based on actual expenditure, not just budget promises? Looking at actual government behaviour rather than promises appears to tell the opposite story - so one of "bust with minor boom" instead of "boom and bust". Specifically, and this is just looking at the graph, for the 2011 to 2012 period, there was no "boom" based on actual expenditure. Indeed, there was a reduction in actual expenditure from 0.4% to about 0.38%. This reduction in actual expenditure continued through to 2017 (with some bumps). So by 2017, it had fallen to about 0.25% - so a very large reduction of over one-third in anti-corruption funding as a share of the budget. And then it started to increase during the tail end years of the O'Neill government. So "boom and bust" on promises, "bust with minor boom" on the actual expenditure figures? Of course, we haven't as yet seen the "actuals" for the Marape Government. On legislation, did the O'Neill Government get the ICAC Bill through two successful Parliamentary votes? With respect Paul

Very interesting. Hope to see this economy revive and pick up once the travel bubble is opened.

Shabana, sorry about your friend but the only way for these Fijians to make it home is for flights to resume. And that's going to require tourism to fill those planes and get them on regular scheduled service again. Plus there are people stuck in Fiji who need to go their families in other countries. This pandemic isn't going to look any different a year from now. Just as it doesn't look any different from four months ago when we locked down. We can't stay in this no-travel configuration for another year. And Fiji's been pinning its hopes on this travel bubble. As I stated in this article, Australia wasn't/isn't ready. Fiji's wasting time reopening waiting for other countries to include it in a bubble (where it will be a complete afterthought). Fiji needs to control their own destiny and make a travel system that allows it to reopen immediately . . . or realize it will be in this same position a year from now (which is unsustainable).

This use of the multi stakeholder engagement strategy is clearly effective in mining and other resource related policy and program developments and it is also proving useful in humanitarian disaster response, where some civil society structure remains. In particular it is effective in that it can empower and facilitate women and other minority interests' participation. Without such engagement the long term or even short term success is limited.

Is Pngsdp in operation.

""Learning and adaptation" should be a very good step. Going through the financial narrative I learned that it will be hard to achieve the inclusive growth as recommended by UN 2030 Agenda because the Big Financial Actors although having issues new rules of the game, the didn't adapt the strategy. Why? There is more than one reason, the prevalent one is in the fact it should be lessened the dominant role of the finance in the economy. By the way, it is very strange that in changing time, economists, commentators and analysts don't use the theory of change. We did id: THE THEORY OF CHANGE APPLIED TO FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT http://reader.ilmiolibro.kataweb.it/v/1252660/the-theory-of-change-applied-to-finance-for-development_1268103

"DFAT had to a large extent delegated responsibility for the Pacific to AusAID". You would expect me to disagree, and I do. DFAT worked hand in glove with AusAID and I have the very best recollection of the collegiality of my AusAID colleagues. But just during my tenure of the job in DFAT, DFAT was the lead agency on our two big Pacific initiatives - RAMSI, of which it supplied the head, and the Enhanced Cooperation Programme in PNG. DFAT was lead agency on Forum issues, managed the response to the coup in Fiji and the riots in Tonga, and at an earlier stage than the above led the drive to get Bob Dunn into the SPC. We wrote the paper on compacts which formed the basis for Mr Downer's speech on that subject and was translated into PM Rudd's approach to the Pacific. We did initial work on labour mobility but that didn't get as far as we would have liked because of reluctance at the top levels of government. I could go on (and on), but you get the picture. In short, DFAT did not delegate responsibility for the Pacific to AusAID, although, as I hope I've made clear, we worked very closely with AusAID.

Thanks Moses for this article, an interesting read. I don't like the idea of the death penalty and appreciated some of the points you raised on why the death penalty won't deter crime.