Comments

From Satish Chand on Development and the 2019 election: the partisan divide
Thanks for this very informative, and succinct, post Stephen. My guess is that the first two issues, i.e. those relating to aid and refugees, are hardly vote grabbing issues for the public. So not surprising that the campaign thus far has swept both these issues under the carpet. It is the next national budget that will 'reveal the money' dedicated to these priorities. And if the economy decelerates then we will see cuts in both aid and the refugee intake.
From Michael Kabuni on PNG government struggling to stay intact
Hi Henry, you have documented the recent developments well. I'm wondering whether one of the "posts" that gave way might be the reduction of DSIP/PSIP funds from K10 million for open MPs and K5 million x number of open electorates for the governors, to about K2 million. The court ruled the amendments that reduced sitting days, numbers required to sign the motion, etc in 2015, but it took another four years for MPs to leave PNC in large numbers. In previous years MPs such as Basil, Juffa, and Namah accused government of withinholding their funds, and also using it to attract and maintain large numbers in the government coalition. These funds have greatly diminished.
From Quimiguay gropu on Solid waste management in Papua New Guinea
Solid waste management is truly a concern in these two cities and other centers as well. Really uncontrolled waste disposal is becoming a norm in everywhere and Port Moresby is already being affected by this.
From Michael Kabuni on Changing prime ministers in PNG: does party size matter?
My opinion is, the Supreme Court will rule even section 63 of OLIPPAC as unconstitutional. Remember in 2010, it ruled that sections preventing MPs from voting against their party's position in parliament, or voting against the PM in a vote of no confidence having supported him after election, as unconstitutional. I guess the only reason why section 63 of OLIPPAC (which states that only party with majority after elections can form the government) is still active is because it was not one of the provisions raised for interpretation by the Supreme Court in 2010. Had it been raised, it would have been ruled unconstitutional together with the other provisions that were ruled unconstitutional. In it's ruling, the Supreme Court stated that such restrictions takes away citizen's fundamental rights under section 50 of the Constitution. Preventing individual MPs or party with small numbers does the same thing too. With this precedence set, section 63 may be ruled the same way. If another amendment is made, as you suggest, that can be contested in court.
From Osbourne Karmie on Changing prime ministers in PNG: does party size matter?
Am thinking now that PM has advised the new Attorney General to review the OLIPAC. They may amend it to favor the PNC rulling party. By way of adding a new section similar to section 63 but for VONC, must comes from a party with large numbers. PM has passed so many controversial laws in his term than any other government in history to favor his Government.
From Lisa Hilli on Papua New Guinea is not Pasifika
I'm curious to know your definition of Pasifika Martyn? You allude to it in your text, but do you know the origin of this term and how it's use came about? There are many labels for nations and regions in Oceania that are not of our languages or ways of identifying. I'm with Epeli - "we have to search for appropriate names for common identities. That are more accomodating, inclusive and flexible than what we have today." Yes Pasifika may not be relevant for people from the Highlands region of Papua New Guinea, particularly when the origin of Pasifika evolved largely from the Samoan and Tongan diaspora who migrated to Aotearoa and chose to identify themselves as Pasefika / Pasifika. Did the people of Papua New Guinea choose this name for themselves as their country or did our colonisers? What about Melanesia? An anthropological term which has derogatory racial connotations. What I admire about Pasifika nations is that most of the names of their Island States are of their own or closely related languages; Samoa, Tonga, Tokelau, Niue, Viti (Fiji) Hawaii, Rapa Nui, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tahiti etc. I vividly remember being in utter disbelief when my Tolai mother told me that the name of the island I was born on was called New Britain! It's great that a 'Pasifika' party has sparked your questioning about nationhood and regional identity. I think it's important to seriously consider and question the validity of continuing to have colonial associations and history associated with name of Papua New Guinea. Fossil fuel extraction and exploitation economy days are numbered. How will PNG's economy survive then and support it's people? Your tone in this article reeks of privilege and lacks empathy toward fellow Papua New Guinean's who have already been impacted by climate change in the Carteret Islands, who relocated to mainland Bougainville over 10 years ago, with no financial aid from the PNG government. In regards to that Pasifika party in Goroka, maybe those who attended weren't in a privileged position such as yourself to own a sulu or any other Pasifika clothing. Maybe that was the reason you won the prize?
From Jon Fraenkel on Political developments in Papua New Guinea in a historical context
Nice article, Michelle, especially on power shifts in the southern Highlands. As you rightly say the ‘seeming political volatility in earlier years may have been an important mechanism in preventing power from becoming entrenched in the hands of a few big men’.
