Comments

Thanks for the post Stephen. The evaluation of the Capacity Building Service Centre in PNG may also assist in thinking through the value of community mobilisation as a strategy. In particular, the evaluation identified the importance of ‘a sense of responsibility for service outcomes’ as a key mediating variable between capacity (or skills and motivation) and discretionary behaviour, persistence, innovation and ultimately, performance by service providers in constrained settings. These findings were published in a Health Systems Strengthening focus issue of the PNG Medical Journal in 2009. Also of relevance, is the work of Alice Street who looks at governance in PNG from an anthropological perspective. The article: Seen by the state: Bureaucracy, visibility and governmentality in a Papua New Guinean hospital suggests that as a result of the ‘absent state’ and the particular PNG social construction, instruments of governance do not operate as we would anticipate – connecting providers as a ‘second tier’ expression of government, but rather as a means to make the providers visible to those that govern. I think this is a very apt insight – and would bolster an argument for the potentially efficacy of community mobilisation as a means of reorienting this focus, improving governance and resiliently improving health.

I agree with you, Stephen, that a new approach is worth trying. Perhaps, however, the evidence for doing so might be stronger than you suggest. Do the 2 studies you cite (as others have done) - from Uganda and India - really cast any major doubt on what you are proposing? Were the respective interventions similar enough to warrant comparison? Is the Indian context really comparable to that in Uganda, and are comparisons across sectors valid? At least some of these seem open to question. For example, Pritchett has drawn attention to the fuzzy lines of accountability of VECs in India, which typically oversee more than one school. Yet in the intervention in India, according to the authors of the study 'no attempt was made to introduce new institutions' - even though VECs seem to have some significant flaws as institutions able to provide accountability. Further, in the Indian intervention, as far as I can see, no attempt was made to value local knowledge about why schools were failing. Apart from the different contexts, the Indian intervention in fact had a series of quite major differences with that in Uganda, not least in terms of how accountability and transparency worked, and the types of agencies involved. One of these is particularly important, in my view. In the Uganda intervention, it seems that local knowledge about health service failure was valued in a variety of ways, and used to effect health reforms. A recent study has showed that development outcomes from this intervention have been sustained some years later. As you say, mobilisation is not guaranteed to succeed. However, the comparison between these 2 studies seems wide open to question. What do you think?

Stephen I think you are absolutely right to note the potential of transparency and social mobilisation to address some of these issues in PNG. However I think it is also worth noting the conclusions of the <a href="http://www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/20121024-appp-synthesis-report-development-as-a-collective-action-problem" rel="nofollow">Africa Power and Politics research</a> (see especially pages 68-71) which suggests that social accountability of this type rarely works unless there is also 'top-down' pressure for change, and that such initiatives 'go with the grain' of local politics. This also suggests that donors and NGOs need to be very careful how they are involved if they are not to inadvertently undermine the very changes they wish to encourage by depoliticising the process, or by turning them into 'projects'.

This is detailed and well elaborated, i do appreciate the effort put. I also want to highlight the challenges faced by particularly govt entities in tracking performance over time. Despite the several mechanisms in place to try and link different institutions M & E systems, i personally realize that there is still a lot of wastage of resources in terms of duplication of systems. Needless to mention the overlaps in mandates of different entities/ institutions, which in my view is rather political, the technical wing has also resorted to experiments, trail and error in a bid to re-invent the M &E phenomenon ignoring the other more effective and efficient alternatives of building synergies and working with what is in place. This is an issue that still requires urgent attention.

I totally agree with marie mondu. The church run institutions in health services are doing well in providing maternal/child health care, immunisation etc.. despite limited funds, however government run health services are failing in providing services to most of the rural population. When funds run dry up they slow down services. Rachy B (PMGH) PNG.

Just a Quick Point: I have just come back from my first time working in a middle income country, having previously worked only in LDCs. It is immediately obvious that that gap between our resources and theirs was smaller than in LDCs. But the gap between our knowledge and theirs is even smaller.

My partner told me about this blog and I am glad I have seen it. I had the chance to be both an Austraining and AVI volunteer and I can confirm from my experience that AVI provided much more support to me throughout my assignment.

I would suggest that focussing excessively on skill transfer methods would neither make a person skilled at this (every teaching graduate realises this pretty quickly and pre-departure training is rarely more than two weeks long) nor would it be particularly helpful if it could. The research on cross-cultural effectiveness instead points to skills such as observation & listening, patience, open-mindedness, self-criticism and the ability to laugh at oneself, and other less technical skills. While having a professional skillset is important, volunteers who are encouraged to rush in and transfer skills (one-directional) immediately are more liable to make terrible mistakes than those encouraged to take sufficient time to learn the local culture, including the workplace culture, and be accepted in their host community. Development outcome boxes might not be so quickly ticked in the first months, but the sustainability and appropriateness of the efforts afterwards make up for that. The agencies which have been doing this since the 50s, such as AVI and Palms, are well aware of this, though there may be legitimate questions about pressures from impatient donors conflicting with a less forceful development model. Of course it also raises questions about the value of short-term placements, particularly for first-time volunteers.

