Comments

Thanks Elisabeth. I should have credited Richard Moore with the GIZ idea. He recommended it in a <a href="https://acfid.asn.au/sites/site.acfid/files/Richard%20Moore%20-%20Speech%20at%20ACFID%20Conference.pdf" rel="nofollow">speech</a> to ACFID back in 2016. However, in his more recent <a href="https://devpolicy.org/publications/reports/DFAT-AusAIDIntegrationReview-FullVersion.pdf" rel="nofollow">review</a> of DFAT-AusAID integration, Richard has backed away from the idea. I'm still attracted to it. I do feel that the rapid turnover (individual and institutional) in our aid programs undermines efficiency and effectiveness. Moving away from bidding to dedicated providers seems to me a positive way forward, and a state-owned provider could help with that transition. But I certainly agree that there is a lot more to be analysed and written on this subject.

Thank you so much to Michelle for a very good preview of the current political development in PNG.We are all looking forward to the outcome of VONC soon if it is going to be held. However, in developing economies where Governments want to make too decisions for too many things or projects without developing a very successful project and using that as benchmark (model) for future developments will result in many dissatisfied stakeholders which will give room for many unforseen events. Further, in PNG culture, the longer a person is a leader or PM, personal ego and self turn be at upper hand than policy and government systems. This is probably in line with cultural big man system which is not healthy for sustainable government and this development. What citizens need to see and appreciate is for governments to develop very good policies and use that to develop a very successful project (a major project) in respective sector with all stakeholders fully satisfied. There is no need to rush and it is very important to win confidence of citizens first. Then, use that as a model for future projects. Governments are changed and formed based decisions on projects and others. It is interesting to watch the political developments and see who will continue stand up during the VONC. Otherwise, trend will continue in this country.

Thanks,for the comments and am still believed that opposition will remove Mr O'Neill from the prime minister. According to the statistics of this country falls from 22.5%to 5.3%.If Mr O'Neill sitting as the prime minister all economic will be like the selling places and also thinking of selling the country also.

Thank you Stephen and others for this interesting discussion thread, which I have followed with interest as a former long-term AusAID and DFAT senior aid program manager. There seems to be a consensus that facilities can offer gains in terms of efficiency, flexibility/responsiveness and innovation but DFAT's own independent review acknowledges that facilities are complex to manage: "Far from enabling DFAT staff to adopt a less ‘hands-on’ approach, facilities require intensive and ongoing DFAT oversight, engagement and management of both the development content and the delivery process.High quality aid policy development, strategic programming and effective aid delivery depend on fostering and retaining staff who can: engage in deep, content-oriented policy dialogue with partner governments; establish and manage contracts with delivery partners that enable rather than constrain effective aid delivery; and make quality choices about activity focus (and how/when these need to change) that optimise results (effectiveness and value for money). DFAT has some of this, but not enough – in either breadth or depth." The integration of AusAID and DFAT resulted in the departure of the majority of AusAID's internationally recruited sector specialist staff, who previously provided high level technical guidance and oversight especially of more complex programs. A lot of experienced program managers also left and many others understandably moved fully into the diplomatic stream to optimise their career options. Those that are left or have been newly inducted increasingly find their ability to devote time to program management squeezed by the core public service duty of providing advice and briefing to Ministers and senior officers. DFAT has tried to remedy this situation by insourcing external technical expertise through panels or standing offers and by expanding the use of mechanisms such as facilities. Whilst this may have benefits in drawing in fresh expertise and new ideas, it has also major risks - most important of all, in my view, the erosion long-term of DFAT's ability to engage in that "deep, content-oriented policy dialogue with partner governments" the review says is crucial. As Erin Anderson noted in her post, it is critical that DFAT provide a good 'brain' to steer programs in dialogue with partner governments and other stakeholders- whether those programs are delivered through old fashioned 'body shops', facilities, individual projects, sector-based programs, multilateral or NGO partnerships or otherwise. DFAT can do this either through its own staff, through facility/contractor managers, through independent external technical advice, or a combination of these. However there is a 'moral hazard' risk of contractor capture, in DFAT staff relying too heavily on advice from a contractor's own managers or technical specialists to help steer large and complex programs, without independent technical advice and support. This can increase the potential for proliferation of activities and poor coherence and fragmentation over time (the 'Christmas tree' syndrome), as arguably contractors are commercially incentivised to increase activities and inputs. Over-reliance on contractor advice by inexperienced and over-stretched government program managers can also lead to contractors influencing positive performance assessments for programs they manage (the 'dog judging the dog show' syndrome). The recommendation of the DFAT review for independent quality assurance for all complex facilities seems to be a good way to mitigate these risks. Another major risk of facilities, particularly multi-sector facilities, is that they can be established relatively rapidly in pursuit of ill-defined higher level outcomes, without sufficient up-front investment in understanding sector context and in developing some kind of agreed road-map or trajectory towards the higher level outcomes (eg at least a set of notional benchmarks or 'stepping stones'). This takes time and resource investment in joint analysis and design with partners, to enable joint progress monitoring, discussion and problem-solving along the way. That is not to deny the benefit of adaptation, seizing political opportunities and exploratory and innovative approaches during implementation, but to better enable such decisions to be made consciously and explicitly, rather than by 'finding the way as we go'. The example cited by Jacqui de Lacy of Australian aid training midwives and providing medicines to birthing facilities in West Timor without being able to address the lack of water in these facilities is a good case in point: rather than something to be 'fixed' retrospectively through a facility, I would suggest that is something that good old-fashioned sector analysis and donor dialogue should have picked up and addressed even before any project design. In arguing for facilities, Colin Adams in his post rather glibly states that 'transformational development outcomes are not achieved through simple, sector-specific programs'. Yet, like our own, most partner governments structure their own development plans, budgets and institutions around sectors, as do most major donors including the multilateral banks. So a strong understanding of sector context remains critical to 'transformational development'...and neither are sector-specific programs simple! In Tonga, where Australia has supported a long-standing health sector support program, agreed benchmarks and outcomes for the program have included among others: a continuation of increased spending on health as a proportion of the overall budget (and within that an increased allocation to public health); development of a national non-communicable disease strategy and media campaign; development and implementation of increased excise duty on tobacco and unhealthy food; infrastructure investments to improve environmental health (eg water supplies); and expansion of rheumatic disease screening and treatment to all children in Tonga. These are hardly minor achievements and were based on a joint program design with the Tongan government based on extensive analysis, guided by DFAT and independently-contracted health sector experts and supported by high-level annual performance reviews and discussions between the two governments. As it happens (based on reading DFAT's latest annual performance report on the Tonga aid program), it seems that due to disasters, changes in senior personnel and other factors, the Tongan government's implementation on this program is faltering - and may well need supplementation through a facility or similar contractor-led modality! My argument is not with facilities (or any other particular modality), but with the need for DFAT to be able to devote the specialised resources needed to manage these and other complex programs well, in order for Australia's aid to be effective and to have impact at scale and at the level of policy. From discussions with colleagues in other parts of government, DFAT is also far from alone in having lost or downgraded program management expertise. This seems to have been a broader trend caused by the ongoing shrinking of the federal public service and the prioritisation of 'policy'(more often than not briefing needed by ministers or senior officials to address the growing demands of the media cycle) over implementation in government over the last decade or more. I would argue the need to address the challenge of ensuring the "high quality policy development, strategic programming and effective delivery" and to "engage in deep, content-oriented policy dialogue with partners" cited by DFAT's review extends more broadly across government- witness the state of service delivery to our own indigenous people, in addressing homelessness, in environmental management and in a range of other policy areas. How the professional management expertise needed to manage complex facilities and other programs is best re-established in DFAT (and arguably elsewhere) seems to me to be a crucial policy issue for the future effectiveness of Australia's aid program...and more broadly for effective service delivery across government. Options seem to include establishing specialist technical, research and implementing agencies in government (a la ACIAR and GTZ); through private sector and NGO outsourcing (delivery) and in-sourcing (management and technical advice); through partnerships with research institutions, NGOs, international agencies or a combination of these. In relation to DFAT and the management of facilities specifically, the recommendations in the independent review seem to be a good place to start.