From Dolly Guise on Political developments in Papua New Guinea in a historical context
In my mind I keep thinking about Vietnam and Papua New Guinea (PNG). I ask myself how is it that Vietnam went through a shocking war in the 1960s through to the 1970s and yet she is way ahead in economic development (or is she?) and appears to be politically (as in governance) stable (or is she?). Papua New Guinea on the other hand has not been through a shocking war and yet is no where as advanced as Vietnam. What is it? Why is this so? Does the progress of Vietnam from shocking bombings, gorilla warfare to where she is today have more to do with the people of Vietnam (once thoroughly colonized and for a much longer period than Papua New Guinea) who are industrious and more used to just chipping away at getting ahead than some of the people of Papua New Guinea? I would really appreciate an article (or a series of articles) that looks at both Papua New Guinea and Vietnam - look at both these countries critically and without being politically correct to one or the other. I read too many articles on Papua New Guinea as coming out screaming of political correctness (PC). For the sake of Papua New Guinea be truthful and cut out the PC. Also include looking critically at both indigenous societies. If local cultures of both societies have to come in for critical examination, do so. No PC. PNG is now 40 plus years old. Surely, we should be further in Development than we are today? What are the real issues keeping PNG down? If foreign corporations and individual business people have to be critically examined, do so. Mercilessly. Does Vietnam face the same massive corruption issues as PNG? If not, why not. If so, how does she handle this? How does Vietnam handle Development and foreign corporations who almost always use the international market fluctuations as an excuse for low prices for a commodity once the corporation has got its tax free profit contracts in place from the host country? As I see it, PNG has major problems but briefly the 4 major ones are: 1. Gross political corruption coupled with lack of good and honorable governance (both formal and informal), 2. Large corporations taking profits out of the country during their tax free honeymoon period, 3. the lack of an industrious culture within communities and 4. Constitutionally and culturally locked-in landownership. Too simple? Probably. Then someone in the Australian National University (they are the ones that do most of the writing with huge doses of PC) or UPNG should get her/his act together and throw some intelligent light on these issues - most particularly for PNG's sake. Australia should be glad of one important point:- PNG has not had a bloody political revolution in the streets. This is something that a lot of Australians said would happen within a few years of PNG Independence. Well it hasn't happened. Thank goodness for PNG's intelligence, this happens through the VONC.
From Stephen Howes on The problem with facilities, and aid
Thanks Elisabeth. I should have credited Richard Moore with the GIZ idea. He recommended it in a <a href="https://acfid.asn.au/sites/site.acfid/files/Richard%20Moore%20-%20Speech%20at%20ACFID%20Conference.pdf" rel="nofollow">speech</a> to ACFID back in 2016. However, in his more recent <a href="https://devpolicy.org/publications/reports/DFAT-AusAIDIntegrationReview-FullVersion.pdf" rel="nofollow">review</a> of DFAT-AusAID integration, Richard has backed away from the idea. I'm still attracted to it. I do feel that the rapid turnover (individual and institutional) in our aid programs undermines efficiency and effectiveness. Moving away from bidding to dedicated providers seems to me a positive way forward, and a state-owned provider could help with that transition. But I certainly agree that there is a lot more to be analysed and written on this subject.
From Jacob Sinne on Political developments in Papua New Guinea in a historical context
Thank you so much to Michelle for a very good preview of the current political development in PNG.We are all looking forward to the outcome of VONC soon if it is going to be held. However, in developing economies where Governments want to make too decisions for too many things or projects without developing a very successful project and using that as benchmark (model) for future developments will result in many dissatisfied stakeholders which will give room for many unforseen events. Further, in PNG culture, the longer a person is a leader or PM, personal ego and self turn be at upper hand than policy and government systems. This is probably in line with cultural big man system which is not healthy for sustainable government and this development. What citizens need to see and appreciate is for governments to develop very good policies and use that to develop a very successful project (a major project) in respective sector with all stakeholders fully satisfied. There is no need to rush and it is very important to win confidence of citizens first. Then, use that as a model for future projects. Governments are changed and formed based decisions on projects and others. It is interesting to watch the political developments and see who will continue stand up during the VONC. Otherwise, trend will continue in this country.
From Aigir Blo Yauro on Political developments in Papua New Guinea in a historical context
Thanks,for the comments and am still believed that opposition will remove Mr O'Neill from the prime minister. According to the statistics of this country falls from 22.5%to 5.3%.If Mr O'Neill sitting as the prime minister all economic will be like the selling places and also thinking of selling the country also.
