Comments

O'Neil certainly has been very adroit in maintaining his grip on power and dealing with any attempts at removing him from the leadership. In many ways it is similar to the recent NA hegemony with Somare at the forefront of that leadership group and ruling with a grand coalition.... He has in effect continued the de-parliamentarization started by Somare and his party (check Matthew Shuggarts blog for some discussion on this) No engagement with Parliament is probably critical to such politicians who yearn to such periods of uninterrupted rule. For me as I read this article my gut reaction is who cares... In this day and age and with the requirements for developing and growing our country how does being a skilfully politician "advance the civilisation"? Both Somare and O'Neil had enough opportunity to build this nation up and take us to a different level of freedom and property... However despite the record budgets not much has changed in rural PNG where the bulk of the population lives. It's interesting having this article to read as we think about the leadership style and traits of LKY of Singapore however no comparison is possible.

Hi Vinny Thanks for this and especially for the examples of governments that do purchase insurance.

Dear Keston, Thank you for your comment. While I agree that terms such as good governance can be nebulous, I don't think the problem is one of epistemology, but rather definition. And in the Solomons case the definition implicit in my analysis is not particularly problematic: the country's state is not capable of providing basic public services such as health and eduction which would improve Solomon Islanders' welfare; nor is it doing a good job of promoting economic development (either through some form of industrial policy of the sort that Kahn or Rodrik might approve of, or through a more Washington Consensus type approach). These complaints are not mine alone. As I emphasised in the first blog post in the series, Solomon Islanders themselves freely express their frustrations with the governance the country experiences. I am sorry if my posts on Solomon Islands electoral politics and political economy strike you as negative and paternalistic. In terms of the negativity, it is hard to be too positive given the ongoing challenges the country is facing and the clinetelist trap its politics appear to be stuck in. However, you will note in the final point above that I do emphasise a the encouraging rise of new civil society groups and express my hope that they may hold some of the solutions to the challenges the country faces. I have also in previous posts noted the significant achievement that the country has made in holding relatively good elections. In a similar vein, I am sorry that my blog posts on Solomon Islands seem paternalistic to you. However, I would contend that is not really paternalistic to argue that "aid can’t transform Solomon Islands. Its problems are domestic, born of its own political economy, and ultimately this is where solutions will have to come from too. For the time being though, aid can help: it can hold things together, it can improve people’s lives, and it can enhance, in its own small way, the space for change to grow from within." I would suggest that rather than being paternalistic, I am pointing out that the agency for change here lies foremost with Solomon Islanders themselves, not outside powers. Thank you for your suggestion regarding Mushtaq Kahn. I have learnt a lot from reading his work on political settlements. But I do not think -- as you appear to suggest -- that the problem in Solomons case is that external actors are imposing the wrong ideals of good governance on the country's politics. For what it's worth I think the Solomons case fits in quite well with Kahn's typology as a kind of non-developmental clientelist state. The real issue is what might possibly shift it out of this equilibrium. My guess/hope is that will be the rise of a new form of domestic civil society which allows the country to overcome the collective action problems inherent in trying to move to more programmatic politics. I am open to other suggestions though. Thanks again for your comment. Terence

Thank you Dan and Tess, It is great to hear stories of businesses getting back on their feet from those in Vanuatu. Thank you also for your efforts to publicise the impact of Pam - the various blogs written by Tess (one less than 24 hours after the cyclone hit), and photos taken by Dan that were featured by newspapers around the world (Dan's photo essay is available <a href="http://pacificpolicy.org/2015/03/cyclone-pam-in-pictures-2/" rel="nofollow">here</a>). Dan - just to clarify one possible misunderstanding: the RBV forecasts were made prior to Cyclone Pam and have not been updated. So I'm sure the RBV will also downgrade its estimates of future growth (as done by ADB), but those revised estimates have not yet been made public.

Hi Ilan, Thanks for the comment. Your points are well taken. I'm glad you emphasise the distinction between impacts on GDP and well-being It's an important point to make, as I intimated in the footnote. Your more specific argument, that spending on infrastructure reconstruction comes at the expense of spending in other areas, I think emphasises the important role that donors could play in supporting reconstruction. Even where funds are not directed specifically to reconstruction activities, broader support from donors to government - such as in the form of budget support requested recently by the Vanuatu Govt - can useful support reconstruction. We will have a better indication as to the resources Australia will provide in support of reconstruction in about a month when the 2015-16 Australian budget is released.

