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Have you thought of sending this in to the Senate committee into the incident on Feb 17th? It reinforces what many of us are saying about the background cultural/political situation and impossibility of providing safety for the asylum seekers.

Tthis is a clear evaluation of challenges being faced by most Papua New Guineans since the birth of this young nation . Remember that despite the the downfalls we have faced, i believe this is an assurance that we will achieve the core goals of this nation, like the vision 2050. Thus we shall all bloom to give a summed glory of PAPUA NEW GUINEA.

Totally agreed with Luc.

I agree with Mark. There is no single solution to such a complex matter. It is a two-way street; the donor and the recipient and within these walls are the processes involving politics, security, developmental issues, cultural understanding and the practices of procurement, and others. I am also in agreement with the left-wing NGO AID/WATCH critique on AusAID. AID/WATCH argues that "development projects can have detrimental effects on local communities when the donor country imposes decisions without the appropriate assessment of social, cultural and environmental needs." There is also criticisms of AusAID being hijacked or purposely serving Australian commercial interests through its procurement policies which 'promotes particular economic and trade policies' that disregards the poor, lacks transparency, and the misused of aid funding; in particular the extreme cases of overpaid consultants and cronies of public servants in Canberra. As known in the Pacific Islands as 'boomerang aid', AusAid has failed. Reports suggested that some consultants have been paid more than what the Australian Prime Minister earns in a year. Even removing AusAid and merging it with DFAT could still posed problems unless critical issues are adequately addressed. For discussion, I have posted critics that may serve as a guide for DFAT in the future. For example, criticisms have been levelled at AusAID by the right-wing, Centre for Independent Studies which claimed "aid has failed PNG and the Pacific" (Helen Hughes). I am in agreement with this claim as I used to work in the front lines in PNG (AusAid/IMF) and in the Cook Islands (AusAid/NZAid,EU) and saw how aid was delivered, managed, and implemented. To me, it was a waste of time as the way it was designed, delivered and implemented. Aid projects often take off on the wrong foot from the start which are likely to fail (before they ever started). But the fundamental issue in the criticism is not about the administration of aid when it is on the ground but the "broad policy and approaches of AusAID to developing countries" that is the concern. There has been media criticism leveled at AusAID over the selection, equality, effectiveness and transparency of its contracts with consultants and advisors are feedbacks that could be used to redirect its focus in policy shifts, scrutiny of the processes and engage more with the local communities aid was intended and so on. One media article in particular claimed that consultants are being paid more than Australia’s Prime Minister in a year needs to be studied and remedied. AusAid needs to go back to the drawing board and radically review its policies, approaches to development, and the procurement processes. AusAid may need to rely more on community partnership rather than 'fly-in-fly-out' consultants to make aid more effective. Hopefully, over time the stigma of 'boomerang aid' will become a memory of the past and AusAid can bring back its true meaning in development that will bring justice to Australian taxpayers, as well as recipients of developing countries AusAid now serves.

Allow me to leave a few comments from Oxfam: The figures in our report are based on up-to-date figures provided by Lesotho’s Ministry of Health during extensive research in February 2014 in partnership with the Consumers Protection Association of Lesotho. Oxfam conducted interviews with key stakeholders in Lesotho including representatives from the Government, Netcare, Tsepong Ltd, health worker associations, civil society organizations, as well as district level and other health practitioners. The figures we provide are more recent than those used in the Boston study. The new private hospital complex cost the country $67 million in 2013/14, accounting for 51% of its $133 million health budget. Oxfam also stands by its figures on the 25 per cent return on investment. The financial model for the Lesotho PPP issued in March 2009 confirms that the contract was projected to generate a 25.2 per cent rate of return on equity for Netcare and the broader Tsepong shareholders. Contrary to what is said in the article, the Lesotho Ministry of Health has not defended the project as a success. The Minister of Health Dr Pinkie Manamolela has raised a number of concerns about the project since our report was published. A recent article in one of Lesotho's Public Eye newspaper on April, 11, 2014 <a href="http://publiceye.co.ls/?p=5698" rel="nofollow">reported</a>, “The minister held the view that by establishing Tšepong, the government had not been well advised “because now we are even experiencing more congestion and high costs with the new hospital.” In another <a href="http://publiceye.co.ls/?p=5843" rel="nofollow">interview </a>with Public Eye on May 2, 2014, the Minister questioned the advice given by the IFC on this project and is very clear on the fact that the costs of the project have escalated, contrary to what was promised: “as negotiations got under way, around 2007, the costs as agreed between the parties were already at anything up to 10 times the running costs of maintaining the QE-II. And with the contract now in place the costs have only been escalating.” As she also says in this interview, she opposed the project from the beginning: “We all saw it coming as Basotho practitioners, at least those of us who were in the private sector, and we opposed it all the way but were ignored and even snubbed.” And she is not alone: her colleague from South Africa, Minister of Health Dr Motsoaledi <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/healthcare/2014/04/11/motsoaledi-says-netcare-project-will-fail" rel="nofollow">said </a>"When the minister of health in Lesotho came to invite me for (the launch of the project), I told her it’s not going to work". In an interview to the BBC on April 11, 2014, the Prime Minister of Lesotho himself said they were considering reopening the old hospital to correct the big mistake made in this project Oxfam stands by its figures and its recommendation that the World Bank leadership should take action to remedy the grave consequences of the PPP in Lesotho.