From Nic Notarpietro on The problem with facilities, and aid
Thank you Stephen and others for this interesting discussion thread, which I have followed with interest as a former long-term AusAID and DFAT senior aid program manager. There seems to be a consensus that facilities can offer gains in terms of efficiency, flexibility/responsiveness and innovation but DFAT's own independent review acknowledges that facilities are complex to manage: "Far from enabling DFAT staff to adopt a less ‘hands-on’ approach, facilities require intensive and ongoing DFAT oversight, engagement and management of both the development content and the delivery process.High quality aid policy development, strategic programming and effective aid delivery depend on fostering and retaining staff who can: engage in deep, content-oriented policy dialogue with partner governments; establish and manage contracts with delivery partners that enable rather than constrain effective aid delivery; and make quality choices about activity focus (and how/when these need to change) that optimise results (effectiveness and value for money). DFAT has some of this, but not enough – in either breadth or depth." The integration of AusAID and DFAT resulted in the departure of the majority of AusAID's internationally recruited sector specialist staff, who previously provided high level technical guidance and oversight especially of more complex programs. A lot of experienced program managers also left and many others understandably moved fully into the diplomatic stream to optimise their career options. Those that are left or have been newly inducted increasingly find their ability to devote time to program management squeezed by the core public service duty of providing advice and briefing to Ministers and senior officers. DFAT has tried to remedy this situation by insourcing external technical expertise through panels or standing offers and by expanding the use of mechanisms such as facilities. Whilst this may have benefits in drawing in fresh expertise and new ideas, it has also major risks - most important of all, in my view, the erosion long-term of DFAT's ability to engage in that "deep, content-oriented policy dialogue with partner governments" the review says is crucial. As Erin Anderson noted in her post, it is critical that DFAT provide a good 'brain' to steer programs in dialogue with partner governments and other stakeholders- whether those programs are delivered through old fashioned 'body shops', facilities, individual projects, sector-based programs, multilateral or NGO partnerships or otherwise. DFAT can do this either through its own staff, through facility/contractor managers, through independent external technical advice, or a combination of these. However there is a 'moral hazard' risk of contractor capture, in DFAT staff relying too heavily on advice from a contractor's own managers or technical specialists to help steer large and complex programs, without independent technical advice and support. This can increase the potential for proliferation of activities and poor coherence and fragmentation over time (the 'Christmas tree' syndrome), as arguably contractors are commercially incentivised to increase activities and inputs. Over-reliance on contractor advice by inexperienced and over-stretched government program managers can also lead to contractors influencing positive performance assessments for programs they manage (the 'dog judging the dog show' syndrome). The recommendation of the DFAT review for independent quality assurance for all complex facilities seems to be a good way to mitigate these risks. Another major risk of facilities, particularly multi-sector facilities, is that they can be established relatively rapidly in pursuit of ill-defined higher level outcomes, without sufficient up-front investment in understanding sector context and in developing some kind of agreed road-map or trajectory towards the higher level outcomes (eg at least a set of notional benchmarks or 'stepping stones'). This takes time and resource investment in joint analysis and design with partners, to enable joint progress monitoring, discussion and problem-solving along the way. That is not to deny the benefit of adaptation, seizing political opportunities and exploratory and innovative approaches during implementation, but to better enable such decisions to be made consciously and explicitly, rather than by 'finding the way as we go'. The example cited by Jacqui de Lacy of Australian aid training midwives and providing medicines to birthing facilities in West Timor without being able to address the lack of water in these facilities is a good case in point: rather than something to be 'fixed' retrospectively through a facility, I would suggest that is something that good old-fashioned sector analysis and donor dialogue should have picked up and addressed even before any project design. In arguing for facilities, Colin Adams in his post rather glibly states that 'transformational development outcomes are not achieved through simple, sector-specific programs'. Yet, like our own, most partner governments structure their own development plans, budgets and institutions around sectors, as do most major donors including the multilateral banks. So a strong understanding of sector context remains critical to 'transformational development'...and neither are sector-specific programs simple! In Tonga, where Australia has supported a long-standing health sector support program, agreed benchmarks and outcomes for the program have included among others: a continuation of increased spending on health as a proportion of the overall budget (and within that an increased allocation to public health); development of a national non-communicable disease strategy and media campaign; development and implementation of increased excise duty on tobacco and unhealthy food; infrastructure investments to improve environmental health (eg water supplies); and expansion of rheumatic disease screening and treatment to all children in Tonga. These are hardly minor achievements and were based on a joint program design with the Tongan government based on extensive analysis, guided by DFAT and independently-contracted health sector experts and supported by high-level annual performance reviews and discussions between the two governments. As it happens (based on reading DFAT's latest annual performance report on the Tonga aid program), it seems that due to disasters, changes in senior personnel and other factors, the Tongan government's implementation on this program is faltering - and may well need supplementation through a facility or similar contractor-led modality! My argument is not with facilities (or any other particular modality), but with the need for DFAT to be able to devote the specialised resources needed to manage these and other complex programs well, in order for Australia's aid to be effective and to have impact at scale and at the level of policy. From discussions with colleagues in other parts of government, DFAT is also far from alone in having lost or downgraded program management expertise. This seems to have been a broader trend caused by the ongoing shrinking of the federal public service and the prioritisation of 'policy'(more often than not briefing needed by ministers or senior officials to address the growing demands of the media cycle) over implementation in government over the last decade or more. I would argue the need to address the challenge of ensuring the "high quality policy development, strategic programming and effective delivery" and to "engage in deep, content-oriented policy dialogue with partners" cited by DFAT's review extends more broadly across government- witness the state of service delivery to our own indigenous people, in addressing homelessness, in environmental management and in a range of other policy areas. How the professional management expertise needed to manage complex facilities and other programs is best re-established in DFAT (and arguably elsewhere) seems to me to be a crucial policy issue for the future effectiveness of Australia's aid program...and more broadly for effective service delivery across government. Options seem to include establishing specialist technical, research and implementing agencies in government (a la ACIAR and GTZ); through private sector and NGO outsourcing (delivery) and in-sourcing (management and technical advice); through partnerships with research institutions, NGOs, international agencies or a combination of these. In relation to DFAT and the management of facilities specifically, the recommendations in the independent review seem to be a good place to start.
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