Comments

Yes, I would largely agree—especially Brendan's point A. Put another way: The problem isn't so much the tyranny of context, but rather the hubris of analysis. There are limits to what can be learned through the research that precedes program design. The most important nuances of contexts only reveal themselves over the course of iterative action.

This is a valuable contribution to understanding PNG politics. I have worked from 2012-2015 at the University of Papua New Guinea and the regime over the student body during student protests as presented here is familiar to me. Yet there are a few comments to be made from my experience. First, a background in student politics is still more important than suggested here. Peter O’Neill, Ben Micah and Paul Paraka are names at the centre of PNG politics and have been student leaders. O’Neill introduced himself as an ex-student leader when he came for the first time as prime minister to the campus. Analysis of the social background of MPS showed that a substantial number had been at UPNG: 31 MPs in the 2012 parliament; 26 in the 2007 parliament. Less parliamentarians had been at UNITECH: 10 in 2012 and 8 in 2007. A common university background may therefore be important and student leadership may play a big part.. Second, protests at UPNG tend not to be directed against the university administration and no demands were made to sack the vice chancellor in the past years. The university administration avoids as much as possible a confrontation with the students. At UNITECH there was the demand for the return of a vice chancellor and that was associated with a specific accusation of big corruption. At Goroka the protests seem to be diffuse and general, but that is not the case in Lae or UPNG. Thirdly, there is a distinct difference between student protests at UPNG and at the other institutions. Student protests in UPNG tend not to deal with the administration of the university but with big political issues: the demand to the Prime minister to step down on the Paraka issuel;the UBS loan in 2014; the agreement with Australia on the asylum seekers in Manus in 2013 etc. This makes these demonstrations even more a stage to raise a political profile than is elsewhere the case. These protests cannot reasonably be solved by giving in to student demands as it would assume that students can dictate the prime minister and parliament is out of consideration. Thirdly, it is striking that the protests are not aimed at the quality of teaching, despite that they are for example frequently not turning up in class. That is surprising as this has direct consequences for their chances in life. A link between the quality of the degree and their chances on the job market is absent in the mind of students, while this link is obvious to outsiders.

The insights in this blog are of course significant, but raise also questions. First, it may be worthwhile to look more closely at situations where big spending did not produce the desired outcome. It may be that "candidates who campaigned with money and gifts performed better than those who did not", but this is too general. It may be that the popular voice can overrule the influence of money. Secondly, PNG elections have many candidates and therefore many losers. It has to be explained why many candidates spend a lot of money while the chances to win are very slim. Is this conscious gambling or being driven by a dream? Many candidates in Western Province in 2012 dreamt that they would win. (Information from Wesley Serber). Thirdly, there is a question where the money does come from. The benefits from natural resource extraction are distributed much more widely than before. The increased access to money may be a more important factor than the introduction of LPV.

It is disappointing that Australia and New Zealand have not committed more aggressive policy towards mitigating greenhouse gas production. Mitigation is absolutely necessary on a global scale. But adaptation development in the Pacific Region is very much needed in addition to mitigation commitments. So while the U.S. China and EU, big producers of GHGs, may not be PIF members they too need to have their feet held to the global warming fire in the region. President Obama's policy on climate change has been a great start but with a presidential election looming and the possibility of a climate denier getting into office President Obama must commit more to the region, now. U.S. funding for climate change in the Pacific Region is focused largely on rural projects but the areas with the greatest economic, social service and population impacts are the new rapidly growing urban environments. These are the heart and soul of Pacific development and opportunity so keeping them operational and growing is important. Big ticket items like inland roads and adequate safe health infrastructure need support from donor partners. A commitment to Pacific Island adaptation development using renewable energy sources and environmentally sound as well as safe construction from the Millennium Challenge Corporation could go a long way. But the U.S. just does not seem to be able to put one foot in front of the other in order to do anything beyond gratuitous small scale programs in an area that has big challenges to address.

Like Alan, I appreciate the attempt to find a reasonable middle ground. While I find the 'Opening the Black Box' report very helpful and useful, it does carry some danger of A) being (mis)interpreted to mean that if you 'get the analysis right' that will tell you what tool/methodology/linear intervention to adopt, and B) be so intensive as to imply that only big INGOs or contractors can successfully implement social accountability projects. Rather I the underlying message, as you and Alan note, is the importance of balancing analysis and adaptation. Two small additions from my own thinking on these can be found here, on <a href="https://politicsgovernancedevelopment.wordpress.com/2015/06/09/political-analysis-for-citizen-led-accountability/" rel="nofollow">analysis</a> and <a href="https://politicsgovernancedevelopment.wordpress.com/2014/01/20/thinking-politically-about-social-accountability/" rel="nofollow">politically-informed social accountability</a>. But at the end, I think there still needs to be more emphasis on <a href="http://www.transparency-initiative.org/news/new-think-piece-series-on-citizens-movements-and-state-accountability" rel="nofollow">building collective capacity among citizens</a>. Sorry for the excess of linkages, but this touches on a lot of ongoing conversations as well.