Thanks Joanna, excellent article raising very important issues. Few are working on aging issues (just as few are working on psychiatric illnesses) in the Pacific and I'm certainly not aware of anything or anybody raising awareness of the situation of the terminally ill or those caring for the terminally ill. UNFPA raises the ageing question in their population policy support around the Pacific and UN ESCAP have tried to raise the ageing issue and persuade governments to take it seriously, but, as you point out, it tends to get diluted in the wider Asian context. Disability has undergone a significant transformation in the Pacific over the last decade or so starting from a pretty low point and next to no support from the major donors in the early days - it makes for an interesting case study on how to get formerly invisible social issues on to governments' policy agenda. Thanks for this. Alastair Wilkinson

The District Authority concept won't quite work as our open mandated MPs are not necessarily highly educated. Some are village leaders and will genuinely need support and guidelines from the district administration, such as the District Authority (DA) and District Treasurer (DT).Furthermore services will be marginalised to MPs' cronies or voting bases, unfairly distributed. When the District Authority is in place, the DA and DT would be useless, the open MP can simply hire chartered accountants or consultants to run the show and spend district funds at will. Clearly District Authority is heading in a dictatorship fashion, very power-hungry fasion.

Sorry, what I also wanted to say is that I agree that skills transfer is a capacity development 'tool', particularly focusing on individual competencies (which might amalgamate, plus other ingredients, to collective capabilities). But I also think that simply placing people (volunteers, for example) in line positions within organisations can be a capacity development tool, too. If you use the Baser and Morgan definition, it fits. And I think examination of individuals in line positions, and the broader impact they may have, would be useful. Perhaps they actually achieve more capacity development than those tasked with skills transfer. Worth a thought. But ultimately, personally, I think capacity development contributions made by external actors come down to the skill, experience and attitude of the individual (in a variety of areas), their understanding of the context, and the relationships they build and maintain.

Hey there Stephen. Sometimes it seems like there are so many definitions of capacity development it ends up having no meaning. My favourite is: "that emergent combination of individual competencies, collective capabilities, assets and relationships that enables a human system to create value" (Baser and Morgan et. al, Capacity Change and Performance: Study Report, Discussion Paper No. 59B, April 2008, European Centre for Development Policy Management, p. 3). Recommended further reading are new (relatively) publications by two Australian practitioners, Ernest Antoine and Deborah Rhodes. They both wrote the useful 'A Practitioners Handbook for Capacity Development: A Cross-Cultural Approach'. And Deborah wrote 'Capacity Across Cultures. Global Lessons from Pacific Experiences.' Both make a fabulous contribution to the literature and it is wonderful to have Pacific experiences documented in them.

Dear Mr Motor Booty, Thanks for your response to my blog. I apologize for the lateness of my reply...I didn't know you had responded until now. Now, to your very well-made points. I agree that governance and anti-corruption support by foreign donors is inherently vexed, because the nub of the issue lies so deeply behind and underneath the formal apparatus of state. The Huntington view, typically realpolitik, is that corruption is a necessary aspect of state functionality, especially in its early stages. Seen in this way, corruption prevents all-out war between elites by giving them enough of available public resources to keep them at bay. But many others (such as Acemoglu et al) argue that social tolerance of predatory political behaviour quickly becomes institutionalized and thus commits societies to being impoverished for a long, long time. I don't have a precise answer to the question 'when should good governance advocates do deals with corrupt elites, and when should they walk away?' But these decisions are best left to actors embedded permanently within societies - sober and moderate, and unlike expatriate officials and advisers, they and their children live with the results of their policy prescriptions. A wise old man I worked with over many years, in respect of these issues, would advise me, "When you sup with the devil, make sure you use a long spoon." As to your question, 'will Australian aid take a more nuanced, and less state-centric approach to governance in coming years?' I hope so. Time will tell. The same pressures that undermine quality governance programming will always be there - the need to hire/lease the ongoing loyalty of local elites; spend the budget; avoid complexity; with a regular turnover of donor staff, some of whom may have little interest and/or experience in the area. In the end it seems that the well-spring of positive governance change is always local political action, and not external TA targeting public officials. Understanding and respecting that may be a step in the right direction. Thanks again for your excellent comments.

Agreed. Which highlights the need for appropriate regulation in this sector. The Vanuatu experience has illustrated that left to 'the market' Digicel would have exercised economic and political clout to get rid of the incumbent (TVL) leaving it with a monopoly.

Lately...the Porgera Gold Operator, Barrick Niugini Limited, is taking back and away land owner contracts operated by iPi Group and Porgram Camp Services Limited. It is making these land owner contracts in house. How can Land Owners participate meaningfully and economically when Developers such as Barrick do this? Can somebody enlighen us, the land owners of Porgera??