Dear Terrence, This is a very interesting piece. Notwithstanding what the reality may seem like, I think that there needs to be a more nuanced approach to understanding governance in developing countries , especially ones that have been subjected to conflicts. I am originally from Trinidad and Tobago , which is also the empirical focus of my phd work, and it is very difficult Sometimes to not see things as negavtive given the quantum of resources the country has and the present state of development. Deploying terms like 'good governance' and not scrutinizing their institutional and epistemological origins lead to the types of conclusions you've seemed to have drawn in this case. I can't help but sense the very paternalistic tone emerging from the writing; and the tenor seems very negative. I think this largely stems from the conceptual underpinnings of your examination of the Solomon Islands case. The term political economy seems to be used in a negative manner, whereas it actually represents the emoirical reality in all countries as they all have a political economy. Political economy in fact interrogates the historical, socio-cultural, political and economic processes that underpin their respective trajectories and it is neither negative or positive but just is the reality. If you would permit me to direct you to work undertaken by Mushtaq Khan, a professor of economics at SOAS, University of London, where I am currently doing my PhD. Khan is known for developing the concept "political settlements" defined as the distribution of organizational and political power between competing groups and classes. I think the problem emerges when one seeks to compare the empirical situation of a developing country with the criteria and requirements of the good governance. It is a serious mismatch and Khan and others outline why this is the case in their work. In fact along with Rodrik, their work suggest that "the evidence supports the claim that the most persistent types of state failure occur when institutions fail because of an inappropriate match between internal political settlements and the institutions and interventions through which states attempt to accelerate transformation and growth (Khan 1995; Rodrik, 2004)" (cited in Khan, 2004) It might be useful to take a look. I'm happy to discuss further and even explore our common interests in small island developing states. Best regards, Keston

Hi Tess, I agree that insurance is an underutilized part of the disaster risk management toolkit in the Pacific, and that PCRAFI is a useful experiment to look at the specific risk of emergency cash. It's not unheard of, however, for governments to consider blanket insurance coverage or protection schemes - although it is less prevalent in developing countries (Turkey has an earthquake insurance scheme; advanced countries like New Zealand's EQC and Japan's earthquake insurance scheme are also good examples where countries negotiate bulk re-insurance deals for blanket coverage). That said, that type of insurance is likely to be prohibitively expensive for small island developing economies, especially those in the Pacific, without some form of pooling, reinforcing your post's basic premise.

Tess, it is really is frightning to comprehend now figures are involved. Life is all about figures and thanks for sharing your analysis. I would very much hope the government take this much in depth analysis to their grasps. I would hate to think the countries future potentially appears to be shady for the economy. JB

Hi Sonja It is commendable of you to take time and deliberate a detailed response. You mention Rowan Callick's article at the end. Perhaps he should be alerted to your response so he can cross-check some of these facts that appear to be in dispute. Regards, Bal

Denis, I also look forward to reading your book. In 1997, with Bougainville slowly recovering from destruction and theft of property, I was involved in attempting to secure new two way radios for communities right across the region. Isolation, poor roads, lawlessness in some areas, challenged health and education services made the radios almost essential. Australian Aid, so we were told by officials, was not possible because the radios were to be placed in community headquarters which were church run institutions or parish centres. It seemed that there was a fear that the support would be used for evangelical purposes or at least might appear to be a contribution by Australia to evangelical endeavour. If there is a concern that the values of the religions, which provide communities with services, do not align with mainstream Western development values then there may need to be a review of Western development values. We have seen this throughout the history of PNG, officials or evangelists who see the need for local alignment with mainstream Western values as a prerequisite to receiving the cargo. There can be good reasons for this but when it is directed at a religion and not state it would seem unfair. If this principle were applied to secular institutions development workers would need to face the probability that they are providing support to institutions and officials showing very little practical signs of alignment with mainstream Western practice. Lawrence Stephens

Hi Matt, Thanks for producing this first assessment of the numbers involved. I think you rightly identified and highlighted a few key issues: (1) the disaster's financial damages will be very large; (2) aid is not going to be sufficient to plug the funding-for-reconstruction gap (if we can rely on past experience); (3) tourism sector is very vulnerable to both damage to infrastructure and changes in perceptions - experience seems to suggest the sector takes years to recover from similar shocks (see for example Christchurch in NZ or the Hawaiian Island of Kauai). You have included in your assessment the financial damage to stocks (the immediate destruction of assets), and flow (the decrease in GDP growth), but you have not included the direct impact on people, in terms of their well-being and livelihoods. As a classic example of the Broken Window Fallacy (from Bastiat's 1850 essay), disasters do result in short-term boost to economic activity during the period of reconstruction, but human welfare is clearly decreased by the need to spend precious resources on the reconstruction of physical assets. Research shows that in poorer countries and households this need usually comes at the expense of spending on non-food expenditure, such as education and health. As such, it can lead to long-term adverse impacts that can indeed "take Vanuatu back a decade of development." The key to preventing that, it seems, is externally-supported aggressive and rapid reconstruction. The Pacific Insurance Pilot Program (PCRAFI) and the mostly in-kind bi-lateral assistance from Australia and New Zealand are clearly vastly insufficient for that to occur. The international community's attention span is typically quite short, so it is also essential to speed up this process.

Hi Sonja, Thanks for taking the time to make this detailed response. I've fixed the typos you pointed out, and will leave the issues of substance to the author. Just a point not about this comment but to everyone considering contributing to this discussion: we very much welcome your comments, but, as per our blog and comments policy, we won't publish personal attacks. Regards, Stephen.