Comments

Great comment David, thank you. Definitely needs to be better communication. And there is still a huge amount to do on preparedness as well. And unfortunately there's been some questionable decisions that may have delayed assistance reaching people. But this has been Indonesia's policy for a while, there seemed to be a bit of an expectation from some INGOs that they wouldn't actually stick to it and would just open the doors when the next big thing happened. So there's also room for reflection (and better preparation) for INGOs as well.

Thanks for this intelligent and insightful article. In effect what Indonesia did was say that we have our own disaster management system, running in our own national language, and if you don't know it, understand it and can work comfortably within it please don't come. Also then listing exactly what help they did need. This was what happened in Japan after the tsunami, what happened in China after the earthquake, and it makes sense. There can be no doubt though that this was not as well-communicated as it might have been, and that a lack of clear rapid mechanisms hindered critical aid that was needed and confused the entire national and international aid community at the cost of the affected community. What does this tell us? It tells us that Indonesia's decision to not request international assistance was their right and they exercised it, but that work needs to be done on improving communication mechanisms, MOUs and rapid request and approval systems, all of which are challenging and complex in a very hierarchical pillared society. There can be no doubt that Indonesian national response capacity is stretched with both Lombok and Palu, but also should be no doubt that trying to merge two very different coordination and response mechanisms may only add to the confusion. The other lessons that need to be learned are a) the need for disaster response plans for when local government is no longer capable of functioning and b) clear public plans for when something is beyond the capacity of BNPB and the military is called in, so both the military, government and civil society can be trained for this and c) most importantly an increased awareness that their is no such thing as a natural disaster, only a natural event, that results in a disaster of we are insufficiently prepared. Although there are many strange and dangerous natural events in Indonesia, as Palu has shown here are only three risks 1) town planning: that communities are allowed to live in areas with a high probability of being struck by severe natural events, without adequate mitigation measures in place; 2) that buildings and infrastructure are not adequately designed and built to survive the natural events they will face; and 3) that communities are under prepared and under trained to prepare for and respond to disasters when they do occur. Underlying all of this is a much more complex discussion about perceptions of risk, and each individuals role and obligation as an active participant in their own risk reduction. Indonesians are some of the most accepting people on earth. Accepting foreigners and their help, though this time within limitations, but also accepting risk as gods will, this may also need to change if other changes are to occur. Some bold decisions need to start to be taken to change paradigms and reduce risk and some improved diplomacy is needed to communicate those solutions to the outside world. I remain stunned that there are more than 300,000,000 million speakers of Malayu/Indonesian, and yet it is still not even an official language of the UN, and high level meetings continue to be undertaken here with inadequate or sporadic translation, with the expectation that Indonesian attendees will be able to cope... Imagine doing that in France, which is a an official UN language, with far less people who speak it. The Euro-centric approach to engaging in Asia needs to change and the localisation agenda needs to be taken seriously.

You can purchase a copy via Amazon: https://www.amazon.com.au/My-Walk-Equality-Stories-Guinean/dp/1542429242

The issues affecting women in PNG, as expressed by a few courageous women and girls, are real. It all happens right under the noses of men but we seem to turn a blind eye to these issues. Everyone should read what's been expressed in this anthology, I'm in search of a copy myself.

This is a disaster. Other Pacific countries should strictly guard their borders.

Bryant, Rotarian's Against Malaria (RAM) are still very much involved in in the National Malaria Control Program. RAM continues to manage the net distribution program with redistribution occurring every three years to most areas with an outstanding record of getting to even the most remote communities in the country. Challenged by the significant reduction in Global Fund funding, RAM was able to secure a grant from 'Against Malaria Foundation' from the UK to fund the latest procurement of the nets. The Global Fund funding goes towards the cost of net distribution and for the procurement of a proportion of malaria treatment drugs and Rapid Diagnostic Tests.

Phyone. Your article is an eye opener.. I read your article and I want to learn more . I hope you can stablish a dialogue platform face to face with Timorese in Perth . Is it possible?My name is John. Cheers.

Jemima, in the 1970s I was a foreign student in Indonesia where Radio Australia's Indonesia n language service was immensely popular. In the 1990s my family and I were in Southern Thailand when the Australian government made the ABC shut down its powerful relay transmitter in Darwin. Radio Australia struggled on with short wave from Melbourne for a while. Now it's all gone. Reviving it could include short wave but we should keep in mind the considerable reach of AM medium wave, especially at night. A powerful AM transmitter can reach hundreds of kilometres in the day time and much further at night. If we can produce the content a combination of these two supposedly old fashioned technologies might reach cheap battery radios in most of the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

Thank you Richard, you accurately identified the issues hindering greater participation of PNG workers in these programs. The issue is more so with the inability of the PNG government. The government wants employers to receive workers only from them, their database, but employers obviously do not have confidence in the PNG government's vetting process and they have every right to. These issues have been identified and discussed many many times over the last few years. When will PNG authorities admit that their process is weak and take steps to improve and open up opportunities for their citizens? Papua New Guineans are keen, so keen to come and work but the PNG government itself is making it hard for them. Many are asking and asking how they may participate. As a PNGean living in semi rural Australia, it also frustrates me to see so many other fellow Pacific islanders coming here for work here on farms but not my country men and women. I hope that PNG authorities wake up soon and try different approaches to improve current situation.

Thanks Murray, Good comment. I think you're quite right to conclude that 'good' as measured by the types of indicators of practice that one can compile in an international dataset, and good as measured by actual positive impacts on the ground, are quite different things. To be fair to those who aspire to measure the former, it seems reasonable that meeting some ideals of best practice probably brings with it a higher probability of success on the ground. The trouble is, it turns out to be very hard to measure best practice in a manner amenable to creating cross country comparisons. I support the endeavour. But I think it will always be imperfect at best. Then again, alternatives like OECD peer reviews are also imperfect. The world of aid is imperfect I guess. Ultimately, better evaluations so we learn what works on the ground is likely to be much more practically useful. But I can still see the appeal of international comparisons, trends over time, etc. Thanks again Terence

Very good points Terence. There is one other thing to consider. Too many times institutional donors and some researchers (here's looking at you CDG...) make the erroneous inference that good aid quality by an agency must mean good quality projects on the ground. This error is not a moot given that aid and project quality have very difference frames of references. Furthermore, as no two projects are the same, it is impossible to infer project quality from a single assessment of 'aid quality' (this is related to the 'ecological fallacy' in inferring results between different levels of aggregation). Professionally, what is more interesting is the quality of each project - rather than organizations trumpeting how 'good' they are at delivering aid. I could go on but the PhD on project quality will be submitted soon...

Bryant, long-lasting insecticidal net distribution has been ongoing since that time without interruption, though with slightly reduced funding. RAM has been doing an outstanding job primarily with money from the Global Fund. We published in Bull World Health Organ 2017;95:695–705B how prevalence steeply decreased with the repeated rounds of net distribution. The increase mentioned in this blog is fairly recent and while it occurred in the context of reduced funding the underlying reasons are still subject of further investigations. It is most likely multi-factorial as we mention in the report: intervention coverage (prevention, treatment), mosquito ecology, human behaviour. The malaria situation in PNG is so complex and what works in some places of the country doesn't seem to be sustainable in others. But one thing is clear: without increased and sustained political and financial commitment the current increase is only the beginning.