Comments

Santif, This comment is completely wide of the mark. The proposal in the APS Adviser Review is simply that public service advisers who would not be entitled to a car in Canberra but who have been given one overseas would have to pay $250 a month if they make extensive private use of their vehicle. It would be left to individual agencies to decide whether cars should be allocated to advisers. If you want a meaningful debate, you need to be well informed.

Fran, I enjoyed reading your paper. It presents some fresh perspectives on a longstanding but very important question. I agree with the sentiment that perhaps we ought to allow for some degree of Pacific "exceptionalism" when it comes to expectations on economic growth. After all, most of these countries face permanent diseconomies of scale and other structural impediments and disadvantages. But at the same time, at least for my own country (the Marshalls), it is absolutely clear that we can do significantly better in managing the resources and opportunities we have towards better development outcomes. While an economic miracle is unlikely, we can still make incremental progress. And this requires strong governance and leadership, and credible policies and plans that are effectively implemented. If any one of these essential ingredients is missing, which is often the case, our chances for real progress are slim. So while some degree of (cautious) exceptionalism is okay when it comes to our expectations on economic growth, NO degree of exceptionalism should be tolerated when it comes to our expectations of governance.

Some elements of insanity regarding the discussion surrounding vehicles for advisers going to PNG; You will pay at least twice as much for a comparable vehicle in PNG than in Australia. The environment and exchange issues mean that maintenance costs are highly inflated when compared with Australia and repairs can take much longer than in Australia (added vehicle hiring costs). Then add the risks of vehicle loss and litigious nature of the society means insurance and associated risk are disproportionately high. Anyone considering a job in PNG should consider the above. Spending $10,000+ (anything less is a mobile coffin) upfront for a job with questionable security attached will come as a rude shock to many who have never been to PNG. Think also about how you will sell - if you can! And remember that these costs are additional to your existing vehicle wherever home is (unless you plan to play the buy and sell game there as well!). I will not be surprised when someone gets killed because they tried to get around in questionable public transport system and paid the ultimate price - and just to put "questionable" into context we are talking vehicles that are not roadworthy, drivers who have questionable skills (may be unlicensed), drivers who have been known to be the perpetrators of crimes on passengers, telegraphing on movements to the criminal element and the list goes on. [This is not paranoia - this is the reality of living in POM and you are fooling yourself if you ignore it.] What about hire cars - consider A$2,500 per month for an old second hand car on long term hire arrangements (probably a lot more by now). Short term hire A$150/day. These are rough estimates from some time back - but consider taking A$2,500 of your monthly salary and you might think twice about the decision to take the job. There are a host more associated issues and the unfortunate aspect of the debate is that people who make criticism of the provision of vehicles and/or associated compensation in lieu too frequently demonstrate a distinct lack of understanding of the operating environment. My suggestion - stop developing positions based on personal bias and undertake some true analysis of the situation then the debate can approach a meaningful level. Now let's get real instead of emotional.

why do you have a picture of the virgin islands on an article about fiji? you call yourself a reliable source ?

Dear Dinuk, Thanks for this much-needed piece. I haven't really been sure what ODE does. Maybe they do lots behind the scenes but with the push for greater transparency, ODE should publish more evaluations of AusAID work and with a more critical eye. It is good for everyone. Your piece is balanced and is the kind of holding to account that we the public need to have. Well done, Joel

I agree and I would also suggest that Vanuatu will be particularly cautious about progressing PACER plus coming on the back of last year's (and continuing into this year) debate around WTO accession. The "plus" in PACER plus has previously been described as capacity building within Pacific island nations but equally the what and how of that has not yet been clearly articulated.

Thanks for these comments. Garth raises the posssibility that, if you controlled for other variables (such as the varying reasons for giving aid), you would find an association between exposure to fragile states and aid quality as measured by QuODA. It's possible, but I doubt it. It would be difficult to find the controls, and, from the graph above, there's not even a hint of a relationship between the two variables of interest. There is evidence that aid quality is higher in better governed countries. For example, if you look at World Bank project ratings, they tend to be highest in East Asia and lowest in Africa. But QuODA is at best a very partial measure of aid quality, which is probably why we don't see a correlation between it and exposure to fragile states. Tom makes the point, I think, that I do in my first paragraph, namely that overall Australia comes 8th out of 23 bilateral donors. I agree that that's not bad at all, and I stand by the characterization of the aid program by the Independent Review as "good but improvable." But that is different from claiming that Australia is a "world leader" or "among the world's best." No doubt we are in some areas, but there isn't the evidence to substantiate this as an overall claim. I'm not sure what to make of the ATPC comment. I do actually think that the best way to look at aid effectiveness is through in-depth case studies. But these need to be balanced and rigorous.

