Comments

An interesting post but written I feel from a narrow AusAID perspective and with errors. I was a bit confused by the suggested importance of the mutual benefits rationale over development ones in ACIAR dealings that was mentioned in the summary as I have never found this the case. Your stated estimate that only 10% of the benefits are Australian (which presumably would not change with a revision of the 50:1 rate of return which new research estimates at around a respectable 30:1) would suggest developing countries benefits dominate. It is hard to imagine how a standard ACIAR project would not deliver some mutual benefits given the underlying characteristics, especially the collaborative model which, unlike some other agencies, ensures the project is not made up completely of Australian consultants flying into a developing country and out with a report reflecting little collaboration with local researchers. The collaborative model of ensures the direct involvement of developing country research institutions and that all the researchers are not Australian. Often the Commissioned agency is one of the expensive CGIAR centres mentioned with any Australian involvement a minor component. The collaborating developing country institutions are free to involve non-Australian expertise from their funds and many have, along with other research agencies, NGOs, and private companies. Some of the developing country researchers involved have been amongst the world’s best and some have end up as government Ministers, or Chief Economists or candidates for heading up international agencies. The Australian collaborating institutions often involve foreign students studying for Australian PhDs within the project as part of the capacity building objective; another mutual benefit that provides greater incentives for a successful project which is not a bad thing as Adam Smith would have said. And what is wrong with many Australian researchers in this area? Australians have punched above their weight in the administration of international agencies despite quotas and in the more recognised work of the professional journals. Many of the people concerned have had connections with the ANU and the Crawford School in its various guises like Sir John Crawford, Ross Garnaut, Ron Duncan, Stuart Harris, Kym Anderson, John Freebairn and Peter Warr to name a few. This relatively high representation reflects what might be expected of a country with a high comparative advantage in agriculture and large agricultural-related institutions, including those involved in research such ABARES, parts CSIRO and the PC, and equivalent state agencies. Finally, all ACIAR project proposals have more or less from the outset included an ex ante impact assessment and many completed projects undergo a formal ex post one, the benefits of which in terms justifying its existence have been well understood long before some other agencies.

Hi Graham, A very interesting article and some really relevant aspects about PNG you raise from the ODI Report. At the risk of being controversial, it seems that ol’ George Santayana was right on the money when he observed; ‘Those that turn their back on history are doomed to repeat it.” You only have to look at nations elsewhere that had to coalesce from various disparate origins and become a unified nation in order to advance. Until PNG becomes a unified nation, there are too many conflicting influences and influencers pushing and pulling the country’s priorities and resources apart. Australia is one of the few countries that didn’t have a civil war before becoming unified (to some extent anyway I grant you depending on which state side you barrack for). It took two wars and a defeat like Gallipoli to turn us into a semi unified nation. Turn back the clock and look at England after the Norman conquest or Europe in the Middle Ages. Italy needed a Garibaldi to effect unification and then hand his conquest over to a civilian authority without succumbing to the lure and glory of becoming a dictator when he had the power and opportunity. PNG has never had enough time to evolve into anything more than a fragmented and artificially cobbled together entity due to political connivance and lack of understanding by those on both sides of the Torres Strait and in those in the UN who pushed Independence on the people before they were fully prepared. No wonder that there are so many parallels on the former colonies in Africa. Perhaps PNG does need a totally different form of government to the Westminster system that clearly does not work in a PNG context. Mind you, some would observe it may not be working in many other countries as well. Recently, two ANU academics wrote about what did work in PNG (see <a href="http://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/jbraithwaite/_documents/Articles/Colonial_Kiap.pdf" rel="nofollow">here</a>) [pdf]. The notion of what clearly did work in rural PNG could well be work another look. It was only got rid of by those who did not know what they had and provided no other viable option.

