Comments

Hi Tony, This looks like a great project... it reminds me of a discussion we had about the relative dearth of ‘institutional memory’ in the Pacific a couple of months back… Nik Soni wrote that: "In aid we never allow spanner monkeys (who are usually grumpy old men and women soured from years in the field) any input." I wrote "While there may be some ‘soured and grumpy older men and women from the field’ their valuable experience in addressing development challenges is often hard to tap into." So here's to a conference of grumpy spanner monkeys from the Pacific! I for one would be keen to read/see what they have to say. ;o)

Thanks for your comments Jack. You are right about the ‘Big man’ politics in the Highlands. I was blown away by the amount of money poured in the campaigns.

Joel, I don't have an exact definition of Asia in mean, but I am particularly focused on Indonesia. I thought someone had to say something after the various calls to cut aid to Indonesia, not only from Hugh White, and the frequent, and almost flippant, dismisal of its value from several in the strategic community. As to what aid should be spent on, Ashlee's point, that is a much more difficult subject. In a way it is a strength of aid that there are so many good things it could be spent on, but it can also be a weakness as agencies end up doing "a little of a lot." Unfortunately, it seems very difficult to say in general that aid should be spent on x rather than y. Thanks to both for your comments. The second installment should appear on Monday I hope!

Hi Stephen, Very interesting and clear. Looking forward to reading posts 2 and 3. Will be interesting to read what types of aid are most appropriate for Asia. Can we also get a definitional clarification on what you and Hugh mean by "Asia." Given the size and population of the continent, might be worth clarifying how you are defining Asia for the purposes of this debate. If we are focusing on SE Asia (and you mention Indonesia directly) then that is different from focusing on Pakistan or Syria or Bangladesh for that matter. And Ashlee - like your point about assistance on social welfare structures or tax collection - rather than the traditional input focus on bednets or schoolbooks.

A good account of the PNG type of politics especially in the highlands of PNG.This to a lesser extent happens in the coastal areas of the country. In trying to understand PNG (highlands) politics, one has to have a better understanding of the culture of the people. PNG society is predominantly a communal society where everybody takes part and share the wealth (pigs, taro etc...). So the national election campaign is liken to the hosting of a village feast where the 'big man' shares his wealth amongst his people.

Interesting post Stephen. I think your example of Australian aid assisting Indonesia to increase its tax revenue is a good one — there's plenty of scope for aid to Indonesia to try to address some of the growing inequality that is emerging in the country as its economy (and middle class) continues to expand. For example, assisting in the development of social welfare structures or healthcare safety nets for the poor, financed by the tax system and the country's growing tax base, could have a big impact on the most marginalised. I think these kinds of innovations are often overlooked in debates on aid, with the focus instead falling on more direct forms of assistance (schools, medical, disaster relief, etc). The technical assistance provided to governments by Australian aid can significantly improve the lives of people living in poverty when it is delivered effectively. Aid is also about transferring knowledge and expertise, not just cash.

John, I haven't had a chance to read through the full report in detail as I intend to but before this post moves off the radar I wanted to pose a question to you. In scanning through your summary of other's views of failed states it seems to me that the role of the community in contributing to strengthening failing states or rebuilding failed states is ignored. If we are to see the strength of the state as being dependent upon a functional social contract between the governed and those that govern then surely our contribution should equally be focused upon building the capacity of the governed to, for example, hold those in government to account, to develop lobbying capacity etc. This is more than a glib call for civil society which usually gets included in every report and some chump change allocated to NGOs, its a question as to fundamentally what are we doing in stabilization efforts? Do we build a state as an end in of itself regardless of its functionality or is the state apparatus only as good as the community understands how to utilize it for its purposes? As I noted in an earlier post on this blog there are too few community strengthening projects around, the CAP in Iraq and NSP in Afghanistan being the only two worth mentioning. That their approaches don't appear as headers in any of the strategies of the groups you summarized is I would suggest a reason for our continuing failures in preventing state failure or in state building efforts. Again, apologies if this is covered in detail in your report as I haven't had the chance to go through it all.

John, This was actually brought up in the most recent <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/estimate/c5fb527c-51a7-4d94-b363-7b29d918bc9f/toc_pdf/Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence%20and%20Trade%20Legislation%20Committee_2012_05_31_1071.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/estimate/c5fb527c-51a7-4d94-b363-7b29d918bc9f/0000%22" rel="nofollow">Senate Estimates</a> (see page 51). According to DG Peter Baxter the decision to cancel the contract was actually conducted in agreement with the Dutch and was based primarily on consistent lack of performance (for example, over a two year period they expected 17 reports from TLO and only received 6). The primary justification for not looking for another contractor is because AusAID has significantly increased its presence and Oruzgan since 2010 and was confident they could get the information they needed to conduct programming decisions from their own people on the ground. All of this, in my eyes, seems quite reasonable. I would still be interested in hearing TLO's perspective on the whole matter. If I come across anything I will be sure to share. Jonathan

In the context of the Eyers report, it is interesting to read of AusAID cancelling its contract with an Afghan-based non-governmental organisation (The Liaison Office - TLO) after a critical report on progress in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province. AusAID asked TLO to prepare the report to evaluate Australia's efforts as lead nation in the province up to the end of 2011. I understand that TLO conducted about 180 interviews with local residents for the report, with a similar number of interviews from four quarterly provincial updates also incorporated. The resulting primary data was analysed by the TLO Research Team, comprised of both national and international staff, who conducted further desk research and triangulation interviews with 50 key Uruzgan actors and 29 development organizations. The report also includes local perspectives derived from a December 2011 survey conducted at a provincial stability meeting (jirga) with 523 Uruzgani respondents from all districts. The TLO Report appears to be comprehensive and is available on the TLO Website. I note that the report was financed by the Royal Netherlands’s Embassy in Afghanistan and the AusAID. I wonder if the report has been accepted by the Dutch? Mr. E. John Blunt is an Institutional and Public Procurement Expert with extensive experience in leading public procurement reforms in a variety of international development environments. He is currently on assignment with the Southern African Development Community in Botswana.