Many thanks for this Anna (and Derick and Jana). I think it's the best explanation there is of why it's important, and how it is possible, to find a middle ground between "context is king" and "one-size fits all". It's very much in line with our new strategy and its focus on country-level learning, but explains things more clearly still. https://www.globalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/GlobalIntegrityLearningtoopengovernanceStrategysummary.pdf best wishes, Alan

Thanks Camilla for your detailed response. Yes, it is easy for someone on the outside to critcise however as you say, more should be being done. I guess it depends on one's perspective and experience as to what one believes. I grant you that my perspective is far more focused on PNG than the rest of the world and in that aspect, I do have a modicum of experience. The recent decision by Julie Bishop to cancel an obviously corrupt {NG Departmental decision over the aid funded PNG pharmaceutical contract is an excellent example of what needs to be done to stop ongoing corrupt use of our overseas aid money. This debacle was after two years of funding an excellent scheme that actually delivered the pharmaceuticals to where they were needed at K70 less than what the PNG government adopted outside of the official tender process. The pharmaceutical delivery process in PNG is now back to where it was prior to our aid funded program. Naturally, nobody in Australia heard, knew or really cared about it because no one is educating the public in 'how to connect the dots'. The public relies on the government to manage our economy (yeah right!) yet complains when they have to pay more tax or their savings disappear due to inflation or fund overseas aid. I agree that we need to do more and especially more for PNG our closest neighbour. What is required is a national, overall managed approach to our overseas aid rather than the current scatter gun methodology. Individual programs need to be put to the acid test as to whether they are constructively helping those who need help or merely lining pockets on either side of the Torres Strait. Every project and program should first have set benchmarks that can transparently be seen as defining whether or not a program or project is helpful and sustainable and providing value for our aid money. An clear example of the problem is the huge amount of funding devoted to sending Australian police to PNG, based on a previous PM to PM discussion. This has only resulted in those officers receiving huge financial incentives while PNG's law and order problems just get worse and worse. At the end of the day, the PNG PM and the Police Commissioner have called the program of no use whatsoever and it will be terminated at the end of this year without any benefit from the overseas funding except perhaps a new police mess in Moresby etc. Local anecdotal reports suggest those police being sent to PNG have no real cross cultural training or appropriate language skills and are virtually kept apart from their local equivalents due to their being unable to take part in any operational capacity. Exactly who is being helped here? Hand out mentality never produces anything more than a desire for more handouts. What is desperately required is an international training establishment that both those going to PNG and those coming from PNG can acquire language skills, cross cultural training and be assessed as to their suitability for the transfer or placement. We used to have just such an establishment in Mosman, Sydney however it was closed due to obvious conflicts with the 'establishment' at the time. I think Julie Bishop is doing a great job and should be congratulated with what she is achieving given the obvious difficulties she faces at home not to those mention overseas. Again, thanks for your comments.