Overall a very positive and detailed report on "in the community" feelings. Koo Wee Rup is a major area of SWP participation and has been so over many years now so you hit bulls eye on location Rochelle.

Same old story without an end in sight. This is PNG Politics. Almost very predictable.

A very intetesting post, many thanks Stephen. I'd be interested to hear from those familiar with the GIZ model. My understanding is that it still implements projects with defined timeframes and budgets so it would not necessarily be more efficient approach than the managing contractor approach. I'd also be interested in any evidence of efficiency or effectiveness gains from facilities versus other models. The aid stakeholder survey gives us informed opinions but triangulating these findings with some cost-benefit analyses would be useful. Given the changes within DFAT over the last 5 years, an evidence-informed discussion about how best to deliver the aid program is very timely.

I wonder if all the people of Papua New Guinea, especially those ones that are in rural areas have gained some benefits from hosting APEC. In my observation so far, i've come to realized that the people in rural areas are at least benefiting in terms of road, education and health services which are the three key areas of development. Why are the people in rural areas suffering and being deprived? part of the wealth that was used to host the APEC also belongs to the people residing in rural areas. Investing only in urban areas is unfair.

There are some great observations in your article. However, your visit to only "one" region of PNG where you pretty much based your point of view of the whole of PNG from explains how limited some of your observations are. I still think PNG is part of the Pacific Island nations in many ways. We have much more in common than differences! Cheers

An interesting perspective by Chief Ila Geno given PNG's current political leadership turbulence. You continue to inspire our leadership ambitions.

I am indeed so humble to salute the initiative undertaken to change and influence the youth through leadership training.There is a saying going"To liberate the nation you liberate the person".

Article is misconceived. PNG is another decolonised country similar to its sister Pacific islands all connected through the same ocean. We either pursue our interest in the global arena in collective representation with the rest of the Pacific islands, or we use power of attraction to maximise on national interest similarly to other Pacific islands. In that same ideology/approach (PNG or Pacific islands ), we deal with our challenges as a region. The only distinction one could draw is that PNG has a huge land mass that gives essence to our land resources, and a huge population of diversity in cultural and traditional practice and foremost have the biggest market relative to its population. Otherwise, I would say PNG is a unique and fortunate Pacific island country.