The independent reviews of Sachs' efforts on the Millennium Villages project are less than stellar and are hardly an endorsement for similar projects. My view is too many goals, not enough focus on basic issues that underlie development

This may sound counter-intuitive in an environment that quite rightly does focus on outcomes, but when it comes to wages for aid workers I feel some attention needs to be given to the contract negotiations. It has already been well argued that in order to attract good quality foreign workers high salaries need to be paid. Going abroad can be an exciting, interesting and attractive offer for a couple of years (how many people save up to go on gap years?), but as a long term career it has some serious downsides listed already by Andrew. What niggles me is when people (who do not work in development) make the first argument Terence pointed to: we do not give our money for you to go and live a cushy life. I can understand the desire for tax payers to get their money's worth, but I always react with: I'm sorry, do you want this job done? If so, are you prepared to do it yourself? And if not, are you prepared to pay someone a fair wage to do it? Aid workers are undertaking a service on behalf of their home nation in much the same way teachers, doctors, policemen, politicians do. We purchase goods from companies who pay their managers, accountants, financial analysts, salesmen and lawyers far more. I object to the expectation made by everyone else that I should gain job satisfaction because I work in development and therefore can be expected to take a financial hit, live in a mudhut and contract scurvy. Why should that be me, just because I am the one actually trying to do the work? From my (limited) experience development work can at times be far less satisfying than other jobs because you are conscious of how painfully slow progress is, how inefficient the system in which you are confined within is, and how unnecessary bureaucratic wranglings and limited political will to effect change is costing people their lives. There is also something a little perverse, although I cannot quite articulate an argument around it, about going to live in the exact conditions you are trying to help people escape. I currently work in a government department where my salary is supplemented about 3 fold by a charity back home. I would not go as far as to say I am 4 times as efficient / competent as my counterparts. But I would say I am more efficient and competent. I have been to one of the best universities in the West, they are the product of of local universities. This may sound incredibly arrogant, but if the local educational outcomes were as good as my home country (a) there would be no point in having me here and (b) the country would probably be doing a hell of a lot better. It is also worth pointing to the fact that much of the money circulates back into the economy. I live in a country that is trying to promote tourism because they recognise having rich foreigners come in and spend money in shops, restaurants, hotels etc. benefits the economy at large. Of course the primary benefactor of my salary is me, and conceivably by pushing up demand for goods I might be raising the price level, but there is a multiplier effect at work and my maid, the security guards at my compound, the wait staff at the restaurants I eat at, the guys that fill my car at the petrol station do also all benefit. So, although I remain sensitive to and aware of it, I am fairly comfortable with the gap between me and my local counterparts. I do not feel that riding a bike to work or switching to a poorer diet would help me perform my job better, but it may make me reconsider whether I want to go back to the City. I truly applaud the PCVs who can hack the local life, but it is not for me. I already have to live without (super) high speed internet, Thai restaurants, satellite sports channels and theatre. Please don't tell me I am being unreasonable by employing a maid two days a week.

Acemoglu & Robinson’s (2012) book, Why Nations Fail, is indeed compulsive reading. Its strength is in a unifying thesis about institutional failure, tested across a very wide set of disparate cases, historical and current. Among its examples it includes the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (with its 'Black Act' aftermath drawing on the work of Marxian historian E.P. Thompson in his book Whigs and Hunters) and the convict–based British settlement of New South Wales, Australia. Diamond's lengthy critical review of the book, entitled ‘What Makes Countries Rich or Poor, should also be read. It will be evident that Diamond’s 'geographical' (reductionist?) approach as in his Guns, Germs and Steel is specifically and seriously targeted in A&R’s book. So Diamond has a lot at stake in this debate. One anomaly here (surprisingly, not picked by Diamond in his own review) is that despite A&R's commendably cross-disciplinary scope, their critical focus in regard to Diamond’s work is exclusively on Guns, Germs and Steel, but there is no mention of the equally important evidence and argument in Diamond’s later book Collapse (2005) and see also references cited for other works in a similar vein. Indeed, words such as 'environment' or ‘ecology’, let alone environmental 'collapse', do not feature in A&R's index. There is an important reference to 'climate change' but this does not encompass human-induced climate change, much less the notion of humanity as a 'geological' force acting on nature more generally, such as to justify the term ‘anthropocene’ to describe the geological era that some see as having emerged over the last few centuries. This is an amazing 'silence' on the part of A&R given the evidence (from Diamond and elsewhere) of past civilisations collapsing due to human-induced environmental effects. This is especially so given their apparent aspirations for the book, titled as it indeed is, Why Nations Fail ─ rather than why they may, even if temporarily, succeed. The further puzzle follows from the sub-title to Diamond’s Collapse, namely: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive. While the case studies in Collapse convincingly substantiate the role of human-caused environmental degradation as a force destructive of those very societies and civilisations (and neglected by A&R) the weaker aspect of Diamond’s book is in his failure adequately to theorise his own ‘public choice’ question at the institutional level. Analysis of the ‘public choice’ question at the institutional level is the very strength that A&R claim for their own work. Clearly, there is ample scope for this debate to continue productively, recognising the need for close reconsideration on both (or all) sides.