I suspect this question is probably not the right one to ask. The question should not be what can donors do in governance in PNG. The real question is why do donors end up selecting governance modalities in PNG that have consistently been shown not to work, at least in terms of generating service delivery outcomes? Potential answers to this question quickly lead one to speculation on what really drives investment choices, what activities do managers (both PNG and donor) consider constitutes good governance, and why? What makes managers opt for the Henry Ford approach to choice? As in, "you can have any innovative governance model you like, as long as it is ends up being advisers and public financial management capacity building". Is it conceivable that maintaining good contacts in the centralised bureaucracy and enhancing donor abilities to assemble defensible budget numbers might actually be a donor preference over delivering on provincial service delivery objectives? Often the argument is mounted that boosting corporate and central functions inevitably leads to better service delivery, but there is really not much evidence to support that proposition. So how many donor investments and advisers actually work on specific service delivery vs how many work on boosting central or corporate policy functions? Why do we select the options that we do?

Graham Thanks for this interesting blog and analysis. I agree that donors need to look outside central government to help get basic service to PNG citizens. I think there are a number of options out there but I agree with Julia and Tess that there's no evidence that giving extra funds to MPs is one of these. Experience from the private sector particularly mining companies suggests that they are willing to provide or subsidise basic health, education and infrastructure services for their work force and for communities in and around their geographic footprint areas. But they need government to be part of this service delivery system and to take a fair share of the responsibility for providing staff, facilities, and supplies. If there isn't buy-in by government, local private enterprises will be left with these responsibilities and government will be off-the-hook in delivering on its responsibilities to its citizens. As Julia remarks with respect to community-driven development there is potential for private sector support for provision of basic services to be a catalyst for greater accountability at the local level -- businesses supporting the provision of services could publish the details of agreements they reach with local authorities and also publish regular updates on how the parties are delivering on those agreements. Donors like AusAID could look for ways to be a catalyst and supporter of service delivery partnerships with the private sector -- I know AusAiD is already doing some of this, but the very poor state of service delivery in PNG suggests the agency could do more to respond to the Aid Effectiveness Review's recommendation on reconsidering how it balances financial and development risks.

A long long time ago in a galaxy far far away I was in a class trying to learn computer programming. Some of the students got very frustrated with the computer not doing what we were trying to tell it to do so we kept rerunning the same program time and time again until the instructor ordered us to stop, saying that the same program can be run as many times as we want but will always yield the same erroneous result. We needed to change the program if we wanted the computer to give different results. It seems after years of development work that development practitioners can use a little beginning computer science class. This little article gives out the same warning as that instructor a long time ago. I really appreciate the fresh insight. In particular I would like to point out the final point -- giving MPs a sum to spend as they want on their constituents. The orthodoxy for years has been that this practice, under the pejorative term of pork barrel, is very bad and any developing country should try as much as it can to eliminate that type of spending and to bring all expenditures under the Executive budget. This is the first time that I know of anyone has mentioned that it might be a good idea. Of course, doing that requires a lot of conditions but this is truly thinking outside the box and an idea worth pursuing.

In addition to the anonymous comment below, we have also received another email from an involved party with the same claims. The matter has been also reported in the press here http://www.centralwesterndaily.com.au/story/1237002/fair-work-on-the-cherry-case/. We have contacted Anna Berry for comment, but have not had a response. While we would not normally get involved in private disputes, clearly this one is relevant to the blog above. Stephen Howes and Jonathan Pryke Development Policy Blog editors

Sir Mekere is living testament and a role model for young leaders and politicians. He is the Political tycoon responsible for Institutional and Orginizational reforms that he implemented during his short time of Prime Minister. As a result of these reforms, successive governments have been able to reap the dividends and enjoyed political and economic stability. Yet, our so called young leaders need a thorough review of their leadership style and are yet to prove themselves to the citizens of this nation on the national political arena. They need not to have development goals and investment plans within their respective electorates and provinces but must have long term Goals, Visions, Aims, Passion and Purpose for the country (PNG). Being a national leader means more than your mandated electorate or province. They need knowledge to move the nation forward. We need visionary leaders like Sir Mekere, who can forecast the future before making decisions and government policies that can have an impact on the unseen generation of PNG. I strongly support Sir Mekere's view on the establishment of the Independent Infrastructure Authority to overlook the Infrastructure services of School, Universities, Hospitals, Ports, Airports and major government institutions and departments. Transforming resource wealth into basic infrastructure development that will improve the living standard of the citizens of this country is vitally important. Young leaders are yet to prove themselves to the people of PNG. Sir Mekere, your style of leadership and governance is still needed. You are a great reformer. We salute you.....