Hi Joseph, Thanks very much for the thoughts (and thanks Cori for posting) I agree with most of your comments. Independent regulation certainly isn't the only issue affecting performance. Also important is the skill base of an organisation, accountability for performance (and clear organisational objectives/targets), internal controls etc. Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure these factors, and incorporate them into analysis of the kind above. I do think that as utilities are corporatised, independent regulation will become more important, given the tendency for excessively low tariffs in the region. Regional support for utility regulation of the kind in the East Caribbean makes sense in theory, and exists to some extent with the good work of organisations like PPA. But I suspect substantive moves towards regulation at a regional level in the Pacific will be hindered at the political level. On causality - you're right, and unfortunately the data don't allow for anything more than correlation to be established. There clearly are other factors at play as well, not just independent regulation. I would argue that in the case of the Fiji Electricity Authority, substantive reform happened before (truly) independent regulation was put in place (ie early 2000s). That said, the increasing role of the Commerce Commission (the independent regulator) has had a positive impact, enabling refurshbishment of power plants (eg half-life refurbishment of Wailoa) and much-needed investment in renewable power. Thanks again

Many thanks for your comment. The Australian Volunteers for International Development <a href="http://www.ausaidvolunteers.gov.au/" rel="nofollow">Annual Progress Report</a> 2011-2012 has the results of the Orima Research Survey of Returned Volunteers reported on page 7. Between July 2011 and June 2013, Austraining has mobilised 1148 Australian Volunteers for International Development. Of that number, only six volunteers returned early citing the reason of assignment mismatch for their return. Of the early returns, the majority of volunteers (85%) site their reasons for returning early as the following: • Assignment outcomes completed • Personal Reasons • Study/employment • Health Issues

It's great working with you Matthew, putting this article together. I received a number of encouraging and insightful comments via email and had some very engaging discussion on this topic. I would like to share feedback from Joseph Mayhew who would also appreciate your thoughts: Thanks Matt, John and Cori for the interesting blog and for starting a discussion on an important topic in the Pacific energy sector. It's heartening to see the data from the benchmarking study being used to delve into and analyse issues in the sector. Pacific power utility performance is mixed across the board, and while I support the thrust of your analysis I do have a few comments and musings: - In addition to Fiji, Vanuatu, and Tonga, I note that Samoa also has a regulator in the electricity sector. This may not have been in place when the benchmarking was done. Having previously only regulated telecommunications, the Office of the Regulator now is responsible for electricity too. - I think the point you make about ‘outsourcing specialised functions for tariff determination’ is important. If there is support for more extensive tariff regulation in the Pacific power sector, a regional support programme may be viable and appropriate. I don't think it is realistic to expect numerous small regulators, with often limited capacity, to provide high-quality and quite specialised functions. As there is a lot of commonality in their roles, support for regulators through one of the regional agencies or programmes may be worth considering. - That said, once the appropriate methodologies to determine electricity tariffs are established, well understood in the sector, and ideally quite transparent, the regulator's monthly tasks can be quite mechanistic. This suggests that it is vitally important that a suitable foundation is established for the regulator to be effective. This has to include clarity on the roles, relationships, and responsibilities between the government, the utility, and regulator. The relationship is often fraught at the best of times, but it seems to me that this is often influenced by ambiguity of roles and mandate, and perhaps a lack of appreciation about value of having a regulator, rather than any necessary or fundamental conflict. - As you indicate, an emerging issue is of private sector independent power producers bringing in generation competition. The role of the regulator varies significantly if, in addition to regulating retail tariffs, they also have to have a view on wholesale or offtake prices under a Power Purchase Agreement with an independent power producer. This can add an additional layer of complexity and potential confusion. Again, it comes down to being clear what is, and what is not, within regulators' mandates. - I don’t think it is necessarily correct that having a regulator removes political influence in establishing tariffs. Electricity tariffs increases from a low and often subsidised base, even when commercially justified, can be perceived as problematic. - I know you don't go into causality, but I do wonder to what extent the higher performance of the regulated utilities is really down to tariff regulation. Is it a case of correlation and not causality? In some cases, even though there is a regulator there remains political influence in tariff setting, and in other cases high performance may be also supported by historic relationships and arrangements with parent companies. I have no doubt that tariff regulation can encourage commercial practice and sound decision-making that can lead to better performance, but I guess my point is only to suggest that isolating the regulator-factor is probably quite difficult, especially as there is sometimes a mismatch between the regulator’s role in theory and in practice. Thanks again for the useful article, Best regards Joseph

Colin, I believe that you are correct that the wage disparity gives an incentive to work in other countries. I also believe that for every expat in all the various fields, two PNGians should be trained in the expats country of origin. This could be a component of the aid provided by those countries. Steve Day puts it nicely but does not take it far enough "The greatest training tool I ever found was to send them to Australia to work in their trades for a few months. Gave them the opportunity to work with people who were not wantoks, wairas or any of the other tribalists, which I believe are impediments to success that they are constantly attacked by in PNG". The dreaded wantok system explains why people are more productive out of PNG. The wantok system can equally be a path to riches or more often a slippery slide to mediocrity. Tony Flynn