Hi Paul, Thank you for your thoughts on this subject. On the whole, I don’t think we’re as much in disagreement as you seem to think we are. I’d like to respond to just a few points from your extensive commentary. On your first, fundamental point, “The results of any survey depend on what questions are asked and in what sequence” – absolutely yes. Perhaps this is not adequately emphasized in the blog post, but this observation drives a large section of the Discussion Paper to which the post refers. As we note, this is also an area in which we hope to conduct more research, to understand better the ways in which surveys and polls may be used and manipulated by those on both sides of the aid debate. Similarly, we also highlight in the paper (and in the blog) that, as you note, many Australians do not know how much of the national budget is spoken for by different areas, and how much funding might be saved. Yes, Australia is facing an increasingly negative economic outlook, and yes this means that there may not be as much funding to go around. But you seem to imply that there is waste and room to spare in the aid budget, and not in other sectoral areas; I would push back on that. For example, while there has recently been some <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/26/Chronic-fraud-in-Australias-aid-program-Think-again.aspx" rel="nofollow">media attention</a> granted to fraud in the aid program, available data shows that the levels of fraud recorded by DFAT (and AusAID before it) have been significantly lower than fraud in a number of domestic programs and departments, including Defence. On this basis too I would respond to your question, “Can we therefore still keep funding overseas aid at the current level when ‘charity begins at home’?” with an emphatic yes. It’s a false dichotomy to suggest that we can only do one or the other. But certainly we could, and should, seek to do both much better. I also agree wholeheartedly that there is much to be gained by doing as much as possible to educate those involved with giving aid about what works and what doesn’t. You ask, ‘Have those that seek to influence our collective national aid program taken a constructive look and detailed investigation of what long term benefits of our long term aid programs have actually achieved?’ The answer is: not as much as we would like, but we are trying. Aid effectiveness has been a long-standing focus of this blog and of our Centre’s work more generally. But working to improve the evidence base and the effectiveness of the personnel and strategies within the Australian aid program does not necessitate ignoring public opinion altogether. I would suggest these can be parallel, not competing, activities. For accuracy, I don’t think anyone is implying that we should “get into a ‘bidding war’ with other and far larger economies”. Of course it would be ludicrous to argue that, for example, ‘The US will give <a href="http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/" rel="nofollow">$33.7 billion in FY2016</a>; why won’t Australia step up?!?” Generosity in giving ODA is typically measured as a percentage of GNI, precisely because it means we can make meaningful relative comparisons with other, much larger economies. In sum: yes, public opinion is not the be all and end all. Yes, surveys can be misleading (and/or produce misleading results) and respondents may not be adequately informed to respond to them. These are all points we readily acknowledge in the paper, and aim to learn more about. And you certainly won’t find any objection from our corner that aid effectiveness could and should be improved. But I don’t think it’s particularly helpful -- or accurate -- to make blanket statements describing the aid program as a ‘multi cobbled together animal’, to insinuate that taxpayer dollars are more often than not ‘corruptly syphoned off into tax havens and personal bank accounts’, or to suggest that aid program personnel, consultants, academics, and other ‘so called experts’ are either oblivious to or don’t care about the problems and challenges inherent in giving aid, or are indifferent to the very real needs of aid’s intended recipients. No one is saying running an aid program is easy. It’s a messy, complex business. That’s precisely why we are interested in pursuing this research. Camilla

Thank you Ashlee and Stephen for your responses. You are quite correct in that the New Colombo Plan initiative should not be labelled direct overseas aid. I have now received and am studying a comprehensive policy statement from DFAT. The original PNG media release was perforce rather lacking in any real detail. I agree 'Overseas Engagement' might be a better and more appropriate terminology. The results of this initiative may well prove beneficial to Australia's national interest. The extensive requirements for students who apply to join may select those attending tertiary institutions most suited to engage in this program. My concerns as to whether they as representatives of Australia, are uniformly trained, prepared and transparently reported on is however another matter and I reserve my thoughts until I have thoroughly perused the official policy. Notwithstanding, my original observations about surveys on whether Australians per se even think let alone know anything at all about 'overseas aid' still stand and are apparently unchallenged.

The New Colombo Plan also sends students to developed countries in Asia, like Singapore and Japan. We wouldn't consider that 'aid'. Why should it be any different for PNG? It's a student mobility program, with no development objectives. The objectives are to build a base for longer-term engagement in the region by young Australians. The students that go on the short-term mobility placements are largely participating in a supervised 'field school' type credit, usually coordinated by their home university in Australia, or a semester of language training or something similar. They aren't in-line or in operational positions at all. It's not aid, so it can't be boomerang aid. Whether one thinks it is a worthy investment in regional engagement is another matter entirely.

Dear Tim/Paul, I agree whole heartedly Australia could and should be doing more. But aren't you being a little bit disingenuous quoting statistics about how many refugees have been recognised by Lebanon for example..for what does it really mean for them to be recognised? will they gain citizenship, access to health care and welfare, as in Australia? and the huge numbers now in Lebanon are clearly a result of the conflict in Syria....so how many refugees per year and per head of population have Lebanon resettled over the ten years before the current crisis? That would be a more appropriate comparison. If you look at the UNHCR website, and remove the Syrian numbers, there are less than 10,000 refugees from other countries recognised in Lebanon, and the increase between Jan 15 and Dec 15 is projected to be 300 people. Do you point out that the Lebanese government has donated a grand total of $73,000 to the UNHCR in the last 10 years, whilst the Australian government has donated $350 million; or that Lebanese private donations to the UNHCR in the last 9 years has been $100,000 whilst Australian private donations have been $85 million?? So I think you are being just as disingenuous as you claim the Australian newspaper is, when bald statements like that about Lebanon's recognition per capita being 120 x that of Australia are made. You show no more rigor, and are just as happy to mislead for your own purposes

Thanks for offering up some comments and thoughts on this important topic. I found the ACFID article a little narrow in its outlook largely because it seems to focus on Australian private sector organisations. What about the private sector in developing countries? That is where there is enormous potential for real economic development, job creation and better service delivery. Too often, donors focus solely on the public sector and overlook the critical role of the private sector and the things that it can achieve in a highly effective way. DFAT has worked in this area a bit (witness the various market development and M4P programs around the place) and is also embarking on private sector development (PSD) programs such as Investing in Infrastructure (3i) in Cambodia. PSD is certainly an area with rich potential to implement aid programs in a different way.