I would think that world standard question that would be answered if there was an Olympic event to gauge each participant in the Aid-game. In that context Aus-Aid used of Aust.Technical college in the Pacific (http://www.aptc.edu.au/support/index.html) would be a good point to begin with. The game of using DFAT resources to fund an institution, that is majority staffed by Australians and getting paid using Australian standards of income ($Aus) to these expatriates who enjoy tax free incentives, a generous package of having their Mcmansions, top of the line vehicles and entertainment allowances, and school fees for the kids paid for. Of course these funds are channeled using Australian banks. Students who travel to host countries are set up with bank accounts with ANZ, Airline travel for students (where possible) is through Qantas. The website of these Technical College's have their servers in Australia and maintained by Australians. All personal data for these Pacific island students are in these cloud servers in Australia and data mining via echelon is prevalent. While the local staff are paid the local minimum rate and won't be upskilled so that these expatriate positions are perpetually held by Australians and even though there are localization mandates in the immigration policies of these island Governments; these plans have been put on the back burner due to convenient excuses of lack of qualified personnel in the host country. That is the effectiveness of Aus-Aid. Are those practices right in the moral sense?

Hey Stephen, thanks for this analysis. I'm not sure that the way in which you've chosen to critique the ODE's analysis is that meaningful. Of course, the "2nd out of 6" measure might be questionable, but it seems to me that Australia does relatively well in two measures of what constitutes a good aid policy - a) how much of the aid is effective, and b) how much of the aid is going to the countries who need it most. As you say, there will be trade offs between these two measures because aid delivered to fragile states might be difficult to deliver to a high standard. However it seems that AusAID strikes a fairly good balance here.

Thank you Stephen for this post - it highlights the relatively arbitrary nature of the comparison used by ODE. I am confused though by your focus on the lack of association between quality score and exposure to fragile states.There are a large number of factors that influence aid programs and many of these have little to do with maximising aid quality. Therefore is it not possible that it may be harder in both theory and reality to score a high QuODA score when aid is predominantly focussed on fragile states, but that in reality there does not appear to be an association between fragility exposure and QuODA score because of all the other (non-quality) factors shaping donor actions. In other words isn't the relevant chart one which compares fragility exposure and degree of difficulty in scoring high on QuODA?

This post provides a useful analysis of the various transparency and monitoring initiatives AusAID has been included in recently. It might be helpful to clarify that the reason we didn’t score “sometimes” and “collected answers in the 2011 pilot Index is because we are asking for comprehensive disclosure of aid information. Partial and unsystematic disclosure means you only get a snapshot of what donors are doing and you cannot compare and use this information in any meaningful way. We were also unsure of the quality of the "sometimes" and "collected" data so it would not have been appropriate to include it in the final results. If readers would like to use this data and/or change the weightings used then there is a tool on the Publish What You Fund website that allows you to do this: http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/resources/index/2011-index/visualise/

The referenced policy brief should be required reading for all development partners, scholars and practitioners working in Public Finance Management (PFM) and related areas, including public procurement. While political economy analysis is highly relevant to the design and implementation of new initiatives to strengthen Central Finance Authorities (CFA), it is equally relevant to current initiatives. Concepts such as fully understanding the drivers and dynamics of the reform process, the importance of mobilizing internal capabilities, the full engagement of leaders/stakeholders, focus on ‘best fit’ rather than ‘best practice’ models, the importance of effective change management and project management practices, and focus on human resources management are fundamental to any sustainable reform. I look forward to development partners, scholars and practitioners using a political economy analysis in their design and implementation of PFM/CFA strengthening efforts. E. John Blunt is a Procurement and Institutional Expert with extensive experience in leading public procurement reforms in a variety of international development environments. He is currently working with the Southern African Development Community Secretariat in Botswana.