Julia, I also agree that the idea of giving MPs more money to disperse with 'strict conditions' is problematic not only for the reasons you identify but also because if (or when) the strict conditions are not complied with, what is the means by which the conditions will be applied and by whom? There is no shortage of rules about who can spend public funds on what but in the absence of meaningful enforcement procedures they are largely ineffective and simply adding more does not improve things and quite likely makes it worse

Thanks for a very interesting blog which raises a number of valuable insights. I would like to comment on your fifth and sixth points. It is difficult to see why ‘giving $1 m to an MP with strict conditions’ will be any more effective than giving many millions into departmental budgets and trying to apply strict conditions. Although there may be some value in spreading the money out more widely. We know that when our strict conditions aren’t relevant to local ways of operating, they will be subverted. Given that MPs already get around $5 million through DSIP, it would seem an extra $1 million with 'strict conditions' may not be that attractive. It also seems to play into the 'winner takes all' mentality which is part of the problem. Thanks for raising the option of CDD, this deserves greater prominence in aid to PNG. CDD can directly support the the interests and aspirations of disadvantaged communities. There is also a good evidence base on the value of supporting inclusive participation where women and men, poorer families and wealthier families agree on priorities for development and how they will hold each other accountable for progress. You suggest CDD is bypassing government systems, but it shouldn't be. It is about creating an environment where communities have the opportunity to build responsive and accountable local governance within the country's systems and policies. CARE Australia, with funding from AusAID, is piloting a range of community driven approaches in remote and disadvantaged areas in PNG. We are optimistic that this program will provide a good base of experience to tackle some of the most entrenched poverty in PNG. We are not bypassing government in this program, but engaging local, district and provincial government as appropriate. The “fundamental purpose of Australia’s aid program is to help people overcome poverty", this should be the starting point for any aid expenditure.

Thanks Graham for this post which I found thought provoking and which I am sure will prompt numerous comments. I agree with you that a 'more of the same' approach is not what is needed in this context (if indeed it is needed in any context) and also, as someone put it to me very succinctly the other day, 'the state is not the main game in town'. However, further to Terence Woods post on Making Bureaucracies Work and discussion following, it seems to me that what is missing from this analysis is a recognition that state mechanisms can indeed be supported (by identifying and supporting normative champions who can then develop normative communities around them) through flexible, agile and nuanced activities grounded in meaningful relationships as nurtured over time - surely this is the key to 'building on what's there'.

These are interesting findings, and deserve to be taken seriously. I wonder if it would be useful for PICs to consider internationalising some of their internal positions - sharing key personnel by either time-sharing, as Tess notes above, or the establishment of transnational institutions that could house this technical expertise. This would entail a loss of sovereignty and is unlikely to be taken lightly, but could be worth the gains.

The main small-country reason why PICs don’t manage their public finances the way outside observers think they should, is that in PICs the political governments are so close to the management action and so prone to intervene. Passage of an annual budget through parliament is commonly a near-meaningless formality. What matters is the daily flow of formal and informal, recorded and unrecorded directions to finance officials from the PM, the Finance Minister and persons close to them. The usually unspoken context is ‘Do it this way or you’ll be sorry—good financial management means doing whatever we have to do to stay in office’. MPs are silenced by pay-offs that help them to get re-elected. Donors are afraid to criticise in case they lose their place in the inner circle of ‘high-level consultations’. Something like this happens in bigger countries too, but there the effects are not so immediate or pervasive, and improper pressures are more likely to be exposed. What PICs need is a way of electing political governments that understand, believe in and will practice good financial management. Anyone who knows how we can do this, please share the secret. Tony Hughes