Comments

Robin, Thank you for that excellent eulogy for an organisation that I worked in from almost the very beginning - from those days of the Aid Branch in External Affairs in the early 60’s, through the various changes of acronyms ultimately to AusAID. I can only hope that the professionalism and expertise gained over the decades will not be lost but will enhance that of DFAT. As my mate, Allison Sudradjat was wont to say 'it's the best job in the world'.

Very sad, but useful reading. Thanks for reading the whole document and providing a very good summary. Edward

Echoing the majority of other commenters I hear, I thank you for the piece. Having spent many years working beside and encouraging improvement in Australia's aid program, I too have been encouraged by the knowledge and commitment of so many of its staff. It strikes me, as echoed by Don d'Cruz's consistent comment above, that this move has little to do with improving our aid program further - and is driven purely by ideology. Whilst recognising the success of the supporters of Australian aid who have gained a doubling of the aid program in the last ten years (off a very low base), it seems the quantum of aid debate has filled the always limited public space and left little room for a public discussion about why and how we deliver aid. Focusing on the dollars that go to aid has also evidently wrankled the ideologues like d'Cruz and his friends at the IPA who see this 'integration' as an achievement. There is of course significant opportunity that will come from this change but enslaving our aid dollars to a larger bureaucracy with a much broader agenda, will likely mean a blurrier public perception of what aid does and not a clearer one. It is difficult too, to see how the new FM will acheive her 'genuine performance-based benchmarks' - whatever they may be - with a greatly reduced workforce, a focus on 'trade not aid', a return to 'mutual accountability' (I look forward to the FM laying down the law to FM Natalegawa on what Indonesia's obligations will be) and a PM who can't seem to come to grips with how foreign policy actually works. I thank the staff of AusAID for their achievements and wish them the very best in navigating this personally challenging time that lies ahead. There is little doubt the incredible gains in reducing child mortality, in improving maternal health, in bringing polio to the brink of eradication and the millions of other lives that AusAID has made a positive contribution towards, could never have happened without your dedication, skills and commitment.

Thanks Dr T for your insight. I think your views about SI governance are especially valid, considering your status as an elite Solomon Islander with a broad worldview and senior political and managerial experience. And your post is balanced and well-considered, so it probably has far less bias than reports that are commissioned and paid for by any organisation that is the subject of the same report. As you rightly point out (please excuse my paraphrasing), we are all held captive by our own bias (and incentives) when we view the world. In regard to your post, may I humbly refer to an article I read in the past few days… The Professor of Political Science of University of Copenhagen, Vivek S. Sharma very recently published this article controversially entitled, “Give corruption a chance.” Sharma writes about the experience of the Western allies in Afghanistan in the last decade, and what looks like their complete inability to do anything about the raging ‘corruption’ that feeds the Afghani political system. He makes specific mention of “the duffel-bags stuffed full of taxpayer money” that the CIA and the Brits use to prop up Hamid Karzai’s government. I was struck by the argument made by Sharma and its relevance to your two excellent posts (the conceptual equivalency between the duffel-bags of cash, and Taiwan’s funding of the CDF in Solomons, is one of many similarities). Sharma seems to think that the ‘state-building’ project, as it is configured by the international (Western) community, is for the most part an intellectually bankrupt enterprise. Sharma says that, “It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the project of implanting ‘good’ institutions in non-Western societies, whether through conquest (as in Iraq and Afghanistan) or through consensual, noncoercive means (as in Cambodia), has turned out to be a thankless task.” Sharma argues, “it appears that in our modern age there may be no way to use liberal means to attain liberal ends in nonliberal societies.”, and concludes, “in some instances, corruption must be accepted as an undesirable but nonetheless potentially legitimate mechanism for engaging with societies organized along different lines. Perhaps it is time to give corruption a chance.” If one accepts Sharma’s argument about the practical necessity and overwhelming power of informal political transactions (some of which are ‘corruption’) in transitional states, then one must question the very essence of much of the donor-driven capacity-building agenda. Thankfully Sharma provides clues that will lead us out of the cul-de-sac. “In order for the development project to succeed beyond the actual alleviation of human suffering it will have to find ways in which to incentivize individuals—and especially elites (unless we propose to decapitate them, elites are crucial)—to adhere to different standards of public and private conduct. Otherwise, all that will happen is the creation of administrative structures that will be penetrated and permeated by the natural incentive structures organic to the existing society.” If we are compelled by our nature to use reason and logic as our refuge of last resort, then we must treat Sharma’s ideas with respect, even if they lead to personally inconvenient analytical conclusions. It seems difficult to argue against the general contention that RAMSI played a key role in bringing law and order to Solomon Islands after the Tensions. But it also seems equally difficult to argue against the contention that in 2013 most parts of the Solomon Islands state are as weak and lootable as they ever were, and the illegal urban land-grab going on right now in Honiara is just one piece of evidence to support this. I think the big question is why was the former achievable, and the latter not? My hope is that as Solomon Islanders and their development partners move forwards in their quest for inclusive stability and prosperity, the lessons of the past, both convenient and inconvenient, are taken on-board. The hard questions about RAMSI and its operational model may be easier to ask now, rather than a year ago. The worst case scenario is that for all parties concerned every new year is year zero.

Thanks for fact checking that Robin. There were a few items of interest in that speech plus a number of things noticeable by their absence (e.g. Pacific island countries other than PNG). Still waiting for some sizeable gaps to be filled in re the aid program - not so much the 'how much' but more the 'what', 'where' and 'why'.

Thanks Robin for putting this so well. As someone who has worked outside of AusAID over many years, but with many forays into and adventures with the organisation, I still think the clear aim to reduce poverty is an essential and even noble thing. My sympathies are definitely with the many many people from AusAID who have shared and still share that view and who are now facing the unknown. We collectively need to keep the flame alive.

Simon, This detailed comment is much appreciated. In response to your question about the timing of future such exercises, let's first see if our boldness results in embarrassment and ridicule. If not, we'll aim to put something out earlier next year -- not least because things might be a little more stable in the local scene -- but I don't think we'd have a good enough information base until around late May 2014 when all relevant budget announcements have been made. Robin

Also found the article very interesting Robin. It is the sad passing of an era, I hope that AusAID staff can become a positive influence on DFAT and on the new political leadership.

Such a good overview, excellent capture of the feelings that accompany this transition. As I sit writing reports for a new entity, I'm struggling for a short-hand name, but perhaps AFKA (the agency formerly known as AusAID) will do - which has the benefit of slightly existentialist overtones...

Robin, an excellent eulogy and as one who has hung around AusAID on the outside (mostly as a pesky NGO lobbyist) for thirty of that forty years it has been remarkable how it has weathered so many storms, but not this one: as we move to a new world order in which global self-interest rules, and the rules and standard setting DAC if not dead is certainly 'pining for the fiords'. The challenge of the first few years of AusAID in the 1970s was to get beyond PNG and notice development, which the 'second wavers' you mention did. To your list of government reports one should add Harries of 1979 which foisted the notion of the development 'project' on us. It also foisted lots of agricultural projects everywhere, including Africa, using Australian approaches and technology (needless to say not a great success); resulting in series of cultural and context mistakes that may well be repeated, as paternalism and self interest re-emerges, and AusAID and broader DAC lessons are lost. Thanks again Robin for a great Obit.

What happened to AusAID was predictable and deserved. AusAID had it coming. Good riddance.

Thank you Robin great piece,